[00:00:01] Speaker 03:
Good morning and welcome to the Ninth Circuit.

[00:00:03] Speaker 03:
I'm Judge Nelson and it's a pleasure to be joined by my colleagues Judge Fletcher and Judge Wallach who is visiting from the Federal Circuit and we're always grateful to our visiting judge colleagues who help us manage a pretty heavy caseload on the Ninth Circuit.

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We also want to welcome counsel this morning, and we're grateful to our court staff who keep the trains running on time.

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We ask that during arguments, please just pay attention to your time.

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Wrap up as your time's concluding.

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Let us know if you want to reserve some time and then watch the clock.

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But we're ready to proceed to our calendar this morning.

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We have two cases set for argument.

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The first one

[00:00:44] Speaker 03:
is Cervantes Maggia versus Bondi case number 23-1735.

[00:00:51] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:00:58] Speaker 02:
Good morning.

[00:01:00] Speaker 02:
Christopher Stender on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Cervantes.

[00:01:04] Speaker 02:
I'd like to reserve two minutes of my time for rebuttal.

[00:01:08] Speaker 02:
I think the primary issue before the court is what to do with the age of the oldest child, Yesenia, who was under 21 years of age and met the definition of child under the Immigration Nationality Act, but turned 21 years old after the case was pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals.

[00:01:25] Speaker 02:
I think that's what the court should

[00:01:28] Speaker 02:
focus its attention on, and I think that's kind of the seminal issue in the case before it.

[00:01:32] Speaker 02:
I think looking at the case law, at the regulations, and at just simple reason, I think it compels the court to fix or lock in the qualifying relative's age at the definition of a child under 21 at the time the application is considered by the immigration.

[00:01:51] Speaker 03:
So your point is we don't have precedent that analyzes this particular issue yet.

[00:01:56] Speaker 02:
Well, it's very interesting.

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I would agree there's no precedent on that.

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And I think that's why the court, I assume, has set this oral argument.

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The BIA has made several statements regarding good moral character or continuing physical presence kind of being locked in at different points.

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The Ninth Circuit in Garcia

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Generally, you agreed that the policy right now is, I thought the policy was pretty well established, that you had to qualify up until the BIA heard your case.

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The continuing application argument.

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Yeah, it's very interesting on that note because the Board of Immigration Appeals cannot be a primary finder of fact.

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They can't reconsider what was established in front of the immigration judge, who's the trial court judge in this case.

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But they can look at the calendar.

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I'm sorry?

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But they can look at the calendar.

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Yes, of course they can.

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But what you have in a hardship calculation is a weighing of the hardship based on the facts that were established for the immigration judge.

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So the regulations are very clear that the Board of Immigration Appeals cannot, that their function is to review an established record, that the BIA has authority to review hardship as when presented by or before

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the immigration judge.

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And what's happening in this type of case where there's a change in the qualifying relatives, in this case where four children and a wife were qualifying relatives, somehow the BIA then is forced to reevaluate what the hardship was considered by the immigration judge.

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And it's very difficult to say what the BIA does in that sort of circumstance.

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Does it cut out a fifth of the hardship?

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Does it cut out a quarter of the hardship?

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How does it get to that

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point where it says, yes, here's the record, but we're going to go back and look at it.

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And since that person no longer qualifies, we're going to carve out this portion, reweigh it, which is outside their remit under the regulations in the case law.

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What's the alternative?

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I mean, at the alternative, she's 21.

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She's aged out.

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The BIA is hearing it.

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There wouldn't be a reweighing if she's 21.

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So if you send it back, the IJ

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at that point wouldn't even be able to reweigh her as a hardship, right?

[00:04:18] Speaker 03:
So I guess I'm sort of confused at what the ultimate import of your argument is.

[00:04:24] Speaker 02:
Well, I think you're bringing up something very important because the problem in this type of case is if we reverse the facts and the judge had granted 42B, it gives the incentive for the government to appeal it, knowing that that qualifying relative is going to age out.

[00:04:40] Speaker 02:
There is a bit of a conundrum here because obviously children continue to age throughout the process.

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These cases drag on for years.

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Sometimes it's to the benefit of the non-citizen obviously.

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There are cases and the BIA makes that point.

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But yet there's also this perverse incentive that if the government drags it out,

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I'm not saying they did in this case, but there are certainly cases where that could be an incentive for the government, and that changes the whole calculus of the case.

[00:05:06] Speaker 00:
So your basic position is we'll leave our current precedent in place, which says that if there's been aging out before it gets to the IJ's decision, okay, well, the person's aged out.

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But what you want is, I think would be sufficient for you to win this case on this point, would be the record with respect to age is fixed at the time of the IJ's decision.

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And that's the end of it for that purpose.

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That's all you need for your case.

[00:05:36] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:05:37] Speaker 00:
So we don't need to revisit the factual decision of our Mejia case.

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We just need to limit it to the facts of that case.

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That's the argument.

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That's 100% the argument.

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And I think the case law does provide that.

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I think the regulations are set up for that purpose also.

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Again, that the BIA is an appellate body.

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They can't reestablish or reweigh the record.

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And I think, again, as I've argued logic, it's just

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The immigration judge is the finder of fact.

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The record is established for the immigration judge.

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That's what all the case law suggests.

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And I think that's what the court should be compelled to find in this case.

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It feels a little artificial, though, to freeze a fact.

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I understand you with factual findings.

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But this is a qualification issue.

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And in other contexts, I think that's the policy.

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And that's what I want to hear from the government on.

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I thought that there was a government policy that said you have to qualify all the way up until and so if it were factual finding I think your position would be more well taken but your age isn't it's not arbitrary we know what somebody's age is in the same way that I suppose if you know if there were a citizenship requirement and they had you know established that they'd moved somewhere else I suppose that would change the facts.

[00:07:04] Speaker 02:
The point is not that simple.

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It is a qualification argument.

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But yet the immigration judge has calculated that hardship to that qualifying relative at the time before the immigration judge, under 21, a qualifying relative.

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And it changes while it's on appeal in front of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

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It really puts the Board of Immigration Appeals in a completely untenable position.

[00:07:26] Speaker 02:
How does it make a hardship finding by subtracting that qualifying relative that the immigration judge considered and weighed?

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This case, it didn't revolve completely around that because it was denied and we made other due process arguments.

[00:07:40] Speaker 03:
That seems like that's a different argument because you're right.

[00:07:43] Speaker 03:
I suppose if the total package changed and it would have some impact, then you might have to actually remand it, but that's not an issue here.

[00:07:53] Speaker 00:
Well, with all due respect, I think it is an issue because Judge,

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The package did change.

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I mean, as the IJ looked at it, she was under 21.

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And the IJ concluded, well, even with respect to hardship for her, including that, your client did not prevail.

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That's true.

[00:08:13] Speaker 00:
So if we were to agree with you, why is the IJ wrong?

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That is to say, considering the hardship to Asenia.

[00:08:22] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:08:23] Speaker 02:
We made arguments that the IJ did not consider the hardship because he made incorrect factual findings, for example.

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She was on certain medications for her mental health.

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He said, well, she's off them now.

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But it was specifically because she was pregnant and couldn't take them at the time.

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And there was evidence in the record, I believe, that she said she wanted to go back on them.

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Yeah.

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And there was a previous suicide attempt.

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Yes.

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I mean, so she's a troubled person.

[00:08:47] Speaker 02:
She is correct.

[00:08:49] Speaker 02:
Correct, and that, yes, so factually this case is interesting because the IJA denied it, but yet I think what's clear about this case, and I think it was before the court, is because this creates an issue where a qualifying relative falls out, then the BIA has to reevaluate that hardship again, and I think the case law and the regulations don't support the Board of Immigration Appeals in doing that.

[00:09:14] Speaker 02:
Thank you, and I think I'll reserve the rest of my time unless there's a question.

[00:09:17] Speaker 02:
Yeah, thank you.

[00:09:30] Speaker 01:
Good morning, your honor.

[00:09:32] Speaker 01:
Jonathan Needle, Department of Justice, on behalf of the respondents.

[00:09:37] Speaker 01:
May it please the court?

[00:09:41] Speaker 01:
We submit that the petitioner misconstrues the board decisions, as well as this court's decision, amend as Garcia, in asserting that the statutory requirements need only be met by the time the IJ adjudicates.

[00:09:55] Speaker 01:
decancellation application.

[00:09:57] Speaker 03:
Can I ask about that?

[00:09:58] Speaker 03:
I mean, could we just rely on Mendez-Garcia and say that's the end of this?

[00:10:03] Speaker 03:
I do feel like there's, it doesn't answer this exact question, right?

[00:10:08] Speaker 03:
I mean, the import of it may lead you to the same conclusion, but I don't know that we could just say petitioner loses C. Mendosa or Mendez-Garcia.

[00:10:21] Speaker 03:
Right.

[00:10:22] Speaker 04:
The question is, is there anything to write?

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And if so, what?

[00:10:27] Speaker 01:
I'm sorry, Your Honor.

[00:10:28] Speaker 04:
Is there anything to write here?

[00:10:30] Speaker 04:
And if so, what does the government think it should be?

[00:10:34] Speaker 01:
Well, Mendez-Garcia does establish a, it is based on a distinct factual scenario where the immigration judge, where the qualifying relative aged out before the adjudication by the immigration judge.

[00:10:49] Speaker 01:
So there's nothing in that decision that

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bars the agency from doing what it did in this case, where the age out occurred on appeal to the board.

[00:10:59] Speaker 00:
But neither is there anything in that decision that absolutely supports what the BIA did.

[00:11:05] Speaker 01:
Well, that's correct, but it does discuss the relevant agency precedent in terms of matter of Besidro, matter of Batista Gomez.

[00:11:17] Speaker 03:
Maybe you can help us out why that precedent

[00:11:21] Speaker 03:
dictates the result the government seeking here?

[00:11:25] Speaker 01:
Well those decisions clearly established that an application for cancellation is a continuing one and that it continues until there's a final administrative decision.

[00:11:34] Speaker 00:
So what do you do with the argument?

[00:11:36] Speaker 00:
I think a genuine practical argument with, you know, there are a lot of delays and over the time I've been a judge, which is quite a long time, there have been periods in which the

[00:11:47] Speaker 00:
The time between the decision by the IJ and the decision by the BIA had been years, like three years, four years.

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When I first started, they were five years.

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I mean, that's a really awkward business if you've got, say, a 17-year-old kid with enormous problems at the time of the IJ.

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Let's say the IJ does grant relief based upon the hardship to that 17-year-old kid.

[00:12:13] Speaker 00:
The BA doesn't get to it for another four years.

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By the time we get there, the kid is aged out.

[00:12:19] Speaker 00:
And you're saying that the government wins?

[00:12:23] Speaker 01:
In that situation, that's what the agency's interpretation of its statutory authority requires.

[00:12:29] Speaker 00:
And you're willing to stand behind that answer?

[00:12:31] Speaker 00:
I mean, is that the right answer?

[00:12:33] Speaker 00:
Is that the answer we should come to?

[00:12:34] Speaker 00:
Because the BA is so backed up, it can't get to the appeal from the IJ's decision for four to five years?

[00:12:40] Speaker 01:
Well, there's no doubt that there are delays in adjudications before the IJ and before the board, but there are... Yeah, and I'm only talking now about delays between the IJ and the BIA.

[00:12:51] Speaker 01:
Sure, but there are also mechanisms by which a litigant can seek expedited resolution.

[00:12:57] Speaker 00:
Yeah, good luck with that.

[00:13:00] Speaker 01:
Well, that was not attempted in this case, either before the IJ

[00:13:05] Speaker 01:
Or the board, even though it was apparent, or it should have been apparent to the petitioner at the outset of the case that there was a potential age out issue.

[00:13:18] Speaker 01:
The age out could have occurred before the IJ's adjudication.

[00:13:22] Speaker 01:
It could have occurred while on appeal to the board.

[00:13:25] Speaker 00:
Yeah.

[00:13:25] Speaker 00:
Are there any Court of Appeal decisions that address this precise question?

[00:13:29] Speaker 00:
I mean, ours obviously is aging out before you get to the IJ decision.

[00:13:34] Speaker 00:
Are there any that present this question?

[00:13:37] Speaker 01:
There are.

[00:13:37] Speaker 01:
I believe one of them is referenced in our answering brief, the Balthazar Felipe case from the 11th Circuit.

[00:13:46] Speaker 01:
which where similarly the qualifying relative aged out while the case was on appeal to the board and interestingly Baltazar Felipe also discussed the fact finding and rejected the fact finding argument that the petitioner is making where it found that it wasn't improper for the board to take notice of the fact that the petitioners qualifying relative had aged out on appeal even though there was no

[00:14:15] Speaker 01:
factual record, um, uh, specifically related to that point, um, before the IJ, um, it found that the court can simply that the date of birth, the age of the qualifying relative is clearly established by the record and the court can simply take notice of the date of its decision.

[00:14:34] Speaker 03:
And what year I was looking at, what year was that case decided?

[00:14:38] Speaker 03:
Um, I believe it's 2023.

[00:14:39] Speaker 01:
Oh, so that's recent.

[00:14:42] Speaker 03:
Did it rely on the board's, um,

[00:14:45] Speaker 03:
regulations or decisions?

[00:14:48] Speaker 01:
It actually interpreted the, this was sort of a statutory holding where the court interpreted 1229B.

[00:14:56] Speaker 03:
Well that's what I was wondering because I mean the other interesting thing and query whether we even need to get into it here but Mendez-Garcia sort of relies on some of the boards

[00:15:11] Speaker 03:
prior precedent, the Supreme Court has now come down with Lope or Bright that says, you know, we don't give as much deference to agencies.

[00:15:19] Speaker 03:
So are we, you know, if we were to extend Mendez-Garcia, and I think we need to think through that, would we do it based on the board's decisions or would we need to do the statutory analysis?

[00:15:33] Speaker 03:
And it sounds like what you're saying is the 11th Circuit went and did the statutory analysis.

[00:15:37] Speaker 01:
That's correct, but there's no argument from the petitioner that what the board did was outside its statutory authority.

[00:15:43] Speaker 01:
There was no attempt to... No, it's not.

[00:15:46] Speaker 03:
I think those are slightly different questions.

[00:15:49] Speaker 03:
It's not whether it's outside their statutory authority, but whether... I mean, in the olden days, I guess we would just kind of defer to the board's

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uh, decisions.

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And now we sort of have a different command from the Supreme Court, which is no, they're not do that deference.

[00:16:05] Speaker 03:
We need to just look to the statutory interpretation.

[00:16:08] Speaker 03:
But I take it your argument is it's the same, even if there's ambiguity in the statute and the board had the authority to take this position, the best interpretation is consistent with the government's position here.

[00:16:23] Speaker 01:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:16:24] Speaker 01:
The Loper-Bright does not automatically overrule every case.

[00:16:30] Speaker 03:
No, I totally understood.

[00:16:31] Speaker 03:
That's not my point.

[00:16:32] Speaker 03:
My point, though, is I think I'm coming to the conclusion that we can't just cite Mendez-Garcia and be done with this case.

[00:16:42] Speaker 03:
And if that's the case, then it's not about overruling Mendez-Garcia, but whether we extend it.

[00:16:47] Speaker 03:
And if we're going to extend it, on what basis do we do that?

[00:16:50] Speaker 01:
Well, the extension would be based on the board's own precedent.

[00:16:54] Speaker 00:
And you dropped a footnote in your brief saying that Lopez-Bright leaves this one alone.

[00:17:01] Speaker 00:
That is to say, does not interfere with previous adjudications by the agency.

[00:17:07] Speaker 00:
And I think that's right.

[00:17:09] Speaker 01:
That's correct.

[00:17:09] Speaker 01:
So Menace-Garcia remains precedential.

[00:17:13] Speaker 00:
I think that's Loper-Bright, as you appropriately cited in your footnote.

[00:17:18] Speaker ?:
Sure.

[00:17:19] Speaker 01:
But this is a case where the court's own reference to the board's decisions and matter of a seed row, matter of Batista Gomez established that the application continues until there's a final administrative order.

[00:17:41] Speaker 01:
Those are the clear holdings that the agency has made with respect to this issue.

[00:17:49] Speaker 01:
And there is simply no basis in precedent or in any other provision that the petitioner cites that the record is firmly closed at the time of the adjudication.

[00:18:02] Speaker 00:
You know, it continues to bother me, however, that this is such a moving target that if there is delay in the process, all of a sudden hardship that existed disappears if the BIA is slow.

[00:18:16] Speaker 00:
I understand you've got cases you're talking about, but I'm now asking, sort of backing up from that, is there a good reason for this?

[00:18:28] Speaker 01:
I should say policy reason.

[00:18:34] Speaker 00:
I'm now kind of moving away from case law.

[00:18:37] Speaker 00:
What are we talking about in terms of practical application of this?

[00:18:44] Speaker 01:
Well, I think that Congress has to draw the line somewhere.

[00:18:48] Speaker 00:
Well, I'm not sure Congress has.

[00:18:49] Speaker 00:
I think maybe the BIA has.

[00:18:51] Speaker 01:
Well, as far as the definition of a child, that's what the statute refers to.

[00:18:56] Speaker 00:
Well, I understand the definition of the child, but the question is when?

[00:19:00] Speaker 04:
Could the government move for a reconsideration of an established case after a child turns 21?

[00:19:05] Speaker 01:
Well, I think in that scenario, there would have to be a grant of cancellation that the government appeals.

[00:19:14] Speaker 01:
I think what the petitioner was arguing is that the government might engage in a bad faith decision to appeal in order for there to be... Following on that question, how does this work in practice?

[00:19:27] Speaker 03:
So if, let's say the IJ had reached a different conclusion and had canceled removal.

[00:19:32] Speaker 03:
I mean, I guess you could have appealed it, but let's say the BIA says, okay, it's canceled the removal, that the child is 19 at the time of cancellation or removal.

[00:19:43] Speaker 03:
Two years later, three years later, can you come back in and say, we need to remove you again?

[00:19:49] Speaker 03:
Or is that cancellation of removal good forever?

[00:19:53] Speaker 03:
Is this a temporary cancellation or is this an unqualified cancellation once they get it for hardship of a minor child?

[00:20:02] Speaker 01:
I think once there's a final administrative decision, then there are certain procedural hurdles that need to be cleared in order for the agency to reopen the case.

[00:20:13] Speaker 00:
you know, the regulations do give the Department of Homeland Security the opportunity to file a motion to reopen in cases where there's already a final administrative order, but there are certain... But building on Judge Nelson's question, let's say, not this case, but let's say we have a case where the IAJ does grant withholding based upon hardship to a child who at the time of the IAJ's decision is 19 or 20, and the government

[00:20:40] Speaker 00:
files an appeal, kind of hoping, well, by the time it gets to the BIA, the hardship that the judge relied on is no longer there.

[00:20:48] Speaker 00:
I mean, it just doesn't seem fair to me.

[00:20:52] Speaker 01:
Right, but it can go both ways.

[00:20:55] Speaker 01:
The fact that it's a continuing application, there could be facts that arise after the IJ's adjudication that work to the litigants' favor.

[00:21:03] Speaker 00:
Do you have cases where, in fact, we get new hardship determination based on new evidence that comes in after the IJ's decision?

[00:21:11] Speaker 00:
I don't think there are.

[00:21:12] Speaker 01:
Do you mean if there is new evidence supporting hardship?

[00:21:16] Speaker 00:
Yes, exactly.

[00:21:18] Speaker 01:
I believe there is one case, I can't think of the name right now, but HARTAP, which is a Ninth Circuit case, 603 Federal Third 1173, where additional evidence of hardship arose after the IJ's adjudication and it was found that the board had the authority to entertain a motion

[00:21:39] Speaker 01:
to remand based on that additional… To remand, but not to itself decide?

[00:21:44] Speaker 01:
Correct, because it would require additional fact-finding, whereas in this case the age-out is… Well, it's fact-finding.

[00:21:51] Speaker 00:
It may be that the facts are not disputed, but they're relying on facts that are different from the facts that were in front of the IJ, so it's fact-finding in that sense.

[00:22:01] Speaker 01:
I think we would respectfully disagree that it's fact-finding because there is... Well, it's a fact and they find it, but why is it not fact-finding?

[00:22:10] Speaker 00:
It's not disputed, I understand that.

[00:22:14] Speaker 01:
Well, looking at page 60 of the administrative record, which is page 6 of the IJ's oral decision, the IJ says that Yesenia will turn 21 on February 13, 2021.

[00:22:26] Speaker 01:
So that is a factual finding and the board issued its decision after February 13th, 2021.

[00:22:34] Speaker 00:
Finding that she's now 21, right?

[00:22:37] Speaker 01:
Correct, but the alternative is not disputed.

[00:22:41] Speaker 01:
Correct, but it seems the alternative would be remanding to the IJ.

[00:22:46] Speaker 01:
for the purpose of finding whether she's over 21.

[00:22:48] Speaker 00:
No, I get that.

[00:22:50] Speaker 00:
Somehow this one just sticks in my craw that the IJ decides it based upon a set of facts, and the BIA decides it based on a different set of facts.

[00:23:01] Speaker 00:
And the government is, in some respects, in control of this in terms of the timing.

[00:23:06] Speaker 00:
I mean, by here, the government, in the sense of the BIA's calendar, it just strikes me as that's not the way the system ought to work.

[00:23:13] Speaker 03:
Understood, Your Honor.

[00:23:15] Speaker 03:
Okay, we've taken you over.

[00:23:16] Speaker 03:
I think we have your argument.

[00:23:18] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:23:19] Speaker 03:
We'll give you time for rebuttal.

[00:23:20] Speaker 03:
No.

[00:23:23] Speaker 03:
Yeah, yeah, you got time for rebuttal.

[00:23:25] Speaker 02:
I'm sorry, I thought there was something else.

[00:23:27] Speaker 02:
Sorry.

[00:23:29] Speaker 02:
Well, just briefly regarding deference, I think the court touched upon under Loper-Brite, there's obviously no Chevron deference.

[00:23:34] Speaker 02:
At most, I think you'd look at Skidmore deference, which would be the power to persuade.

[00:23:39] Speaker 03:
If you look at the public... Right, but how would you respond to... Oh, maybe you were going to go there, the 11th Circuit case.

[00:23:45] Speaker 02:
Yeah, I will apologize.

[00:23:47] Speaker 02:
What I saw cited in the government's brief, I'm not sure it's a published decision.

[00:23:51] Speaker 02:
It might be unpublished.

[00:23:52] Speaker 02:
I didn't.

[00:23:52] Speaker 02:
It's published.

[00:23:54] Speaker 02:
I didn't double check the citation.

[00:23:55] Speaker 02:
It was not published.

[00:23:57] Speaker 02:
It looks like it's just a Westlaw site.

[00:24:01] Speaker 02:
So I'm not sure that it's precedent 11 circuit.

[00:24:04] Speaker 02:
But if you look at the BIA decisions regarding the quote continuing application argument,

[00:24:08] Speaker 02:
They only in matter of Garcia, it's regarding continuous physical presence element because there's actually four elements to cancellation removal and good moral character which is matter of Ortega Cabrera.

[00:24:20] Speaker 02:
Every BIA case and every Ninth Circuit case focuses on the hardship being found at the time it's adjudicated before the immigration judge.

[00:24:29] Speaker 02:
Everybody points to that and then the BIA somehow just kind of always says, well, they're under 21 and we're going to take it out.

[00:24:36] Speaker 03:
There is not a published decision that I'm aware of that says that this is correct what they're doing.

[00:25:05] Speaker 03:
That just seems different than age in some way.

[00:25:07] Speaker 04:
It's the whole concept of judicial notice.

[00:25:13] Speaker 02:
I understand the court is wrestling with it.

[00:25:17] Speaker 02:
It's the litigants wrestle with it.

[00:25:19] Speaker 02:
I think the government to some degree wrestles with it too.

[00:25:21] Speaker 02:
It's not correct I think what's going on and where to draw the line obviously from the petitioner's point of view is to lock in the record while it's factually being made.

[00:25:30] Speaker 02:
in front of the immigration judge.

[00:25:32] Speaker 02:
Because anything other than that creates all these ancillary issues which are unanswered.

[00:25:37] Speaker 02:
How the BIA can just parachute in and reconsider the hardship and overrule a case.

[00:25:43] Speaker 02:
And I don't mean to say the government in bad faith would, but practically speaking, age is beyond everybody's control and it just happens.

[00:25:49] Speaker 02:
But the argument then arises and the case is dismissed on that basis.

[00:25:53] Speaker 02:
That certainly can't be what should be happening in these types of cases.

[00:25:58] Speaker 02:
the courts brought up a lot of these issues that we've argued and I think, and we'd ask that the court make a finding that that age can be locked in during this process but not on appeal.

[00:26:09] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:26:09] Speaker 03:
I think we got your argument.

[00:26:10] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:26:11] Speaker 03:
Thank you to both counsel in a case that turns out to be more interesting than we may have thought, so appreciate it.

[00:26:19] Speaker 03:
The case is now submitted.