[00:00:02] Speaker 03:
Good morning.

[00:00:02] Speaker 03:
We'll proceed to hear argument in the one case on calendar for this morning, which is 25-3826, City of Huntington Beach et al.

[00:00:13] Speaker 03:
versus Gavin Newsom et al.

[00:00:16] Speaker 03:
And we'll hear first from Mr. Chair.

[00:00:18] Speaker 03:
You may proceed.

[00:00:20] Speaker 05:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:00:22] Speaker 05:
Gene Chair, representing the parents, and I'd like to save five minutes for rebuttal.

[00:00:27] Speaker 05:
Let me first thank the panel for your timeliness.

[00:00:30] Speaker 05:
You're holding this hearing so quickly and for the standing analysis in your motion decision.

[00:00:36] Speaker 05:
For reasons that I'll explain in a few minutes, we respectfully think that you reached the wrong result in that decision as to at least one of our plaintiffs.

[00:00:46] Speaker 05:
But we do appreciate your laying out a roadmap by which we believe we can establish standing to your satisfaction.

[00:00:54] Speaker 05:
And if you're not persuaded on the evidence that I'll discuss today, we ask for an opportunity to follow your roadmap back in the district court, which as you know, found that we had standing as to four of the eight plaintiffs that are still in this case.

[00:01:09] Speaker 05:
But before addressing standing, let me briefly lay out some general background on the law at issue and then explain our two central claims, a clear understanding of which is critical to a full appreciation of the standing issues.

[00:01:22] Speaker 05:
As the court is no doubt aware,

[00:01:24] Speaker 05:
AB 1955 was part of a national movement to address children who may experience gender incongruity, and it's a serious issue.

[00:01:34] Speaker 05:
As discussed in Justice Alito's recent concurrence in the denial of cert in the Lee case and in his earlier statement in the Eau Claire case, however, some in that movement believe that school personnel are really better than parents at dealing with those issues.

[00:01:53] Speaker 03:
But counsel, the only defendants we have in this case are state defendants.

[00:01:58] Speaker 03:
You did not, in this case, sue the district.

[00:02:01] Speaker 03:
So the question is whether or not your injury is traceable to the provisions of this law would be redressed by a relief directed at validating that law.

[00:02:13] Speaker 03:
And the issue we identified in the prior order

[00:02:17] Speaker 03:
was that the district court construed the state law as prohibiting the disclosure of the information when that does not seem to be supported by the text, which merely seems to preempt mandatory disclosure policies and therefore leaving open voluntary disclosure by individual employees.

[00:02:39] Speaker 03:
Can you address that issue?

[00:02:40] Speaker 05:
That's right.

[00:02:41] Speaker 05:
And in that regard, Your Honor,

[00:02:43] Speaker 05:
AB 1955 is quite similar to the law that the Supreme Court struck down in Romer versus Evans.

[00:02:49] Speaker 05:
You'll recall in Colorado they adopted by initiative a law that prohibited local governments and the state government from enacting any laws or policies protecting certain members of the LGBT community.

[00:03:04] Speaker 05:
And the Supreme Court obviously invalidated that.

[00:03:08] Speaker 03:
And that's what AB 1955 does here, is it prohibits local governments, local school boards from adopting policies that would require... An individual teacher, say the homeroom teacher for a class, sees that and learns that a child is experiencing gender dysphoria and decides, I'm going to call the parents and let them know that.

[00:03:32] Speaker 03:
AB 1955 prohibit that parent from making that call.

[00:03:36] Speaker 05:
No.

[00:03:37] Speaker 05:
But what it does is it allows the homeroom teacher in that hypothetical to begin a social transition on the child without telling the parents and AB 1955 protects that teacher from any consequences.

[00:03:53] Speaker 03:
And that might be a good theory and claim to make if you had sued the school districts as additional defendants, but you have to trace the injury to AB 1950

[00:04:03] Speaker 03:
And if all it does is prohibit mandatory policies and leaves it up to the discretion of the teacher, then it's not clear that you've established that any teacher or any school district would otherwise have provided the information in the absence of 1955.

[00:04:20] Speaker 03:
And that seems the core of the standing issue.

[00:04:23] Speaker 03:
What's your response on that?

[00:04:25] Speaker 05:
Your Honor, we can do that today as to Plaintiff 7A.

[00:04:29] Speaker 05:
Plaintiff 7A resides in Orange County.

[00:04:35] Speaker 05:
This is not all in the complaint, but in fact, the Orange County Board of Education adopted a resolution on August 8th of 1924 criticizing AB 1955, saying they did not want to comply with it.

[00:04:52] Speaker 05:
The next day, well, the day before, they joined a lawsuit with some other school boards around the state expressly challenging AB 1955.

[00:05:05] Speaker 05:
And the court can take judicial notice of those two things, or we're happy to provide a motion for the court to take judicial notice of those.

[00:05:15] Speaker 05:
But those clearly establish that in Orange County, where 7A resides, if he went to the

[00:05:23] Speaker 05:
If he went to the school board and requested help, absent 1955, they would be willing to adopt a policy requiring disclosure or, at a minimum, as has happened in a number of schools before AB 1955, at a minimum, reach an agreement with him that he would be notified

[00:05:43] Speaker 03:
The only, as I construe the complaint, the only plaintiff who, as to whom you alleged, did have an agreement for disclosure was plaintiff 1A who didn't appeal.

[00:05:55] Speaker 05:
Correct.

[00:05:56] Speaker 03:
Do you have another one who has similar facts or could have led similar facts?

[00:06:00] Speaker 03:
Because 1A looks like the one person who could have satisfied the standing analysis that we identified in the order, but 1A didn't appeal.

[00:06:09] Speaker 05:
Correct, but all of the plaintiffs could seek such agreements with their schools absent 1955.

[00:06:15] Speaker 03:
That's not enough for standing.

[00:06:16] Speaker 03:
That someday hypothetical and Lujan says that isn't enough.

[00:06:20] Speaker 05:
Well, there may be a difference between, on this point, between the pleading standard and the standard for a PI, right?

[00:06:29] Speaker 05:
Under the PI standard,

[00:06:30] Speaker 05:
You have to make an evidentiary standard.

[00:06:33] Speaker 05:
Certainly in our pleadings, we have adequately alleged that absent 1955, parents would be free to seek those kinds of agreements.

[00:06:46] Speaker 05:
And we know from 1A's experience that some parents have been successful in seeking those agreements before AB 1955.

[00:06:52] Speaker 03:
But you said in paragraph 367, and we flagged this in the order, that some of the parents lived in communities and school districts with family-friendly policies requiring schools to inform parents if the schools had been asked to facilitate social transitioning and that AB 1955 ends those policies.

[00:07:13] Speaker 03:
Could you amend that paragraph to specify specific school districts that had such mandatory policies that were preempted and which school districts are those?

[00:07:22] Speaker 05:
Off the top of my head, I don't know which school districts they are, but we would be happy to amend to do that.

[00:07:29] Speaker 01:
Can I ask you about 7A?

[00:07:30] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:07:31] Speaker 01:
If I look at the complaint on 7A, the parent 7A is repeatedly on notice about 7C using a different name, different pronouns, like repeatedly.

[00:07:45] Speaker 01:
If I look at the preliminary injunction declaration, we can discuss whether that's appropriate or not.

[00:07:50] Speaker 01:
There's so many instances, you know,

[00:07:52] Speaker 01:
during freshman year, summer after freshman year, during sophomore year, just repeatedly.

[00:07:57] Speaker 01:
So if the parent has this much information, don't they have, number one, the information that they're requesting, and number two, enough information to direct the medical care and treatment of the child?

[00:08:10] Speaker 01:
I'm hoping that you can explain what the burden is because particularly with 7C,

[00:08:18] Speaker 01:
There is so much information.

[00:08:20] Speaker 01:
The parent has already been investigated by Child Protective Services, has had multiple communications with counselors.

[00:08:29] Speaker 01:
So I guess I'm still unclear.

[00:08:33] Speaker 01:
What's the burden if 7A already knows about 7C?

[00:08:37] Speaker 05:
Well, what is 7A going to do about it?

[00:08:40] Speaker 05:
In that respect, this is somewhat similar to the Mahmoud case, where the people who were defending the policy that was ultimately struck down in Mahmoud, they said, well, if you don't like this, you can just take your kids out.

[00:08:51] Speaker 05:
And yes, parent 7A probably has enough notice about the child's

[00:08:58] Speaker 01:
So would you concede that the right to information has already been satisfied?

[00:09:02] Speaker 01:
Because you're requesting, you know, the right to information and the right to direct the medical care and treatment of the child.

[00:09:10] Speaker 01:
So what is the information that you need?

[00:09:13] Speaker 01:
There's so much information in both the complaint and the declaration about 7C's gender identity issues.

[00:09:19] Speaker 01:
What more do you need?

[00:09:21] Speaker 01:
I mean, the parent is calling and the school district says, we don't have a kid by that name.

[00:09:26] Speaker 01:
7A is saying you've got to use 7C's real name, real birth date, real address.

[00:09:31] Speaker 01:
They can't find her student ID because it's under a male name.

[00:09:34] Speaker 01:
And so like just time and time again with different counselors, 7A is having these conversations with the school.

[00:09:41] Speaker 01:
So what information does 7A need?

[00:09:44] Speaker 05:
This is where the district courts and the state's mischaracterization of that claim, count three, is important.

[00:09:52] Speaker 05:
The chief bit of information that parent 7A needs is, is somebody at the school trying to transition my kid?

[00:10:00] Speaker 05:
Okay?

[00:10:01] Speaker 05:
That the parent has not been able to get, and under AB 1955, parent 7A cannot get it unless somebody at the school gives it to her voluntarily.

[00:10:13] Speaker 01:
But you would agree that AB 1955 doesn't require a student to change his or her name or their name or to change their pronouns, right?

[00:10:23] Speaker 01:
It doesn't.

[00:10:23] Speaker 01:
And it doesn't require a teacher or a counselor or any school administrator to use a name or a pronoun that a student asks them to use, right?

[00:10:32] Speaker 01:
Also true.

[00:10:33] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:10:33] Speaker 01:
It also doesn't give the school or a teacher or a counselor the authority to decide whether a student says, I want a new name, I want new pronouns.

[00:10:43] Speaker 05:
Well, that's where I disagree.

[00:10:45] Speaker 01:
OK.

[00:10:45] Speaker 01:
How does it do that?

[00:10:47] Speaker 05:
AB 1955 certainly does that.

[00:10:49] Speaker 01:
How does it give them the authority to do that?

[00:10:52] Speaker 05:
in two ways.

[00:10:53] Speaker 05:
Number one, it prohibits the school and anybody controlling the school from adopting policies prohibiting that.

[00:11:03] Speaker 05:
And it also protects the teacher who chooses to do that from any consequence for that.

[00:11:10] Speaker 05:
So if that's not authority, I don't know what is.

[00:11:14] Speaker 05:
And that's the fundamental problem is that it transfers

[00:11:17] Speaker 05:
the authority over social transitions from parents to the school and the child.

[00:11:23] Speaker 01:
But you would agree, I think you agreed when you were talking with Judge Collins that a teacher counselor could refuse to use a requested name or pronoun and could inform a parent even under AB 1955, correct?

[00:11:40] Speaker 01:
That a student had made that request.

[00:11:42] Speaker 05:
That's possible.

[00:11:44] Speaker 05:
But the concern and the reason parents are so up in arms about AB 1955 and these kinds of policies around the country is because it transfers authority from them to individual teachers or counselors to decide whether to transition their kids, which, by the way,

[00:12:02] Speaker 05:
according to the medical evidence.

[00:12:04] Speaker 01:
But how are you just, I guess, it's the student that is asking for a different pronoun or name to be used.

[00:12:14] Speaker 05:
We don't know that.

[00:12:15] Speaker 05:
In a lot of cases, teachers have been found to push that, to push social transition on kids.

[00:12:21] Speaker 01:
But you're saying 1955 requires counselors or teachers to push

[00:12:27] Speaker 01:
a student to use a different name.

[00:12:29] Speaker 01:
I'm not quite seeing that.

[00:12:31] Speaker 05:
Again, that's not what I'm saying, Your Honor.

[00:12:32] Speaker 05:
The problem is transferring authority from parents

[00:12:38] Speaker 05:
to school officials in consultation with students, but transferring authority from parents to school officials to make those very fundamental decisions in which, by the way, the child's future ability to become a parent is at stake.

[00:12:53] Speaker 05:
That's the end result of, according to the medical evidence, that is the end result of social transition in a high percentage of cases is the kid goes on to get invasive surgery that makes them

[00:13:07] Speaker 05:
permanently infertile.

[00:13:09] Speaker 05:
And so that's a matter of great concern to parents.

[00:13:12] Speaker 05:
It's not just a knee scrape or something where a school teacher is providing a little bit of care.

[00:13:19] Speaker 03:
If you were given leave to amend on remand to attempt to address the issues of standing and redressability, what specific amendments would you make?

[00:13:34] Speaker 03:
You know, identify mandatory policies that would otherwise existed in schools.

[00:13:38] Speaker 03:
Would you add additional defendants?

[00:13:40] Speaker 03:
Would you challenge additional California laws?

[00:13:42] Speaker 03:
What changes would you?

[00:13:44] Speaker 05:
I don't anticipate that we would challenge additional California laws, but we certainly would.

[00:13:51] Speaker 05:
Again, if in order to establish the chain of causation that you're looking for for standing, if you say we have to have the schools as defendants, then we can certainly bring the schools in as defendants.

[00:14:05] Speaker 05:
That's no problem.

[00:14:07] Speaker 05:
And the reason we didn't do that is because if we had sued the schools, they would have said, well, our hands are tied by AB 1955.

[00:14:15] Speaker 05:
We really can't do, because of California law, what you're asking us to do.

[00:14:18] Speaker 05:
But if you think that's necessary to square the causation point, that's certainly something that we could do and would do on remand.

[00:14:29] Speaker 01:
Can I ask you a question since you mentioned Mahmood?

[00:14:32] Speaker 01:
In your opening brief, you say that Mahmood didn't require anything regarding the, you know, curriculum or policy but there's, you know, language in Mahmood, you know, that says that it requires the parents to submit their children to instruction that poses a very real threat of undermining their religious beliefs and practices.

[00:14:54] Speaker 01:
It says the board requires teachers to... Assuming they stay in the school.

[00:14:58] Speaker 01:
That's correct, but the board requires teachers to instruct young children using storybooks that explicitly contradict their parents' religious views.

[00:15:06] Speaker 01:
And, you know, in Mamoud, they specifically, the opinion specifically states, we have recognized the potentially coercive nature of classroom instruction of this kind.

[00:15:16] Speaker 05:
I like that quote.

[00:15:18] Speaker 01:
I understand, and that's the law that we're going to follow, but where is the coercion here?

[00:15:25] Speaker 01:
And do you agree, you know, you said in your opening brief that, you know, the curriculum policy in Mahmood neither required nor prohibited parents or children from doing anything other than omitting a means to opt out of the instruction.

[00:15:39] Speaker 01:
But that seems to be in tension with the quotes I've just read from the opinion that says there's coercion here, there's requiring parents.

[00:15:47] Speaker 01:
If they want to stay in the public school system, their children have to be subject to these books.

[00:15:52] Speaker 05:
Well, if our description of Mahmood wasn't sufficiently accurate, I apologize.

[00:15:56] Speaker 05:
But indeed, there is coercion here, obviously.

[00:16:00] Speaker 05:
And this was the problem the court talked about in Mammoth.

[00:16:04] Speaker 05:
It's very expensive for parents to take their kids out of public school and put them in a private school.

[00:16:10] Speaker 05:
And so basically what AB 1955 says to parents is, if you want to be able to

[00:16:17] Speaker 05:
to control this very important decision about whether your child is going to be socially transitioned, basically your only choice is to take him out of public schools and put him in a private school.

[00:16:28] Speaker 05:
And that was exactly the choice that Mahmoud said parents cannot be faced with.

[00:16:33] Speaker 03:
I want to make sure I understand the substantive scope of your constitutional claim.

[00:16:37] Speaker 03:
Is it your position that the federal constitution requires the mandatory policies at 1955 preempts?

[00:16:47] Speaker 05:
I don't know that it requires the policies necessarily.

[00:16:51] Speaker 05:
It requires parents to be able to, at a minimum, to meaningfully seek agreements with their schools.

[00:17:00] Speaker 03:
One of your claims is specifically styled as a right to information.

[00:17:07] Speaker 03:
Right.

[00:17:07] Speaker 03:
And that would seem to assert that the Constitution requires mandatory disclosure to parents.

[00:17:13] Speaker 03:
And I wanted to know whether that was your position or something else.

[00:17:16] Speaker 05:
Well, I think our position is perhaps a bit narrower than what you've stated.

[00:17:21] Speaker 05:
It's the right not to have government officials conceal that kind of very important information from parents.

[00:17:30] Speaker 03:
I'm not sure I understand the difference between a right not to have the information concealed and a right to have the information disclosed.

[00:17:41] Speaker 03:
Help me out there.

[00:17:42] Speaker 05:
Yeah, the problem in the school setting is, and again, we've seen this all over the country, teachers and counselors, well-meaning, no doubt, will sometimes

[00:17:56] Speaker 05:
begin socially transitioning kids, and then affirmatively hide it from parents.

[00:18:03] Speaker 05:
They will tell the child, you can't tell your parents, and they will prohibit other school officials from disclosing that to parents.

[00:18:13] Speaker 05:
I mean, 7A is a classic example.

[00:18:16] Speaker 05:
She, after trying to get the school to, you know, to acknowledge her daughter's true name, for example, the school ultimately said, we're not even going to acknowledge your daughter's real name, your daughter's birth name.

[00:18:33] Speaker 05:
So I, you know, and that's what...

[00:18:37] Speaker 01:
agency of any of these students?

[00:18:40] Speaker 05:
I'm sorry?

[00:18:40] Speaker 01:
You're saying it seems like your position is the schools are all doing these against the will of the students, that they're starting it, not at the students' request?

[00:18:47] Speaker 05:
No, that's not what I'm saying.

[00:18:49] Speaker 05:
It's a mix, is the problem.

[00:18:52] Speaker 05:
But the real problem is that whether it's initiated by the child or the teacher or counselor,

[00:18:59] Speaker 05:
It's still taking that decision away from the parents who are constitutionally entitled to make that choice and not the school.

[00:19:09] Speaker 03:
Do you want to save some time?

[00:19:11] Speaker 01:
Actually, I'm sorry.

[00:19:11] Speaker 01:
I have more questions if that's okay.

[00:19:13] Speaker 01:
All right.

[00:19:14] Speaker 01:
All right.

[00:19:16] Speaker 01:
So, if we were to find that the plaintiffs do not have standing, then we would not have jurisdiction to address the merits, correct?

[00:19:26] Speaker 05:
That's fair.

[00:19:27] Speaker 05:
Okay.

[00:19:28] Speaker 05:
But again, what... I understand you disagree on the issue of standing.

[00:19:33] Speaker 05:
Right.

[00:19:33] Speaker 05:
It's the P.I.

[00:19:34] Speaker 05:
versus the dismissal, right?

[00:19:35] Speaker 05:
And that's part of what we're appealing here is the dismissal and that turns on the allegations that we made in our complaint.

[00:19:41] Speaker 01:
Right.

[00:19:42] Speaker 01:
So and we should look just to the allegations of the complaint, not to the P.I.

[00:19:45] Speaker 01:
declarations in determining standing for the motion to dismiss, correct?

[00:19:49] Speaker 05:
For a motion to dismiss, I think that's fair.

[00:19:51] Speaker 01:
Okay, thank you.

[00:19:53] Speaker 01:
If AB 1955 is... One exception.

[00:19:56] Speaker 01:
Go ahead, please.

[00:19:57] Speaker 05:
The Jones decision from a few weeks ago suggests that in making a standing determination, you can also consider subsequent developments in the case, including evidence that's been presented.

[00:20:11] Speaker 03:
The other question I had is the

[00:20:15] Speaker 03:
The standing deficiency that we identified in the preliminary injunction or preliminary injunctive relief order, that was not a deficiency that was identified in the district court because it was based on a rejection of the district court's reading of the statute.

[00:20:32] Speaker 03:
So you've never been given an opportunity to plead facts with respect to that specific deficiency.

[00:20:37] Speaker 05:
That's exactly right.

[00:20:38] Speaker 03:
Okay, right.

[00:20:39] Speaker 01:
So let me ask, there's a point that's made and I just want to understand it.

[00:20:45] Speaker 01:
With regard to the federal FERPA, you know, it has a right of parents to inspect and review the education records of their children.

[00:20:54] Speaker 01:
It defines those records as information

[00:20:57] Speaker 01:
related to their student and similarly the reg also, you know, gives that right to inspect and review the student's education records.

[00:21:09] Speaker 01:
The California state statutes gives the parents the right to observe the classroom in which their students are enrolled to have access of the school records.

[00:21:17] Speaker 01:
And I guess I'm, why isn't this sufficient in your view to get the information that you need?

[00:21:26] Speaker 01:
These parents could go observe the classroom, they could access all of their student's records, they have a right to it under federal and state law.

[00:21:38] Speaker 05:
is what parents and counselors are doing privately with their children, conversations that they're having privately with their children.

[00:21:46] Speaker 05:
Yes, certainly a parent can avail himself or herself of those things and obtain some relevant information, but again, when you're faced with a legal regime which AB 1955 creates that protects teachers and counselors in their efforts to transition children,

[00:22:06] Speaker 05:
And that can be done in a lot of different settings at school that wouldn't necessarily be covered by those authority.

[00:22:13] Speaker 01:
There's still a gap.

[00:22:14] Speaker 01:
I'm sorry to interrupt you.

[00:22:15] Speaker 01:
But if you observe a classroom, wouldn't you see how a student is being referred to, either by pronoun or by name?

[00:22:24] Speaker 05:
You might, or you might not.

[00:22:26] Speaker 05:
Or the teacher and the student might decide not to even use pronouns that day, or not even use names.

[00:22:34] Speaker 01:
So one last question, and I thank Judge Collins for giving me the time.

[00:22:39] Speaker 01:
If I were to use someone's preferred pronoun, am I giving them medical treatment and medical care?

[00:22:49] Speaker 05:
Merely using their preferred pronoun?

[00:22:53] Speaker 01:
Yes, or their preferred name.

[00:22:55] Speaker 01:
Am I administering medical care or medical treatment?

[00:22:58] Speaker 05:
I think it depends on the context.

[00:23:01] Speaker 05:
If you're a friend and not in a position of authority, I would probably not call that medical care.

[00:23:09] Speaker 05:
But I think if you're in a position of authority,

[00:23:14] Speaker 05:
as a school counselor or a teacher, that is one aspect of providing medical care under Doe versus Horn.

[00:23:21] Speaker 05:
And I'll add, I think even if you reject the idea that what teachers and counselors are doing when they try to transition kids is medical care,

[00:23:34] Speaker 05:
The right that we've identified doesn't depend on it being medical care.

[00:23:37] Speaker 05:
There's no question that, you know, gender dysphoria is a very serious condition, and as we've discussed, it has potentially life-altering consequences.

[00:23:49] Speaker 05:
I can't imagine a world in which a parent would have a parent's right to information about that and a parent's right to control that decision would depend on whether you call it medical care or psychological care or mental health care or something else.

[00:24:04] Speaker 05:
It's a decision that has potentially grave life-altering consequences and one that parents have a constitutional right to control.

[00:24:15] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:24:15] Speaker 03:
We've taken you substantially over, but I'll give you five minutes for a revolt.

[00:24:19] Speaker 05:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:24:20] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:24:20] Speaker 03:
And we'll hear now from Ms.

[00:24:23] Speaker 03:
Veroff.

[00:24:25] Speaker 03:
Did I pronounce that correctly?

[00:24:26] Speaker 02:
You did.

[00:24:27] Speaker 02:
All right.

[00:24:27] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:24:38] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:24:39] Speaker 00:
Julie Veroff for the state defendants.

[00:24:41] Speaker 00:
The court can resolve this appeal on the same grounds it resolved plaintiff's motion for an injunction pending appeal on causation and redressability.

[00:24:48] Speaker 00:
As the court explained in that order, AB 1955 only prohibits policies categorically requiring school officials to out LGBTQ students.

[00:24:56] Speaker 01:
AB 1955 does not prevent... Could the plaintiffs be given leave to amend?

[00:25:01] Speaker 00:
The district court granted the 12B1 motion with allowing the option for plaintiffs to seek leave to amend as to the parent plaintiffs.

[00:25:09] Speaker 03:
But as I just pointed out in my colloquy with counsel, the particular deficiency that we identified

[00:25:15] Speaker 03:
was never identified in the district court.

[00:25:17] Speaker 03:
Indeed, we rejected the district court's reading of the statute, which, if the district court had been correct, would moot our analysis.

[00:25:26] Speaker 03:
So now that we've identified a new legal defect that was never identified in the district court, they never had a chance to meet that deficiency, how could we not remand the case to give them a chance to try and satisfy that standard when they've said that they could do so?

[00:25:42] Speaker 00:
We don't oppose remand for plaintiffs to have an opportunity to ask the district court for a leave to amend.

[00:25:47] Speaker 00:
It's notable to me that my friend wasn't able to identify to you which parents fit the some parents allegation in paragraph 376, but we don't oppose them asking the district court for permission to do so in the first instance there.

[00:26:00] Speaker 01:
Wait, but you do oppose if this court gives leave to amend?

[00:26:04] Speaker 01:
Oh, we don't, Your Honor.

[00:26:06] Speaker 01:
Okay, so you don't.

[00:26:07] Speaker 01:
But what were you going to say before, that the district court had previously granted leave to amend and the plaintiffs chose not to amend?

[00:26:12] Speaker 00:
So as to the 12B1, Your Honor, the district court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice as to the city, but not with prejudice as to the parents.

[00:26:20] Speaker 00:
So we read the order to allow the possibility to plaintiffs to seek leave to amend as to the parent plaintiffs.

[00:26:30] Speaker 00:
In addition to that causation issue that your honor said.

[00:26:33] Speaker 04:
If we can go to, I understand that we had discussed in the PI or decision relating to the PI, section 6A of AB 1955, which was about policy.

[00:26:43] Speaker 04:
But then there's also section 5A, which says an employee of a school district shall not be required to disclose any information related to a people's gender identity without the people's consent, unless otherwise required by state or federal law.

[00:26:59] Speaker 04:
Under this following hypothetical, say a parent goes to a school principal and says, I want to be informed about my child's potential gender identity issues and makes a very compelling case.

[00:27:11] Speaker 04:
And the principal agrees, yes, in this circumstance, I think you should be notified if something like that happens.

[00:27:18] Speaker 04:
But under Section 5A, the school principal can't require the teacher to disclose that information to the parent if the student

[00:27:29] Speaker 04:
Doesn't agree isn't that right?

[00:27:33] Speaker 00:
That's a question of state law your honor that's to my knowledge not been litigated and resolved I think that's probably right, but We don't have that particular issue presented here because as it was acknowledged in the conversation with my friend parent 1a is the only parent who have alleged any effort to

[00:27:49] Speaker 00:
such an agreement and none of the parents with live claims here have any allegations along those lines?

[00:27:55] Speaker 04:
Well, I guess it was because prior to AB 1955, they could ask the teachers for that information.

[00:28:02] Speaker 04:
And I think, for example, parent 6A asked the teacher and teacher agreed and provided that information.

[00:28:08] Speaker 04:
But now under the statute here, if the parent went to the principal, the principal could require the teacher to disclose that, right?

[00:28:19] Speaker 04:
Well, you know, that exact factor scenario may not be present, but a lot of that is pre-AB 1955.

[00:28:24] Speaker 00:
That's true, but even assuming AB 1955 forecloses those kinds of agreements, AB 1955 doesn't prevent or prohibit disclosure in individual cases.

[00:28:35] Speaker 00:
So to the extent a parent doesn't receive information from a school official about their child's gender identity, that nondisclosure is not compelled by AB 1955.

[00:28:44] Speaker 00:
It's the result of a school official's independent decision

[00:28:46] Speaker 00:
or perhaps the operation of a school district's non-disclosure policy.

[00:28:49] Speaker 03:
So do you concede that there is, that nothing in California law would prohibit a, the homeroom teacher and the hypothetical I had before from calling the parent and disclosing against the child's wishes that the child has requested gender transitioning and different pronouns, et cetera?

[00:29:14] Speaker 00:
It would probably depend on the details, Your Honor.

[00:29:16] Speaker 00:
There are other state laws that constrain disclosure in certain circumstances, for example, the State Equal Protection Clause, state anti-discrimination statutes, state privacy laws.

[00:29:25] Speaker 00:
But as a general matter, those state laws don't prohibit disclosures in all circumstances.

[00:29:30] Speaker 00:
The attorney general's legal alert that we set in our opening brief, for example, explains that school officials remain free to disclose a student's gender identity to advance the student's well-being where the school official deems that necessary or appropriate.

[00:29:47] Speaker 01:
Why wouldn't anti-bullying or anti-harassment programs be an adequate alternative?

[00:29:55] Speaker 00:
Anti-bullying or anti-harassment programs might address how students treat other students at school, your honor, but it wouldn't be responsive to the concerns that animated the adoption of AB 1955.

[00:30:07] Speaker 00:
The legislature found that depriving LGBTQ young people of any agency over when they share their identities with their parents undermines their ability to build trusting relationships with their parents.

[00:30:17] Speaker 00:
anti-bullying initiatives wouldn't speak to that problem.

[00:30:20] Speaker 00:
It also wouldn't speak to the finding of the legislature that a significant number of young people face parental rejection.

[00:30:26] Speaker 03:
Can you speak up or maybe pull the microphones a little closer?

[00:30:29] Speaker 03:
Yeah.

[00:30:30] Speaker 00:
Apologies, Your Honor.

[00:30:31] Speaker 00:
OK, that's better.

[00:30:31] Speaker 03:
Is that better?

[00:30:32] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:30:32] Speaker 00:
Great.

[00:30:32] Speaker 00:
I'll adjust for that.

[00:30:33] Speaker 00:
Vertically challenged among us, yes.

[00:30:35] Speaker 00:
Would it be helpful for me to repeat my response to Judge Coe?

[00:30:38] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:30:39] Speaker 00:
So one of the legislature's reasons for adopting AB 1955 was its finding that when you deprive LGBTQ young people of any agency over when they share their identities with their parents, it undermines the ability of those young people and their parents to build trusting relationships with each other.

[00:30:54] Speaker 00:
The legislature recognized the importance of those relationships and thought it appropriate and reasonable not to require school officials to interpose themselves between parents and children in a way that would threaten those relationships.

[00:31:05] Speaker 00:
And to Judge Coast's point, anti-harassment or anti-bullying initiatives between students at school wouldn't be responsive to that finding.

[00:31:13] Speaker 03:
Now, I noticed both provisions of AB 1955 say that they're declarative of existing law, that the legislature, you know, provided additional detail but didn't think it was substantively changing things.

[00:31:28] Speaker 03:
And as I understand it, the state sued the Chino Valley District and obtained

[00:31:35] Speaker 03:
a prohibition on their mandatory policy before AB 1955 took effect.

[00:31:43] Speaker 03:
Am I correct on that?

[00:31:45] Speaker 00:
That's correct.

[00:31:46] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:31:46] Speaker 00:
It's long been the state's position that forced outing policies violate other provisions of state law.

[00:31:51] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:31:51] Speaker 03:
So in order to, suppose we found that someone had standing, I mean, suppose plaintiff, one neighbor here, and would a

[00:32:05] Speaker 03:
An injunction just against 1955 redress the injury because it seems like other provisions of California law would still be standing and would not be affected by that potentially.

[00:32:19] Speaker 03:
Does that create a redressability issue in your view?

[00:32:23] Speaker 00:
That's right, Your Honor.

[00:32:25] Speaker 00:
My friends here could have chosen to

[00:32:27] Speaker 00:
to school districts, school officials, could have chosen to challenge other state laws.

[00:32:31] Speaker 00:
But the narrow nature of the suit here, both the defendants and the relief sought, creates a serious causation and redressability problem.

[00:32:39] Speaker 03:
OK.

[00:32:39] Speaker 03:
But again, he suggested on remand he would consider making any amendments that might be necessary to

[00:32:50] Speaker 03:
address the standing deficiencies, and so would the state be opposed on remand to amendments that might add additional defendants or additional claims in order to resolve the standing issue and essentially get to the core issues that they're raising?

[00:33:07] Speaker 00:
We'd have to see that the motion for leave of the details, the reasons for not bringing those to the court.

[00:33:11] Speaker 00:
First, this would be the second amended complaint, not the first, but we would look at those the way we would look at any motion for leave to amend and respond accordingly.

[00:33:24] Speaker 01:
Let me ask you, you know, footnote 13 in Doe v. Horn does seem to say that social transitioning is medical care or medical treatment and you can see that parents have a fundamental right to direct their children's medical care.

[00:33:40] Speaker 01:
So then why don't you explain how there's no infringement of that right here?

[00:33:47] Speaker 00:
We don't dispute that social transition is sometimes recommended as a way to alleviate symptoms of gender dysphoria in much the same way that exercise is sometimes recommended as a way to alleviate symptoms of postpartum depression.

[00:33:59] Speaker 00:
But it doesn't follow that using a transgender person's name and pronouns or leading a postpartum woman in a yoga class is itself an act of medical care.

[00:34:08] Speaker 00:
Medical care is conduct regulated as part of the practice of medicine to be provided by licensed healthcare professionals.

[00:34:15] Speaker 00:
Using a transgender person's name and pronouns is something that lay people do all the time in all contexts as a matter of civility and respect.

[00:34:22] Speaker 00:
It's far afield from anything that the Supreme Court or courts of appeals have ever recognized as the conduct giving rise to a substantive due process right to direct medical care.

[00:34:34] Speaker 01:
You know, you cite case law about how, you know, parents don't have say in the curriculum schools and there's certainly case law that says that, but do you think Mahmood undermines that?

[00:34:43] Speaker 00:
It was a free exercise case, your honor, not a substantive due process case.

[00:34:48] Speaker 00:
So no, we don't read it as bearing on the substantive due process line of cases, the Pierce-Meyer cases.

[00:34:53] Speaker 00:
And I also don't understand my friends to have articulated a Meyer-Pierce substantive due process claim here.

[00:34:59] Speaker 00:
Furthermore, the facts in Mahmoud were fundamentally different.

[00:35:03] Speaker 00:
There, as your honor was suggesting earlier,

[00:35:05] Speaker 00:
There was a requirement for in-classroom instruction using particular books, direction to teachers to dissuade students who expressed views discordant with those in the books.

[00:35:15] Speaker 00:
AB 1955 here doesn't require students to do anything, doesn't prohibit them from doing anything, doesn't require parents to do anything or prohibit them from doing anything, doesn't involve curriculum.

[00:35:25] Speaker 00:
The challenge provisions only arise when the student on their own initiative says, I identify as transgender.

[00:35:29] Speaker 00:
When the student says, please don't share this information with my parents without my consent,

[00:35:34] Speaker 00:
Factors that created concern for potential coercion in Mahmoud simply aren't implicated by UD-1955.

[00:35:39] Speaker 04:
Are there any other laws in California that give basically the veto right to a student to say certain information shouldn't be disclosed to their parents?

[00:35:48] Speaker 00:
I'm sorry, Your Honor.

[00:35:48] Speaker 00:
You said that would give students a veto right.

[00:35:50] Speaker 04:
Yeah.

[00:35:50] Speaker 04:
Are there any other laws in California that gives a student a veto right and say, please don't tell my parents about, you know, X or Y or Z?

[00:35:58] Speaker 00:
There are some of those laws are detailed in the Professors of Psychology and Human Development amicus brief and I believe some may be detailed in the California Teachers Association amicus brief.

[00:36:06] Speaker 00:
There are rules around student pregnancy, student participation in substance abuse programs, things like that where students have a presumption of confidentiality as to those issues.

[00:36:18] Speaker 03:
And have such a confidentiality vis-a-vis their parents.

[00:36:21] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:36:24] Speaker 01:
Are any of those implicated with gender identity or their pregnancy, substance abuse?

[00:36:29] Speaker 00:
I don't know that there are laws specific to gender identity that are referenced in this race, Your Honor.

[00:36:38] Speaker 01:
Why wouldn't a, you know, restricting disclosure only when the parents are unfit?

[00:36:44] Speaker 01:
Why would that be unworkable?

[00:36:46] Speaker 01:
Why would that necessarily out a child?

[00:36:49] Speaker 00:
It's hard to imagine how to do that inquiry on a case-by-case basis, Your Honor, where the parent wouldn't have a reason to think that

[00:36:58] Speaker 00:
Child is transgender or gender nonconforming.

[00:37:00] Speaker 00:
There's no practical way for school officials to do that inquiry for every single parent.

[00:37:05] Speaker 00:
And so if they were doing it in a targeted way, it could necessarily out the child.

[00:37:10] Speaker 00:
Doing that kind of inquiry could also chill young people from expressing their identity.

[00:37:14] Speaker 00:
For example, the legislature found that a significant number of LGBTQ young people don't report when they experience harassment or bullying or discrimination based on their identity because they fear being outed to their parents without their consent.

[00:37:26] Speaker 03:
Certainly, I mean, if a child is experiencing gender dysphoria or gender disconfusion, that indicates the child is experiencing some measure of mental distress.

[00:37:40] Speaker 03:
And the allegations of complaint show at least some instances in which counselors in the school have taken upon themselves

[00:37:50] Speaker 03:
to have sort of counseling sessions to sort of encourage the child in one direction or the other.

[00:37:57] Speaker 03:
Is it your view that states have the right to engage in that kind of shaping and setting the direction of the children's life when they're experiencing significant mental distress and to do so secretly from their parents?

[00:38:16] Speaker 00:
A few responses there, Your Honor.

[00:38:18] Speaker 00:
One, AB 1955 doesn't prevent a school official from deciding.

[00:38:22] Speaker 03:
Well, that's getting back to sort of the standing issue.

[00:38:24] Speaker 03:
But I want to know the substantive positions.

[00:38:27] Speaker 03:
Suppose we found standing.

[00:38:28] Speaker 03:
We had a plaintiff who had standing, et cetera, and we had the substantive constitutional issue in front of us.

[00:38:34] Speaker 03:
I want to know what your position on that is.

[00:38:37] Speaker 00:
Well, we'd say two things, Your Honor.

[00:38:39] Speaker 00:
First, as to whether the asserted liberty interest is a fundamental right, here, the liberty interest that my friends are asserting is a right to direct their child's medical care.

[00:38:48] Speaker 00:
And in the state's view, respecting a transgender person's name and pronouns is not an act of medical care.

[00:38:54] Speaker 03:
It just seems hard to square that with what Joe V. Horne said, because Joe V. Horne specifically says in the footnote that

[00:39:05] Speaker 03:
The medical treatment for gender dysphoria has a number of components, and this treatment can include, and the first thing that's announced is the use of gender pronouns.

[00:39:17] Speaker 03:
So aren't we bound by what we've said in HORN?

[00:39:22] Speaker 00:
HORN addresses the fact that social transition

[00:39:28] Speaker 00:
can be

[00:39:43] Speaker 00:
medical issues that are not themselves medical care, exercise, deep breathing for anxiety, and so forth.

[00:39:50] Speaker 00:
And school officials often provide supports to students, seating up student with vision challenges closer to the board, ensuring a net free environment for students with serious allergies.

[00:39:59] Speaker 00:
But those learning supports are not in and of themselves medical care.

[00:40:03] Speaker 00:
But even setting the question of whether there's a fundamental right implicated here aside, part of the due process analysis requires asking, is there infringement of that right?

[00:40:12] Speaker 00:
And here, there's no infringement by AB 1955.

[00:40:15] Speaker 00:
In cases concerning infringement of a substantive process rate, we see some element of coercion, compulsion, active interference in the parent-child relationship.

[00:40:24] Speaker 00:
AB 1955 doesn't do any of that.

[00:40:25] Speaker 03:
Could the state adopt a law that forbade school districts from disclosing that the student had expressed suicidal tendencies?

[00:40:36] Speaker 00:
It's very difficult to imagine the state adopting such a policy.

[00:40:39] Speaker 00:
I know, I know.

[00:40:39] Speaker 03:
That's why it's a hypothetical.

[00:40:41] Speaker 03:
But I want to know how far your position goes on the constitutional issue.

[00:40:44] Speaker 03:
Can the state adopt such a policy?

[00:40:48] Speaker 00:
I don't think such a policy would implicate a substantive due process right to direct a child's medical care.

[00:40:53] Speaker 03:
To be subject just to rational basis.

[00:40:56] Speaker 03:
Maybe it would fail that, but... It may not.

[00:40:58] Speaker 00:
It may well implicate other strands of substantive due process rights that my friends haven't raised here.

[00:41:04] Speaker 00:
For example, there are cases where parents sue school officials for particular negligent behavior that results in harm to the child that causes a loss of companionship.

[00:41:15] Speaker 00:
Or otherwise interferes with the family association between the parent and the child That species of substantive due process could be implicated by the type of policy your honor is So there's some substantive due process right to some information about the child's mental well-being and it's a question of where the line is and

[00:41:37] Speaker 00:
In general, there is no substantive due process right to compel school officials to provide information that parents deem helpful.

[00:41:43] Speaker 03:
In the very extreme hypothetical- You just acknowledge that there's something there, and then it's a question of where the line is.

[00:41:51] Speaker 00:
Potentially for suicide or something quite acute, and there already are a number of laws that would require disclosure in those very acute specific circumstances.

[00:42:00] Speaker 00:
But courts repeatedly, as the district court collected, have rejected a notion that

[00:42:05] Speaker 00:
parents have a substantive due process right to compel information that is just generally helpful.

[00:42:10] Speaker 00:
And here, the law at issue is just speaking to disclosures of gender identity, gender expression, not the particularly acute situations your honor is identifying.

[00:42:20] Speaker 00:
And I don't think this case calls upon the court to articulate exactly the bounds of the parental substantive due process right, but simply to say that those rights are both not implicated here and certainly not infringed upon by AB 1955.

[00:42:34] Speaker 01:
Where is the law that the school should give the parents information to protect the health and safety of the student?

[00:42:44] Speaker 01:
The federal FERPA statute, or where do we find that?

[00:42:47] Speaker 00:
There's mandatory reporting requirements on school officials, Your Honor.

[00:42:51] Speaker 00:
There is a provision we cite in our opening brief, I believe, about when school mental health counselors can or should disclose to parents if a child has experienced particularly acute distress.

[00:43:07] Speaker 04:
You had earlier mentioned the amicus brief about other laws that may give a veto right to the students.

[00:43:12] Speaker 04:
But those, I'm just looking at now, those laws relate to information provided to a mental health provider.

[00:43:19] Speaker 04:
So there's a confidentiality issue, right?

[00:43:24] Speaker 00:
Yes, if that's right.

[00:43:26] Speaker 04:
So obviously, those are separate privilege involved.

[00:43:31] Speaker 04:
But are there any other laws that don't relate to certain privilege where a student has the right to veto information being provided to their parents?

[00:43:42] Speaker 00:
I'm not aware of other laws that implicate that particular issue.

[00:43:48] Speaker 00:
You're on the outside of the school counselor.

[00:43:52] Speaker 00:
Again, AB 1955 doesn't give students a blank check veto.

[00:43:57] Speaker 00:
AB 1955 allows for disclosures in individual circumstances.

[00:44:00] Speaker 00:
It only prohibits requiring disclosures in all circumstances.

[00:44:07] Speaker 01:
But I'm looking at California Education Code 49602 and it does provide a confidentiality exception that would allow disclosure of information to a parent or to a school principal to avert a clear and present danger to the health, safety and welfare of the student.

[00:44:28] Speaker 01:
Is that the law that you're referring to?

[00:44:30] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:44:31] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:44:41] Speaker 00:
Well, if there are no further questions, I see that my time has expired.

[00:44:44] Speaker 00:
And so we would ask that the court affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's claims.

[00:44:48] Speaker 00:
Thank you very much.

[00:44:49] Speaker 00:
All right.

[00:44:49] Speaker 03:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:44:50] Speaker 03:
We'll hear rebuttal now.

[00:44:56] Speaker 05:
Well, thank you.

[00:44:57] Speaker 05:
Let me go back to counsel's description of the legislative history of this provision, which I think makes crystal clear that this law was intended from the outset to be a challenge to parental rights.

[00:45:10] Speaker 05:
Counsel talked about how

[00:45:11] Speaker 05:
how the focus was on student agency in the face of objections from their parents, and it's clear that the law was designed to and does transfer control over this very important decision about social transitions from parents to some combination of teachers and students.

[00:45:30] Speaker 05:
And contrary to counsel's characterization, we do believe that is a flat violation of

[00:45:37] Speaker 05:
parental rights as articulated in Supreme Court decisions going all the way back to Meyer and Pierce and the whole line of decisions since.

[00:45:46] Speaker 01:
Is your argument that schools have an affirmative duty to disclose any gender dysphoria issues to the parents or that the schools must disclose that information when a parent requests it?

[00:46:01] Speaker 05:
Certainly the latter.

[00:46:02] Speaker 05:
When they requested?

[00:46:04] Speaker 05:
We wouldn't, I don't think we would suggest that they have an affirmative obligation to provide information that's not even requested.

[00:46:14] Speaker 05:
But they do have an obligation not to try to hide it when parents try to find out about it.

[00:46:19] Speaker 01:
Okay, but if a parent knows enough to ask, don't they have enough information to direct their child's medical treatment and care?

[00:46:28] Speaker 05:
No, because they make it live to.

[00:46:30] Speaker 05:
by school officials, or they may be the subject of evasion.

[00:46:37] Speaker 05:
And again, that's what AB 1955 empowers.

[00:46:40] Speaker 01:
I'm sorry.

[00:46:40] Speaker 01:
I thought you were saying, you agree that under Supreme Court law, the due process clause doesn't require an affirmative obligation on the school to disclose.

[00:46:48] Speaker 01:
So it only is when the parent asks the school, does my child have gender dysphoria?

[00:46:55] Speaker 01:
Is having any gender identity issues in school?

[00:46:57] Speaker 01:
then the school must disclose that information.

[00:47:00] Speaker 01:
But if the parent has enough information to even ask the question, isn't that enough information to direct their child's medical care and treatment?

[00:47:11] Speaker 05:
No.

[00:47:11] Speaker 01:
Why not?

[00:47:13] Speaker 05:
because they may not have the information they need.

[00:47:17] Speaker 05:
I mean, you know, if I were a parent today in some of the schools where our clients attend, I would be very worried about my kids being socially transitioned even if they showed no signs whatsoever of gender identity issues and even if I had no information about that because a parent doesn't know what a parent doesn't know.

[00:47:39] Speaker 05:
And so because of AB 1955, parents have to live in constant fear that if they send their kids to public schools, somebody in the public school, you know, without even any warning or suggestion of gender dysphoria, might try to put a kid on a path towards a gender transition.

[00:48:01] Speaker 05:
And that's one of the fundamental problems with the law.

[00:48:05] Speaker 03:
I'd like if I could also to... A question about the scope of any remand or what we could say in connection with any remand.

[00:48:17] Speaker 03:
Yes.

[00:48:19] Speaker 03:
If we were to determine that the current allegations of the complainer insufficient, even taking into account the material and the

[00:48:29] Speaker 03:
preliminary injunction declarations is functioning as a sort of existing proffer in the record.

[00:48:35] Speaker 03:
If we would find that to be deficient, but give leave to amend to add additional allegations to resolve that on remand, we would be in a situation where our jurisdiction had not yet been established.

[00:48:51] Speaker 03:
If that's the case, our

[00:48:54] Speaker 03:
Is it consistent with Steel Company for us to at this point say anything about the merits or will we have to await to see whether on remand jurisdiction is established and then the case comes back?

[00:49:08] Speaker 05:
Well, I think it would certainly be appropriate for the court to opine on the merits.

[00:49:15] Speaker 05:
Otherwise, if the court is convinced that

[00:49:20] Speaker 05:
the claims as we've pledged them are simply not valid as a matter of constitutional law.

[00:49:25] Speaker 03:
That's the hypothetical jurisdiction.

[00:49:27] Speaker 03:
Steel company condemns the efficient resolution.

[00:49:31] Speaker 03:
The whole theory of hypothetical jurisdiction is if the merits would resolve it one way or the other and move the jurisdictional issue, why bother with the jurisdictional issue?

[00:49:42] Speaker 03:
Steel company says we can't do that.

[00:49:45] Speaker 03:
If we haven't settled our jurisdiction, can we say anything on the merits or do we just have to

[00:49:50] Speaker 05:
remanded and otherwise be silent Well, well, I think that I think the court could pretermit the jurisdictional question by addressing the merits if you wanted to but I would I would do that consistent with steel company I would encourage the court to hold that we have adequately alleged But my hypothetical was suppose we have not I want to know what we do if that's what we do and I need This is your opportunity to help me on that question.

[00:50:15] Speaker 05:
Well, I I

[00:50:18] Speaker 05:
I think we have, at least at a minimum, alleged standing.

[00:50:22] Speaker 05:
I mean, for one thing, and again, we'll be happy to submit a motion for judicial notice with respect to Orange County, which I think would fully square the circle that the Court identified in your opinion, at least with respect to Plaintiff 7A.

[00:50:41] Speaker 05:
And if we are given an opportunity to amend, I think in light of the prior colloquy, we would and we will in fact add challenges to the additional provisions that my friend identified that the state believes also prohibit sharing of gender identity related information with students.

[00:51:04] Speaker 05:
And finally, I would just mention on that.

[00:51:06] Speaker 01:
Can I just ask, you know, when you were here earlier, I specifically asked if we were to find that plaintiffs do not have standing, then we would not have jurisdiction to address the merits correct and you said correct.

[00:51:16] Speaker 01:
The answer now seems different.

[00:51:18] Speaker 01:
Why is that?

[00:51:20] Speaker 01:
I did ask that question earlier.

[00:51:27] Speaker 05:
Well, I don't think there's any doubt that we have sufficiently alleged a basis for standing in the complaint.

[00:51:37] Speaker 05:
And so I think the only real question is have we sufficiently shown through evidence sufficient for a PI

[00:51:46] Speaker 05:
that we have standing.

[00:51:48] Speaker 05:
And I understand the court's earlier opinion to be addressing that evidentiary question.

[00:51:56] Speaker 05:
I suppose if the court were to conclude that even under the allegations, construed as they must be in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, that even under those allegations that we haven't established a basis for standing, then I

[00:52:12] Speaker 05:
then I think my prior answer is correct, that the court would not have jurisdiction to opine on the merits.

[00:52:19] Speaker 05:
But I think you clearly have, in my view, an ample basis for concluding that we have sufficiently alleged the requirements for standing.

[00:52:28] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:52:29] Speaker 03:
Any further questions?

[00:52:30] Speaker 03:
No, thank you.

[00:52:31] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:52:32] Speaker 03:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:52:33] Speaker 03:
We thank both counsel for your very helpful arguments in this case.

[00:52:38] Speaker 03:
And the case just argued is submitted, and we will stand adjourned.

[00:52:55] Speaker 02:
Hear ye, hear ye, all persons having had business with the Honorable the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shall now depart for this court for this session.

[00:53:04] Speaker 02:
Now stands adjourned.

[00:55:51] Speaker 02:
Oh my God.

[00:56:09] Speaker 02:
It's nice.

[00:56:09] Speaker 02:
Mm hmm.

[00:56:31] Speaker 02:
Coming in here, I'll go ahead and finish.