[00:00:03] Speaker 02: Good morning, Your Honours. [00:00:11] Speaker 02: Good morning, Your Honours. [00:00:12] Speaker 02: May it please the Court, Bartis Vacchili for Patrick Douglas. [00:00:16] Speaker 02: I'll watch my time. [00:00:17] Speaker 02: I'm going to aim to reserve two minutes for a bottle here. [00:00:19] Speaker 02: Very well. [00:00:21] Speaker 02: Today I'd like to focus on the two elements of the Strickland claim in particular. [00:00:25] Speaker 02: How trial counsel's investigation into Mr. Douglas's mental illness was deficient under prevailing [00:00:32] Speaker 02: professional standards and how that failure prejudiced him. [00:00:36] Speaker 02: And under how the California Court of Appeals decision was unreasonable and holding otherwise. [00:00:42] Speaker 02: On the deficient performance element, Your Honor, what the California Court of Appeals held was this wasn't deficient. [00:00:49] Speaker 02: His investigation into the mental illness issues wasn't deficient because he had reviewed some medical records sufficient to put him to make him not, quote, not entirely unaware of the issue. [00:01:02] Speaker 02: But the Supreme Court in Wiggins has expressly rejected this rationale as being a sufficient investigation in Wiggins. [00:01:10] Speaker 02: Just like here, there were records indicating relevant evidence to trial counsel. [00:01:14] Speaker 02: There it was social background information. [00:01:16] Speaker 02: It was in the pre-sentence report. [00:01:18] Speaker 02: There was DSS records. [00:01:20] Speaker 02: And the Maryland Court of Appeals there said that's enough for counsel to make an informed tactical decision. [00:01:25] Speaker 02: not to have pursued it any further. [00:01:27] Speaker 02: Council was aware of it, and that was enough. [00:01:30] Speaker 02: And Wiggins, the Supreme Court in Wiggins rejected that. [00:01:33] Speaker 02: The records put Council on notice that there was an issue with it, and that there was a duty to investigate further, including by consulting an expert, in that case a forensic social worker. [00:01:45] Speaker 02: And so applying that rationale, this court, in case after case after case, in Beemore, in Noguera, in Whedon, even in the case of the government sites, Douglas and others, counsel is aware of mental health issues, but that awareness doesn't end the investigation. [00:02:04] Speaker 02: It triggers the need for further investigation. [00:02:07] Speaker 02: Essentially, trial counsel has to investigate under the ABA guidelines, [00:02:12] Speaker 02: to make a sufficient determination that is clearly not relevant. [00:02:16] Speaker 02: That's just not what counsel did here under Wiggins. [00:02:19] Speaker 00: Well, I think at least my reading of the record really highlights this deficiency in terms of the duty to investigate and go further because the issue was on the table. [00:02:33] Speaker 00: But then we have [00:02:34] Speaker 00: Because we're here on habeas review, as you know, we had a lot of procedural and substantive hurdles to jump through. [00:02:41] Speaker 00: So looking at the standard under the prejudice prong, the question being, but for these errors, would the result have been different? [00:02:51] Speaker 00: So it would help me if you would address that standard that we need to consider if we're looking here on the guilt phase. [00:02:59] Speaker 02: Yes, Your Honor. [00:02:59] Speaker 02: And so at the guilt phase, the standard [00:03:04] Speaker 02: But for counsel's errors, is it sufficient to undermine the court's confidence that even one juror, one, would have changed their mind on the issue of mental state in this case had they gotten the whole picture of mental illness? [00:03:19] Speaker 02: So that's the standard. [00:03:20] Speaker 02: And then, yes, but was it unreasonable for the California Court of Appeals to hold otherwise? [00:03:26] Speaker 02: And the answer is yes. [00:03:27] Speaker 02: And so to understand that, Your Honor, we have to understand that this is a specific intent crime with an aggravator for premeditation and deliberation. [00:03:37] Speaker 02: These are the mental states at issue. [00:03:39] Speaker 00: And he said, I'm going to kill this bitch, right? [00:03:42] Speaker 00: And I'm going to go on a killing spree. [00:03:45] Speaker 00: So we have to kind of figure that in, right? [00:03:48] Speaker 02: Right. [00:03:48] Speaker 02: And so the California Court of Appeals says, Dr. DiFrancisco's testimony is general and vague and not really enough to get over this piece of evidence. [00:03:56] Speaker 02: But that was unreasonable in light of the state of the law, Your Honor. [00:04:01] Speaker 02: The California Court of Appeals, in two separate cases, has considered similarly, I think, damning evidence on specific intent and premeditation. [00:04:10] Speaker 02: in people v. Cortez and people v. Herrera. [00:04:14] Speaker 02: And in those cases, for instance, in people v. Cortez, there was a stabbing. [00:04:19] Speaker 02: The defendant's own witness said, I pulled my friend out of there. [00:04:25] Speaker 02: There had been an altercation with the victim. [00:04:27] Speaker 02: He said, I pulled my friend out of there and my friend told me, I'm going to handle this guy. [00:04:31] Speaker 02: And he lifts up his shirt and he shows the knife. [00:04:34] Speaker 02: And then moments later, he goes in, and there's a stabbing, and the victim dies. [00:04:39] Speaker 02: So you have this sort of damning evidence of intent with the showing of the knife. [00:04:45] Speaker 02: Trial counsel Ann Cortez wanted to submit evidence of dissociation, which is consistent with what Dr. DeFrancisco wanted to do. [00:04:54] Speaker 02: And the trial court said no. [00:04:56] Speaker 02: And the California Court of Appeals reversed, said this was prejudicial. [00:04:59] Speaker 02: It said specifically, dissociative states prevent persons from forming intent. [00:05:05] Speaker 02: An appellate may have been in such a state. [00:05:08] Speaker 02: Dissociative states mean that people have lack conscious volition. [00:05:13] Speaker 02: This is part of Dr. DeFrancisco's testimony that Mr. Douglas suffered from PTSD, that in September he had suffered this gruesome beating. [00:05:22] Speaker 02: He was hospitalized. [00:05:23] Speaker 02: He suffered head injuries. [00:05:26] Speaker 02: A few weeks later, he's in a car crash, he's investigated as a suicide attempt. [00:05:29] Speaker 02: And then a month later, these attacks happen. [00:05:32] Speaker 02: And so, yes, there's this evidence that isn't good for Mr. Douglas. [00:05:37] Speaker 02: But this evidence of dissociation in People View Cortez had to be heard. [00:05:41] Speaker 02: There, the court reversed. [00:05:43] Speaker 02: Herrera is almost similar. [00:05:45] Speaker 02: In Herrera, it's another stabbing. [00:05:46] Speaker 02: It happens in a car, like here. [00:05:48] Speaker 02: And there, the defendant drives to a CVS with the victim in his car, their friends. [00:05:55] Speaker 02: And there had been an altercation. [00:05:57] Speaker 02: Things had gotten heated. [00:05:58] Speaker 02: He goes to the CVS, buys a knife. [00:06:01] Speaker 02: Now, he testifies he bought the knife because he had to cook the next day. [00:06:05] Speaker 02: But he buys a knife at CVS, buys scissors at CVS, at CVS cuts the knife free from its packaging, and then puts it in his pocket and brings it into the car. [00:06:15] Speaker 02: That's pretty darn bad evidence in terms of intent. [00:06:19] Speaker 02: And moments later, there's an altercation. [00:06:22] Speaker 02: The victim runs from the car. [00:06:24] Speaker 02: The defendant chases him out and stabs him 26 times. [00:06:28] Speaker 02: Again, counsel wanted to submit evidence of dissociative state on the intent issue. [00:06:35] Speaker 02: Again, the trial court said no. [00:06:36] Speaker 02: And again, a different California Court of Appeals. [00:06:38] Speaker 02: Now we have two California Courts of Appeals saying that's prejudicial and said specifically, the denial left the jury no basis to infer that Herrera had lapsed into a dissociative state. [00:06:51] Speaker 02: in which he might not have deliberately premeditated the infliction of wounds on the victim. [00:06:56] Speaker 02: And it allowed the prosecutor to argue that there was no alternative explanation for the crimes. [00:07:02] Speaker 02: And that's precisely what happened here. [00:07:04] Speaker 02: Here the prosecution's theory was that this evidence of the video put Mr. Douglas into what prosecutors called an indiscriminate rage. [00:07:14] Speaker 02: And that's the motive, right? [00:07:16] Speaker 02: And so [00:07:18] Speaker 02: Without anything to explain that, the jury had nothing else to go on. [00:07:22] Speaker 02: And this evidence of intermittent explosive disorder, PTSD, that would have given the jury something to hang their hat on as a more precise verdict to find. [00:07:36] Speaker 02: Now, it's important to know that sufficiency of that video, Your Honor, may support a finding of intent and premeditation. [00:07:45] Speaker 02: Now remember, deliberation is formed at or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of the considerations for and against the proposed action. [00:07:57] Speaker 02: That's what we require for deliberation. [00:08:00] Speaker 02: That comes from People v. Houston. [00:08:01] Speaker 02: That's the California Supreme Court. [00:08:03] Speaker 02: It's also in the jury instructions. [00:08:04] Speaker 02: It's at 117 of the record. [00:08:07] Speaker 00: And so I don't want to interrupt, but you triggered something in my mind about the footage and the body cam. [00:08:15] Speaker 00: That's, I don't find it in the record. [00:08:18] Speaker 00: Is it in the record? [00:08:18] Speaker 02: There's a transcript of the video, Your Honor. [00:08:20] Speaker 02: The video itself is not in the record. [00:08:22] Speaker 00: Okay, that's what I thought. [00:08:23] Speaker 00: So the video is not part of the record. [00:08:25] Speaker 02: It's not part of the record, but the transcript of the video is. [00:08:27] Speaker 02: And the transcript of the video indicates he's, it takes place a couple minutes before the first attack, after the first attack. [00:08:34] Speaker 02: The attacks are about 12 minutes apart. [00:08:36] Speaker 02: It takes place a couple minutes after the first attack, presumably on his way to the second. [00:08:42] Speaker 02: And he's [00:08:43] Speaker 02: He's yelling at somebody into his phone saying, I'm going to go on a killing spree. [00:08:50] Speaker 02: He says something like, forgive the language, I'm no bitch. [00:08:55] Speaker 02: You'll see, I'm going to go on a killing spree. [00:08:57] Speaker 02: And the government's argument that that was premeditation, that was deliberation, was exactly what he said. [00:09:05] Speaker 02: There was a plan. [00:09:05] Speaker 02: There was nothing else to give the jury here. [00:09:09] Speaker 02: But that's really thin on careful thought, weighing of considerations for and against. [00:09:15] Speaker 02: And if had the jury heard, hey, this person suffers from intermittent explosive disorder, one of the symptoms, as Dr. DeFrancesto told us, is this urge to violence that's not premeditated, that can't be controlled. [00:09:30] Speaker 02: He also suffers from PTSD and might have been in an dissociative state, because he doesn't remember any of what happened. [00:09:36] Speaker 02: under people v. Herrera, people v. Cortez, the court should have, the jury should have heard those things. [00:09:42] Speaker 02: And it's unreasonable for the California Court of Appeals, in light of what its sister courts did, to say otherwise. [00:09:49] Speaker 02: Now, as I was saying before, the record might support a finding of specific intent, bless you, Your Honor, based on the video, certainly. [00:10:00] Speaker 02: But that's not the question. [00:10:01] Speaker 02: That's going to be the case in virtually all of these appeals. [00:10:04] Speaker 02: Someone was convicted. [00:10:05] Speaker 02: there is sufficient evidence. [00:10:08] Speaker 02: That's not the standard. [00:10:09] Speaker 02: The standard of the evidence is whether this court, or the California Court of Appeals, could, would be, you know, their confidence would be undermined that even one jury member would have changed their mind. [00:10:24] Speaker 02: And for this court to determine whether it's unreasonable for the court to do so. [00:10:28] Speaker 02: And I point the court to Grace v. Herzog. [00:10:30] Speaker 02: It's a decision of this court. [00:10:32] Speaker 02: Now it's an IAC claim on [00:10:35] Speaker 02: It's crazy, Herzl, on a failure to instruct on a lesser included. [00:10:39] Speaker 02: So it's not exactly apples to apples. [00:10:41] Speaker 02: But the court acknowledges there the phenomenon that exists, that juries, when presented with evidence and options, not just a black or white, guilty or not guilty, but guilty, a lesser included, an aggravator, these options, and given evidence, they'll tend to fit the conviction to the crime. [00:11:02] Speaker 02: in the way that makes most sense from a justice standpoint. [00:11:05] Speaker 02: And Chris acknowledges that this happens, and so this sufficiency standard isn't really what we're looking at. [00:11:11] Speaker 02: What would one of these jurors have changed their mind? [00:11:13] Speaker 02: Maybe. [00:11:15] Speaker 02: Right? [00:11:15] Speaker 02: And is it unreasonable to think one wouldn't? [00:11:17] Speaker 02: And given the evidence, I'd suggest that it's unreasonable to say that it was not going to happen to even one juror. [00:11:27] Speaker 02: If I could turn for a moment to sentencing, the presence of sentencing, [00:11:32] Speaker 02: I do think this court can get to the issue of presence of sentencing, notwithstanding that it wasn't precisely raised at the state court level. [00:11:42] Speaker 02: Now, perhaps now, about a month ago, this court issued an opinion in Atkins v. Bean, I think Judge Callahan wrote it for the majority, that I think takes off the table that the failure to investigate sentencing is a standalone ground for ineffective assistance. [00:11:59] Speaker 02: I think this court can and should and actually must consider the prejudiced sentencing as part of the prejudice analysis for the failure to investigate this undoubtedly preserved. [00:12:13] Speaker 02: And so in Browning v. Baker, [00:12:17] Speaker 02: This court says, while an individual claiming ISE must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of a reasonable professional judgment, that quote Strickland, the court considers counsel's conduct as a whole to determine whether it was constitutionally adequate. [00:12:38] Speaker 02: Strickland itself says, in making a president's determination, a court hearing an effectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence [00:12:46] Speaker 02: before the judge or the jury. [00:12:48] Speaker 02: And as court held in Beemore, the duty to investigate pervades all aspects. [00:12:54] Speaker 02: You must investigate for purposes of guilt phase and sentencing phase, because a strategy that might not be, even if a long shot at the guilt phase, might be the superior choice in view of the impending penalty phase. [00:13:07] Speaker 02: And so really, when viewing prejudice, the court should look holistically at what happened. [00:13:13] Speaker 02: Yes, the petitioner has to point specific conduct that fell short. [00:13:18] Speaker 02: That's the exhaustion. [00:13:20] Speaker 02: But in determining the whole IAC claim, a prejudice, the court should look at the totality of the circumstances. [00:13:28] Speaker 02: And with that, I saved my two minutes. [00:13:30] Speaker 02: Very well. [00:13:31] Speaker 01: Well, we'll go ahead and round up the two minutes, but you'll get your two. [00:13:34] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:13:39] Speaker 03: May it please the court, Deputy Attorney General Amanda Lloyd on behalf of respondent. [00:13:44] Speaker 03: Douglas stabbed two females in two separate violent attacks, during which he clearly stated his intent to kill both victims. [00:13:52] Speaker 03: But his victims survived. [00:13:54] Speaker 03: Not only were they able to testify against him, but Douglas recorded a video between the two attacks, proclaiming his intent to go on a killing spree, which ultimately ended in his attempt to run over a sheriff's deputy and a high-speed chase. [00:14:06] Speaker 03: The state courts denied Douglas relief from his convictions on direct appeal and habeas. [00:14:11] Speaker 03: And because the state courts reasonably applied United States Supreme Court law, the district court's denial of Douglas's habeas petition should be affirmed. [00:14:21] Speaker 03: While Douglas raises two claims regarding [00:14:25] Speaker 03: First, the state courts reasonably applied Strickland in rejecting Douglas' ineffective assistance of counsel claims. [00:14:31] Speaker 03: While Douglas raises two claims on appeal, both failure to investigate and present a diminished actuality defense and failure to present mental health evidence at sentencing, only the former is properly before this court. [00:14:45] Speaker 03: Douglas did not mention mitigation or sentencing anywhere in his state or federal habeas petitions. [00:14:51] Speaker 03: So it is unexhausted and also not cognizable before this court because it was not raised below. [00:14:56] Speaker 03: And Douglas cannot overcome the strong presumption that his counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. [00:15:09] Speaker 03: Counsel is deficient only if no competent attorney would have taken the same action. [00:15:15] Speaker 03: Douglas' counsel was aware of prior counsel's request for a psychological evaluation and why. [00:15:23] Speaker 03: Counsel was aware of his diagnoses, and counsel had met with Douglas 10 times, more than 10 times, and had lengthy discussions about the merits of the case. [00:15:34] Speaker 03: As the state courts found, Douglas failed to identify any other evidence that trial counsel was unaware of that would support a viable mental health defense. [00:15:44] Speaker 03: And it's particularly with diminished actuality, while the doctor could have testified as to the diagnoses and definitions of the mental illnesses, which is what he stated in his declaration, the only way to connect those diagnoses and definitions to what happened during the actual crime would have been to put Douglas on the stand. [00:16:09] Speaker 03: And that was risky. [00:16:10] Speaker 03: And the trial counsel made a tactical decision [00:16:15] Speaker 03: that going with that defense was not the best decision considering the video evidence of Douglass's intent to kill. [00:16:29] Speaker 03: But even if Douglas' counsel was deficient, as this court stated in Beemore, a tactical decision may constitutionally adequate representation, even if in hindsight, a different defense might have fared better. [00:16:44] Speaker 03: So here, defense counsel had basically two bad defenses to choose from. [00:16:50] Speaker 03: One, identity, where he didn't have to put Douglas on the stand, and alternatively, going with the deficient actuality, where he would have to put Douglas on the stand. [00:17:01] Speaker 03: But even if counsel was deficient in some way, Douglas cannot show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have been different. [00:17:12] Speaker 03: And this is the likelihood of a different outcome must be substantial, not just conceivable. [00:17:17] Speaker 03: And here we have facts showing that Douglas made a series of choices that night. [00:17:22] Speaker 03: He chose to be out at 2.30 in the morning with a knife armed. [00:17:26] Speaker 03: He chose to pick up the first victim. [00:17:28] Speaker 03: and drive her around town. [00:17:30] Speaker 03: When she asked to get out of the car due to his driving, he chose to take her to a parking lot where he parked the car, locked the doors, walked around to the trunk, and said, I am going to kill this bitch. [00:17:41] Speaker 03: He then proceeded to the passenger side window and stabbed her approximately 15 times, pulled her out of the car, and left her there to bleed as he drove away. [00:17:51] Speaker 03: to his next victim. [00:17:53] Speaker 03: On his way, he made this video where he showed the blood all over the passenger side. [00:17:58] Speaker 03: He showed himself holding a knife and driving down the road. [00:18:00] Speaker 03: And he stated again, quote, I'm about to go on a killing spree. [00:18:04] Speaker 03: I'm going to kill everyone I can kill. [00:18:06] Speaker 03: You'll never see me again. [00:18:07] Speaker 03: And when he arrived at his second destination, he took the same knife. [00:18:11] Speaker 03: He walked up to the second victim, who was a delivery driver, simply delivering her goods to the 7-Eleven. [00:18:16] Speaker 03: And he stabbed her twice in the side and once in the arm. [00:18:19] Speaker 03: and took off again, leaving her there, bleeding to death. [00:18:24] Speaker 03: This is a series of choices that Douglas made, showing that his intent that night was to kill these two women, and probably more if the deputies had not caught up with him and eventually tracked him down. [00:18:42] Speaker 03: As to the second issue before this court, I don't know if the court wants to reach the [00:18:49] Speaker 03: the Chapman issue as well, didn't really go too far into it. [00:18:53] Speaker 01: I had just a practical question, and I don't mean to shade anything on my view of it, but let's say they happen to be right on that issue. [00:19:03] Speaker 01: He was convicted of a lot of things here. [00:19:05] Speaker 01: So what would the practical effect be if there were a Chapman error, and I'm talking EDBA Chapman error, which I'm not suggesting, I'm just [00:19:12] Speaker 01: I'm just trying to understand in a state court, we'll go back to re-sentencing, but what would the practical effect be? [00:19:17] Speaker 01: Because I don't mean to diminish the severity of that conviction, but even a lot of other stuff that night that was far worse than the car offense. [00:19:28] Speaker 01: So what would the bottom line be? [00:19:30] Speaker 03: I don't know exactly what the bottom line would be practically. [00:19:36] Speaker 03: I don't think the court needs to go there because it is harmless beyond reasonable doubt. [00:19:39] Speaker 01: I understand. [00:19:40] Speaker 01: I'm just trying to understand that. [00:19:42] Speaker 01: I don't mean to diminish it, but it's like murder, murder, murder, attempted murder, attempted murder, and then kind of drove with the car. [00:19:52] Speaker 01: This case was not about the car. [00:19:53] Speaker 01: This case was really about the attempted murder. [00:19:56] Speaker 01: So I was just trying to think more practical. [00:19:58] Speaker 03: Practically, it probably would not mean much in terms of resentencing or something, yes. [00:20:02] Speaker 03: But again, we would argue that the [00:20:07] Speaker 03: that no fair-minded jurists could, you know, sorry, that Douglas has not shown that no fair-minded jurists could agree with the state's application of the federal harmlessness standard. [00:20:17] Speaker 00: So... Well, I mean, one thing that the state court said that was a little troubling is that, well, it's unlikely the jury would have found this. [00:20:24] Speaker 00: That's not quite the standard, right? [00:20:27] Speaker 03: No, but it did follow up right after that immediately with the correct standard. [00:20:30] Speaker 03: And you can tell by looking at the totality of the decision that the court applied the right standard. [00:20:34] Speaker 03: And may have misspoken as to the unlikely miss there. [00:20:38] Speaker 00: So everybody seemed to agree that you can't use the car as saying it's an inherently dangerous. [00:20:45] Speaker 03: Correct. [00:20:45] Speaker 03: And neither council argued that the car was inherently dangerous on his own, but that the way that Douglas used the car by driving it directly at the deputy who was standing in his stance, gun pointed, telling him to stop and driving it directly at him, [00:21:01] Speaker 03: The only way that the deputy was not hit was because he was able to step out of the way. [00:21:04] Speaker 03: And of course, the car went by him so closely that he was able to kick it on its way by. [00:21:09] Speaker 03: Because Douglas has failed to show that the state courts unreasonably applied Strickland and Chapman, or that their decisions were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, we ask this court to affirm. [00:21:23] Speaker 01: Thank you, counsel. [00:21:29] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honor, and I'll be brief here. [00:21:33] Speaker 02: Counsel here essentially made our case for us about why trial counsel's choice of mistaken identity defense was futile. [00:21:41] Speaker 02: There was nowhere to go with that defense. [00:21:44] Speaker 02: What counsel had to have done under the ABA standards was investigate the mental health issues first, then make a determination as a trial strategy with in mind the fact that this client was facing two life sentences. [00:21:58] Speaker 02: And maybe the right strategy under BMOR is you sort of walk in there and say, OK, they got us. [00:22:05] Speaker 02: But here's the reasons why. [00:22:07] Speaker 02: And let's try to lighten the sentence here. [00:22:08] Speaker 02: You have to investigate to inform your trial strategy. [00:22:12] Speaker 02: And that's just not what was done here. [00:22:16] Speaker 02: Just really briefly on the Chapman issue, the issue turns on what it means to use a car as a deadly weapon. [00:22:26] Speaker 02: And the definition is, [00:22:28] Speaker 02: is it used in a way that's likely to result in death or great bodily harm, substantial injury. [00:22:35] Speaker 02: That's a really fact-dependent inquiry. [00:22:38] Speaker 02: I don't know how many times I've driven my car five to ten miles an hour since I've caught this case. [00:22:42] Speaker 02: Many, many, many times. [00:22:45] Speaker 02: It's really hard to imagine that the deputy, a former Marine looking right at [00:22:50] Speaker 02: the defendant driving 5 to 10 miles an hour, sort of kicking the car as it's coming to him, that it was likely he was going to suffer harm. [00:22:59] Speaker 02: Assaulted? [00:23:00] Speaker 02: An assault? [00:23:00] Speaker 02: Yes, but assault is likely to suffer great bodily injury. [00:23:04] Speaker 02: I don't know that that goes there. [00:23:06] Speaker 02: The last part of the practicalities, Your Honor. [00:23:10] Speaker 02: There are crimes here for which he was convicted that he did not appeal. [00:23:12] Speaker 02: There are lesser included offenses here for which the mental state arguments won't work. [00:23:18] Speaker 02: Mr. Douglas, he said from the beginning, he said in the mitigation, he said it when he allocated at sentencing, I understand something egregious was done here and a punishment is deserved. [00:23:29] Speaker 02: And all we're asking for in this case, Your Honor, is that he be provided the opportunity to give all of the relevant evidence so that the conviction and the punishment fit the crime. [00:23:39] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:23:40] Speaker 01: All right, thank you, counsel. [00:23:41] Speaker 01: Thanks to both of you for your briefing and argument. [00:23:44] Speaker 01: This matter is submitted. [00:23:45] Speaker 01: I want to thank you, counsel, today for doing a good job before the law students. [00:23:48] Speaker 01: It's always rough when they don't. [00:23:51] Speaker 01: But that was not the case today. [00:23:53] Speaker 01: So we're going to adjourn here. [00:23:54] Speaker 01: But my understanding is that for those who want to stay on, some law clerks from our court are going to do some question and answer for a little bit. [00:24:01] Speaker 01: And then we may come back out. [00:24:02] Speaker 01: We'll see how much time we have left before then. [00:24:04] Speaker 01: But we are adjourned. [00:24:05] Speaker 01: Thank you, everybody.