[00:00:02] Speaker 03: Madam Clerk, is this the video participant? [00:00:06] Speaker 03: Yeah, this is the argument. [00:00:07] Speaker 03: Okay, so then I need to do a bit of a sound test. [00:00:10] Speaker 03: There you are. [00:00:11] Speaker 03: Council, can you hear us okay? [00:00:17] Speaker 04: Now you're unmuted. [00:00:18] Speaker 04: I'll just unmute myself so I can hear you. [00:00:20] Speaker 04: Can you hear me? [00:00:21] Speaker 03: Yes, we can. [00:00:21] Speaker 03: And you can see us okay and we're all good. [00:00:24] Speaker 03: Yeah, thank you so much. [00:00:25] Speaker 03: Council, you're able to see and hear opposing Council? [00:00:28] Speaker 03: Okay, in that case, we're all set. [00:00:30] Speaker 03: You can may begin. [00:00:30] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:00:42] Speaker 00: May it please the court. [00:00:43] Speaker 00: My name is Katherine Rentra, and I represent Mr. Duane Esparza in the petitioner in this matter, and I would like to reserve four minutes for rebuttal, please. [00:00:51] Speaker 00: This case turns on whether the department met its burden to prove removability of a lawful permanent resident of nearly 40 years. [00:00:58] Speaker 00: It does not. [00:00:59] Speaker 00: It did not, excuse me. [00:01:00] Speaker 00: The agency made three fundamental legal errors that require a vacature of the underlying removal order or at least a remand. [00:01:07] Speaker 00: First, the agency failed to apply the categorical approach when analyzing Mr. Duane Esparza's case, and this court has required that method for other similar conduct-based removal grounds in both Alana Salvarado versus Holder and Zalai versus Holder. [00:01:22] Speaker 00: California Penal Code section 236.1C is broader than the federal trafficking definition, and the agency improperly relied on police reports [00:01:31] Speaker 00: instead of engaging in any kind of statutory analysis or relying on otherwise shepherd approved conviction documents. [00:01:38] Speaker 00: Accordingly, the agency erred in finding that the department met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Duane Esparza is removable. [00:01:46] Speaker 01: Let's assume that we don't think the categorical approach applies, that the agency was entitled to look at your client's statement before the IJ. [00:02:01] Speaker 01: If that's the case, why doesn't your client's statement before the IJ establish that he committed a human trafficking offense? [00:02:11] Speaker 00: Your Honor, our position is that that is a legal question, a question that our client wasn't fit to define. [00:02:19] Speaker 01: Well, they said to him, Mr. Petitioner, you're here. [00:02:25] Speaker 01: We're here to determine whether you've committed a human trafficking offense. [00:02:29] Speaker 01: And he said, yep, I did. [00:02:30] Speaker 01: Why isn't that enough to provide clear and convincing evidence that he committed a human trafficking offense? [00:02:37] Speaker 00: My reading of the record is that what the petitioner was agreeing to is that he had been convicted of a human trafficking offense in California. [00:02:46] Speaker 00: That's right. [00:02:47] Speaker 00: Right. [00:02:47] Speaker 00: But our position is that agreeing to that conviction or that offense, rather, in California is not the same thing as agreeing that he is removable from the U.S. [00:02:58] Speaker 00: There has to be [00:03:00] Speaker 00: some kind of analysis to determine whether a violation or an offense that falls within the realm of Section 236.1C of the California Penal Code is also a human trafficking... Well, no, but I'm telling you right now that I'm not worried about the categorical approach. [00:03:17] Speaker 01: So the judge, in my view, if we don't worry about the categorical approach, looks at the evidence to determine whether your client committed a human trafficking offense. [00:03:28] Speaker 01: He says, the client says, yes, I did. [00:03:30] Speaker 01: That's some evidence. [00:03:33] Speaker 01: The colloquy in the trial court presents some evidence. [00:03:40] Speaker 01: The police reports, which the rules of evidence don't apply in immigration court, provides some evidence. [00:03:49] Speaker 01: And the judge then concludes, yes, you have. [00:03:53] Speaker 01: So it seems to me if the judge is not constrained by the California statute, I want to get back to that in a second. [00:04:01] Speaker 01: After Judge Fulcher has a chance to ask a question, please. [00:04:04] Speaker 01: After other people have questions. [00:04:05] Speaker 01: But why isn't that enough? [00:04:09] Speaker 00: You like me to respond first? [00:04:10] Speaker 00: Yes. [00:04:10] Speaker 00: I apologize. [00:04:11] Speaker 00: I thought you were waiting for Judge Fulcher. [00:04:13] Speaker 00: No, I confused. [00:04:14] Speaker 00: Go right ahead. [00:04:15] Speaker 00: We don't think that that is enough. [00:04:17] Speaker 01: Again, the standard... Well, I know you don't think it's enough. [00:04:19] Speaker 01: Tell me why. [00:04:20] Speaker 00: Yes, yes. [00:04:21] Speaker 00: The standard here is clear and convincing evidence. [00:04:23] Speaker 00: And Mr. Duane Esparza is a lawful permanent resident. [00:04:27] Speaker 00: And so it is the government's job to prove this heightened standard of removability. [00:04:32] Speaker 00: And as you explained, federal rules of evidence do not strictly apply in immigration court, but they are persuasive. [00:04:38] Speaker 00: And the government did not make any effort to [00:04:42] Speaker 00: verify the information within the police reports. [00:04:45] Speaker 00: There are no additional witnesses called by the government. [00:04:48] Speaker 00: We have no additional testimony suggesting that everything in the police reports is true. [00:04:55] Speaker 00: So we would argue that that evidence is insufficient. [00:04:59] Speaker 00: And you're right. [00:05:00] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:05:01] Speaker 03: Could we hear from Judge Fletcher? [00:05:02] Speaker 02: Absolutely. [00:05:04] Speaker 02: I want to pursue, I guess, the question that was already before you. [00:05:08] Speaker 02: You started out by saying that the categorical approach applies. [00:05:12] Speaker 02: I don't see that it does. [00:05:13] Speaker 02: Judge Hurwitz didn't tell you why he doesn't think it applies, but I'll tell you why I don't think it applies. [00:05:19] Speaker 02: Because the statute doesn't talk about a conviction. [00:05:22] Speaker 02: The statute only talks about an alien who commits or conspires to commit. [00:05:28] Speaker 02: It doesn't say who's been convicted of. [00:05:30] Speaker 02: So I don't think the categorical approach applies at all. [00:05:33] Speaker 02: Do you have a response to that? [00:05:35] Speaker 00: Yes, Your Honor. [00:05:37] Speaker 00: So as we know, the popular language, conviction is a relevant statutory hook, right? [00:05:43] Speaker 00: But that is not strictly applied in the Ninth Circuit, where other conduct-based removal grounds have been subject to the categorical approach. [00:05:53] Speaker 00: And the examples that I selected were [00:05:56] Speaker 00: Section 237A2E, Romanet 2, which is the domestic violence protection order violation removability ground. [00:06:04] Speaker 00: And that's the Alana Salvarado versus Holder and Salai cases where this court chose to apply. [00:06:09] Speaker 00: Categorical approach even though it's not necessarily required that but here the only question is did he commit? [00:06:16] Speaker 02: And it doesn't say was he convicted of and so we just look at the evidence as to whether or not he was Convicted which is then the evidence that you were going back and forth on and you're saying there's not enough evidence But I don't see that this is a categorical case at all well your honor I think that I would pivot then to the second portion of my argument is that the immigration judge aired in his statutory analysis because he [00:06:38] Speaker 00: applied the reason to believe language to the entire provision of the statute. [00:06:42] Speaker 01: Right after he said reason to believe, he cites the correct standard. [00:06:47] Speaker 01: The very next sentence says clear and convincing evidence. [00:06:51] Speaker 01: So he may have had a reason to believe. [00:06:54] Speaker 01: We all have a reason to believe on this record. [00:06:56] Speaker 01: But he also then went on to say the standard is clear and convincing evidence. [00:07:00] Speaker 01: So why should we assume that since the immigration judge actually said the right standard, he didn't apply it? [00:07:07] Speaker 00: Judge Hurwitz, I think of those as two separate inquiries, right? [00:07:12] Speaker 00: So there's whether the department has met its burden by clear and convincing evidence, but there's also the question of whether, in this case, Mr. Duane Sperasa actually committed or conspired to commit a human trafficking offense, or the second clause, whether there is reason to believe that he is an aider or a better or other tangential actor to human trafficking. [00:07:34] Speaker 00: And so what the immigration judge did [00:07:36] Speaker 00: is he found that the department had met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reason to believe that Mr. Duane Esparza actually engaged in human trafficking. [00:07:46] Speaker 00: And that's not what the statute says. [00:07:48] Speaker 00: Instead, the statute bifurcates this question and the reason to believe language only applies to the second clause related to tangential actors. [00:08:00] Speaker 00: And I think we have to understand that [00:08:02] Speaker 00: that Congress must have done this intentionally especially when comparing it to the drug trafficking statute in which the reason to believe language applies to the entire provision. [00:08:12] Speaker 00: But here there's a very specific choice. [00:08:14] Speaker 02: I'm inclined to think that you've got a fair argument here that even with that second sentence that Judge Hurwitz read to you, it may well be that he thought that the standard was reason to believe. [00:08:25] Speaker 02: Isn't the error harmless, however? [00:08:27] Speaker 02: Look at the record. [00:08:29] Speaker 00: Your Honor, I would say no. [00:08:30] Speaker 00: I think first, you know, legal error [00:08:33] Speaker 00: is sufficient on its own to remand. [00:08:36] Speaker 00: And also in this case, remember, we're dealing with a lawful permanent resident of over 40 years. [00:08:41] Speaker 01: And that's why... Who pimped out a 14-year-old girl. [00:08:43] Speaker 01: And so the question isn't whether he was a legal permanent resident of 14 years. [00:08:48] Speaker 01: We're not weighing the equities here. [00:08:50] Speaker 01: The question is whether he committed a human trafficking offense. [00:08:53] Speaker 01: The record makes incredibly clear that he did. [00:08:57] Speaker 01: There may have been legal error in the way the IJ analyzed the case, but [00:09:02] Speaker 01: I'm having a difficult time viewing your client as somebody who didn't commit a human trafficking offense. [00:09:08] Speaker 00: Involving a minor. [00:09:09] Speaker 00: Involving a minor. [00:09:11] Speaker 00: I think it's helpful to go back to the standard. [00:09:13] Speaker 00: So, you know, disregarding the amount of time that Mr. Duane Esparza has been in the United States, the fact remains that Congress intentionally set the clear and convincing evidence standard when dealing with an LPR. [00:09:28] Speaker 01: I guess the question to Judge Fletcher maybe [00:09:31] Speaker 01: may have been asking, I think he was asking, is doesn't it plainly meet that standard? [00:09:36] Speaker 01: Could anybody conclude that the evidence didn't meet the clear and convincing evidence standard? [00:09:42] Speaker 00: I don't think it did, Your Honor, for the reason... How? [00:09:44] Speaker 03: This is it for me. [00:09:45] Speaker 03: How is it not? [00:09:47] Speaker 03: How does it fall short? [00:09:49] Speaker 00: As I mentioned earlier, I don't think that the police reports are reliable, and the government should have done more to call witnesses to explain what was going on in the police reports or more details of the investigation. [00:10:02] Speaker 03: This is again to back up of your client saying, answering the question, yes, I committed a human trafficking offense. [00:10:07] Speaker 03: Your Honor, again, the... Tough argument for you to make. [00:10:10] Speaker 03: What's your very best shot? [00:10:11] Speaker 00: The burden is on the government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is not [00:10:15] Speaker 00: on the respondent to prove that he is not removable from the United States? [00:10:20] Speaker 01: And had the respondent said, I contest that, or I don't know, or I didn't do that, then I'd understand that the government might have to then come in with a different level of proof or different matters of proof. [00:10:33] Speaker 01: But your client never contested it. [00:10:37] Speaker 01: And so that's why I think we have to view the evidence in that light. [00:10:42] Speaker 03: We've given you an awful lot of questions. [00:10:44] Speaker 03: You wanted to reserve some time for four minutes. [00:10:49] Speaker 02: I'll say it this way. [00:10:50] Speaker 02: You said you had three points. [00:10:51] Speaker 02: We've only talked about two of them. [00:10:53] Speaker 00: Yes, well, I'm happy to rest on the briefing on the applications for relief. [00:10:58] Speaker 03: Do you have more you want to tell us now or do you want to reserve? [00:11:00] Speaker 00: Yeah, I'll continue on to speak to your question a little bit more Judge Hurwitz. [00:11:05] Speaker 00: I think it's important to come back to [00:11:08] Speaker 00: the reason to believe issue with the immigration judge's decision and so it's not clear from this decision whether the immigration judge believed that the department met by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Drainis-Barraza is removable or whether he only decided as we see in the record that the department met by clear and convincing evidence that there is [00:11:29] Speaker 00: in fact, a reason to believe. [00:11:34] Speaker 00: And I see we're close to 4 minutes. [00:11:36] Speaker 00: I'll go ahead and just reserve the rest of my time there. [00:11:38] Speaker 03: You bet. [00:11:38] Speaker 03: We'll hear from opposing counsel, please. [00:11:46] Speaker 04: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:11:47] Speaker 04: Jessica Burns on behalf of the Attorney General. [00:11:50] Speaker 04: Mr. Duane Esparza is removable as an alien who committed a human trafficking offense. [00:11:56] Speaker 04: The removability ground under the INA does not require conviction. [00:11:59] Speaker 04: It solely requires commission of a human trafficking offense inside or outside the United States. [00:12:05] Speaker 04: Petitioner does not dispute that he committed human trafficking in California. [00:12:09] Speaker 04: The California statute requires exhortation of a minor to commit a commercial sex act, and he does not meaningfully dispute [00:12:18] Speaker 04: that this constitutes human trafficking. [00:12:20] Speaker 04: And accordingly, the court should uphold the removability finding. [00:12:23] Speaker 01: I have a preliminary question for you. [00:12:27] Speaker 04: Yes, sir. [00:12:28] Speaker 01: What is human trafficking? [00:12:31] Speaker 01: I searched through the statutes in vain to find a definition of human trafficking. [00:12:38] Speaker 01: I find a definition of severe human trafficking, which must be human trafficking plus something. [00:12:45] Speaker 01: How do I know what the elements of human trafficking are? [00:12:49] Speaker 01: It may not be relevant in this case. [00:12:51] Speaker 01: I'm trying to figure out what they are. [00:12:54] Speaker 04: Human trafficking isn't defined in federal law. [00:12:56] Speaker 04: The only place where it is defined is in the context of severe forms of human trafficking. [00:13:02] Speaker 04: And again, I think the government would agree that human trafficking is something less than severe forms of human trafficking. [00:13:08] Speaker 01: OK, so take the severe form definition and tell me which things you would subtract from it to arrive at human trafficking simplicity. [00:13:19] Speaker 04: Severe forms of human trafficking is defined as trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age. [00:13:34] Speaker 04: I think that the court doesn't need to decide what human trafficking is, because in this case, the California statute is essentially equivalent to that severe forms of human trafficking. [00:13:44] Speaker 04: So the contours of what human trafficking is [00:13:48] Speaker 04: isn't really relevant. [00:13:49] Speaker 04: I mean, it's relevant, but it doesn't need to be defined in this case in order to conclude that Mr. Duane Esparza unquestionably committed human trafficking. [00:14:00] Speaker 01: I'm not sure you've answered my question. [00:14:03] Speaker 01: So tell me what the answer is. [00:14:04] Speaker 01: I don't have a definition of human trafficking. [00:14:07] Speaker 01: I don't either, and that's why I was asking you. [00:14:08] Speaker 04: I think it's the type of, you know, you would anticipate it involving some commercial [00:14:18] Speaker 04: some sort of trafficking where there's some commercial element and, again, either not being of age to consent or some sort of inducement or coercion. [00:14:31] Speaker 01: But again, the contours of it are- Let me come back to that because this is the point that your friend raises in her brief. [00:14:38] Speaker 01: She says human trafficking requires inducement. [00:14:44] Speaker 01: And inducement is absent in this case because [00:14:48] Speaker 01: the victim wanted to do it. [00:14:52] Speaker 01: And I'm trying to figure out whether or not human trafficking really requires inducement or whether that's merely an element of severe human trafficking. [00:15:02] Speaker 04: I think that it is simply an element of severe forms of trafficking, but the California statute also requires inducement. [00:15:10] Speaker 04: of a minor. [00:15:11] Speaker 04: So again, I don't know that the court needs to define human trafficking in this case in order to conclude that Mr. Duane Esparza committed a human trafficking offense. [00:15:20] Speaker 04: When Congress passed this ground of removability, it was done. [00:15:24] Speaker 04: The legislative history shows that it was enacted as part of a broad effort to stop human trafficking. [00:15:30] Speaker 04: and to protect victims, particularly minors. [00:15:33] Speaker 04: So Congress intended this to be a wide umbrella of cases. [00:15:36] Speaker 04: It applies to offenses that are committed both in the United States and outside the United States. [00:15:42] Speaker 04: And this emphasizes why there isn't a categorical analysis here, because these could be foreign acts that fall under human trafficking. [00:15:52] Speaker 04: But again, it's supposed to be a wide umbrella, and I think unquestionably the California Human Trafficking Statute would fit under that umbrella. [00:16:02] Speaker 01: So are you arguing that even if we applied a categorical analysis, which, and I agree with Judge Fletcher, that we shouldn't, it wouldn't make any difference that the California statute is a categorical match for whatever the federal definition of human trafficking is? [00:16:19] Speaker 04: There is a difference. [00:16:20] Speaker 04: California law includes attempts. [00:16:24] Speaker 04: The severe forms of trafficking does not specifically include attempts. [00:16:27] Speaker 04: Here it's unquestioned that it was not an attempt. [00:16:30] Speaker 04: If you look at the record, Mr. Duane Esperaza actually induced his minor stepdaughter to engage in sex for money. [00:16:40] Speaker 04: So again, a categorical match isn't required. [00:16:45] Speaker 04: But unquestionably on the facts of this case, there wasn't an attempt. [00:16:49] Speaker 03: But that's why it matters so much that the categorical test is not applied here. [00:16:53] Speaker 03: Because otherwise, if it did, we wouldn't look at the facts of the case. [00:16:58] Speaker 02: So the harder question for me in this case is the district judge's, excuse me, the IJ's sort of misstatement of the standard, because the standard is not reason to believe. [00:17:09] Speaker 02: How do you respond to your opponent's argument? [00:17:13] Speaker 04: I think that the IJ's decision could be characterized as an artful but it's a harmless error because the only question I would say goes beyond an artful he just misstates it. [00:17:24] Speaker 04: Well, if you look at the record where petitioner actually conceded his removability, the immigration judge specifically asked, have you committed or conspired to commit human trafficking offenses in the United States? [00:17:35] Speaker 04: To which petitioner responded, yes. [00:17:37] Speaker 04: So the IJ really wasn't required to do a lot of analysis when a petitioner concedes removability. [00:17:42] Speaker 04: And the IJ's colloquy there with the petitioner shows that the IJ was focused on the first part of the statute. [00:17:49] Speaker 04: And again, on this record, [00:17:52] Speaker 04: There are two inquiries. [00:17:54] Speaker 04: Did he commit? [00:17:54] Speaker 04: Here we have a guilty plea, which necessarily means that he did the things that he's pleading guilty to, that he committed. [00:18:01] Speaker 04: That meets that standard. [00:18:03] Speaker 04: And then whether that constitutes human trafficking. [00:18:05] Speaker 04: And I think unquestionably, human trafficking under California law meets the standard of human trafficking, however defined. [00:18:13] Speaker 04: And because there's no question that this would be a removable offense, the court can reach that on the record without remanded to the immigration judge to provide a more eloquent decision. [00:18:24] Speaker 02: So are you basically saying harmless error? [00:18:28] Speaker 04: Yes, Your Honor. [00:18:29] Speaker 04: And again, before the board, he doesn't raise, he never raised any of these challenges to the board either. [00:18:34] Speaker 04: So there really wasn't an opportunity. [00:18:36] Speaker 04: He conceded removability before the immigration judge. [00:18:41] Speaker 04: He raised one challenge to the board about removability, but it wasn't the challenges about the categorical approach or modified categorical approach or the improper use of reason to believe. [00:18:52] Speaker 04: So the board just adopted and affirmed. [00:18:56] Speaker 04: didn't need to provide additional analysis. [00:18:59] Speaker 04: And so therefore, the court can look at this record and conclude that this is unquestionably human trafficking. [00:19:06] Speaker 04: And again, Mr. Duane Esparza does not dispute that he committed this offense. [00:19:12] Speaker 04: He pled guilty to it. [00:19:13] Speaker 04: He was convicted. [00:19:13] Speaker 02: Yeah, I was going to say he spent six years in jail for it. [00:19:16] Speaker 04: And he was sentenced to 12 years. [00:19:18] Speaker 02: Yeah, I know that. [00:19:20] Speaker 03: Anything further? [00:19:21] Speaker 03: Thank you for your argument. [00:19:26] Speaker 03: We'll hear from opposing counsel who I think saved four minutes. [00:19:31] Speaker 03: There you go. [00:19:33] Speaker 00: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:19:34] Speaker 00: I'd like to focus on a couple of points here. [00:19:37] Speaker 00: And the first is that I think that the court does need to determine [00:19:41] Speaker 00: what human trafficking is, is because that's really the essence of this case, whether this conviction renders someone removable from the United States. [00:19:49] Speaker 00: And I think looking at the record, it's clear that everyone's confused about what applies, right? [00:19:56] Speaker 00: The immigration judge used the wrong language with reason to believe. [00:19:59] Speaker 00: The department is never consistent in its briefing about whether [00:20:04] Speaker 00: Mr.. Duane Esparza actually committed or conspired to commit or whether there was a reason to believe that he was some sort of Tangential actor and then is there any reason to doubt that he pimped out the daughter of his girlfriend Well your honor. [00:20:17] Speaker 00: I think again that the department hasn't met its burden in that regard. [00:20:21] Speaker 03: That's what we're asking I appreciate there's some [00:20:25] Speaker 03: squishiness in the language about the standard that applies and the definition that applies, but he did admit to human trafficking. [00:20:32] Speaker 03: And on these, and categorical, at least I'll say from my point of view, we're not doing a categorical match here. [00:20:39] Speaker 03: So we do look at the facts, which brings us back to Judge Fletcher's question. [00:20:42] Speaker 03: On these facts, how is there ambiguity under any definition of human trafficking? [00:20:48] Speaker 00: I think the ambiguity lies in what the department briefed. [00:20:52] Speaker 00: And as I was saying, there's [00:20:55] Speaker 00: It's not clear whether Mr. Duane Esparza, again, actually engaged in human trafficking because we don't know from the police reports whether that is sufficient on their face or whether there's reason to believe that he actually, or excuse me, confusing myself here, reason to believe that he was a tangential actor to human trafficking. [00:21:17] Speaker 03: What suggests that he was? [00:21:19] Speaker 00: That he was or was not? [00:21:20] Speaker 03: What suggests that he was a tangential actor? [00:21:23] Speaker 03: I didn't see anything in the record that suggested that. [00:21:25] Speaker 03: But I might have missed it. [00:21:26] Speaker 03: And we've been away from your advocacy. [00:21:28] Speaker 03: So if we've missed it, please. [00:21:29] Speaker 00: The department suggested in the briefing before both the immigration court and the Board of Immigration Appeals that there was reason to believe that he had been an aider or a better or other tangential actor. [00:21:41] Speaker 00: It just states the whole provision. [00:21:43] Speaker 00: It's not clear which. [00:21:45] Speaker 03: What is the foundation for that statement? [00:21:49] Speaker 03: Did you see it in the record somewhere? [00:21:50] Speaker 00: I did. [00:21:51] Speaker 03: I have the foundation for the statement. [00:21:54] Speaker 00: The reason for the statement is what I mean to be asking in the immigration judge asked the department to brief remove ability. [00:22:02] Speaker 03: We're not communicating. [00:22:04] Speaker 03: I'm asking you whether there's anything in the factual record that would support that assertion or that suspicion. [00:22:11] Speaker 00: I think that it's not clear from the police reports. [00:22:15] Speaker 00: That's the best argument that I have, is that it's unclear. [00:22:19] Speaker 03: The opposing counsel argues that some of the arguments you make here were not exhausted. [00:22:25] Speaker 00: I would disagree with that, Your Honor. [00:22:27] Speaker 00: The board cites matter of Bourbonneau, and there's good case law to support the fact that when the board cites this, it means it's reviewed the decision. [00:22:35] Speaker 00: It's in entirety, and it has no other edits to it. [00:22:39] Speaker 00: to the decision, and I think that's sufficient. [00:22:41] Speaker 00: And it only wrote separately to address the due process issue, which is not an issue in this case. [00:22:47] Speaker 03: You have additional questions? [00:22:48] Speaker 03: Judge Fletcher? [00:22:49] Speaker 03: Judge Horwitz? [00:22:51] Speaker 03: You have a little bit of time if you wanted to wrap up. [00:22:53] Speaker 00: I'll rest on the briefing. [00:22:54] Speaker 00: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:22:54] Speaker 03: Thank you so much. [00:22:55] Speaker 03: I want to thank you, because I think you're participating in a pro bono capacity. [00:22:58] Speaker 00: That's correct, Your Honor. [00:22:59] Speaker 03: We so appreciate your advocacy. [00:23:01] Speaker 03: We benefit from it very much. [00:23:02] Speaker 03: So thank you for participation in the program. [00:23:05] Speaker 00: I appreciate that. [00:23:05] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:23:06] Speaker 03: Thank you both. [00:23:07] Speaker 03: We'll take this matter under advisement.