[00:00:00] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honors, and I will endeavor to reserve five minutes for rebuttal.

[00:00:06] Speaker 01:
May it please the Court.

[00:00:07] Speaker 01:
My name is David Fox on behalf of March for Our Lives, Idaho.

[00:00:11] Speaker 01:
Two years ago, amidst a surge of youth political activism in Idaho, the Idaho legislature amended its voter identification and registration laws to reduce for the first time the types of identification that can be used in Idaho elections by specifically eliminating student identification as a valid means of identification for voting and for registration.

[00:00:34] Speaker 01:
The record supports the conclusion that this was a targeted strike on young voters' political participation.

[00:00:40] Speaker 01:
by a legislature that was expressly concerned with the age of voters that voted using particular means and careful to avoid doing anything that would make it harder for elderly voters to vote.

[00:00:51] Speaker 01:
The case should have proceeded to trial on that basis.

[00:00:54] Speaker 01:
There are three issues.

[00:00:55] Speaker 01:
First, whether the district court correctly ruled that March for Our Lives Idaho has standing.

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Second, what test governs our 26th Amendment claim?

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And third, whether there is a dispute of fact under that test that precludes the summary judgment that was granted for the defendant.

[00:01:11] Speaker 01:
And I'll plan to take those in that order.

[00:01:14] Speaker 01:
First, standing.

[00:01:16] Speaker 01:
The district court correctly ruled that March for Our Lives Idaho is injured as an organization by the challenged laws.

[00:01:22] Speaker 01:
The analysis is quite simple.

[00:01:24] Speaker 01:
March for Our Lives Idaho helps young voters, particularly students, register and vote, and the challenged laws make that harder.

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Before the challenged laws, March for Our Lives Idaho knew that everyone it was approaching who was a student had what they needed to register and vote.

[00:01:39] Speaker 01:
After the challenged laws, they don't, and that requires them to divert resources, and it makes their existing activities of helping students register and vote more burdensome.

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And so March for Our Lives has to spend additional resources overcoming those injuries.

[00:01:54] Speaker 01:
The district court considered all of that and rightly held that March for Our Lives Idaho has organizational standing.

[00:01:59] Speaker 01:
It did so even after the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hippocratic medicine, explaining that unlike the Hippocratic medicine plaintiffs, which were bystanders with a moral objection to the regulatory action that they challenged, March for Our Lives Idaho is directly affected in its existing activities by the laws that they challenged, because they helped students register and vote using student ID, and now they can't.

[00:02:25] Speaker 01:
Idaho's contrary arguments on this score fail.

[00:02:27] Speaker 01:
First, they rely on this court's decision in American Diabetes Association to argue that this is just business as usual for March for Our Lives because it was always helping students register to vote.

[00:02:38] Speaker 01:
But the critical distinction is that here the challenge laws made March for Our Lives Idaho's business of helping people register to vote harder, and that wasn't true in American Diabetes Association.

[00:02:48] Speaker 01:
The law that was challenged there actually made what American Diabetes Association had been doing a bit easier, and the only activity that they alleged was caused was a need to explain it once to someone who they would have explained the old policy to anyways.

[00:03:01] Speaker 01:
That is completely unlike this case, where the laws are a targeted attack on exactly the population that March for Our Lives Idaho was already helping to register and vote and made that activity harder.

[00:03:12] Speaker 01:
Idaho also argues that the injury asserted was too speculative because it was in large part forward-looking testimony about what March for Our Lives would do in response to the challenge law rather than what they had already done.

[00:03:23] Speaker 01:
That is just an artifact of this case's timing.

[00:03:26] Speaker 01:
The laws were passed in early 2023.

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Discovery closed in October 2023.

[00:03:31] Speaker 01:
There was no general election in Idaho during that period of time.

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March for Our Lives activism is largely focused on state and federal elections.

[00:03:39] Speaker 01:
There was no state or federal election that year.

[00:03:42] Speaker 01:
And so, of course, yes, March for Our Lives was explaining how the law would affect what it would do in the future because that was the time period in which the evidence was being offered, the discovery was being taken.

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It doesn't suggest that that, in fact, hasn't happened, and it's well established that imminent injury is sufficient.

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You don't need to show past injury.

[00:04:00] Speaker 01:
As for what happened once the laws took effect, I'd urge the court to take a look at the babe vote amicus brief, which discusses the impact of these laws in the 2024 election, but that's not in the record because of when discovery closed in this case.

[00:04:12] Speaker 01:
I'm happy to address associational standing as well, but unless the court has questions, I will move on to the 26th Amendment standard.

[00:04:21] Speaker 01:
Our position on the 26th Amendment standard is simple.

[00:04:25] Speaker 01:
Just like the 15th Amendment prohibits race discrimination in matters having to do with voting, that's from Bolden, so too the 26th Amendment prohibits age discrimination in matters having to do with voting.

[00:04:36] Speaker 01:
That means both facial discrimination and facially neutral laws that are, quote, motivated by a discriminatory purpose.

[00:04:42] Speaker 01:
That's also from Bolden.

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To decide whether a facially neutral law is motivated by discriminatory purpose, the court should apply the same test that courts always use to answer that question.

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Arlington Heights.

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The reasons for applying the 15th Amendment standard to the 26th Amendment standard are simple.

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The text is identical.

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Both amendments provide that the rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of age or on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

[00:05:12] Speaker 01:
The text is the same, so the test should be the same, because when a term is obviously transplanted from another legal source, it brings the old soil with it.

[00:05:20] Speaker 01:
That much at least appears to be undisputed by the parties on the appeal.

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The District Court had some doubt, but I don't read Idaho to seriously dispute that the 15th Amendment standard should guide the 26th Amendment analysis.

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And the Seventh Circuit's Tully II decision on which both the District Court and Idaho rely so heavily also agreed that the 15th Amendment analysis was the right starting point for 26th Amendment analysis.

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But then, Idaho and the District Court go astray in what that 15th Amendment analysis requires.

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And in particular, they blend together two distinct issues, and thereby muddy some waters that should be clear.

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So the first issue is the question about facial discrimination.

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That is a law that expressly treats people of different ages or different races differently, and intentional discrimination via a facially neutral law.

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That is a law that is motivated to harm people based on a protected characteristic, but that treats everyone facially equally.

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It doesn't apply different procedures to different people.

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Can we assume motivation from effect?

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That is to say there clearly is a differential effect on young people.

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Can we assume the motivation from the effect, or do we need evidence of motivation beyond that?

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Under the Arlington Heights analysis, the court, certainly discriminatory effect is one important prong for discerning motivation.

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I think under the Supreme Court's recent approach in some of these cases, I would be reluctant to say that discriminatory impact alone without more is enough.

[00:06:43] Speaker 02:
So what evidence do we have beyond effect?

[00:06:46] Speaker 01:
So the key piece of evidence relates to the same legislature's simultaneous treatment on the one hand of student identification and on the other hand of the affidavit option in lieu of offering identification to vote for voters who are already registered.

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And with student identification, there were concerns raised about the impact on young people.

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They were entirely disregarded by the legislature.

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On the affidavit option, legislators who are considering and pushing to eliminate the affidavit option specifically asked for a breakdown of the age of the voters

[00:07:14] Speaker 01:
who use the affidavit option.

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They received a breakdown which showed that elderly voters disproportionately use the affidavit option.

[00:07:20] Speaker 01:
There were then statements repeatedly made by multiple legislatures on the floor about the importance of protecting elderly voters' ability to vote, about the fact that elderly farmers may not have access to identification, may not need identification anymore.

[00:07:32] Speaker 01:
And they then declined to restrict the affidavit option for identification while eliminating student identification.

[00:07:39] Speaker 01:
And this is particularly significant because the affidavit option, of course, the pretext that has been advanced to justify the elimination of student identification is that the cards are not secure enough, although there's very little of that in the legislative record.

[00:07:52] Speaker 01:
But, of course, an affidavit option is less secure than any form of student identification because it is just the voter's own say-so that they are who they say they are.

[00:08:00] Speaker 01:
And so the fact that the legislature was specifically concerned about age and then specifically declined to eliminate one form of identification after learning that it was used by elderly voters and in doing so said they were trying to protect elderly voters, while on the other hand restricting student identification that clearly is disparately used and disparately affects young voters is strong evidence of intent.

[00:08:21] Speaker 02:
Do we have evidence as to the type of voters the young people were, that is to say, Democratic, Republican or Independent or other, and the political orientation of those in the legislature who were restricting the student identification?

[00:08:38] Speaker 02:
Is there some reason, is there some conflict there that is to say do we have, for example, legislatures of one party trying to make it more difficult for people to vote when those people are largely of the other party?

[00:08:51] Speaker 02:
Is there any such evidence on the record?

[00:08:53] Speaker 01:
There's not evidence of the partisan affiliation of the young voters who are using student ID, or of the voters who use student ID more generally.

[00:09:03] Speaker 01:
And I think we might make assumptions, but I actually don't think those assumptions are safe, particularly in a state like Idaho.

[00:09:09] Speaker 01:
It's just not in the record.

[00:09:10] Speaker 01:
There was nothing in the record.

[00:09:11] Speaker 01:
There was nothing in front of the legislature about the partisanship of the students who vote using student ID.

[00:09:16] Speaker 01:
It is certainly true that, as I recall the votes on these measures, they were

[00:09:20] Speaker 01:
substantially partisan divides.

[00:09:22] Speaker 01:
I think the Democratic legislators in general voted against these bills and that the Republican legislators in general voted for them.

[00:09:28] Speaker 01:
I don't have those votes in front of me.

[00:09:30] Speaker 01:
But there's not evidence of the second half of that.

[00:09:32] Speaker 01:
There's not a suggestion that the legislators were focused in this case on the partisanship of the users of student ID.

[00:09:38] Speaker 01:
And I think that's important because it distinguishes this case from a case like Alexander, where you have this inextricably intertwined partisan and racial consideration.

[00:09:45] Speaker 01:
Here there's

[00:09:46] Speaker 01:
no evidence of partisan considerations.

[00:09:47] Speaker 01:
And they're not, I mean, Idaho's defense is not that they were trying to make it harder for Democrats to vote.

[00:09:51] Speaker 01:
There's not a word of that in the legislative record.

[00:09:53] Speaker 01:
There's not a word of that in their brief.

[00:09:59] Speaker 04:
And what did the district court make of that, of the McGrain's policy director's request of the age-based voting patterns with respect to the young voters and then the affidavit used by the older voters?

[00:10:13] Speaker 01:
The district court seemed to view that discussion of the affidavit issue as sort of distinct and irrelevant.

[00:10:19] Speaker 01:
I don't think she seriously

[00:10:21] Speaker 01:
contended with the fact that this was happening at the same time, the same legislature, the same folks, sort of as part of the same broader debate.

[00:10:28] Speaker 01:
You know, I think her view was that's about a different issue.

[00:10:31] Speaker 01:
It's not about student ID.

[00:10:32] Speaker 01:
And so she did just, in our view, just didn't draw the inferences that we are entitled to have drawn, especially at summary judgment, from the fact that the same legislature

[00:10:39] Speaker 01:
that was doing this was clearly concerned with age.

[00:10:41] Speaker 01:
You know, I think it's fair as well to infer that the legislature didn't need to ask about the age of people using student ID because it is obvious to anyone that the age of people using student ID is going to be disproportionately young voters.

[00:10:53] Speaker 01:
And there's also plenty of evidence in the record that the legislators concerned about student ID were people from college towns.

[00:10:58] Speaker 01:
They were thinking about college students.

[00:11:01] Speaker 04:
Council, let me ask you about the proper framework that we need to think about this.

[00:11:04] Speaker 04:
Does Heller instruct us?

[00:11:06] Speaker 04:
Are we having to figure out, based on Heller, how we're going to define terms like right to vote, deny a bridge?

[00:11:14] Speaker 04:
In other words, do we need to determine how these terms were understood at the time the 26th Amendment was ratified in 1971?

[00:11:20] Speaker 01:
So that is the Tully approach.

[00:11:23] Speaker 01:
And I want to be clear that we win under that approach.

[00:11:27] Speaker 01:
So I don't know that you need to resolve that debate in this case, because Tully says, well, look at the right to vote at the time the 26th Amendment was adopted.

[00:11:34] Speaker 01:
In that case, they said, look, there was no mail voting.

[00:11:36] Speaker 01:
So how can a restriction on mail voting abridge the right to vote?

[00:11:38] Speaker 01:
This isn't a case about mail voting.

[00:11:39] Speaker 01:
This is a case about voter ID.

[00:11:42] Speaker 01:
When the amendment was adopted, Idaho didn't have voter ID.

[00:11:45] Speaker 01:
And so it is, in fact, harder now to vote in Idaho in the relevant respect under these laws than it was when the amendment was adopted because there was no voter ID requirement at all when the amendment was adopted.

[00:11:55] Speaker 01:
And so if the court does adopt that approach of focusing on the historic right to vote,

[00:11:59] Speaker 01:
then we should win because there is an abridgment as compared with that.

[00:12:03] Speaker 01:
I would urge the court though not to do that.

[00:12:05] Speaker 01:
It allows a great deal of voting discrimination to go unprotected by amendments that are intended to prevent voting discrimination.

[00:12:12] Speaker 01:
In particular, I find it quite shocking that the Seventh Circuit in Tully won and Idaho in their brief here

[00:12:17] Speaker 01:
says that a law that expressly allowed white voters to vote absentee but did not allow black voters to vote absentee would not violate the 15th Amendment.

[00:12:25] Speaker 01:
I think that is a conclusion that the court should be very reluctant to reach and I don't think there's any need to reach it.

[00:12:30] Speaker 01:
I think it is far more straightforward to conclude that what it says is, however,

[00:12:34] Speaker 01:
A state allows voters to vote.

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It cannot discriminate in the ways that allows voters to vote based on the prohibited characteristics, whether that's race for the 15th Amendment or age for the 26th Amendment.

[00:12:44] Speaker 01:
And I think that is a straightforward test.

[00:12:47] Speaker 01:
It's easy to apply and it's consistent with the clear language and purpose of the amendments.

[00:12:53] Speaker 01:
And in particular, I think the reason why these amendments are all phrased in terms of deny or abridge the right to vote is that they were not substantively creating a right to vote.

[00:13:01] Speaker 01:
States have all sorts of requirements for when you can vote.

[00:13:03] Speaker 01:
Some states disenfranchise people based on different types of felonies and so on.

[00:13:07] Speaker 01:
And so the 15th Amendment and the 26th Amendment don't say, you know, these groups affirmatively have the right to vote.

[00:13:13] Speaker 01:
They just say age or race can't enter into it.

[00:13:15] Speaker 01:
And I think that's why, and that is a framework that was adopted in these amendments that was clearly intended to reflect changes.

[00:13:21] Speaker 01:
As states changed who was eligible to vote, the amendments would continue to say, that's fine as long as you don't deny or abridge the right to vote on behalf or based on these prohibited characteristics.

[00:13:30] Speaker 01:
And so you just can't intentionally discriminate against people based on age.

[00:13:35] Speaker 01:
I think part of the reason courts have gotten tangled up over this is that it is just counterintuitive in, under federal constitutional law, to think about age as a prohibited discriminatory characteristic.

[00:13:44] Speaker 01:
And I get that.

[00:13:45] Speaker 01:
Of course, under the Equal Protection Clause, age is not a protected characteristic.

[00:13:49] Speaker 01:
But the 26th Amendment says what it says, and it was specifically designed to eliminate age discrimination in voting.

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And the court should enforce it as it's written.

[00:14:01] Speaker 01:
And, you know, I think Idaho's primary argument is that there is a separate requirement that the abridgment or denial of the right to vote be material.

[00:14:08] Speaker 01:
And we would just urge the court to reject that argument.

[00:14:11] Speaker 01:
I don't think the district court accepted that argument, although the reasoning isn't entirely clear.

[00:14:14] Speaker 01:
I think the district court instead relied on the facial versus intentional discrimination point.

[00:14:19] Speaker 01:
But the 26th Amendment and the 15th Amendment do not say there may be no substantial or material denial or abridgment of the right to vote.

[00:14:26] Speaker 01:
They say there may be no denial or abridgment of the right to vote.

[00:14:29] Speaker 01:
A small diminishment is as much a diminishment as a large diminishment.

[00:14:33] Speaker 01:
And if the court were to adopt a substantiality or materiality requirement, it would need to devise some test for deciding how much of a burden is too much of a burden in this context.

[00:14:43] Speaker 01:
There's no guidance in any of the cases that Idaho cites that would help answer that question.

[00:14:47] Speaker 01:
They try to rely on the Anderson Burdick line of cases, cases like Crawford, but Crawford can't answer that question.

[00:14:53] Speaker 01:
They're concerned with

[00:14:54] Speaker 01:
reasonable non-discriminatory voting laws and by definition a 26th amendment claim is arguing that the law is discriminatory so it takes it outside of Crawford and there's just no support for the idea that it needs to be material.

[00:15:07] Speaker 01:
It is true that in a lot of these cases especially the civil rights era cases the court was considering extremely egregious laws designed to entirely disenfranchise black Americans and yes in the course of describing those laws they explain that they imposed a substantial material outrageous

[00:15:21] Speaker 01:
burden on the right to vote, but the court never purported to impose that as a separate test or as a separate requirement.

[00:15:27] Speaker 01:
In short, the amendment means what it says.

[00:15:29] Speaker 01:
If you discriminate on the basis of age in voting rights, then you violated the 26th Amendment.

[00:15:34] Speaker 01:
And I will reserve my remaining time.

[00:15:35] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:15:44] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:15:46] Speaker 00:
May it please the Court, Michael Zarian on behalf of Idaho Secretary of State Phil McGrain.

[00:15:51] Speaker 00:
States have the constitutional authority to decide the times, places, and manners of elections.

[00:15:55] Speaker 00:
Since its founding, Idaho has always used this authority to make voting as easy and secure as possible, and the companion bills that march for our lives is challenged as no exception.

[00:16:04] Speaker 00:
These laws streamline voting by creating a single list of acceptable forms of identification across all methods of registering and voting, while omitting IDs that cannot be reliably used to verify identity, like student IDs.

[00:16:16] Speaker 00:
My friend on the other side has tried to frame this as an attempt to place special burdens on young voters, but nothing could be further from the truth.

[00:16:22] Speaker 00:
In fact, these laws don't place a special burden on anyone.

[00:16:25] Speaker 00:
Any student who would have used a student ID before is now simply in line with the rest of the electorate who has always had to go to the DMV and obtain a compliant identification, couldn't use student IDs before.

[00:16:36] Speaker 00:
So this case is really about seeking special treatment for students and not equal treatment, which is why these laws cannot be an abridgment of the right to vote under the 26th Amendment.

[00:16:45] Speaker 00:
The laws are also not an abridgment because the steps require a no fee ID are not material burdens and because there's no evidence whatsoever of any intent to hamper young voters.

[00:16:55] Speaker 00:
I would like to start with standing.

[00:16:57] Speaker 00:
We didn't talk about associational standing today, and I think it would be incredibly difficult and impossible for March for Our Lives to show associational standing.

[00:17:04] Speaker 00:
I think we've talked about some of the murkiness and inconsistencies in Ninth Circuit case law about is there a need to show us and identify a member?

[00:17:12] Speaker 00:
Can a group that calls people constituents, can they rely on their injuries?

[00:17:17] Speaker 00:
I think just jumping to the end about is it clear and not speculative that any constituent of March for Our Lives, Idaho, they would be injured.

[00:17:25] Speaker 00:
Just jumping to that, there are no facts in the record showing that anybody who they claim as constituents would be injured.

[00:17:30] Speaker 00:
The only evidence they've cited this entire time is one declaration that says that some of their constituents have driver's licenses and previously relied on their student identification card in order to register to vote or vote.

[00:17:44] Speaker 00:
But then in a deposition,

[00:17:45] Speaker 00:
That same person who filed that declaration was asked, are you aware of any members who have used a student ID to vote in elections?

[00:17:51] Speaker 00:
And she said no.

[00:17:53] Speaker 00:
So there's case law that we cited in our brief explaining why affidavits contradicted by a declaration are not good enough to get past summary judgment.

[00:18:01] Speaker 00:
And that's all the evidence that they have that anybody is going to vote who they claim is a constituent.

[00:18:06] Speaker 00:
And also these people could vote with an affidavit.

[00:18:08] Speaker 00:
So even the people that are being talked about in that quote don't need to go to the DMV to get a license.

[00:18:14] Speaker 00:
The second type of standing, moving to organizational standing.

[00:18:20] Speaker 00:
Really, I haven't heard much about the idea that needing to get information from or asking the DMV for information or transmitting that information via an Instagram post or via by retraining volunteers I haven't heard much about that being a harm and that wasn't brought up again in the reply either and sensibly so I'd say that really were the case that somebody who's in the business of educating the public could have standing anytime some new development happens then CNN law professors

[00:18:47] Speaker 00:
legal reporters, everybody would have standing to challenge any change in the law.

[00:18:53] Speaker 00:
The real key language in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine is about interferences with core activities.

[00:18:57] Speaker 00:
And it's not an interference.

[00:18:58] Speaker 00:
It wasn't harder to transmit that information to the public.

[00:19:01] Speaker 00:
So then it just turns on the question of whether the effect on their registration activities is

[00:19:10] Speaker 00:
is enough under Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine.

[00:19:13] Speaker 00:
And legally, we think that legally this can't suffice.

[00:19:19] Speaker 00:
There's been no direct injury to any legal rights of march for our lives.

[00:19:22] Speaker 00:
They've decided to sort of jump into the mix by helping people who are directly regulated voluntarily have

[00:19:29] Speaker 00:
decided to help those people, but much like lawyers who help people comply with the law, lawyers don't have standing to challenge every time the law changes.

[00:19:37] Speaker 00:
For example, a new form that needs to be filed with the SEC.

[00:19:40] Speaker 00:
A lawyer can't say, well, now it's going to be harder for me to help my client comply with the law.

[00:19:45] Speaker 00:
This is a burden on me as a lawyer.

[00:19:47] Speaker 00:
I'm going to sue to challenge the new SEC regulation.

[00:19:50] Speaker 00:
That's basically the same thing as this case.

[00:19:52] Speaker 00:
March for Our Lives says, now we have to do

[00:19:54] Speaker 00:
more steps to help people comply with the law, but they're not directly regulated, and that's the key insight of Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine.

[00:20:00] Speaker 00:
It's not a direct harm to them.

[00:20:03] Speaker 00:
But even on the facts, we know that that issue is going to be addressed by the Arizona Alliance case that's being heard en banc, and these same arguments that have been aired here were aired in the en banc opinion.

[00:20:13] Speaker 00:
or in the en banc argument, which is the opinion still not out, we think the facts of this case is a much more straightforward way to resolve no standing.

[00:20:24] Speaker 00:
They said that they will drive people to DMV, but I'm sorry, did you have a question?

[00:20:28] Speaker 03:
I have a question.

[00:20:29] Speaker 03:
Yes.

[00:20:30] Speaker 03:
Do you think our panel should hold our decision in this case and await Arizona alliance decision?

[00:20:43] Speaker 00:
I don't think it's necessary only because the sort of public education type things that they have undertaken in response to the law aren't really going to be at issue at Arizona Alliance.

[00:20:54] Speaker 00:
Registration is going to be at issue, but here the issue can just be resolved in the facts.

[00:20:58] Speaker 00:
So I think the court can just proceed to the facts and explain.

[00:21:02] Speaker 00:
There is no evidence that they will drive anyone to the DMV.

[00:21:05] Speaker 00:
In the deposition, their representative said they're not aware of anybody who is unable to vote because they don't have an ID, anyone who is unable to get to the DMV.

[00:21:15] Speaker 00:
They've never driven anyone to the DMV before.

[00:21:17] Speaker 00:
And so the idea that they are going to be materially burdened by having to drive people to the DMV, as we can tell, in 2022, there were only 100 people, roughly, and the data that we were able to collect, which is most of the counties in Idaho, there were only 100 people who used only a student ID to vote at all.

[00:21:35] Speaker 00:
And out of those 100 people, we don't know whether they had another form of ID.

[00:21:38] Speaker 00:
And we don't know which one of those people's march for our lives we'll ever find.

[00:21:41] Speaker 00:
And then we don't know if they do find one of those people, whether they'll ever drive those people to the DMV.

[00:21:47] Speaker 02:
The right answer when you're asked, should we wait for the en banc, is almost always yes.

[00:21:53] Speaker 00:
Almost, Your Honor, on this one.

[00:21:55] Speaker 00:
The facts make it clear.

[00:21:56] Speaker 00:
And for the Satanic Temple case, we cited that at 28J, was issued just a month ago.

[00:22:03] Speaker 00:
And it's on this exact same issue.

[00:22:04] Speaker 00:
But they didn't wait for the Arizona Alliance case.

[00:22:06] Speaker 00:
So there are cases where, on the facts, it's just too speculative.

[00:22:09] Speaker 00:
And so that was our case as well.

[00:22:11] Speaker 00:
And so that's why we would argue for that.

[00:22:13] Speaker 04:
So Counsel, let me make sure I understood.

[00:22:15] Speaker 04:
You're saying, look, there's not that many people who use their student IDs to vote anyway, right?

[00:22:20] Speaker 00:
That's correct.

[00:22:20] Speaker 04:
What was the purpose of the law then?

[00:22:22] Speaker 00:
to Idaho has tried to make its elections as secure as possible and wanted to foreclose any loophole that could possibly be used for fraud.

[00:22:29] Speaker 00:
And this was going to have a minimal impact.

[00:22:31] Speaker 00:
So we didn't think it was going to be challenged at all, honestly.

[00:22:35] Speaker 02:
What evidence of fraud was there with respect to student IDs?

[00:22:39] Speaker 00:
We haven't been able to detect.

[00:22:40] Speaker 00:
We haven't detected yet any evidence of it actually happening.

[00:22:44] Speaker 02:
So fraud was imagined as a possibility, but there was no evidence of fraud using student ID?

[00:22:50] Speaker 00:
Imagine makes it sound a little more speculative than it really is that we've shown what the IDs look like for student IDs versus government IDs and I'll take away the word imagined There was no evidence of using false IDs for that purpose It has not happened yet, and it won't be able to happen in the future Thanks to this law, but in Crawford it does talk about two separate interests both in preventing fraud and

[00:23:10] Speaker 00:
and also promoting public confidence in the integrity of the election.

[00:23:13] Speaker 02:
In enacting this legislation, was there anything in front of the legislature in terms of student IDs in other states?

[00:23:20] Speaker 02:
I mean, how broadly did they sweep in trying to figure out whether this was a potential problem?

[00:23:25] Speaker 00:
There's no evidence in the record about what the legislature considered, but I can tell you that multiple other states have also prohibited student IDs from being used in elections.

[00:23:34] Speaker 00:
In Idaho, there are IDs printed from the University of Idaho that said not to be used for official government identification, because it wasn't backed by any actual government ID.

[00:23:44] Speaker 00:
Generally, to get a student ID, you have to show a birth certificate or some sort of identification, but University of Idaho didn't ask for that.

[00:23:49] Speaker 00:
So they printed not to be used for official government identification, but under the previous law, they could be used for government identification.

[00:23:56] Speaker 00:
This was all the legislature surely was aware of all of these.

[00:23:59] Speaker 02:
And so when the university prints on this not to be used for identification, that's in response to this statute?

[00:24:06] Speaker 00:
That was before this statute.

[00:24:07] Speaker 00:
And that's one of the things the legislature was aware of and said, well, then these IDs probably shouldn't be used for government identification if they're really not backed by any other government identification, like a birth certificate.

[00:24:18] Speaker 04:
So that statement was on the identification, yet the students were able to use it for voting?

[00:24:25] Speaker 00:
As far as I'm aware, yes, Your Honor, before the law took effect.

[00:24:29] Speaker 04:
I have some questions for you.

[00:24:30] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:24:30] Speaker 04:
Do the challenge laws disproportionately impact young voters?

[00:24:34] Speaker 00:
The only data we have in the record shows us there was about 14 more young voters than old voters who used it, so a slight disparate impact.

[00:24:45] Speaker 00:
Does that matter?

[00:24:46] Speaker 00:
That it's slight.

[00:24:47] Speaker 00:
I think it undermines the idea that this is a targeted attack on young voters.

[00:24:52] Speaker 00:
If it's a small attack, if you really wanted to get at young voters, then all you're gonna do is this delta of 14 voters, at least the data on one election.

[00:25:00] Speaker 00:
Not a very good target attack, and undermines the idea that this will strike it to the young voters.

[00:25:06] Speaker 00:
So I think it really undermines the idea of intent.

[00:25:09] Speaker 00:
I think your honor asked a little bit earlier about is disparate impact enough?

[00:25:12] Speaker 00:
And the Feeney case actually makes it very clear, and this is a case from back in the 70s, that disparate impact is generally not enough to show intent.

[00:25:20] Speaker 00:
On this merits question, I wanted to return to Judge Alba's question, Day Alba's question from before, which was the question of how does Heller impact this?

[00:25:28] Speaker 00:
And I don't know if this is really a true, needs to be a real originalist inquiry, but the question under the text of the 26th Amendment is has the right to vote been abridged on account of age?

[00:25:39] Speaker 00:
There's two parts here.

[00:25:40] Speaker 00:
What does it mean to abridge?

[00:25:41] Speaker 00:
And then on account of age is this intent portion.

[00:25:44] Speaker 00:
And abridge, every court is in unison that abridgment

[00:25:47] Speaker 00:
means a significant obstacle to voting.

[00:25:49] Speaker 00:
Not any tiny obstacle, because basically every law that tries to protect any order in voting instead of having chaos, having structure and organization voting, will have some sort of a burden.

[00:26:02] Speaker 00:
And this is what Crawford talks about.

[00:26:03] Speaker 00:
It says that not every law is going to increase everybody's law equally.

[00:26:07] Speaker 00:
A significant burden.

[00:26:09] Speaker 00:
And you can go through Harmon.

[00:26:10] Speaker 00:
Harmon talks about there needs to be a material requirement by a consequence of not paying the $1.50 poll tax.

[00:26:16] Speaker 00:
What is the alternative?

[00:26:17] Speaker 00:
Is that right there a denial or abridgment?

[00:26:20] Speaker 00:
And it was a certification, a residency certification in that case.

[00:26:25] Speaker 00:
So you had to file it every election.

[00:26:27] Speaker 00:
It had to be six months before the election.

[00:26:28] Speaker 00:
It had to be notarized or witnessed.

[00:26:30] Speaker 00:
It had to be brought in person.

[00:26:31] Speaker 00:
And the Supreme Court said this is a real obstacle.

[00:26:34] Speaker 00:
So it doesn't have to be an enormous obstacle, but it has to be a material or significant obstacle.

[00:26:40] Speaker 02:
You're getting that from the use of the word abridge?

[00:26:43] Speaker 00:
Right.

[00:26:43] Speaker 00:
And that's from the 24th Amendment.

[00:26:44] Speaker 00:
In the 15th Amendment, Lane versus Wilson talks about that the 15th Amendment hits, I think it says, hits onerous procedural requirements that effectively handicap the right to vote.

[00:26:56] Speaker 02:
So you're saying a bridge carries with it the adjective significant abridgment?

[00:27:01] Speaker 00:
Absolutely, Your Honor.

[00:27:02] Speaker 02:
No, the adjective is not there.

[00:27:03] Speaker 02:
You're saying we should read it into a bridge?

[00:27:05] Speaker 00:
That's what an abridgment is.

[00:27:07] Speaker 00:
Abridgment isn't effect in any way, but abridgment is a significantly limit.

[00:27:11] Speaker 00:
And that's how every, no court has said it doesn't carry that adjective.

[00:27:14] Speaker 00:
The Walgren case says, we understand that there needs to be, we're going to send this back to the district court to decide whether the limitation was of a significant nature, and therefore it constitutes an abridgment.

[00:27:25] Speaker 00:
Tully too walked through all of these cases, reached the same result.

[00:27:28] Speaker 00:
The Nashville district court case, addressing this exact same law,

[00:27:31] Speaker 00:
reach the same result as well and said well this is not an abridgment because it's not a significant burden but I think apart from whether the burden is significant and Crawford says that this is not a significant burden in Idaho there's always been some sort of in-person aspect to registering to vote and so this is not even above the usual burdens of voting

[00:27:50] Speaker 00:
But apart from is this significant, a significant material burden, there's a separate question which I haven't heard my friend on the other side address at all or have any response to, which is that under the Reno versus Bossier Parish case, the question is not whether you are worse off under the 15th Amendment, which they have said should be brought into the 26th Amendment.

[00:28:11] Speaker 00:
The question is whether your rights are lower than what the rights ought to be.

[00:28:16] Speaker 00:
And so everybody in Idaho, other than students, is at, I need to make an in-person visit to get a compliant ID, except students.

[00:28:24] Speaker 00:
And now students are right in line with everyone else.

[00:28:25] Speaker 00:
So their rights can't be abridged because they are right in line with the baseline.

[00:28:29] Speaker 00:
They might be slightly worse off because before they had an exception.

[00:28:32] Speaker 00:
and they did not need to make an in-person visit to the DMV.

[00:28:35] Speaker 00:
But now they're right with everyone else, and it can't be an agreement.

[00:28:37] Speaker 02:
That's a nice argument, except that when you treat everybody the same, but the people start out in different situations, treating them the same is not necessarily equal treatment.

[00:28:47] Speaker 02:
And students are in a different situation from other people.

[00:28:50] Speaker 02:
That is to say they're young, they come into the state, they may or may not have driver's license in the state.

[00:28:55] Speaker 02:
I mean, there are various reasons why the students are in a different position.

[00:28:59] Speaker 02:
and therefore treating the students equally from everybody else may result in some disparate impact.

[00:29:05] Speaker 02:
I'm saying that in the abstract.

[00:29:07] Speaker 02:
Then the question is, how does that play out on the facts on the ground?

[00:29:11] Speaker 02:
But merely because one group is treated in exactly the same way as the others doesn't necessarily mean that they've been treated equally in terms of the impact upon that group.

[00:29:20] Speaker 00:
Perhaps the impact might be different, but the question is what should the right to vote ought to be and if it's an even-handed regulation across all people.

[00:29:27] Speaker 00:
I can tell you now as Idaho is one of the fastest growing states in the country that there are a lot of outer staters of all ages who are coming into

[00:29:33] Speaker 00:
into the area to vote.

[00:29:35] Speaker 00:
And all of these people will have to go to the DMV.

[00:29:38] Speaker 00:
And Idaho's made it hopefully as easy as possible.

[00:29:40] Speaker 00:
You could register to vote and then take that temporary registration card you vote and vote that same day.

[00:29:45] Speaker 00:
We try to make it as easy as possible to make sure everybody can get the ID.

[00:29:48] Speaker 00:
But it's the same requirement.

[00:29:49] Speaker 00:
It's a legal, even-handed requirement on all people.

[00:29:53] Speaker 00:
And then moving to the evidence of intent.

[00:29:56] Speaker 00:
So moving from the question of what it means to a bridge versus on account of age.

[00:30:01] Speaker 00:
Here.

[00:30:02] Speaker 00:
the latest word from this court on what this Arlington Heights standard that they're applying.

[00:30:06] Speaker 00:
I don't know if it needs to be necessarily Arlington Heights, but similar concept of how do we get it knowing what the intent was.

[00:30:12] Speaker 00:
The Carrillo-Lopez case talks about the strong presumption of good faith, and that is after the cases that they've cited in the reply brief and interprets the Abbott versus Paris case from the Supreme Court.

[00:30:22] Speaker 00:
talks about a strong presumption of good faith for the legislature.

[00:30:25] Speaker 00:
So the question is whether any reasonable fact finder, and remember that this is not a jury trial case, so this exact same district court who thinks there is no evidence whatsoever, would they weigh this evidence and decide that it overcomes the burden, meets the burden to overcome the presumption of good faith?

[00:30:42] Speaker 00:
And here I would say absolutely not.

[00:30:46] Speaker 00:
This law serves a plainly legitimate aim.

[00:30:49] Speaker 00:
We talked about this, about both fraud prevention and creating uniformity in what is needed to be able to vote and to register to vote.

[00:30:57] Speaker 00:
There's a minor disparate impact as we've seen the data play out.

[00:31:01] Speaker 00:
The only other evidence that they've cited at all is that one representative believed this was a big issue.

[00:31:07] Speaker 00:
Student IDs is a big issue.

[00:31:09] Speaker 00:
But that doesn't say anything about its intent.

[00:31:10] Speaker 00:
That doesn't tell us anything that we didn't know already from the fact that the law passed, is that somebody wanted this law to pass, and there's

[00:31:16] Speaker 00:
That's not evidence as to why they wanted the law to pass, just that they like the law and they want it to pass.

[00:31:21] Speaker 00:
So all we have is something about a different proposal.

[00:31:25] Speaker 00:
And we have that one legislator asked for the demographics from the Secretary of State and from his staff and the Secretary of State's staff provided the demographics.

[00:31:36] Speaker 00:
It's on a different proposal.

[00:31:37] Speaker 00:
It's one legislator, and then we have two legislators who are expressly trying to help old people vote.

[00:31:42] Speaker 00:
There's no evidence with respect to this proposal as to any evidence to impede anybody from voting.

[00:31:50] Speaker 00:
And from that, they want to say that in this context,

[00:31:54] Speaker 00:
we can infer that there was some intent to impede young people from voting.

[00:31:58] Speaker 00:
But one of the things that I would like to point out is they've talked about how the affidavit is less secure, but it's been kept.

[00:32:04] Speaker 00:
And that's not actually true.

[00:32:05] Speaker 00:
The affidavit, to be able to vote with an affidavit, you can't register with an affidavit.

[00:32:09] Speaker 00:
So everybody who uses the affidavit will have already registered with a photo ID, a compliant photo ID.

[00:32:15] Speaker 00:
So it's not necessarily that you can just sign and vote.

[00:32:19] Speaker 00:
There was still, from here on out, going forward, everybody will need to show an ID.

[00:32:23] Speaker 00:
The people from before have been grandfathered in because it would be much more difficult to take purge everyone from the role and make them re-register with an ID.

[00:32:31] Speaker 00:
And Idaho didn't want those negative effects on disenfranchising people.

[00:32:36] Speaker 00:
The idea being, the new law requires everybody to show an ID to register to vote before somebody may have registered without a compliant photo ID.

[00:32:44] Speaker 00:
But those people, instead of booting those people off the roll or making them re-register, Idaho simply said, you guys are grandfathered in and everyone going forward will have registered with a photo ID and then you can use the affidavit at the poll because you've already verified who you are.

[00:33:05] Speaker 00:
As I said before, one other point would be that the district courts already assessed this evidence and viewed that it was just the evidence of supposed bad intent to discriminate against young people was all just

[00:33:21] Speaker 00:
There was nothing there, and that any of the political stuff we see is just the regular sausage-making of making laws.

[00:33:28] Speaker 00:
And they've also tried to cite this broad climate of hostility towards young people.

[00:33:33] Speaker 00:
They've cited that minors under 18 weren't allowed to testify in a hearing, but there's all sorts of limitations on people under 18.

[00:33:39] Speaker 00:
That's just the wrong group.

[00:33:40] Speaker 00:
Those are minors who can't vote anyways, who weren't allowed to speak at some of the legislative committees, not all but some of them.

[00:33:49] Speaker 00:
They've talked about some political demonstrations that weren't even about the right to vote.

[00:33:54] Speaker 00:
There was one, I guess, about the right to vote, but that was after this law had already been proposed and talked about there's a law making it so that you can't give extra credit to a student for voting or not voting either way or for supporting a specific proposal, but it's already illegal to

[00:34:10] Speaker 00:
under federal law to bribe someone to vote, so this is just right in line with what federal law already says.

[00:34:14] Speaker 00:
There's just no other evidence that this law was out there to try to stop young people from voting in a broader climate, in some different proposal, or in this proposal.

[00:34:23] Speaker 00:
There's no evidence whatsoever.

[00:34:24] Speaker 00:
So ways that this court can resolve this to review are that a material burden, there's been no material burden, there's been no abridgment, both because there's no significant burden being placed on students and because there's no special burden being placed on students,

[00:34:39] Speaker 00:
There's no evidence of intent to overcome the presumption of good faith.

[00:34:44] Speaker 00:
And of course at the beginning we talked about standing.

[00:34:45] Speaker 00:
There's no standing.

[00:34:47] Speaker 00:
And so I'd just like to finish where I started, which is that

[00:34:51] Speaker 00:
This is states need some leeway and some space to be able to regulate elections to make sure that they're safe and secure.

[00:34:58] Speaker 00:
And that's what Idaho has been trying to do to make sure that there's eliminate any chance of fraud and make sure people trust how the elections are being run.

[00:35:05] Speaker 00:
And there's nothing in the text of the 26th Amendment or in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence that suggests it is good or prudent or even available to

[00:35:14] Speaker 00:
will allow every group to challenge any law that has some sort of disparate impact.

[00:35:18] Speaker 00:
Because every law, at some level, it's going to be difficult to improve everyone's law equally.

[00:35:22] Speaker 00:
Idaho tries.

[00:35:24] Speaker 00:
But we've now been litigating two years on something that didn't affect very many people at all.

[00:35:29] Speaker 00:
And that's part of the problem in allowing any small burden to be challenged under the 26th Amendment.

[00:35:37] Speaker 00:
And with that, we would ask that the court affirm.

[00:35:39] Speaker 03:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:35:45] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:35:46] Speaker 01:
A few points I'd like to make.

[00:35:47] Speaker 01:
First, we're not arguing for a disparate impact standard.

[00:35:50] Speaker 01:
We are arguing that if we show intentional discrimination or show enough to support an intentional discrimination finding, we're entitled to go to trial on intentional discrimination.

[00:35:57] Speaker 01:
That doesn't call into question every law ever passed with a disparate impact, because most laws won't be intentionally discriminatory, but our position as this one was.

[00:36:04] Speaker 01:
Similarly, we're not arguing for a retrogressions standard.

[00:36:07] Speaker 01:
However, opposing counsel's views on that retro-aggression standard and their response to it amount to the argument that because this is a facially neutral law that formally applies to everyone equally, it is insulated from 26th Amendment review, and we do disagree with that.

[00:36:20] Speaker 01:
It is equally true that the grandfather clauses apply to every voter equally in southern states and apply the same test to each of them.

[00:36:26] Speaker 01:
It just had different effects and it was intended to have different effects, and it's that intent that is so key.

[00:36:31] Speaker 01:
Most laws won't be intentionally discriminatory, so they won't be invalid under the 26th Amendment.

[00:36:35] Speaker 01:
Again, we think this one was.

[00:36:36] Speaker 02:
What evidence do we have not about intent, but about the degree of disparate impact?

[00:36:44] Speaker 01:
Yes, so they say there is a very slight disparate impact.

[00:36:46] Speaker 01:
That's what I just heard, which is why I'm asking you.

[00:36:51] Speaker 01:
Further excerpts of record 63, which is a page from one of our experts' reports, the key point is that the denominators are very different.

[00:36:57] Speaker 01:
There are a lot fewer younger voters than there are older voters.

[00:37:01] Speaker 01:
And so when they say, well, there were 14 more younger voters who used it than older voters, yes, but there were many times more older voters than younger voters.

[00:37:08] Speaker 01:
And so it was a much larger percentage of younger voters than older voters.

[00:37:11] Speaker 01:
Now, it's true that in Idaho,

[00:37:14] Speaker 01:
Most people 18 and older have driver's licenses.

[00:37:16] Speaker 01:
Most people use their driver's licenses to vote.

[00:37:18] Speaker 01:
But it is clear, if you look at that page 63 of the further excerpts, that the effect is stronger on younger voters and much stronger.

[00:37:24] Speaker 02:
When you say driver's license, does it have to be in Idaho drivers?

[00:37:28] Speaker 02:
It does.

[00:37:28] Speaker 01:
And that is a key issue.

[00:37:29] Speaker 02:
So there's going to be a fair number of students who do not yet have, they may have a driver's license from some other state and they're attending school in Idaho.

[00:37:36] Speaker 02:
Do we have any numbers on that?

[00:37:37] Speaker 01:
We do not have numbers on that, but it was something that the,

[00:37:41] Speaker 01:
It's a clear issue, particularly because Idaho is a state where, number one, if you want to get an Idaho voter ID card, you have to surrender your out-of-state license, and then you can't drive.

[00:37:50] Speaker 01:
Or you have to... If you want to get an Idaho free voter ID card, you have to surrender your out-of-state license, and then you can't drive.

[00:37:57] Speaker 02:
cannot drive until you get an Idaho license.

[00:37:59] Speaker 01:
Or you could pay and get an Idaho license.

[00:38:02] Speaker 01:
You have to pass a written driver's test to get an Idaho license.

[00:38:05] Speaker 01:
So there actually is a substantial burden.

[00:38:06] Speaker 02:
So if someone comes into Idaho as a student and says, I don't care about voting, but I do want to drive, is there something in Idaho that requires them to get an Idaho driver's license, or can they keep their Washington state driver's license?

[00:38:19] Speaker 02:
Do you know?

[00:38:19] Speaker 01:
As I understand the law, there is a sort of theoretical requirement that after a certain number of days of becoming an Idaho resident and planning to stay in Idaho, you are supposed to convert your out-of-state driver's license.

[00:38:31] Speaker 02:
That's typical.

[00:38:31] Speaker 02:
I don't know about Idaho.

[00:38:32] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:38:33] Speaker 01:
It is as, again, nothing in the record on this.

[00:38:35] Speaker 01:
My understanding is it's not enforced in practice.

[00:38:38] Speaker 01:
I think there are a lot of people in any state in the country who have out-of-state driver's licenses as a practical matter.

[00:38:43] Speaker 01:
But that's my understanding of what the law says.

[00:38:46] Speaker 01:
The Carrillo-Lopez case and the Alexander case, these are not summary judgment cases.

[00:38:52] Speaker 01:
It just cannot be the case that at summary judgment, the standard is, if it's possible to draw an inference for the government, that the government wins, because it would effectively mean that there is no room for trial on the intentional discrimination question at all.

[00:39:05] Speaker 01:
Either plaintiffs present such a strong case that they're entitled to summary judgment because the only possible inference is that they win, or defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

[00:39:13] Speaker 01:
There would be no room for trial.

[00:39:14] Speaker 01:
That cannot be the standard, and there's no case in the summary judgment context that adopts that as the standard.

[00:39:19] Speaker 01:
Those cases also tend to come out of different contexts, and in particular, Alexander comes out of the redistricting context, which presents particular complexities for disentangling partisan and racial intent that just aren't present in a case like this one.

[00:39:32] Speaker 01:
I think the timing point is important.

[00:39:34] Speaker 01:
Some of the tension that they articulate between the deposition testimony and the declaration in this case has to do with the use of tense.

[00:39:39] Speaker 01:
There are people who had not had to vote with a student ID, would have had to vote with a student ID once this law came into effect.

[00:39:45] Speaker 01:
That doesn't mean that they knew they had voted with a student ID.

[00:39:47] Speaker 01:
They weren't eligible voters.

[00:39:48] Speaker 01:
The important thing to know about young voters is that until they turn 18, they can't vote, and then pretty soon they're not young voters anymore.

[00:39:54] Speaker 01:
And that timing point is critical, particularly when you talk about the grandfathering in process that was just described by opposing counsel.

[00:40:00] Speaker 01:
Because the fact is, when Idaho grandfathers in previous registrants who don't necessarily need to have had ID, well, young voters are not going to be those grandfathered-in residents.

[00:40:09] Speaker 01:
Every year, there are new young voters, and all of those people have to comply with these new requirements.

[00:40:13] Speaker 01:
They can't use an affidavit because they weren't registered before.

[00:40:15] Speaker 01:
They weren't eligible to register before.

[00:40:17] Speaker 01:
But when they become eligible to register, this law applies to them.

[00:40:19] Speaker 01:
It prevents them from using the one form of ID that all students in the state have.

[00:40:23] Speaker 01:
And the record shows that it was intentionally discriminatory against them.

[00:40:27] Speaker 01:
Thank you very much.

[00:40:28] Speaker 03:
I have one question.

[00:40:32] Speaker 03:
Does your client have a position on whether or not we should pull the decision in this case to see what the in-bank panel in Arizona alliance does?

[00:40:50] Speaker 01:
So we don't think it's necessary.

[00:40:53] Speaker 01:
And the reason we don't think it's necessary is that we should win even under the since vacated Mays panel decision.

[00:41:00] Speaker 01:
And the reason for that is that as I read that since vacated decision, the essential issue that that panel had was they thought it was too speculative whether the challenged law would in fact affect the voter registration activities of the plaintiff in that case.

[00:41:15] Speaker 01:
And there's just not an argument about that here.

[00:41:17] Speaker 01:
This law is a direct strike against the students that March for Our Lives Idaho helps to register.

[00:41:22] Speaker 01:
There's not an argument that that impact is speculative.

[00:41:24] Speaker 01:
And so I think that even under the since vacated panel opinion, we would win.

[00:41:28] Speaker 01:
And given that, I don't think there's a need to wait for Mays.

[00:41:31] Speaker 01:
But I also don't have an objection to the court waiting for Mays if it thinks it would benefit from clarity on what the standing standard is.

[00:41:40] Speaker 03:
OK, thank you.

[00:41:41] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:41:48] Speaker 03:
Okay, that's done.

[00:41:51] Speaker 03:
I congratulate council on their excellent arguments.

[00:41:59] Speaker 03:
That case will now be submitted on the briefs.

[00:42:05] Speaker 03:
Then the panel will take a brief recess for about 10 minutes.