[00:00:00] Speaker 04: The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is now in session. [00:00:06] Speaker 04: Yes, welcome everyone to the Ninth Circuit remotely. [00:00:09] Speaker 04: My colleagues, Judges Miller and Hawkins, welcome you as well. [00:00:14] Speaker 04: We have it designated as 20 minutes each side. [00:00:17] Speaker 04: And if you're the appellant, that is your total time if you wish to reserve any time for rebuttal. [00:00:24] Speaker 04: That being said, I want to make sure that my colleagues have an opportunity to ask you all the questions that they want to [00:00:30] Speaker 04: ask you. [00:00:31] Speaker 04: And so if your time is up and the court's still asking you questions, you don't need to ask permission to continue. [00:00:39] Speaker 04: Just continue answering questions as long as judges are asking you questions. [00:00:43] Speaker 04: Otherwise, expect to be left to your time. [00:00:45] Speaker 04: So we're ready to hear from the appellate. [00:00:50] Speaker 01: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:00:51] Speaker 01: Good afternoon. [00:00:52] Speaker 01: May it please the court, Drew Ensign, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the United States. [00:00:57] Speaker 01: I would like to reserve four minutes for rebuttal. [00:00:59] Speaker 04: All right, we'll keep that aspiration lay in mind. [00:01:02] Speaker 04: I'm somewhat looking at the clock, so I'll try to help you if that's the case. [00:01:08] Speaker 01: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:01:10] Speaker 01: As the Supreme Court is already implicitly recognized by an exceptionally lopsided vote in the Venezuela TPS case, the government is likely to prevail in this TPS appeal here too, and it stays likewise warranted. [00:01:22] Speaker 01: Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision on Boyle makes clear that its stated decision should control in like cases and point of arguments here are weaker than in the Venezuela case on every conceivable level. [00:01:33] Speaker 04: So I think one thing that I don't think has been addressed yet, but you put it in there. [00:01:38] Speaker 04: What is the magic number about August 19th, 2025? [00:01:43] Speaker 04: And that's why we, because the alleged harm to the government that supports its request for emergency appellate brief, why do you need relief by today? [00:01:56] Speaker 01: Your honor, that might have implied a precision that doesn't quite attach. [00:02:00] Speaker 01: We're already suffering irreparable harm in that one of the terminations would have taken effect on August 6th, and so the stay is already causing that harm. [00:02:10] Speaker 01: In addition, the two other terminations would have taken effect, I believe, on September 6th. [00:02:15] Speaker 01: So recognizing that August 6th had already come and gone, we picked a date that [00:02:21] Speaker 01: would have expedited briefing, but nonetheless permit some sensibility to it. [00:02:26] Speaker 01: It didn't need to be overnight briefing and hearing. [00:02:29] Speaker 01: So there's nothing magical about August 19th. [00:02:33] Speaker 01: We've already begun to suffer irreparable harm because a decision would have otherwise gone into effect that is stayed by the district court's order. [00:02:41] Speaker 01: But that's the rationale for the August 19th. [00:02:45] Speaker 02: Oh, I'm sorry. [00:02:47] Speaker 02: Go ahead, Judge Miller. [00:02:48] Speaker 02: So with respect to [00:02:50] Speaker 02: Because Guatemala and Honduras, those don't take effect until September, right? [00:02:56] Speaker 01: That's correct, Your Honor. [00:02:58] Speaker 02: So on those, you're not really suffering any harm today, are you? [00:03:04] Speaker 01: That's correct, Your Honor, in that those harms won't occur for another two weeks or so. [00:03:10] Speaker 02: And so Nepal is the one that would have been August 5th or 6th, I guess? [00:03:16] Speaker 01: I believe it's a 6th, Your Honor, but that may be plus or minus a day. [00:03:20] Speaker 02: And so what in sort of practical concrete terms, like what's not happening today that you would like to be happening today? [00:03:30] Speaker 01: Your honor, otherwise this would have taken effect and this would have permitted the government to take a variety of enforcement actions given the suspension of temporary status. [00:03:43] Speaker 01: I think the key to really analyzing these harms is that the irreparable harms here are effectively identical to NTPSA. [00:03:50] Speaker 01: NTPSA 1, which went before the Supreme Court, is the government's inability [00:03:55] Speaker 01: to carry out the programs that it has determined are warranted. [00:04:00] Speaker 01: Just as in the Venezuela case, the Supreme Court necessarily held that we would suffer or likely to suffer reparable harm when it granted its stay by an eight to one margin. [00:04:09] Speaker 01: And we think the same results is controlling or that same rationale is controlling here. [00:04:15] Speaker 04: So is it the government's opinion that there is any aspect of the secretary's termination of TPS that is judicially reviewable? [00:04:25] Speaker 01: We don't believe so, Your Honor. [00:04:26] Speaker 01: It's certainly an extremely broad bar. [00:04:29] Speaker 01: It's, you know, I think the language that Congress selected here is important. [00:04:33] Speaker 01: It's there is no judicial review, any determination of the secretary with respect to the designation or termination or extension of the designation dot dot dot. [00:04:42] Speaker 01: That has two features that make that prohibition exceptionally broad. [00:04:46] Speaker 01: It employs the adjective any to modify determination, and it also applies to not just determinations themselves, but anything with respect to a designation or termination or extension, and not merely such terminations or extension decisions themselves. [00:05:02] Speaker 01: And so that language renders this case strikingly similar to Patel versus Garland, which helped that a statute barring, quote, any review of, quote, any judgment regarding the granting of relief, end quote, covered, quote, [00:05:14] Speaker 01: any authoritative decision on the matter, end quote. [00:05:17] Speaker 01: And so we think that same rationale is controlling here and the same results should obtain here. [00:05:22] Speaker 02: So suppose, so just as an example, I guess it's subsection B3B says that when the secretary terminates a designation, she has to give at least 60 days notice before the termination becomes effective. [00:05:40] Speaker 02: Suppose that the secretary terminated a designation and [00:05:44] Speaker 02: and announced this will become effective in 30 days. [00:05:48] Speaker 02: Do you think a court would be able to say, no, the statute says it has to be 60? [00:05:54] Speaker 01: I don't believe so, Your Honor, for at least two reasons. [00:05:59] Speaker 01: The first of which is that I think that would fall within the jurisdictional bar because it's a decision with respect to the determination without a termination determination [00:06:10] Speaker 01: you would have no reason to decide what the wind down period should be. [00:06:14] Speaker 01: So it absolutely is a decision with respect to it. [00:06:18] Speaker 01: I think it also is necessarily committed to agency discretion and hence not reviewable under the APA because of two features of the statutory language. [00:06:26] Speaker 02: It is committed to agency discretion to set a time that's contrary to what the statute says. [00:06:34] Speaker 01: Well, as to the wind-down period, Your Honor, the statutory language expressly says that it's an option. [00:06:43] Speaker 01: Oh, sorry, are you talking about the 60-day termination itself or the wind-down? [00:06:47] Speaker 02: I'm talking about the 60-day termination. [00:06:49] Speaker 02: This is in B3b, where it says the termination shall not be effective earlier than 60 days after the date the note is published. [00:07:00] Speaker 02: The notice is published and so in the hypothetical, the secretary publishes notice, but says this will be effective in 30 days. [00:07:06] Speaker 01: I understand. [00:07:09] Speaker 01: I apologize for misunderstanding. [00:07:12] Speaker 02: So, do you still have the same answer? [00:07:15] Speaker 02: Do you still think that's not reviewable? [00:07:17] Speaker 01: Yes, your honor, although I will acknowledge that that that particular hypothetical involves a question not presented here. [00:07:24] Speaker 01: I still think that would be squarely within the the language of the statutory bar. [00:07:28] Speaker 01: What it could possibly fall within is the kind exception where [00:07:33] Speaker 01: Some actions that are so clearly ultra-virus, courts will nonetheless look past the statutory bar where something is clearly barred. [00:07:43] Speaker 01: So this came up in the Venezuela case. [00:07:45] Speaker 01: I think, for example, if a secretary said, even though the statute limits you to 18 months, I'm going to grant TPS status for 100 years, that might be the sort of extreme ultra-virus action that might [00:07:59] Speaker 01: get you outside of the bar, even though you're within, you know, you're clearly within its plain text. [00:08:04] Speaker 01: Nothing of the sort is remotely presented here, but I think that theoretical safety valve does exist if there are something extraordinarily ultra-virus, like patently so. [00:08:13] Speaker 02: But- Why would you even, I mean, I take the point that you think, you know, that this is different from the hypothetical, but sticking with the hypothetical, why, [00:08:27] Speaker 02: Why do you even need this sort of, you know, extreme ultra-virus safety bar? [00:08:32] Speaker 02: Why is there even a determination in that hypothetical? [00:08:36] Speaker 02: I mean, it doesn't seem, it seems hard to characterize, you know, just an announcement that, you know, I'm going to do something that is contrary to the statute as she's not determining anything in that hypothetical, is she? [00:08:50] Speaker 01: I think potentially she is, Your Honor, in that she could have made the determination effective like 90 days or six months after. [00:08:57] Speaker 01: And so there is a determination on that effective date window. [00:09:01] Speaker 01: That one just wouldn't be statutorily compliant. [00:09:05] Speaker 01: But I do think that it does involve a determination of sort and thus falls within the language of the bar that Congress has enacted. [00:09:12] Speaker 03: How about immediately? [00:09:16] Speaker 01: Your Honor, I think that same analysis would apply, although that potentially would provide even stronger arguments that a kind like exception might apply there. [00:09:26] Speaker 03: So the government's position is the Secretary could terminate, make it effective immediately, and proceed to remove the people? [00:09:38] Speaker 01: No, Your Honor, our position is not that the statute permits that, but our position is that that would be within the text of the jurisdictional bar. [00:09:46] Speaker 01: That would not make unlawful conduct lawful, but it would make it unrevealable. [00:09:53] Speaker 01: I think jurisdiction aside too, plaintiff's claims here fail on merits as well. [00:09:58] Speaker 04: That doesn't make sense because if [00:10:05] Speaker 04: If something you know, if you don't want something to be reviewed, that that's generally is something discretionary and all of that. [00:10:13] Speaker 04: But if it's flat out wrong with the statute, and you're saying, well, okay, but then so can the secretary do just anything and everything or whatever she wants? [00:10:25] Speaker 01: No, your honor. [00:10:26] Speaker 01: And, you know, as an initial matter, the kind exception is potentially available. [00:10:30] Speaker 01: I think I will acknowledge to that. [00:10:33] Speaker 01: That is, you know, that would be a more problematic case where here what you have is a review of. [00:10:40] Speaker 01: the substance and procedures that attach under the APA. [00:10:43] Speaker 01: That's clearly within the core of what Congress was intending to preclude review of. [00:10:49] Speaker 01: But I think if you look at the language of itself, it does bar judicial review for anything with respect to a determination. [00:10:57] Speaker 01: And so I think these hypotheticals fall within the literal language of the statute. [00:11:02] Speaker 01: Yes, Your Honor. [00:11:05] Speaker 03: Is there any issue in this case [00:11:09] Speaker 03: that's not presented in the Venezuelan case. [00:11:15] Speaker 01: Your Honor, yes, although I think the claims are weaker. [00:11:20] Speaker 01: There was not specifically a preordained claim. [00:11:23] Speaker 03: I'm not looking for an assessment of weight. [00:11:27] Speaker 03: Yes. [00:11:28] Speaker 03: I want to know if there are any issues, jurisdictional merits or otherwise, present in this case that aren't present in the Villanueva case that's before a different Ninth Circuit panel. [00:11:41] Speaker 01: Yes, Your Honor, the pre-ordained and wind down period APA claims here were not presented in Venezuela. [00:11:48] Speaker 01: We think they essentially raised the exact same review bar questions. [00:11:52] Speaker 01: But as to the merits of those claims, those are distinct APA claims that were not raised in the Venezuela case that are present here. [00:12:02] Speaker 01: I'll spare you my assessment for now of their relative strengths, but those APA claims are here and not in the Venezuela case. [00:12:10] Speaker 04: Well, but that case has priority over us. [00:12:12] Speaker 04: It's clearly going to have some effect, meaning, so why shouldn't we wait to find out what that case says before we, because they've got priority over us. [00:12:28] Speaker 01: Your honor, if these were both merits appeals, I think that's that certainly would have some strong logic to it. [00:12:34] Speaker 01: This, however, is an emergency stay pending appeal that the government, you know, contends that we are suffering irreparable harm. [00:12:41] Speaker 01: And that is a view that the Supreme Court has endorsed in the NTPSA 1 case. [00:12:46] Speaker 04: So the only thing we're ever going to do in this case is the stay. [00:12:51] Speaker 01: No, you're right. [00:12:53] Speaker 01: So as to announcing a presidential decision, you may want to wait for the other panel to resolve it. [00:12:58] Speaker 01: But I don't think an emergency stay request can be put in advance while a different panel decides a different case. [00:13:04] Speaker 01: The government's contention is that we're suffering irreparable harm of the same sort of NTPSA1 and that our state motion should be decided on a timetable that does not depend on how another appeal is decided. [00:13:16] Speaker 04: Well, okay. [00:13:18] Speaker 04: So what would be the effect of an administrative stay in this case as opposed to a stay-stay? [00:13:24] Speaker 04: Do you see a difference? [00:13:28] Speaker 01: As to alleviating the government's harms? [00:13:30] Speaker 01: No, Your Honor. [00:13:30] Speaker 01: I think that that would alleviate our harms during the duration that an administrative stay was in place. [00:13:38] Speaker 04: So I'm still, I'm just not sure. [00:13:41] Speaker 04: So you agree that regarding [00:13:46] Speaker 04: a presidential decision on jurisdiction, which the other panel has priority and we should wait for that. [00:13:55] Speaker 04: But you want us and we don't know how long that's going to take because if it doesn't go the government's way, then I'm sure that there will be more going on there. [00:14:07] Speaker 04: So if it does go the government's way, [00:14:10] Speaker 04: Let's say we did give you a stay right now. [00:14:13] Speaker 04: If it doesn't go the government's way and we give you a stay and then it comes out, could the other side come back and say, you know, we won, so you can't show irreparable harm? [00:14:29] Speaker 01: In some ways, your honor, I mean, I think it would always be available to the other side to bring a motion to reconsider based on intervening authority that that's something that could also always be made. [00:14:41] Speaker 01: But here we also have the additional factor of a stay from the Supreme Court. [00:14:46] Speaker 01: deciding strikingly similar issues, and its decision in the Boyle case makes clear that its state decisions are to control and like cases. [00:14:54] Speaker 01: So even setting aside the other panel of the Ninth Circuit here, the Supreme Court's stay in the Venezuela case still exists, and the Boyle case still directs this court to use that to control like circumstances, which we think this certainly presents here. [00:15:14] Speaker 01: If I may, I'd like to turn to the merits for a moment. [00:15:17] Speaker 01: Beginning with the pre-ordained claim, I think that lacks support both legally and factually. [00:15:24] Speaker 01: Legally, the executive is permitted to have its policy preferences, and it need not abandon those when crafting policies under the APA. [00:15:32] Speaker 01: The district court's reliance on termination decisions that merely cite an executive order asking the secretary to review, renewal, and termination decisions carefully hardly establishes an APA violation. [00:15:44] Speaker 01: And the rest of the district court's analysis relies on second guessing individual country conditions factually, which violates both the APA and the jurisdictional bar here. [00:15:53] Speaker 01: As to the wind down issue, the district court conjured a putative policy providing at least six months that did not actually exist. [00:16:03] Speaker 01: Prior decisions here are all over the map as plaintiff's own chart showed, which is document 28 in the district court record. [00:16:10] Speaker 01: And there is no policy here that required an explanation of the deviation. [00:16:15] Speaker 01: Indeed, what the secretary did here was following the statutory default period of a 60 day wind down period and explained in all three cases where that 60 days was appropriate. [00:16:25] Speaker 01: The APA required no more here. [00:16:27] Speaker 02: Could I ask you about the request in your motion for a stay of proceedings in the district court pending a reassignment motion which you have not yet filed? [00:16:39] Speaker 02: What would be the authority for us to enter an order staying district court proceedings? [00:16:48] Speaker 01: Your honor, this court has inherent authority as part of its appellate jurisdiction to interstate proceedings below. [00:16:55] Speaker 01: I think that makes a lot of sense here because the issues presented are overwhelmingly legal. [00:17:02] Speaker 01: And if we're correct on the jurisdictional bar, for example, there's nothing to remand or nothing left to do below. [00:17:08] Speaker 02: And does that sound in mandamus or you think it's ancillary because we have an appeal of a PI that gives us authority to stay proceedings or not strictly a PI, but something that you're asking us to treat as a PI, but because we have the PI appeal that gives us authority to stay other proceedings in the case before the district court? [00:17:35] Speaker 01: Yes, your honor, I think that's within 1292 a, and I know we cited two other statutory provisions and the state motion that are escaping me at the moment, but I'm happy to pull those and provide those on rebuttal. [00:17:49] Speaker 01: But we do think it is part of this court's appellate jurisdiction. [00:17:52] Speaker 01: I mean, it's within the nature of it. [00:17:55] Speaker 01: I suppose it could also lean on the appellate of the all writs act if necessary, but [00:17:59] Speaker 01: But certainly this court does issue states of proceedings below at times, and that is not something that I'm aware of any precedent indicating the UAC authority to do just that. [00:18:13] Speaker 01: Okay. [00:18:13] Speaker 01: Just further considering on the wind down issue, this issue is committed to agency discretion and unreviewable because it's expressly provided to be quote an option and quote for the secretary if she quote determines it to be appropriate end quote. [00:18:28] Speaker 01: Pointives do not identify any law to apply to second guess what the secretary deems appropriate as an option. [00:18:35] Speaker 01: And in all events, even if this wind down period claim were meritorious, it would at most justify relief regarding the wind down period itself, rather than invalidating the termination decision. [00:18:49] Speaker 01: Finally, the district court's equal protection holdings should also be reversed. [00:18:53] Speaker 01: In analyzing alleged animus, it's worth recalling the nature of the decisions at issue here. [00:18:59] Speaker 01: Congress always intended temporary protected status to be temporary, hence the name. [00:19:05] Speaker 01: Here the secretary acted to cancel temporary protected status designations that had persisted for as long as a quarter of a century, rendering their intended temporary nature illusory at best. [00:19:17] Speaker 01: The district court thought such terminations were inexplicable except as animus, but making temporary status actually temporary is in fact nothing more than what Congress intended and hardly implies animus at all, let alone compelling a conclusion that animus is at play. [00:19:32] Speaker 01: The termination decisions here all supply the requisite rational basis, which is the applicable standard of review under the Supreme Court's decisions in Hawaii, Matthews, Mandel, and Heresides. [00:19:46] Speaker 01: The district court refused to apply rational basis review here largely because, in its view, quote, there was no allegation of racial animus, end quote, in the Supreme Court's Matthews decision. [00:19:56] Speaker 01: But that's simply wrong. [00:19:57] Speaker 01: The district court and Matthews have concluded that the challenge statuted issue was contaminated by, quote, invidious discrimination, end quote. [00:20:04] Speaker 01: And that's 426 U.S. [00:20:05] Speaker 01: at 73. [00:20:06] Speaker 01: So the entire premise for not applying rational basis review below here is simply erroneous. [00:20:13] Speaker 01: But even assuming the heightened Arlington Heights standard applied, the district court's analysis falls far short of satisfying that standard. [00:20:21] Speaker 01: In particular, it ignored the presumption of good faith entirely and only identified a single statement that was specific to any of the three countries that issued here. [00:20:30] Speaker 01: And that was a tweet about Honduras that was so unremarkable that plaintiffs have not even pointed to it in their state opposition. [00:20:38] Speaker 01: Rather than pointing to anything specific about these three countries at issue, the district court instead relied on an amorphous and putative animus towards all immigrants entirely. [00:20:47] Speaker 01: The regents makes clear that that's far too imprecise, and the district court further erred in relying on ancient campaign statements, which the Supreme Court's decision in Trump versus Hawaii makes clear is improper. [00:21:00] Speaker 01: This court should therefore follow the Supreme Court's lead in the Venezuela TPS case and grant a state pending appeal here. [00:21:06] Speaker 01: I certainly welcome any questions you have. [00:21:10] Speaker 04: Do either of my panel members have any questions at this time? [00:21:14] Speaker 03: No. [00:21:14] Speaker 04: All right. [00:21:15] Speaker 04: So you've used all of your time. [00:21:17] Speaker 04: I'll make a decision after depending on how long we spend with your friend on the other side, whether I'll allow you a short rebuttal. [00:21:27] Speaker 04: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:21:30] Speaker 04: All right. [00:21:31] Speaker 04: We're ready for Mr. Arulova and family. [00:21:35] Speaker 00: Good afternoon, your honors are healing our line of them from the UCLA Center for immigration law and policy for plaintiff national TPS Alliance and the individual plaintiffs. [00:21:44] Speaker 00: I'd like to start just briefly with the pellet jurisdiction, not to belabor it because I recognize that we brief the same issue in NPSA one. [00:21:53] Speaker 00: But just to note that any stay, including even an administrative stay, would involve an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. [00:22:01] Speaker 00: And I don't see how the government can get around the problem that there are these two cases which say there's no appellate jurisdiction in orders like this one, which don't have the practical effect of an injunction under Montana Wildlife Federation. [00:22:16] Speaker 00: And also this case, Alcea Valley, which it cites. [00:22:18] Speaker 00: So I won't get into it if the court doesn't want to get into it, except to note, you know, I do think that that question would have to be resolved before any state of any kind were issued in this case or in NTPSA 1. [00:22:31] Speaker 02: So how do you distinguish the case from last month in Immigration Defenders Law Center? [00:22:36] Speaker 00: So I'm not sure that it can be distinguished. [00:22:40] Speaker 00: And it doesn't cite these other cases. [00:22:41] Speaker 00: And that's why we cited the rule, obviously, that a later panel can't overrule an earlier one. [00:22:46] Speaker 00: Because I think if it can't be distinguished, then you have to follow Montana and Alcea Valley. [00:22:52] Speaker 00: I do think it's different because the order there stopped the re-implementation of MPP. [00:23:01] Speaker 00: What they said they were staying was not just an administrative action like a termination order or some kind of order, but it said also the reimplementation of MPP. [00:23:10] Speaker 00: Now it didn't call it an injunction and said it was postponing that, but it was actually underlying conduct and the plaintiff sought that. [00:23:17] Speaker 00: We cite the district court order and also the plaintiff's request as described in the district court order. [00:23:21] Speaker 00: So I do think it's arguably more injunctive. [00:23:24] Speaker 00: It's more like [00:23:24] Speaker 00: asking someone to do something, although it's not directed at a party. [00:23:28] Speaker 00: So it's not exactly the same as a traditional injunction, but I think it's closer than what we have here, right? [00:23:33] Speaker 00: All we have here is an order that says this decision is postponed until November 19th. [00:23:40] Speaker 02: Suppose, I mean, suppose the secretary were to ignore the district court's order. [00:23:46] Speaker 02: If we don't stay it and then the secretary just ignores it and, you know, I guess, you know, initiates removal proceedings. [00:23:51] Speaker 02: or try to, you know, arrest, tries to remove people whose status has expired under her order, but that would have been stayed by the district court. [00:24:03] Speaker 02: You wouldn't go to the district court and complain about that? [00:24:08] Speaker 00: We certainly would, but two thoughts, Your Honor. [00:24:10] Speaker 00: First, that would not itself be contemptible. [00:24:15] Speaker 00: we'd need another order directing a person before it would become contemptible. [00:24:20] Speaker 00: And that distinction mattered to the Supreme Court in Ken. [00:24:22] Speaker 00: Because in Ken, they're talking about a stay of removal, which is almost exactly your hypothetical, I think, or very close to your hypothetical. [00:24:29] Speaker 00: Yet, nonetheless, they said that was not an injunction for purposes of 8 U.S.C. [00:24:32] Speaker 00: 1252 F2 because it was not enforceable by contempt. [00:24:37] Speaker 00: And then the second thing I'd say, Your Honor, and that is Montana Wildlife, and I'll quote, it says, if the only action required of the government is that the agency refrain from enforcing the challenged action, that is not enough to render it an appealable injunction. [00:24:53] Speaker 00: And I'll say a valley has a very similar line in it. [00:24:56] Speaker 00: It says, of course, as a practical matter, the agency is prohibited as a practical matter from the enforcement of this listing of the salmon. [00:25:04] Speaker 00: But that, again, that was not enough to render it appealable. [00:25:07] Speaker 00: So I think just the fact that they have to acknowledge the district court order exists and that they can't enforce the thing that it postponed is not enough under these courts cases. [00:25:19] Speaker 00: And if they're not further on that I'll turn to the question about emergency was just Callahan's first question I do think it's highly relevant here. [00:25:26] Speaker 00: The only thing that the stay would accomplish between now and September 8 September 8 is the date when under us in Nicaragua would expire. [00:25:37] Speaker 00: is that 7,000 Nepalese who have lived here for more than a decade would be subject, they would lose their employment authorization and be subject to detention and deportation. [00:25:48] Speaker 00: And while that's enormously significant to them, it is not, I think, by any stretch, irreparable harm to the government and certainly not comparable, Judge Hawkins, to your question about NTPSA1. [00:26:00] Speaker 00: You know, NTPSA1 [00:26:01] Speaker 00: You know, we were counseling that we are counseling that case, obviously, but the stakes were higher obviously there's 350,000 Venezuelans who were at stake in NPSA one, they were recent. [00:26:13] Speaker 00: You know, in general, people who had come here since 2021 so it's a more recent population. [00:26:19] Speaker 00: There are other differences, too. [00:26:21] Speaker 00: This order expires November 19th, as I've said a couple of times. [00:26:24] Speaker 00: That order just was pending the conclusion of the district court proceedings. [00:26:29] Speaker 00: The equities were different. [00:26:30] Speaker 00: The government said in that case that the Trende Aragua and the security concerns created by Trende Aragua were implicated. [00:26:38] Speaker 00: We disputed that. [00:26:39] Speaker 00: We hotly disputed that. [00:26:40] Speaker 00: Making arguments like we make here that even somebody with two misdemeanors is ineligible for TPS. [00:26:46] Speaker 00: But that might have been what the Supreme Court decided. [00:26:48] Speaker 00: We don't know because they didn't write anything. [00:26:51] Speaker 00: So there's that difference. [00:26:52] Speaker 00: There's 40,000 American children who live [00:26:56] Speaker 00: with all the TPS holder population in this case, which is different from what was going on there. [00:27:02] Speaker 00: This population as a whole is much more like the population in the Regents case, the DACA case, because we're talking about people, most of whom have lived here for 25 years lawfully. [00:27:12] Speaker 00: It's also Judge Callahan, like the population in the Ramos case. [00:27:15] Speaker 00: It's the same, actually some of the same countries at issue in these cases, but it is not, in that way also it is different from the population in Venezuela. [00:27:22] Speaker 00: So those are some of the differences. [00:27:24] Speaker 00: I'll give you a couple of more. [00:27:25] Speaker 00: The APA claims, as Ms. [00:27:29] Speaker 00: Rensen has acknowledged, are completely different. [00:27:32] Speaker 00: That claim was about vacatur authority. [00:27:34] Speaker 00: It's just a totally different kind of claim. [00:27:37] Speaker 00: This is a challenge to terminations, and also the merits challenges are totally different. [00:27:43] Speaker 00: The thing we had in the Supreme Court had nothing to do with these at all. [00:27:46] Speaker 00: So I think there are a number of reasons why it might be different. [00:27:49] Speaker 00: And while some of these differences may have mattered and some not, there's no way to know because it's not precedent. [00:27:55] Speaker 00: You can't point to any reasoning like you could in Wilcox, for example, in Boyle, where you can say, oh, they have said this is the kind of person who can be fired by the president or not. [00:28:05] Speaker 00: There's nothing like that here. [00:28:07] Speaker 00: The last thing I'll say about NTPSA 1, Your Honor, is the second paragraph of NTPSA 1, even though there's no reasoning in it, [00:28:15] Speaker 00: But it says, do this and do this. [00:28:17] Speaker 00: The second paragraph says that the claim that stays without prejudice to preserving the rights of some set of Venezuelan TPS holders. [00:28:26] Speaker 00: And then we went back in the district court and actually won relief for that smaller population of people. [00:28:31] Speaker 00: That suggests they think some claims are justiciable under the TPS statute. [00:28:36] Speaker 00: So if we're going to play this game of trying to read the tea leaves as this opinion that has no reasoning in it, which I don't favor, I don't believe that's appropriate, but if you're going to do that, it suggests that the government's jurisdictional arguments are too broad. [00:28:49] Speaker 00: And so I'll turn to that now, unless there's other questions about the emergency issues here. [00:28:56] Speaker 00: Yeah, I just, you know, say the record is full of this. [00:29:00] Speaker 00: There's American citizens who are going to either be separated from their families or they're going to be sent to places where the medical care is inadequate, you know, because they're, I mean, yeah, it's just overwhelming. [00:29:11] Speaker 00: Johnny Silva is one of our players. [00:29:13] Speaker 04: They're very sympathetic individuals, particularly the people that you've selected, because they don't fall in the criminal realm. [00:29:19] Speaker 04: They're people. [00:29:21] Speaker 04: But I guess the question that I struggle with always is, [00:29:25] Speaker 04: When you get this status, it doesn't give you an automatic path to citizenship and it's temporary by its very nature. [00:29:36] Speaker 04: And so what it seems to me, the sympathy part of it is asking us to do something that to change their status, which we obviously don't have authority to do. [00:29:49] Speaker 00: So that's what makes it difficult. [00:29:54] Speaker 00: Yes, Your Honor. [00:29:55] Speaker 00: And I remember our exchanges about this from a few years ago. [00:29:58] Speaker 00: I would just say, this is not the appeal. [00:30:00] Speaker 00: It's not the argument that we had last time. [00:30:02] Speaker 00: This is the stay. [00:30:03] Speaker 00: We're only making this point for purposes of equities. [00:30:06] Speaker 00: They have to show irreparable harm. [00:30:08] Speaker 00: And what they're saying is the government is irreparably harmed because it can't deport these 7,000 people or later, these 50, 50, whatever it is, 50,000-ish remaining people. [00:30:18] Speaker 00: And to show that, [00:30:20] Speaker 00: shouldn't they have to show some thing bad beyond just the naked policy preference itself? [00:30:28] Speaker 00: And I don't think that they don't cite any authority, which is just the naked authority itself is good enough. [00:30:32] Speaker 00: If it were Biden v. Texas, the Supreme Court should have granted to stay there. [00:30:36] Speaker 00: US v. Texas, they should have granted to stay there. [00:30:40] Speaker 00: The recent birthright case that this court just issued, I mean, all of these show that just the pure policy preference is not enough. [00:30:46] Speaker 00: And there's not a record here to show that there's any other harm besides that. [00:30:51] Speaker 04: I accept that they can't do their job. [00:30:54] Speaker 04: If TPS is strictly a, within the executive branch or for them to determine not being able to do your job because no one else can determine that. [00:31:03] Speaker 04: You can't, you know, you or I can't go and say, Hey, you should give this country TPS. [00:31:08] Speaker 04: You should do that. [00:31:09] Speaker 04: We can't, they can't do their job if, if we don't give a mistake. [00:31:13] Speaker 04: That's their argument. [00:31:14] Speaker 04: That's the irreparable harm in my mind. [00:31:17] Speaker 00: Right. [00:31:17] Speaker 00: And I guess I just feel like that pure, just the look, we think it's right. [00:31:22] Speaker 00: And therefore, we're irreparably harmed because we don't get to do what we think is right. [00:31:28] Speaker 00: At that breadth of argument, which is I do think is the argument they're making, they should be able to get a stay in any case. [00:31:35] Speaker 04: Well, that might be really broad. [00:31:37] Speaker 04: But then you're saying, create a right that we know we don't have in the statute. [00:31:43] Speaker 04: That somehow that you have a right to convert TPS to some sort of permanent path. [00:31:47] Speaker 00: Right. [00:31:48] Speaker 00: So yeah. [00:31:48] Speaker 00: So let me turn then to the jurisdiction arguments, because it is true that we have a difference about whether or not there is anything cognizable here. [00:31:56] Speaker 00: I'd say maybe it's not a concession, but the problems created by Judge Miller's question about these hypotheticals about them granting TPS for 100 years or, you know, [00:32:07] Speaker 00: terminating before the statutory period provides it. [00:32:11] Speaker 00: That's a bigger problem for them than they acknowledge because there is no account of the word determination on their construction of it that actually permits judicial review under these situations. [00:32:23] Speaker 00: If determination means any action or decision and with respect to means relating to TPS, then it's clearly covered by the hypothetical that Judge Miller and Judge Hawkins have suggested. [00:32:33] Speaker 00: You know, so instead, I think it suggests that you have to look for a different meaning of the word determination. [00:32:39] Speaker 00: And we find that meaning in the ways the statute uses the word determine. [00:32:44] Speaker 00: And it uses it, you know, a bunch of times in subsection B. And it is only stripping claims over subsection B. And then the other thing I would say is, you know, if he wants to acknowledge, he does, that there may be an ultra viris, leadum v kind kind of exception here. [00:33:01] Speaker 00: You know, our claim that we have pled is that the secretary has decided to end TPS for all of the countries, because you know President Trump said, I want to revoke TPS, you know, because it's illegal that's what he said on the campaign trail and that the invasion executive order when it says you have to align TPS with the objectives of stopping the invasion. [00:33:21] Speaker 00: uh you know what that means is end them all. [00:33:23] Speaker 00: Now we might be wrong in the merits, that's a separate question, and we have you know deferential, this court should apply deferential factual review to that, but that is surely a claim that it's as ultraviolet as you know some of these other hypotheticals. [00:33:34] Speaker 00: So I think we ought to be able to head jurisdiction over that claim. [00:33:38] Speaker 00: The second thing I'd say is our orderly transition claim [00:33:42] Speaker 00: which is that this is a radical departure from the agency's past practice, and it is unexplained and unacknowledged, right? [00:33:50] Speaker 00: That's our claim about that. [00:33:52] Speaker 00: That goes to subsection D of the statute, D as in dog, not B as in boy, because that's where the orderly transition is mentioned in subsection D. [00:34:03] Speaker 00: But the stripping provision only applies to determinations under subsection B, under this subsection, which is subsection B. And so we have a clean argument that this claim is not subject to the bar. [00:34:16] Speaker 00: And they're now making new arguments, which they never even made in the district court motion litigation, saying it's barred by 701A2 and saying it's barred by 1252A2B2. [00:34:27] Speaker 00: And I can answer those I've done some amount of reading, you know, in the last few days to try and understand that, but I would suggest that rather than deciding new jurisdictional arguments that were not presented to the district court. [00:34:45] Speaker 00: they never made this argument. [00:34:47] Speaker 00: And so they don't get to, not that it's waived, it's a subject matter argument, I get that, but that the district court did not have an opportunity to do this. [00:34:55] Speaker 00: You should make that argument first in the decision below, or at least let us brief it. [00:34:59] Speaker 00: At least let us brief it, because I don't think it's fair to sort of late in the stage like this, make these kinds of arguments. [00:35:06] Speaker 02: So going back to your first, that was sort of pre-decided, I mean, which is, [00:35:15] Speaker 02: basically an APA claim. [00:35:18] Speaker 02: Absolutely. [00:35:19] Speaker 02: So I'm not totally sure I follow how you read, how you construe the word determination that it doesn't cover an APA challenge to the decision about whether or not to terminate status for a particular country. [00:35:38] Speaker 00: I read determination to mean that the challenge to the country conditions assessment itself [00:35:44] Speaker 00: is barred. [00:35:44] Speaker 00: And what I mean by that is like the kinds of claims you get all the time in asylum cases that you all probably have seen thousands and thousands of times. [00:35:51] Speaker 00: If we wanted to say you are wrong, there's no substantial evidence to support the claim that Nicaragua is safe, given that your own USCIS memo says it's not safe, or same with Honduras, that claim is barred. [00:36:06] Speaker 00: However, a claim that goes to the [00:36:14] Speaker 04: Oh, dear. [00:36:15] Speaker 04: We had some phrasing here. [00:36:17] Speaker 04: Do we have Kwame standing by? [00:36:20] Speaker 00: Yeah, I'm here. [00:36:22] Speaker 00: I'm going to mute the screen. [00:36:23] Speaker 00: Objective review process, which is required by the statute. [00:36:29] Speaker 04: Can you stop for just one second? [00:36:31] Speaker 04: We're unfreezing you. [00:36:33] Speaker 00: Would not be barred. [00:36:35] Speaker 00: Can you hear me now, Your Honor? [00:36:37] Speaker 04: Well, now you're, yes, we could hear you, but we couldn't, you weren't moving. [00:36:42] Speaker 04: But now I think your lips and your face are doing the same thing. [00:36:46] Speaker 04: So are we okay, Kwame? [00:36:48] Speaker 01: Yes, audio is back for the stream. [00:36:50] Speaker 04: Okay, thank you. [00:36:51] Speaker 04: I apologize for that, Your Honor. [00:36:53] Speaker 04: No, you didn't do it. [00:36:56] Speaker 04: The forces did it, you know, someone else. [00:36:58] Speaker 04: Well, so, but let me ask you this about the predetermined. [00:37:02] Speaker 04: Why isn't the argument that the secretary predetermined to terminate the TPS is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Trump v. Hawaii? [00:37:13] Speaker 00: Well, Trump v. Hawaii only addresses the anti-discrimination claim with respect to that. [00:37:20] Speaker 00: I don't recall that they haven't argued that there's any aspect of Trump v. Hawaii that forecloses the APA [00:37:28] Speaker 00: Claim on predetermination and whether or not that claim is available depends entirely on what you think determination means and you know, as I said, I think it's meant to bar country conditions challenges like what you see in asylum cases, but process. [00:37:44] Speaker 00: where we say if you're not conducting the review that is required, the statute says, shall review the country conditions, and it's part of the periodic review process. [00:37:54] Speaker 00: And that's what we're saying. [00:37:55] Speaker 00: The APA imposes on that a rationality and good faith. [00:38:01] Speaker 04: Just humor me a little bit here and tell me specifically in what ways do you contend that the secretary failed to follow the APA procedures in terminating TPS? [00:38:11] Speaker 00: Sure, Your Honor. [00:38:12] Speaker 04: More specifically, we're kind of talking globally, but just more specifically. [00:38:16] Speaker 04: Sure, Your Honor. [00:38:17] Speaker 00: First, we think review entails actual consideration of the country conditions that are at issue in the case, in a given country. [00:38:27] Speaker 00: So, for example, here you have in May of 2025, [00:38:31] Speaker 00: USCIS writing a memo as to Nicaragua saying it is not safe because there's massive political instability and humanitarian crisis. [00:38:41] Speaker 00: It says Honduras is not safe because the same memo or different memo, but you know, May of 2025 USCIS country conditions memo on Honduras says it's not safe because there's rampant crime. [00:38:52] Speaker 00: This is something which is all over. [00:38:53] Speaker 00: It's the State Department says the same thing. [00:38:56] Speaker 00: Now it's one thing to say like, you know, I've looked at that and I actually think it's not that bad. [00:39:01] Speaker 00: But that's not what's happening here. [00:39:03] Speaker 00: Instead, it is entirely ignored. [00:39:06] Speaker 00: There's no reference to it at all. [00:39:08] Speaker 00: And it's not just eight countries. [00:39:10] Speaker 00: It's seven countries in a row that they have done this, even when there's massive problems. [00:39:15] Speaker 02: I'm so sorry to interrupt there, but a garden variety arbitrary and capricious challenge under the APA says exactly that. [00:39:22] Speaker 02: Like there was this important piece of evidence or this argument that we made and you didn't address it. [00:39:27] Speaker 02: So do you think that that sort of challenge [00:39:31] Speaker 02: Escape the bar? [00:39:33] Speaker 00: No, Your Honor. [00:39:33] Speaker 00: I was just saying that to say it's evidence. [00:39:36] Speaker 00: Judge Callahan asked me, or understood the question to ask me, what is the evidence for this? [00:39:39] Speaker 00: And part of the evidence is the fact that they are repeatedly, seven times in a row, ignoring the worst country conditions. [00:39:48] Speaker 00: Another one, though, equally important, Your Honor, equally important, is the fact that they have said they are going to do this. [00:39:53] Speaker 00: They're going to revoke TPS because they think it's illegal. [00:39:58] Speaker 00: And the district court cited statements [00:40:01] Speaker 00: a statement from the president saying they're going to revoke TPS, a statement from the invasion executive order that TPS has to be aligned with the priorities of the administration, and that in turn is cited in each of these decisions. [00:40:19] Speaker 00: So if it was just an arbitrary and capricious claim, that wouldn't be enough actually for us to win on this claim. [00:40:26] Speaker 00: We have to show [00:40:27] Speaker 00: more than just arbitrary and capricious, we have to show that they actually have the intent to end TPS without looking at what the result of the country conditions assessment is going to be. [00:40:38] Speaker 00: So just like disagreeing or even making a mistake is not enough. [00:40:42] Speaker 00: We actually have to show that their plan is to end TPS and that's different from an arbitrary and capricious claim, but we have made that showing for purposes of preliminary relief for sure. [00:40:51] Speaker 00: We have made that showing because they have statement upon statement and that factual finding [00:40:56] Speaker 00: is reviewable for clear error on appeal. [00:40:58] Speaker 02: And how is that different? [00:40:59] Speaker 02: I mean, every change in administration, I mean, just to take it out of this context and another administrative law setting, the EPA administrator comes in and it's somebody who, before he came in, he said, we need to cut all this red tape that's holding back American business, or we need to clean things up and stop the polluters. [00:41:24] Speaker 02: And it seems like on your logic, when he then sets the air quality standard, you'd be able to say, well, this was just part of your pre-existing either regulatory or deregulatory agenda, which is not how the APA works, right? [00:41:40] Speaker 00: Right. [00:41:40] Speaker 00: Yeah. [00:41:40] Speaker 00: So yeah, so two thoughts. [00:41:42] Speaker 00: First, the orderly transition claim is entirely distinct from this, right? [00:41:47] Speaker 00: And it just rests on the 22 years of past practice until this administration. [00:41:51] Speaker 00: I'll answer your question, but I just want to make sure totally that is a distinct claim. [00:41:55] Speaker 00: They have to win on that claim also to win the stay here. [00:41:59] Speaker 00: If we are right and people are entitled to at least six months, then it follows that the stay here is authorized because it only runs through November 19th. [00:42:05] Speaker 00: So I just want to say that that is a distinct basis to reject the government's claim for a stay with a distinct jurisdictional basis as well. [00:42:13] Speaker 00: But to answer your question, [00:42:14] Speaker 00: I would look to, even at the same time the Department of Commerce and the census case, you know says of course you can have a change in administrations. [00:42:22] Speaker 00: It also says agencies have to offer genuine justifications for important decisions. [00:42:28] Speaker 00: And so I think the extent to which you can have a deviation in agenda. [00:42:32] Speaker 00: it's determined by the statutory framework. [00:42:34] Speaker 00: So if the statutory framework gives a huge amount of latitude, well then there's more space in a sense for what you are talking about. [00:42:43] Speaker 00: Right here, the statute, this is something that we litigated in Ramos as well, the statute requires that TPS be extended unless the secretary determines [00:42:55] Speaker 00: that country conditions no longer warrant designation after reviewing the country conditions. [00:43:02] Speaker 00: And so we do think this statute imposes a certain kind of objectivity constraint on the agency. [00:43:08] Speaker 00: That was what it was intended to do. [00:43:10] Speaker 00: It replaced a vastly discretionary regime that was found insufficient in 1990 by Congress. [00:43:16] Speaker 00: It was meant to bar the kind of individual country conditions litigation you get in asylum cases, for sure, absolutely. [00:43:22] Speaker 00: But it was not meant to give them carte blanche [00:43:25] Speaker 00: to do sort of whatever they want. [00:43:26] Speaker 00: And so that constrains the extent to which the APA's, you know, constraints, you know, operate on the decision making. [00:43:33] Speaker 00: I see my time has expired. [00:43:35] Speaker 00: I know I haven't addressed the district court, this forthcoming recusal motion, or the discrimination claim. [00:43:43] Speaker 00: I don't know if the [00:43:44] Speaker 00: I don't know if the court. [00:43:47] Speaker 04: If either of my colleagues would like to give you that time, I'll just give the other time on rebuttal. [00:43:52] Speaker 04: I'm already going to give them a couple of minutes because we've taken you a couple of minutes over. [00:43:56] Speaker 04: Would you like him to explore that in two or three minutes? [00:44:02] Speaker 02: No. [00:44:04] Speaker 02: OK. [00:44:05] Speaker 02: I don't have any questions on those subjects. [00:44:08] Speaker 04: OK. [00:44:09] Speaker 04: It appears we don't have any questions. [00:44:10] Speaker 04: So why don't you take 30 seconds to a minute to wrap up? [00:44:14] Speaker 00: You know, I'll just say again, this is an emergency emotion. [00:44:18] Speaker 00: So the threshold question under this course law is still this course law East Bay. [00:44:21] Speaker 00: They have to show that there is an emergency between now and either when the appeal gets litigated or November 19th. [00:44:28] Speaker 00: And I really think this case really rises and falls entirely on the equities. [00:44:33] Speaker 00: You may disagree with us about jurisdiction. [00:44:35] Speaker 00: We know it was a hotly contested issue last time around, but it's not the sort of thing that should be resolved at this stage, particularly when they're conceding that they can't keep the hard line that they have to keep. [00:44:45] Speaker 00: They need to draw some other distinction because they recognize that these extreme statutory examples don't work. [00:44:52] Speaker 00: And rather than drawing that line in here, I would respectfully request the court should just wait and do this when the appeal comes. [00:45:00] Speaker 00: Thank you, Your Honors. [00:45:01] Speaker 04: All right, thank you. [00:45:02] Speaker 04: I'll give the government three minutes for rebuttal. [00:45:08] Speaker 04: You don't have to take it, but if you want it, you can have it. [00:45:12] Speaker 01: Thank you, Your Honors. [00:45:14] Speaker 01: Four quick points, I'll try to be under time. [00:45:16] Speaker 01: First is the appellate jurisdiction. [00:45:18] Speaker 01: I think this court's decision in DEF is absolutely controlling here that recognize there's appellate jurisdiction over 705 stay. [00:45:26] Speaker 01: I will tell you also that 705 stays are distinct from the Ken stays and that parties routinely threaten us with contempt for violating a 705 stay. [00:45:34] Speaker 01: So I don't think there's any distinctions. [00:45:36] Speaker 02: Do you think you would be, I mean, parties may threaten you with that, but is the position of the United States that you would be subject to contempt if you violate it? [00:45:46] Speaker 01: Your honor, I think there are additional complexities there, but the position of the United States is that we comply with court orders and do not intend to produce a circumstance where that would even be resolved, but certainly court orders cannot be violated, and there are consequences that attach to that, and those sort of serious consequences, whether they're contempt or something else, [00:46:06] Speaker 01: And I believe most opposing counsel, you'll recognize that it certainly can lead to contempt I think it just requires one extra step in his mind is more than sufficient to establish a valid jurisdiction, as is the fact that the Supreme Court granted a stay in NT PSA one. [00:46:22] Speaker 01: where jurisdiction wasn't even raised as a concern. [00:46:25] Speaker 01: And the Supreme Court is granted stays in many other instances where Section 705 stays were to issue again without any jurisdictional concerns. [00:46:33] Speaker 01: And that is not a court that is insensitive to jurisdictional concerns. [00:46:37] Speaker 01: So we think there's certainly a valid jurisdiction here. [00:46:40] Speaker 01: Similarly, we think the NTPSA1 resolves both the irreparable harm and the equities questions here. [00:46:47] Speaker 01: They really are just the same, the flip side of the coin here. [00:46:51] Speaker 01: They present the exact same issues. [00:46:53] Speaker 01: I don't think there's a meaningful distinction between tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of individuals at issue. [00:47:00] Speaker 01: It is still a source of irreparable harm to the government. [00:47:04] Speaker 01: 3rd, preordained is an APA claim. [00:47:07] Speaker 01: It is not an ultra virus claim. [00:47:09] Speaker 01: I don't think it could squeeze within any of the exceptions that we've talked about. [00:47:13] Speaker 01: And very tellingly, the preordained claim relies even in opposing counsel's telling on second guessing the country conditions. [00:47:20] Speaker 01: And that is squarely what is within the jurisdictional bar. [00:47:23] Speaker 01: So I think that this is absolutely within the core of the jurisdictional bar, and this court should follow Congress's explicit prohibition on exercising judicial review of these circumstances. [00:47:37] Speaker 01: And with that, if you have any questions. [00:47:42] Speaker 04: Great. [00:47:42] Speaker 04: Any questions for my colleagues? [00:47:45] Speaker 04: All right. [00:47:45] Speaker 04: That would appear that that would conclude argument. [00:47:50] Speaker 04: And I guess, [00:47:55] Speaker 04: I'm just trying to think, I'm thinking out loud right now. [00:47:59] Speaker 04: So we've had an argument. [00:48:00] Speaker 04: Are we submitting anything right now? [00:48:02] Speaker 04: We really aren't, right? [00:48:04] Speaker 03: I think that's to be determined. [00:48:11] Speaker 04: Yes. [00:48:12] Speaker 04: Okay. [00:48:14] Speaker 03: Further order of the court. [00:48:16] Speaker 04: Is that what we would say? [00:48:18] Speaker 04: So we're going to discuss this and we will further order the court will say we're for submitting whatever we're doing. [00:48:26] Speaker 04: As after we talk about this, this is all been going quickly. [00:48:30] Speaker 00: Thank you, your honor. [00:48:31] Speaker 04: All right. [00:48:32] Speaker 04: Thank you both for your arguments today.