[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
We have two argued cases, the first of which is Oppenheimer and Company versus Mitchell.

[00:00:07] Speaker 02:
And I believe it's Mr. Townsend first, please.

[00:00:11] Speaker 03:
Good morning, Your Honor.

[00:00:12] Speaker 02:
Good morning.

[00:00:13] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:00:13] Speaker 02:
I'd like to reserve three minutes.

[00:00:15] Speaker 02:
Keep your eye on the clock.

[00:00:16] Speaker 03:
We'll try to help you.

[00:00:17] Speaker 03:
I sure will.

[00:00:19] Speaker 03:
May it please the court, I represent the defendants and appellates in this matter, the Mitchells and the Hoppers.

[00:00:28] Speaker 03:
Mitchell's and the Hopper's purchased securities from John Woods and his controlled investment fund while Mr. Woods was a broker at Oppenheimer and a registered broker.

[00:00:48] Speaker 03:
The legal question here

[00:00:50] Speaker 03:
for the court is an application of the definition of customer under FINRA rule 12200 as applied to these facts.

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This has not been visited since Reno by this court and it is generally understood that customer includes associated persons and people through whom those purchases were made.

[00:01:17] Speaker 02:
If any, do you believe Reno plays in this case?

[00:01:21] Speaker 03:
Well, it sets the foundation upon which this applies, and I think Reno is controlling authority here.

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We ask that the court apply Reno faithfully and both by its policy and language.

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Aren't the facts of Reno quite different than this?

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Do you have an associate involved?

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Why is that the same as this case?

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It's, well, it's just the most recent case that this court has applied Rule 12-200.

[00:01:53] Speaker 03:
Right.

[00:01:53] Speaker 02:
But I'm just saying I get that point.

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But in terms of the facts, I find Reno to be quite distinct from this case.

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That's right.

[00:02:01] Speaker 03:
Am I missing something?

[00:02:02] Speaker 03:
No, you're correct in that that was the application of a forum selection clause in a separate case.

[00:02:11] Speaker 03:
The framework provided in Reno is what provides us guidance here, as well as other circuits who have addressed this issue as to the application of an associated person and purchases through an employee or an agent.

[00:02:30] Speaker 03:
Here we have both legal issues to consider and significant errors of facts below in terms of

[00:02:41] Speaker 03:
Citing the record and I'd like to spend some time for the court talking about the evidence that's in the record that was not Accurately represented in the summary judgment orders what I know there's a lot you can talk about You assume we've all read the briefs and the record I'm sure you'll get to this but this is important at least to me in terms of your case and that is

[00:03:07] Speaker 02:
It doesn't seem like your client had any direct interaction with Woods other than a single call between Mitchell and Woods in 2016.

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Is that right?

[00:03:19] Speaker 03:
I think, strictly speaking, that's a correct statement, but I think it's an overly narrow characterization of the way this transaction's happened.

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Mr. Mooney was both a cousin of Mr. Woods and understood through Horizon and represented to my clients and others that he was selling Oppenheimer products.

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Did he say that?

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He did say that, and his testimony is uncontroversial on that.

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And he says that that's an ER 308, ER 427, ER 223.

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Mr. Mooney also testified that he had no incentive to testify either way, had no pecuniary gain in his testimony.

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That's an ER 208.

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Mooney says that he's an agent and he specifically identifies Oppenheimer.

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That's ER 225 and ER 223.

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And similarly, Mooney touted the Oppenheimer relationship and said, this is an Oppenheimer product to the Mitchells and the Taubers.

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As I look at this, I'm going to call this your alter ego theory.

[00:04:31] Speaker 02:
It seems like you're saying that by investing in Horizon that the dependents transacted with Woods.

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Is that correct?

[00:04:38] Speaker 03:
Correct.

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And that's consistent with the structure of FINRA and the supervisory authority under Rule 3110, which requires that Oppenheimer police and investigate and undertake the supervisory authority over its brokers.

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In fact, Oppenheimer, if you look at ER 499, Oppenheimer was aware of this relationship and had concerns about it.

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In Caldwoods in 2013,

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I'm not sure what date on that.

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I have to look at that.

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That's at ER 499.

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But they call Woods and say, hey, are you associated?

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They had the red flags.

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They call Woods and he says, no, I'm not surprisingly the

[00:05:22] Speaker 02:
perpetrator of Ponzi scheme says no I'm not committing a Ponzi scheme and that satisfies Oppenheimer Oppenheimer knew and was aware that these are all going through through horizon horizons also would you agree if we adopt your approach which is what the Second Circuit did to say that Woods was an associate and therefore fit under the federal rules but it really all comes down to whether the relationship between Mitchell and Woods

[00:05:51] Speaker 02:
was enough of a transaction to fit within the law to bring him into this case.

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Well, I think two things about that.

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I mean, Horizon is Woods.

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And so it is a wholly owned entity that's controlled by Woods.

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And if you allow for another rule, which allows someone to create a shell corporation and bring someone in and be publicly represented and associated with Oppenheimer, as Mr. Woods is during this whole time, also associated with Horizon, which is all publicly available in the Georgia records, and those are also in the file.

[00:06:32] Speaker 01:
So was Horizon publicly associated with Oppenheimer?

[00:06:36] Speaker 03:
Horizon is publicly associated with Woods, and Woods is publicly associated with Oppenheimer.

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So it's not a very far way for Oppenheimer to have gone to undertake its supervisory authority over Woods.

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And the association between Woods and Oppenheimer was well known within Horizon.

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That's testified as to, in the record, by Mooney and Britt Wright, who was another salesperson.

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But also I want to go back to this comment of minimizing the, or to not minimize the phone call that occurs between Woods and the toppers.

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They do call Woods and Woods gets the, they get the assurances from Woods.

[00:07:20] Speaker 03:
There's no transcript of that communication.

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There's a note in the order saying, well, we don't know what they said.

[00:07:27] Speaker 02:
First of all, let me ask you, do you agree there was no direct

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really customer relationship between the defendants and Oppenheimer.

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Yes.

[00:07:37] Speaker 02:
So it all hinges on Woods.

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So Oppenheimer could have called Woods and inquired about Horizon without having any knowledge of your clients, right?

[00:07:47] Speaker 03:
Well, if they had known, Horizon, it's not legal for Woods to have created a separate entity and sell securities while a FINRA member through another entity.

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you're required to sell only through Oppenheimer.

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So he was off conducting the side business, this Ponzi scheme, but Horizon, I mean Oppenheimer could and should have known that and seen it.

[00:08:13] Speaker 02:
And you based that on what?

[00:08:15] Speaker 02:
The fact that they called Woods?

[00:08:18] Speaker 03:
It's just that it's publicly, they have the supervisory authority.

[00:08:22] Speaker 02:
I understand that, but I'm just saying, I'm trying to, if there is a relationship, we need to understand the nature of the relationship.

[00:08:30] Speaker 02:
I think what you're saying is that Oppenheimer called Woods, they knew about Horizon, therefore your clients are part of the team.

[00:08:38] Speaker 03:
They're within the supervisory authority.

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Woods' actions are within the supervisory authority of FINRA and Oppenheimer under FINRA rules.

[00:08:48] Speaker 02:
If Woods was an associate under FINRA and it was conducting all kinds of, he was doing all kinds of bad stuff,

[00:08:56] Speaker 02:
but had nothing to do with your client, would that automatically mean that your client, because Oppenheimer called Woods about some stuff he was doing that was wrong, would it mean that your client was covered?

[00:09:10] Speaker 03:
Well, it's important to note here, this is just what gets us into arbitration.

[00:09:14] Speaker 03:
Oh, no, I understand that.

[00:09:16] Speaker 03:
I understand that.

[00:09:18] Speaker 02:
I understand that.

[00:09:19] Speaker 02:
In order to have that, you've got to have the association, get that part.

[00:09:23] Speaker 02:
What I'm struggling with is how do you tie your client to Woods, to Oppenheimer?

[00:09:30] Speaker 03:
I think that Woods and Horizon and Southport are all associated persons because they are all Woods.

[00:09:40] Speaker 03:
And they are Woods's entities.

[00:09:42] Speaker 02:
So it's not just Woods that's an associated person.

[00:09:45] Speaker 02:
Any entity that he's formed is also an associated entity.

[00:09:48] Speaker 03:
Correct.

[00:09:49] Speaker 03:
Because he can't do that under FINRA rules.

[00:09:50] Speaker 02:
I understand that.

[00:09:51] Speaker 02:
But what case law would you cite?

[00:09:54] Speaker 02:
to the effect that an associated person that any entity that he or she forms is automatically an associate of, in this case, Oppenheimer.

[00:10:03] Speaker 03:
Well, I would point to the brief of the Investors Association and the amicus and their analysis of that I found quite persuasive to say if you allow for this to create a shell corporation to insulate it, you're really undermining the impact of FINRA.

[00:10:22] Speaker 03:
To answer your specific question, do I have a citation for you, which I could see I don't have a specific and maybe my

[00:10:28] Speaker 03:
colleague will help me on rebuttal if he has some comments.

[00:10:34] Speaker 03:
But I don't want to go past this direct communication between the Hoppers and Woods.

[00:10:43] Speaker 03:
And I liken it, if you were to invest in Berkshire Hathaway, do you have to talk to Warren Buffett or can you talk to one of his salespeople?

[00:10:52] Speaker 03:
Mooney is just a salesperson for Woods.

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He's the money gets to Woods.

[00:10:56] Speaker 03:
He's ultimately the beneficial owner.

[00:10:58] Speaker 03:
He's a cousin.

[00:11:01] Speaker 03:
He happens to be a former Oppenheimer person.

[00:11:03] Speaker 03:
He knows Woods through Oppenheimer and knows that association.

[00:11:08] Speaker 03:
And that's publicly known.

[00:11:12] Speaker 03:
Our clients went and did internet research and made their purchase based on the understanding that this was Woods and Oppenheimer's good name.

[00:11:24] Speaker 03:
And this was ultimately confirmed.

[00:11:26] Speaker 03:
And then the Seahawks tickets come, too.

[00:11:29] Speaker 03:
And as a Seattle resident, I want to say that those are...

[00:11:32] Speaker 03:
Those are of great value.

[00:11:36] Speaker 03:
But these are not nothing.

[00:11:37] Speaker 03:
This is obviously a scheme that's being perpetuated by Mr. Woods.

[00:11:42] Speaker 03:
He's been convicted of wire fraud, and he was doing it all under... Do you want to save your time for rebuttal?

[00:11:48] Speaker 02:
Thank you very much.

[00:11:49] Speaker 03:
Very well.

[00:11:51] Speaker 02:
All right.

[00:11:52] Speaker 02:
Mr. Frank.

[00:11:59] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:12:01] Speaker 00:
may please the court, Jason Frank from Morgan Lewis on behalf of Oppenheimer and Company.

[00:12:06] Speaker 00:
I'd like to pick up on the court's first question, which is what role does Reno play here?

[00:12:13] Speaker 00:
And there's a two-part answer.

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The first is, well, it sets the rule for what is required to be a customer and therefore to obtain an ability to force Oppenheimer to arbitrate.

[00:12:25] Speaker 00:
But on the other hand, the court is exactly right.

[00:12:27] Speaker 00:
The facts are totally different.

[00:12:30] Speaker 00:
In that case,

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the broker-dealer offered a service and was paid.

[00:12:36] Speaker 00:
And that is the touchstone of the customer test.

[00:12:40] Speaker 00:
This has been rearticulated in the Second Circuit in the Abar case, where they've articulated it as a purchase or account case.

[00:12:48] Speaker 00:
If you have an account with the broker-dealer, you're a customer.

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If you've made a purchase from the broker-dealer or it's an associated person, you're a customer.

[00:12:57] Speaker 00:
And that is not a test that the claimants here

[00:13:02] Speaker 00:
want applied because the fact of the matter is they made a purchase from a gentleman named Michael Mooney.

[00:13:11] Speaker 00:
Michael Mooney was their investment advisor.

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He was an associated person at Southport.

[00:13:18] Speaker 00:
And as a result, these claimants, the appellants here, they're customers of Michael Mooney.

[00:13:25] Speaker 00:
They're customers of Southpoint.

[00:13:27] Speaker 00:
They are not customers of Oppenheimer and Company.

[00:13:31] Speaker 00:
And to give an example, I would liken this to an investment in Coca-Cola.

[00:13:36] Speaker 00:
If a broker, an associated person, solicits a client to invest in Coca-Cola, and that client decides, you know what, I would like to call the investment relations department of Coca-Cola, find out more about Coca-Cola, I'm about to invest.

[00:13:52] Speaker 00:
And then that person invests in Coca-Cola.

[00:13:56] Speaker 00:
They are a customer of their broker.

[00:13:59] Speaker 00:
They're a customer of that associated person.

[00:14:01] Speaker 00:
They're a customer of the associated person's FINRA member firm.

[00:14:06] Speaker 00:
They are not a customer of Coca-Cola.

[00:14:08] Speaker 00:
And this is what the appellants are trying to do here.

[00:14:11] Speaker 00:
They're trying to transform their purchase from Michael Mooney.

[00:14:16] Speaker 00:
into a customer relationship with Horizon and therefore Mr. Woods and therefore somehow Oppenheimer and Company.

[00:14:28] Speaker 02:
What relationship, if any, does Mooney have with Oppenheimer?

[00:14:33] Speaker 00:
None.

[00:14:33] Speaker 00:
Mooney was a former associated person of Oppenheimer and the record reflects that he left Oppenheimer in the year 2010, six years before the purchase made by the appellant's here.

[00:14:46] Speaker 00:
And so what I'd like to emphasize is that the bar case in the second circuit that sets the test explains why it's so important to keep in mind the simple purchase or account rule.

[00:15:01] Speaker 00:
Because when we don't keep that in mind and we go down this rabbit hole of trying to better understand the nature of all of the relationships

[00:15:11] Speaker 00:
And what was represented to whom about what and what claimants believe we get away from clarity.

[00:15:20] Speaker 02:
Is it fair to say that we can have an associated person under FINRA rule 12,200 without having a customer?

[00:15:36] Speaker 00:
Sure, you can have an associate person who doesn't form a customer relationship.

[00:15:40] Speaker 02:
Wood was an associated person, and if the defendants were not customers, they still lose.

[00:15:48] Speaker 02:
Is that right?

[00:15:50] Speaker 00:
A great example of this, Your Honor, is the, I might mispronounce it, it's the Centaurus v. Ausluis case.

[00:15:57] Speaker 00:
And in that case, Mr. Ausluis bought an unregistered security, a deferred sales trust from a guy named Ben Kelly.

[00:16:05] Speaker 00:
Ben Kelly had a business called the State Planning Team.

[00:16:08] Speaker 00:
Ben Kelly was a registered rep.

[00:16:10] Speaker 00:
He was an associated person of Centaurus.

[00:16:13] Speaker 00:
Now, Mr. Ausluss tried to bring an arbitration against Centaurus, and Centaurus, like Oppenheimer here, moved to enjoin that and was successful.

[00:16:23] Speaker 00:
Why?

[00:16:23] Speaker 00:
The court held that Mr. Ausluss was not a customer because he purchased something from EPT.

[00:16:31] Speaker 00:
He entered into a relationship with this other entity, not Centaurus or Ben Kelly.

[00:16:36] Speaker 00:
And that's similar to this case.

[00:16:38] Speaker 00:
The Mitchells and the Hoppers bought Horizon, owned by Woods.

[00:16:42] Speaker 00:
And granting the preliminary injunction, I'd just like to quote what the court said in that case, because it applies directly here.

[00:16:47] Speaker 00:
The court wrote, Ausla seemingly argues that if one has a business relationship with an associated person of a FINRA member, this makes the person a customer.

[00:16:59] Speaker 00:
This cannot be correct.

[00:17:01] Speaker 00:
It is possible that an associated person of a FINRA member could have an independent company, as Ben Kelly appears to have with EPT.

[00:17:11] Speaker 00:
If one does not purchase a good or service from this FINRA member, he is not the FINRA member's customer simply because he purchased the good or service from an associated person acting on behalf of his or her own independent company.

[00:17:26] Speaker 00:
That is exactly the fact pattern here, Your Honors.

[00:17:29] Speaker 01:
Did they address the issue raised by opposing counsel that that's improper for an associated person to engage in a separate transaction or have a side business?

[00:17:40] Speaker 01:
That seemed to be what opposing counsel argued.

[00:17:43] Speaker 00:
I don't believe that is addressed in that case, Your Honor.

[00:17:47] Speaker 00:
Whether or not there's a supervisory issue doesn't give rise to customer status, right?

[00:17:54] Speaker 00:
So not only is that explained in the Abar case, but I believe in the Raymond James v. Kerry case out of the Fourth Circuit.

[00:18:02] Speaker 00:
I want to say it's footnote three, but in a footnote there, the circuit court explains that these sorts of supervisory allegations, they go to the merits of the claim, not to whether or not

[00:18:17] Speaker 00:
the claims are arbitrable.

[00:18:20] Speaker 02:
What's the best, most closely affiliated case you can cite to us that did the facts of this case?

[00:18:30] Speaker 00:
I guess I would cite two cases.

[00:18:33] Speaker 00:
The first is the is the Sintorski-Ausla's case we just discussed, but I'd also turn the court's attention to Morgan Keegan v. Silverman.

[00:18:42] Speaker 00:
This is a Fourth Circuit case that affirms the grant of a permanent adjunction.

[00:18:47] Speaker 00:
where defendants purchased shares in bond funds, they purchased those shares from their broker, Legg Mason, not Morgan Keegan.

[00:18:56] Speaker 00:
Morgan Keegan was the principal distributor and underwriter of the funds.

[00:19:01] Speaker 00:
So while there was communications between Morgan Keegan and Legg Mason, just like there are alleged communications here between Woods and Mooney, there

[00:19:11] Speaker 00:
And there, Morgan Keegan employees encouraged Legg Mason to purchase funds and to have customers purchase funds.

[00:19:18] Speaker 00:
And the Legg Mason broker relied, according to the court, on Morgan Keegan's marketing materials.

[00:19:26] Speaker 00:
But there, the Fourth Circuit held

[00:19:28] Speaker 00:
that the claimants were not customers because there was no contractual relationship with Morgan Keegan.

[00:19:34] Speaker 00:
And the purchases were made from Legg Mason, not Morgan Keegan.

[00:19:38] Speaker 00:
So I think those are the two cases I would direct the court to as closest to our facts here.

[00:19:45] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:19:47] Speaker 00:
And so one of the things I would just like to emphasize is that the facts here that dictate affirmance, they're not that complicated.

[00:19:59] Speaker 00:
The fact of the matter is there was no account at Oppenheimer and there was no purchase from Oppenheimer or an associated person of Oppenheimer.

[00:20:08] Speaker 00:
The Mitchells concede that they had no contact with anyone at Oppenheimer.

[00:20:12] Speaker 00:
That's SER24 and he is SER53.

[00:20:15] Speaker 00:
That is testimony from both Dory and Stephen Mitchell.

[00:20:19] Speaker 00:
Mike Mooney sold the Mitchell's Horizon securities.

[00:20:23] Speaker 00:
That's in their declarations, which is found at the record at ER 301 to 307.

[00:20:29] Speaker 00:
The Hoppers were also sold Horizon by Mike Mooney.

[00:20:33] Speaker 00:
That can be found in their declarations at ER 293 to 298.

[00:20:38] Speaker 00:
At deposition, Ms.

[00:20:40] Speaker 00:
Hopper admitted that her sworn declaration was inaccurate and that she never spoke to John Woods.

[00:20:46] Speaker 00:
That's SER 94.

[00:20:47] Speaker 00:
As the court pointed out earlier, it was only Mr. Hopper who had one conversation with John Woods.

[00:20:54] Speaker 00:
And if you look at that conversation, which is set forth at ER 297 to 298, and Mr. Hopper testified that his declaration sets forth the sum and substance of that conversation.

[00:21:08] Speaker 00:
That's SER 72.

[00:21:11] Speaker 00:
Here's the conversation.

[00:21:14] Speaker 00:
I'm sorry.

[00:21:15] Speaker 00:
He, quote, asked John Woods questions about the investment as part of our due diligence into the program.

[00:21:22] Speaker 00:
John Woods represented that Horizon Private Equity

[00:21:26] Speaker 00:
had access to investments in real estate, bonds, and other products offered through Oppenheimer that allowed it to pay a steady rate of interest to investors, 7% at that time."

[00:21:36] Speaker 00:
E.R., that's 297 to 98, as I said.

[00:21:41] Speaker 00:
Mooney was the defendant's investment advisor at Southport with respect to their investments in Horizon, according to Mr. Mooney.

[00:21:50] Speaker 00:
That's S.E.R.

[00:21:51] Speaker 00:
116.

[00:21:52] Speaker 00:
And Mr. Mooney was compensated for advising Southport clients to invest in Horizon.

[00:21:59] Speaker 00:
That's SCER 119.

[00:22:01] Speaker 00:
And so the question arises on these facts, did the Mitchells or Hoppers purchase the security from Oppenheimer or its associated person Woods in the course of Oppenheimer's investment banking and securities business activities?

[00:22:14] Speaker 00:
And the answer is simply no.

[00:22:15] Speaker 00:
They purchased Horizon from Mr. Mooney.

[00:22:18] Speaker 00:
And Mr. Mooney was an associated person at Southport.

[00:22:24] Speaker 00:
And so if there are no further questions?

[00:22:28] Speaker 00:
I think not.

[00:22:29] Speaker 00:
Thank you very much.

[00:22:30] Speaker 02:
Very well.

[00:22:30] Speaker 02:
Thank you very much, Council.

[00:22:32] Speaker 02:
Mr. Townsend, you have some time left.

[00:22:34] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:22:39] Speaker 03:
I can be brief.

[00:22:44] Speaker 03:
I want to speak to two points made by opposing counsel.

[00:22:48] Speaker 03:
One is the simplicity argument.

[00:22:51] Speaker 03:
Simplicity is achieved by the account test, but that's been rejected by most circuits as not affecting the intent of FINRA.

[00:23:01] Speaker 03:
So you have a direct account relationship.

[00:23:03] Speaker 03:
That is an overly narrow definition.

[00:23:06] Speaker 02:
I gather you do agree, though, that your clients purchased Horizon from Mr. Mooney, right?

[00:23:12] Speaker 02:
Not from Mr. Woods.

[00:23:14] Speaker 03:
He was the salesperson representing Mr. Woods's company and so I find our submission is overly formalistic to require that the individual be there if he's able to divert the customer, the investor

[00:23:32] Speaker 03:
Through a shell corporation and is there any evidence that mr.. Wood received any compensation from your client Well, he owned Southport and and he's he used that as part of his Ponzi scheme His the compensation of his Ponzi scheme yet that it all fed into the into the general sense he did yes

[00:23:54] Speaker 03:
Yeah, is he getting a sliver of the commission?

[00:23:59] Speaker 03:
I think that's, again, overly formalistic, and we need to look at what the intent here.

[00:24:05] Speaker 03:
I want to look at this Coca-Cola example, because I think that's not an appropriate metaphor.

[00:24:13] Speaker 03:
And I think, because Coca-Cola is not a broker dealer, and under the Coca-Cola scenario, it'd be one thing if the broker dealer owned

[00:24:24] Speaker 03:
has controlling interest and owned all the shares in Coca-Cola, that would be a more fitting example.

[00:24:30] Speaker 02:
You live on Bainridge Island, a beautiful place.

[00:24:33] Speaker 02:
There's an official ferry that goes back and forth, takes the cars, takes the people.

[00:24:39] Speaker 02:
If somebody that had their own ferry but no license to dock there came, you wouldn't be able to take that and be officially recognized, right?

[00:24:49] Speaker 02:
You would not, well that's- In other words, the dock on both sides where you empty cars in and out is an officially recognized Washington state controlled entity, right?

[00:25:00] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:25:01] Speaker 02:
So if you had a private ferry boat and you tried to dock there, you couldn't necessarily do that, could you?

[00:25:09] Speaker 03:
Here's what I, here's the metaphor that I would use on the ferry and thank you.

[00:25:13] Speaker 03:
Thank you for using a hometown metaphor for me.

[00:25:16] Speaker 03:
Maybe we're on our way to a Seahawks game.

[00:25:20] Speaker 03:
So imagine that I got on a Kitsap transit bus that then got on the ferry and said, and then, you know, the ferry crashed and got injured.

[00:25:31] Speaker 03:
I mean, we're out of FINRA here, but we're talking about principles of agency and really, I think.

[00:25:37] Speaker 03:
You say, well, wait a minute.

[00:25:39] Speaker 03:
You know, the ferry, the Kitsap transits did it here because I'm sitting on a Kitsap transit bus, but I'm sitting in a ferry that did the problem.

[00:25:47] Speaker 03:
So I think we're in a bus in the ferry.

[00:25:50] Speaker 03:
We're not in a different ferry.

[00:25:52] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:25:52] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:25:53] Speaker 02:
Very well.

[00:25:53] Speaker 02:
Thanks to both counsel for your argument.

[00:25:55] Speaker 02:
We appreciate it.

[00:25:57] Speaker 02:
An interesting case.

[00:25:57] Speaker 02:
The case just argued is submitted.