[00:00:01] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:00:01] Speaker 03: Good morning. [00:00:02] Speaker 03: May it please the court. [00:00:03] Speaker 03: My name is Matthew Seipel on behalf of Appellants, and I'll be reserving three minutes for rebuttal. [00:00:11] Speaker 03: For years, and for some decades, Appellants, agricultural workers, and their families have lived and worked at the Point Reyes National Seashore in the northern district of Golden Gate National Recreation Area in Marin County. [00:00:25] Speaker 03: And for years, the National Park Service has authorized that arrangement. [00:00:29] Speaker 03: It granted leases to the ranchers that permit the ranchers to give those workers and families a place to call home. [00:00:36] Speaker 03: In 2022, plaintiffs appellees sue the National Park Service, seeking to stop it from issuing those leases to ranchers, which would, as a practical matter, lead to the agricultural workers evictions from their homes. [00:00:51] Speaker 03: That's not disputed. [00:00:53] Speaker 03: For the next three years, the existing parties began secretly negotiating a settlement. [00:00:57] Speaker 03: News media reported that settlement was imminent and that it could involve ranchers forfeiting their leases and shutting down their ranches. [00:01:06] Speaker 03: So the agricultural workers moved to intervene under Rule 24. [00:01:09] Speaker 04: And how did you move to intervene? [00:01:10] Speaker 04: In what capacity? [00:01:11] Speaker 03: to engage in ongoing settlement negotiations. [00:01:16] Speaker 04: Under the rule, the rule is very formal. [00:01:19] Speaker 04: You have to intervene as a party with a particular status and file a pleading. [00:01:25] Speaker 04: What pleading did you file and in what status did you seek to intervene? [00:01:28] Speaker 03: We answer the complaint. [00:01:29] Speaker 04: You've intervened as a defendant with an answer. [00:01:32] Speaker 03: I think that's correct, yes. [00:01:34] Speaker 04: You did not assert cross claims. [00:01:35] Speaker 04: You had a section about cross claims that might be coming someday, but none were asserted. [00:01:40] Speaker 03: That's correct, yes. [00:01:40] Speaker 04: So you intervened as a defendant with an answer. [00:01:44] Speaker 04: How is that status as intervening a defendant, how does that survive the settlement of the litigation? [00:01:53] Speaker 04: If you had cross claims, I could see that. [00:01:55] Speaker 04: Then maybe that's not moot when the case settles. [00:01:59] Speaker 04: But if you join the [00:02:02] Speaker 04: the defense of the lead defendant whose conduct is being challenged, and that defendant says, well, I give up. [00:02:08] Speaker 04: I'm not going to do that conduct anymore. [00:02:10] Speaker 04: And you have no affirmative claims. [00:02:13] Speaker 04: They don't want to do the conduct. [00:02:14] Speaker 04: So the legality of the conduct is not relevant anymore. [00:02:19] Speaker 03: It's moot. [00:02:21] Speaker 03: Well, we can definitely talk about mootness, Your Honor, because I think at issue here, I think that's probably the main issue. [00:02:28] Speaker 04: It seems dispositive, because you have the affirmative claims in another case, and the only question here is the intervention, but the intervention seems moot if you intervene only as a defendant, and the defendants gave up. [00:02:43] Speaker 03: Well, I mean, we could still assert cross-claims. [00:02:45] Speaker 03: The matter below isn't discussed. [00:02:47] Speaker 04: But you've never asserted them at any point. [00:02:50] Speaker 04: So we can't reverse. [00:02:52] Speaker 04: There's nothing wrong with what the district court did if the issue is cross-claims, so it's no more asserted. [00:02:58] Speaker 03: Well, if you look at Church of Scientology of California versus United States, that's the US Supreme Court case. [00:03:03] Speaker 03: And also, Spring Communications, that's the Ninth Circuit case. [00:03:06] Speaker 03: They talk a little bit about mootness. [00:03:07] Speaker 03: And the rule is pretty high. [00:03:10] Speaker 03: It says, if an event occurs, so basically it says, [00:03:13] Speaker 03: Only if it is impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatsoever to the prevailing party, the appeal has to be dismissed. [00:03:24] Speaker 03: So in other words, the mootness standard is very high. [00:03:26] Speaker 03: And in Sprint Communications, their case involved a motion to intervene, much like the case here. [00:03:32] Speaker 03: The district court there denied the intervention motion. [00:03:34] Speaker 03: The existing parties, the government and Sprint, they settled the matter, settled it. [00:03:39] Speaker 03: And in fact, they voluntarily dismissed it. [00:03:43] Speaker 03: But this court ruled that the proposed intervener's intervention was not moot because he still might be able to object to the settlement. [00:03:51] Speaker 03: And there's also another case, Cooper v. Nels Newsom. [00:03:54] Speaker 03: That's a Ninth Circuit case, this court's case from 2021. [00:03:57] Speaker 03: It was a case cited by the answering briefs. [00:04:00] Speaker 03: And it came to a similar conclusion that the court here held that the action was not moot. [00:04:06] Speaker 03: despite a stipulated voluntary dismissal, because the proposed interveners could still move in the district court under federal rule of civil procedure 60B to seek relief from the order of dismissal that was entered pursuant to the stipulation. [00:04:19] Speaker 03: Now here, as a party, if the court here were to reverse the district court's order, as a party, we can prevent the settlement agreement from being fully effectuated. [00:04:30] Speaker 03: Because the settlement agreement contemplates a voluntary dismissal [00:04:34] Speaker 03: under Rule 41A1A2. [00:04:36] Speaker 03: Now that requires the stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties. [00:04:43] Speaker 03: We would then be a party, and we would not, of course, have signed that stipulation of dismissal. [00:04:48] Speaker 03: And so they couldn't dismiss it under that. [00:04:50] Speaker 03: So to dismiss the action, they would have to turn to Rule 41A2. [00:04:58] Speaker 03: And that requires a court order, at which point we would have a chance to object. [00:05:02] Speaker 03: In the meantime, we would then be a party with the adequate leverage that we've wanted since the beginning to talk, to negotiate, to try to shape the settlement agreement in whatever way legally is possible to protect our interests and our leaseholds. [00:05:25] Speaker 03: At which point, just like in sprint communications, the agricultural workers might be able to object to the settlement, otherwise obtain an agreement from the existing parties that would provide them with housing or other relief that can be legally provided. [00:05:36] Speaker 03: So under the rule, it's not impossible, it's not moot, it's not impossible for us to obtain some sort of effectual relief whatsoever. [00:05:44] Speaker 03: Indeed, in sprint communications, as I've noted, the action had already been dismissed. [00:05:48] Speaker 03: The action hasn't been dismissed. [00:05:50] Speaker 03: The existing parties are filing status reports and the action isn't dismissed. [00:05:56] Speaker 03: And indeed, the district court itself acknowledged at the time of the January 10th hearing, so after the January 8th sort of public settlement had been announced, the district court acknowledged that the action remains live. [00:06:09] Speaker 03: There hasn't been a dismissal. [00:06:11] Speaker 03: And if the agriculture workers intervene, [00:06:13] Speaker 03: They quote, they would then become a party who wasn't a party to the settlement. [00:06:17] Speaker 03: And that's 2 ER volume 2 of the Exeter records 36 through 37. [00:06:23] Speaker 03: And so based on this court's precedent and the US Supreme Court's decisions, the case isn't moot. [00:06:31] Speaker 03: There's still a chance for some effectual relief. [00:06:36] Speaker 03: And if I may, I can move on to the merits unless there's any other questions about mootness. [00:06:41] Speaker 03: So as to the merits, to prevail under rule 24A2, intervention of right, the proposed intervener must have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the move instability to protect its interest unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. [00:07:05] Speaker 03: And so this court has long held that if an absentee would be substantially affected, [00:07:10] Speaker 03: In a practical sense, by the determination made in an action, he should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene. [00:07:16] Speaker 03: Now, these requirements are broadly interpreted in favor of intervention. [00:07:21] Speaker 03: And review is guided primarily by practical considerations, not technical distinction. [00:07:27] Speaker 03: And if we move on just quickly to the elements, first, timeliness element. [00:07:34] Speaker 03: There's no dispute here that the agricultural workers' motion to intervene was timely. [00:07:38] Speaker 03: Again, no one disputes that. [00:07:40] Speaker 03: Second, the district court below correctly ruled that the agricultural workers do have a significantly protectable interest here, their property and contractual interests in their homes and the park. [00:07:52] Speaker 03: Third, the existing parties, plaintiffs, National Park Service, there are also ranchers and the Rancher Association who [00:08:01] Speaker 03: intervened and no one complained They intervened there were parties now those all those existing parties do not adequately represent the adequate agricultural workers interest here in their leaseholds and the answering briefs appear on appeal don't dispute that element and then finally as to impairment the case below expressly seeks to enjoy the National Park Service from approving a [00:08:25] Speaker 03: the 20-year leases for ranching. [00:08:27] Speaker 03: The settlement contemplates closing the ranches, which would, as a practical matter, lead to a loss of park-based housing for the agricultural workers and their families. [00:08:36] Speaker 03: And the district court acknowledged all of this, and even noted that disposition could uproot the agricultural workers in a major way. [00:08:44] Speaker 03: And so under the plain language of Rule 24A, the agricultural workers should have been entitled to intervene as of right, and the district court erred in ruling otherwise. [00:08:56] Speaker 03: If there are no further questions, I can reserve the remaining time. [00:08:59] Speaker 04: I'm still struggling with the moot in this question. [00:09:04] Speaker 04: You rely on the Sprint case, but in the Sprint case, was the intervener intervening to assert affirmative claims and not as a defendant? [00:09:14] Speaker 03: I believe in the Sprint case, the intervener was specifically intervening to object to the settlement there. [00:09:21] Speaker 03: So I think I think I think I wanted something too. [00:09:25] Speaker 04: I mean wasn't it's a false claims act case. [00:09:29] Speaker 04: Yeah, they wanted to get something. [00:09:31] Speaker 04: Yeah, they want to get an affirmative claim wasn't as a defendant. [00:09:36] Speaker 04: I'm not sure if it was an affirmative claim. [00:09:38] Speaker 04: You have a case where someone tried to intervene as a defendant in a lawsuit. [00:09:44] Speaker 04: Yeah. [00:09:45] Speaker 04: and saying, you know, the main defendant's conduct is good and shouldn't be challenged. [00:09:50] Speaker 04: It should be left in place. [00:09:53] Speaker 04: And the intervener comes in and says, I'm going to intervene as a defendant to join and support that defense. [00:09:59] Speaker 04: And then the main defendant gives up and says, I'm not going to do the conduct anymore. [00:10:03] Speaker 04: I'm not going to do it. [00:10:05] Speaker 04: Did you have a case that says that that sort of an intervention dispute is not moot when the defendant gives up on the conduct and the intervention was only as a defendant? [00:10:14] Speaker 04: Do you have any case that fits that pattern? [00:10:19] Speaker 04: Because I agree with you, if you had put the cross claims in the pleading, then the intervention would not be moot because the fact that they settle that doesn't, the cross claims are still there and [00:10:32] Speaker 04: That would be a basis to challenge the settlement. [00:10:34] Speaker 04: You can't do the settlement because I want something out of this. [00:10:36] Speaker 04: But that was never put on the table. [00:10:39] Speaker 04: That's what I'm struggling with. [00:10:40] Speaker 04: And I'm wondering if you have a case that deals with this kind of unique pattern. [00:10:44] Speaker 03: Well, I would direct the court to, again, this particular issue, I'm not sure we specifically briefed. [00:10:52] Speaker 03: But direct the court to United States versus Carpenter, 298 F3rd 1122. [00:10:58] Speaker 03: That's from a 9th Circuit case from 2002. [00:11:00] Speaker 03: And there, the appellants. [00:11:02] Speaker 04: 298 F3rd, what was the? [00:11:04] Speaker 03: Sorry, 298 F3rd 1122. [00:11:06] Speaker 03: 1122 and That's the United States versus cooper and and in that case the appellants are or carpenter cooper or sorry excuse me carpenter yes And the appellant sought to intervene to object to the proposed settlement And then they filed their intervention intervention potential soon after the proposed agreement was made public and [00:11:31] Speaker 03: And then also, the United States versus Aerojet GenCorp case, that's a case that we cited, and that might hold the answer there as well. [00:11:42] Speaker 03: I think the whole cross-claim issue, you know, I think our interests here extend beyond this 2021 ROD that's at that was sort of being defended by the defendants here, because our interests are the leasehold. [00:11:59] Speaker 03: And specifically, like I said, we intervened, sure, somewhat on the side of the defendant. [00:12:06] Speaker 03: However, we intervened specifically to have a seat at the negotiating table, at least try to, and to sort of shape the settlement that the existing parties, which we knew at the time were coming towards this settlement to extinguish the agricultural workers' right to stay in their home. [00:12:25] Speaker 03: And so that specific purpose in mind [00:12:28] Speaker 03: you know, whether we have a cross-claim issue or not, as to mootness, it's not impossible for us to re-engage in settlement negotiations with the parties. [00:12:39] Speaker 03: Whether they want to or not, that's something that, you know, we'll have to figure out, but it's certainly not impossible. [00:12:45] Speaker 03: And certainly not impossible for us to object to the agreement. [00:12:48] Speaker 03: There's a path here. [00:12:50] Speaker 03: to object to the dismissal, to the settlement agreement and to maybe have a little bit of leverage to shape some kind of settlement. [00:12:58] Speaker 03: And also under rule 41A2, there's a provision there that gives the district court wide discretion to place conditions on a dismissal. [00:13:09] Speaker 03: And so that's also another path. [00:13:11] Speaker 03: Do you want to reserve? [00:13:12] Speaker 03: Yes, I'd like to reserve, yes. [00:13:13] Speaker 03: Okay, thank you. [00:13:28] Speaker 01: May it please the court, my name is Ezekiel Peterson here on behalf of the National Park Service. [00:13:33] Speaker 01: With me at council table is Elizabeth Potter, representing the plaintiffs. [00:13:36] Speaker 01: My plan is to speak for 10 minutes before turning it over to Ms. [00:13:38] Speaker 01: Potter for the remainder of the time. [00:13:41] Speaker 01: The ranch tenants here essentially seek intervention for the sake of intervention without showing any sort of practical purpose that can be served or that they can get any effectual relief. [00:13:50] Speaker 04: And I want to say- Well, I mean, if they had put the cross claims in that are in the other suit and the district court [00:13:58] Speaker 04: had adopted the reasoning that it did here. [00:14:02] Speaker 04: That would get reversed, wouldn't it? [00:14:04] Speaker 04: I mean, that would be indefensible. [00:14:07] Speaker 01: I agree that then there would be a question about claim splitting. [00:14:11] Speaker 01: But there would potentially be a live intervention dispute. [00:14:14] Speaker 04: No, I'm just saying, suppose the second suit had never happened. [00:14:17] Speaker 04: Instead, those claims had shown up as cross claims in the answer they filed. [00:14:21] Speaker 04: So they moved to intervene both as a defendant and as a party with cross claims. [00:14:27] Speaker 04: And they had actually asserted them. [00:14:29] Speaker 04: you know, you reach the settlement and then the district court said what it did, that would seem to me both not to be moot and to be really wrong. [00:14:39] Speaker 01: I agree we'd be in a completely different situation if that were the case, but that's not the case here and I want to discuss why this case is moot because I think it, you know, [00:14:49] Speaker 01: starts and stops there. [00:14:50] Speaker 01: The court can go as far as finding that this intervention dispute is moot. [00:14:54] Speaker 02: And maybe you can address this. [00:14:56] Speaker 02: The best argument I heard was, well, we are a party to the case. [00:15:01] Speaker 02: And therefore, there can't be a dismissal without our agreement. [00:15:07] Speaker 01: Your Honor, we agree that there can't be a formal dismissal. [00:15:11] Speaker 01: But the case below is already administratively closed. [00:15:13] Speaker 01: And I think the key point that they're trying to make [00:15:16] Speaker 01: is that they say they could prevent the settlement from being fully effectuated. [00:15:21] Speaker 01: And that is not true. [00:15:22] Speaker 01: The settlement is already fully effectuated. [00:15:25] Speaker 01: It's an out-of-court agreement. [00:15:27] Speaker 02: You've withdrawn the prior rule, right? [00:15:29] Speaker 01: Exactly. [00:15:30] Speaker 01: So the Park Service has withdrawn the 2021 record decision. [00:15:34] Speaker 01: The settlement agreement was an out-of-court agreement between the ranchers, the Nature Conservancy, the plaintiffs in this case, and us, the National Park Service. [00:15:43] Speaker 01: It's already final. [00:15:44] Speaker 01: It's binding. [00:15:45] Speaker 01: It's signed between the parties. [00:15:46] Speaker 01: The parties have been carrying out their duties under the settlement agreement. [00:15:50] Speaker 01: If there's any sort of disputes about the settlement agreement going forward or administration of the settlement agreement, settlement agreement explains at paragraphs 25 and 48 that those disputes aren't subject to the continued judicial oversight of the district court. [00:16:04] Speaker 01: They have to be litigated in a separate case. [00:16:07] Speaker 01: This isn't a situation like where we have a consent decree or some sort of settlement agreement that's subject to ongoing jurisdiction by the district court. [00:16:16] Speaker 01: This is an out of court settlement agreement. [00:16:18] Speaker 01: And even if the ranch tenants were allowed to intervene, they would have no way of affecting that settlement agreement below. [00:16:24] Speaker 01: The only thing they would be able to do would be to oppose the formal dismissal of the case, which is already in administrative closure in district court. [00:16:33] Speaker 01: There's nothing more that's happening there. [00:16:36] Speaker 01: I think that's the key point when it comes to mootness. [00:16:38] Speaker 01: The focus is on whether the interveners have any possible path to the relief they seek. [00:16:43] Speaker 01: And here, where they're seeking to influence the settlement agreement, they don't. [00:16:48] Speaker 01: I want to touch on a couple of cases that the other side cited, starting with sprint communications. [00:16:54] Speaker 01: Judge Collins, you're right. [00:16:55] Speaker 01: That was a Quee Tom False Claims Act case, where the plaintiffs [00:16:59] Speaker 01: Excuse me where the putative interveners were seeking to intervene as plaintiffs with potential claims that they could then bring so there was the aerojet case the aerojet case was a Circla case that involved a consent decree where the district court had ongoing judicial oversight over the settlement agreement and the consent decree would have affected a [00:17:22] Speaker 01: the putative intervener's liability under the Superfund statute. [00:17:26] Speaker 04: So again, there was some sort of... What was the capacity in which the interveners in Aerojet sought to intervene? [00:17:35] Speaker 04: Because they don't look like scientists, they look like defendants. [00:17:39] Speaker 04: I think they... Were they asserting any kind of affirmative claims as well? [00:17:45] Speaker 01: Your honor, I don't remember the specifics of that case, but in these CERCLA liability actions, it's common for parties to assert cross-claims for contributory... I mean, because they said a contribution claim. [00:17:56] Speaker 01: Precisely, your honor. [00:17:56] Speaker 04: There's... Could it be a cross-claim? [00:17:58] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:17:58] Speaker 01: Yes, your honor. [00:17:59] Speaker 04: And if... Okay. [00:18:02] Speaker 04: So if Aerojet is a cross-claim case, then it would not look like this. [00:18:06] Speaker 04: But if it's just a pure defending case, it would look like this case. [00:18:10] Speaker 01: If it were... I think with the exception of the fact that [00:18:14] Speaker 01: In that case, I believe it was a consent decree in district court subject to ongoing jurisdiction and judicial oversight. [00:18:22] Speaker 01: So I think there would be the opportunity for a putative intervener to object to the entry of the consent decree. [00:18:29] Speaker 01: And here, that's not the case. [00:18:30] Speaker 04: But in what capacity and on what basis were they seeking to do that in Aerojet? [00:18:36] Speaker 04: And how would this be different? [00:18:38] Speaker 01: Your honor, I'm speculating about Aerojet. [00:18:41] Speaker 01: I'm not positive on the exact contours of that. [00:18:45] Speaker 01: But it's different in this case, because this was an entirely out of court private settlement agreement. [00:18:50] Speaker 01: The parties entered into, they didn't need the consent of the district court to enter the settlement agreement. [00:18:57] Speaker 01: The ranchers, the Nature Conservancy, the plaintiffs and defendants in this case, entered this agreement out of court through this private mediation process. [00:19:07] Speaker 01: I'm happy to discuss intervention and the merits if the court has any questions about that. [00:19:11] Speaker 01: But otherwise, I can turn back my time. [00:19:15] Speaker 01: OK. [00:19:15] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:19:16] Speaker 01: Thank you, Your Honors. [00:19:36] Speaker 00: May it please the court, Elizabeth Potter, on behalf of the remaining appellees. [00:19:41] Speaker 00: Today, I want to focus on three quick points that all demonstrate the tenants have nothing to gain or lose through this closed case, and thus intervention is not warranted. [00:19:51] Speaker 00: The same facts that I'm going to discuss all indicate not only that the case is moot, as Your Honors were discussing, but also that intervention is not warranted under Rule 24A. [00:20:01] Speaker 02: Although that's not really before us, or is it? [00:20:05] Speaker 02: I mean, they've already intervened. [00:20:08] Speaker 00: Wait. [00:20:09] Speaker 00: So we are asking this court to affirm the lower court's denial of intervention to the so-called agricultural workers or the tenants. [00:20:22] Speaker 00: And so really they're focused on, even today, on getting a seat at the negotiating table. [00:20:27] Speaker 00: But it is very important to note that they had an opportunity to be at the negotiating table. [00:20:33] Speaker 00: When they first moved to intervene, in this case, [00:20:36] Speaker 00: The parties invited them to join the mediation, but they declined and instead decided to pursue their motion in court. [00:20:44] Speaker 00: This ER 616 to 18, those are some of the record sites that address that. [00:20:51] Speaker 00: And so now they're trying to get into the settlement, but as the Department of Justice attorney indicated, the settlement is already final. [00:21:00] Speaker 00: It is being fully effectuated. [00:21:02] Speaker 00: The ranchers are moving out, the retiring ranchers, they're closing. [00:21:06] Speaker 04: And so... But what's this... Are the appellees going to make an argument in the other litigation if we, you know, affirm or if we hold this case as moot? [00:21:19] Speaker 04: Is there going to be any kind of an argument in the other litigation that there's some sort of preclusion against? [00:21:25] Speaker 04: Because there were not parties to this litigation then, if that's how this ends, so there'd be no preclusion. [00:21:30] Speaker 04: Is that correct? [00:21:32] Speaker 04: There might be practical problems with getting relief when, again, if a defendant, you know, gives up on its conduct and wants to change its conduct, you may have trouble getting an affirmative claim that makes them do something different. [00:21:46] Speaker 04: But there's not going to be any argument that they're bound by anything in this as a preclusive matter, correct? [00:21:53] Speaker 04: Because they're not parties. [00:21:55] Speaker 00: Correct your honor not that not that I'm aware of and so in this instance because They've they've indicated in their brief that they want to potentially challenge the settlement agreement in this case But they're doing precisely that in the other case and so I would point this court to the Ninth Circuit's decision in the DBSI [00:22:12] Speaker 00: case and in that one there this court found that the relief sought in the other action that the that was a tenant case tenants were trying to intervene in a quiet title action involving fair housing issues and there they had also a separate administrative procedure act case [00:22:31] Speaker 00: And the court found that the relief they sought in that other action was essentially the same relief that they say they wish to obtain in the main case. [00:22:39] Speaker 00: And so intervention was not warranted. [00:22:41] Speaker 00: And that's exactly what is at issue here. [00:22:44] Speaker 00: With regard to the settlement agreement, there is nothing in the district court case [00:22:48] Speaker 00: that can happen that can give them the relief related to the settlement agreement which was negotiated it took almost three years it was a multi-party action involving all the ranchers and they had their opportunity to be at the negotiating table and they did not take it [00:23:05] Speaker 00: The second reason why intervention is not warranted involves their arguments about wanting to block voluntary dismissal. [00:23:13] Speaker 00: There's nothing for them to do there. [00:23:15] Speaker 00: It's very important to note in the settlement agreement, voluntary dismissal of the case would only occur after all of the retiring ranches are closed and with that all of the housing. [00:23:26] Speaker 00: that they seek to protect. [00:23:28] Speaker 00: And under the governing law, which includes the now defunct but the 2021 rod that they seek to revive, housing is not allowed outside of those ranching operations. [00:23:38] Speaker 00: And so at that point, there would be nothing left for them to gain through that. [00:23:42] Speaker 00: And with regard to the sprint case that the court was discussing earlier that case is actually quite helpful on the merits there the court found that there was essentially no relief that the would-be Intervener could get in the case and so intervention wasn't warranted And it's the same thing here the the tenants cannot get relief related to the settlement agreement or voluntary dismissal through this case and so thus Intervention is not warranted [00:24:11] Speaker 00: I have one final point in their reply brief the the tenants raised this curious argument about the timing of developments that the court can consider on page 21 and 22 They argue that post-motion developments in the case can't be considered by the court, but they're both legally and factually wrong The cases that they cite don't actually say that I mean intervention is a forward-looking [00:24:36] Speaker 00: Inquiry about how interest will be affected as the case unfolds and they're also factually wrong the representation they made that there was a second intervention hearing before the court actually or before the record of decision was rescinded and the settlement agreement was finalized is not true that actually happened in January and so those two key developments that the rescission of the rod and the execution of the settlement agreement [00:25:04] Speaker 00: happened before the court ruled on the motion to intervene, and are dispositive here. [00:25:09] Speaker 00: Because once those actions happened, there was nothing left that the intervener, would-be interveners, could do to protect their interests in this case. [00:25:18] Speaker 00: And so because their absence wouldn't impair their interests, their presence wouldn't advance their interests, and thus intervention is unwarranted. [00:25:26] Speaker 00: And here, as I mentioned, the ranch retirements are moving forward. [00:25:31] Speaker 00: Settlement agreement is set to The ranch retirements are set to happen in the next few months Completely two are already completely closed and so there's really nothing left to do in this case related to that And so if the court has no other questions, then we would ask that the court affirm the district courts denial of intervention to the ranch tenants and [00:25:56] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:25:57] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:25:58] Speaker 03: Thank you for your time, and we will give you time for rebuttal Just a few quick points I believe the the federal appellee Mentioned that the the case is closed, but it's just administratively closed and in fact if you looked at the district court's order administratively closing it for Statistic purpose statistical purposes only the court [00:26:27] Speaker 03: Notes that any party can reopen the case There's also a mention that the That the stipulated dismissal contemplated in the in the settlement agreement Is sort of it's going to happen and it has no sort of bearing on the settlement agreement It's just sort of a condition that has to be met [00:26:54] Speaker 03: But if you look at the settlement agreement, the public settlement agreement, which by the way we only saw two days before the hearing, which was January 8th, had no chance to brief it down below, the waivers, the releases, the covenants not to sue, they're all conditioned on this stipulated dismissal under Rule 41. [00:27:12] Speaker 03: And so it seems to me that at least looking at the plain language of the settlement agreement that it's the stipulated dismissal is fairly important. [00:27:20] Speaker 04: You cited before on this issue, the mootness issue I'm worried about, the Carpenter and Aerojet cases. [00:27:32] Speaker 04: And I looked at those and Carpenter, the intervention proposed was as a plaintiff. [00:27:37] Speaker 04: And then in Aerojet, our opinion is kind of hard to read, but I looked at the district court decision and it says the court holds that the non-settling PRPs, who were the putative interveners, do not have a right to intervene based upon claims of contribution against the settling PRPs. [00:27:57] Speaker 04: So the cross claims were the basis of the intervention. [00:28:00] Speaker 04: And so I still get back to my question is, do you have a case where someone [00:28:08] Speaker 04: wants to intervene only as a defendant and then, you know, once thinks on that basis, they have the ability to object when the main defendant gives up. [00:28:21] Speaker 04: And with no cross-claims, because the cross-claims would absolutely give you a foot in the door, a seat at the table, but they were not asserted. [00:28:30] Speaker 04: So I'm looking for any case that [00:28:33] Speaker 04: would support you on that because these don't seem to cover this case. [00:28:37] Speaker 03: Well, I'd be happy to brief more, do supplemental briefing on that. [00:28:40] Speaker 03: I do believe that in this case, again, we moved to intervene and we happened to do it on the side of the defendant, so we answered, but we did reserve the right to cross claim as well. [00:28:54] Speaker 03: And I don't think that [00:28:56] Speaker 03: should affect the mootness issue because... Of course it affects it. [00:28:59] Speaker 04: It affects whether claims are asserted makes a big difference. [00:29:03] Speaker 04: And if the claims have been asserted like they are in the other case, I think this would get reversed. [00:29:10] Speaker 04: But the claims were not put in the case. [00:29:13] Speaker 03: I think it shouldn't affect it under the Supreme Court's statements about mootness and this Court's statements about mootness in the context of a motion to intervene because [00:29:25] Speaker 03: It has to be impossible, impossible to obtain any effectual relief whatsoever. [00:29:29] Speaker 03: Our effectual relief is to have a chance to sit at the negotiating table. [00:29:35] Speaker 03: It's a chance to shape some sort of settlement that considers the interests of the agricultural workers right to live where they live right now, live in their homes. [00:29:45] Speaker 03: And so that's the effectual relief we have. [00:29:47] Speaker 03: It's not impossible to get that. [00:29:49] Speaker 03: And I understand the appellees may not want to do that right now. [00:29:52] Speaker 03: But if we made a party, we would have some leverage to do that. [00:29:56] Speaker 03: And that's all we're asking. [00:29:57] Speaker 03: It's just a chance to do that. [00:29:59] Speaker 02: Council, I think we have your argument at this point. [00:30:01] Speaker 02: So thank you. [00:30:02] Speaker 02: Thank you to both sides for your arguments in the case. [00:30:04] Speaker 02: The case is now submitted. [00:30:05] Speaker 02: And that concludes our arguments for the day.