[00:00:03] Speaker 02: Good morning, may I please the court? [00:00:05] Speaker 02: Vitaly Kirchin, present for the appellant in this case, Mr. Versosa. [00:00:10] Speaker 02: I would like to reserve 90 seconds for rebuttal, please. [00:00:12] Speaker 01: Okay, please keep track of your own time. [00:00:15] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:00:15] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:00:17] Speaker 02: Mr. Verzoso filed a petition for a writ of error quorum nobis in the Western District of Washington based on a conviction he received in 2010 for unlawful possession of a firearm under G1. [00:00:30] Speaker 02: The district court issued a summary one-page denial with no explanation as to what the reason for the denial was. [00:00:37] Speaker 02: There are four elements for a quorum nobis petition. [00:00:42] Speaker 02: The government only contests two of those, which is timeliness and fundamental error, as our position on Mr. Vazoso satisfies both elements. [00:00:51] Speaker 02: With respect to timeliness, the law does not specifically impose any specific statute of limitations regarding how much time after a claim accrues [00:01:01] Speaker 02: that the petition has to be filed. [00:01:02] Speaker 01: Council, in the habeas context, ignorance of the law is ordinarily not sufficient to delay filing. [00:01:08] Speaker 01: So the request that you're making in this case is asking us to create a different standard for quorum nobis petitions, correct? [00:01:19] Speaker 02: No, I don't think so, Your Honor. [00:01:21] Speaker 02: I'm not here arguing that ignorance of the law is an excuse. [00:01:25] Speaker 02: My argument is that [00:01:27] Speaker 02: Context matters. [00:01:29] Speaker 02: Facts matter. [00:01:30] Speaker 01: Well, your basic argument is that he didn't make the filing in 2019 or even in 2022 when his mother acted to to to make filings on his behalf in Washington State Court. [00:01:44] Speaker 01: But he didn't act after that because he didn't know that he could. [00:01:47] Speaker 01: Right. [00:01:48] Speaker 02: That is essentially the argument. [00:01:50] Speaker 01: OK, so that that's ignorance of the law, as I as I understand it. [00:01:54] Speaker 02: I understand where you're coming from, Your Honor. [00:02:01] Speaker 02: Our position is that the law does not impose a requirement for a defendant to continue researching the law into perpetuity, into reading Supreme Court opinions, into reading Ninth Circuit opinions, into consulting with an attorney on a semiannual basis. [00:02:16] Speaker 02: continue figuring and trying to figure out if there's an object for relief. [00:02:20] Speaker 02: If we look at the context of all the other cases, there is always some sort of impetus or stimulus that the court looks to that puts the defendant on notice. [00:02:29] Speaker 02: In a lot of these cases, it's immigration consequences. [00:02:32] Speaker 02: That's why I'm saying context matters. [00:02:34] Speaker 02: Mr. Versoso is a US citizen, no immigration consequences. [00:02:36] Speaker 02: He's been a union electrician since 2007, no employment consequences. [00:02:40] Speaker 02: no housing consequences. [00:02:42] Speaker 02: He's basically had no reason to continue trying to figure out if he can have this thing removed or vacated if he has, you know, if he has legal relief. [00:02:51] Speaker 02: So, I think in this particular context, again, I don't know, I didn't know, I didn't have reason to know, is a valid reason for the timeliness petition because... I gather you could also, I mean, what struck me was that at his plea, [00:03:10] Speaker 04: In the federal case? [00:03:11] Speaker 04: Yeah, in the federal case. [00:03:12] Speaker 04: That, you know, he was advised by the court and by, I guess, his counsel and by the U.S. [00:03:19] Speaker 04: attorney who I think would probably stand up and state what the elements of the offense were. [00:03:24] Speaker 04: Everybody said, yeah, those are the elements of the offense. [00:03:28] Speaker 04: So why would he, you think that, what would have led him or what should have led him to think that that was incorrect? [00:03:37] Speaker 02: Is this a timeliness question or a fundamental error question? [00:03:40] Speaker 04: Timeliness? [00:03:42] Speaker 02: So the question is what would have led Mr. Versoza specifically to know what... After having received those advisements? [00:03:50] Speaker 02: Absolutely nothing. [00:03:52] Speaker 00: Assume for a moment that I'm with you on the timeliness question. [00:03:57] Speaker 00: What bothers me more than the timeliness question is this error is of a fundamental character. [00:04:05] Speaker 00: He's got two convictions under state law for a felon in possession. [00:04:10] Speaker 00: He's got a third conviction under federal law for a felon in possession. [00:04:16] Speaker 00: At the time he's convicted under state law, the state law is clear, he violates the state law and he does it twice. [00:04:24] Speaker 00: When he's violating the federal law, the law is clear and he violates federal law. [00:04:29] Speaker 00: He's now basically relying on, I'll call it technicalities or we can call it something else, [00:04:36] Speaker 00: But why is this such a serious error that would be the, quote, most fundamental character when he is three times carrying a weapon when it is against the law as the law now stands? [00:04:50] Speaker 02: Well, Your Honor, I point the court to the 2022 decision of Whirl, United States versus Whirl, which is almost indistinguishable from this case, other than not have to do a 2255 habeas petition. [00:05:01] Speaker 02: We have a quorum nobis. [00:05:02] Speaker 02: But for functional purposes, those are treated as the same. [00:05:05] Speaker 02: In Whirl, almost exactly the same thing happened. [00:05:08] Speaker 02: In Whirl, Whirl got over the cause threshold, because it would not have been [00:05:18] Speaker 02: It would have been futile to object at the time given the uniformity of the law across all the circuits regarding the interpretation of the statute at that time. [00:05:26] Speaker 02: And he got through prejudice because he never actually served more than a year in jail. [00:05:32] Speaker 02: He was sentenced to more than a year in jail but never actually served more than a year in jail. [00:05:35] Speaker 02: Mr. Verzosa was never even sentenced to more than a year in jail. [00:05:38] Speaker 02: His maximum statutory sentence was, of course, five. [00:05:40] Speaker 02: But his actual standard range, or I'm sorry, his actual sentence never exceeded nine months. [00:05:46] Speaker 02: He would have done six months on nine with good time. [00:05:48] Speaker 01: So do we even need to go this far if we were to reach this issue? [00:05:52] Speaker 01: assuming we agree with you on the timing piece and we were to reach this issue, isn't it enough to say that the district court abused its discretion in not holding a hearing? [00:06:01] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:06:01] Speaker 01: Because it's not conclusively established that there was no fundamental injustice? [00:06:07] Speaker 02: Yes, Your Honor. [00:06:07] Speaker 02: And that's why we're asking for a reversal and for a remand for having an initial hearing, yes. [00:06:14] Speaker 02: I think Worrell is basically this positive of the fundamental error issue. [00:06:20] Speaker 02: Does that answer your question, Judge Fletcher? [00:06:22] Speaker 02: Thank you, yeah. [00:06:25] Speaker 04: Could you just tick off for me the factors that you believe, either taken individually or cumulatively over the period of time that we're involved with, which suggests that there's good reason for the delay? [00:06:41] Speaker 02: We're back to timeliness now. [00:06:43] Speaker 02: Yeah. [00:06:45] Speaker 02: The cumulative factors are that people are entitled to move on with their life. [00:06:51] Speaker 02: Again, I don't mean to beat a dead horse, but there's no case that says a person has to continue trying to stay abreast of legal developments. [00:07:02] Speaker 02: So this is an individual who's- But he did have counsel that took care of his state convictions. [00:07:06] Speaker 02: What about that? [00:07:07] Speaker 02: So the record indicates from his declaration that he never actually met with any counsel. [00:07:13] Speaker 02: It was handled through the public defender's office. [00:07:15] Speaker 02: It was a state counsel. [00:07:17] Speaker 02: Technically, they had to represent him, correct? [00:07:21] Speaker 02: They technically did have to represent him, Your Honor. [00:07:23] Speaker 02: Again, he didn't have any contact with his public defender. [00:07:28] Speaker 02: Based on my own experience in state court, the type of case that was handled, which is the vacature of an unconstitutional conviction, is all handled with [00:07:37] Speaker 02: boilerplate forms. [00:07:39] Speaker 02: But I would go a step further to say that just because a state public defender is handling a state case does not necessarily mean that we jump directly to there being federal relief because the vacature of the convictions themselves doesn't justify relief under Lewis and we've dropped that claim on appeal. [00:08:00] Speaker 01: You say that there's no case that says people have to stay on top of the law. [00:08:04] Speaker 01: I agree with you, but do you have a case that says otherwise? [00:08:10] Speaker 01: Because my difficulty is that I can't find a case that says circumstances akin to those that you're presenting here before us today sufficient to be able to show that your client was timely. [00:08:21] Speaker 01: In fact, the cases I think you cite, Quan, Hirabayashi, you know, they're really quite [00:08:28] Speaker 01: different factually, and our court has said that it requires something that prevents the petitioner from discovering the information. [00:08:35] Speaker 01: So it's sort of the inverse of what you're arguing. [00:08:38] Speaker 01: Can you cite me to your best case for the argument that you're making that simply not having a requirement to continue to research the law is a basis? [00:08:48] Speaker 01: to justify the untimely filing. [00:08:50] Speaker 02: I don't, I don't have a case, I wish, I wish I had a case to cite you that had already established a precedent, but... And Quitter, which is a Quitter that just, you know, is a recent decision of this court, says that even getting incorrect information from your lawyer is not sufficient. [00:09:08] Speaker 02: Are you talking about Croitor, Your Honor? [00:09:09] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:09:11] Speaker 02: Yes, but incorrect information is different than no information. [00:09:16] Speaker 02: Um, and so, but he, so I think, I think the thing is, yeah, it's worse. [00:09:21] Speaker 01: I mean, I would say that in Croyder, we said reliance on incorrect advice of council alone is insufficient. [00:09:27] Speaker 02: You're right, Your Honor. [00:09:28] Speaker 02: What I'm trying to get at, I apologize for misspeaking, is that that was an individual where, that was a case where the individual consulted with an attorney received either no advice or incorrect advice. [00:09:37] Speaker 02: Mr. Versus never had a consultation with an attorney until myself in July 2024, at which point I was told him that we could do this and here we are. [00:09:45] Speaker 02: If I had told him, no, you don't have any case, you don't have a case, you don't have a basis, and then three years later he gets a different attorney and files, then maybe that's a different case. [00:09:54] Speaker 02: But in this case, this is just an individual living his life. [00:09:58] Speaker 02: So with that, I'll reserve the last thing. [00:10:00] Speaker 01: We'll put a little bit of time on your clock for rebuttal. [00:10:01] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:10:02] Speaker 01: I appreciate that. [00:10:02] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:10:09] Speaker 03: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:10:10] Speaker 03: May it please the Court? [00:10:11] Speaker 03: Michael Morgan for the United States. [00:10:13] Speaker 03: The case as it's presented to this Court is substantially narrower than it started out in the District Court. [00:10:19] Speaker 03: In the District Court, the petition primarily focused on a whole bunch of claims based on the [00:10:25] Speaker 03: Washington Supreme Court's Blake. [00:10:26] Speaker 01: I'm sorry. [00:10:27] Speaker 01: Can I just stop you for a second? [00:10:28] Speaker 01: Sure. [00:10:28] Speaker 01: Can you restate your name for the record because I don't think you're the attorney that's listed on our on our day sheet, but I want to make sure. [00:10:36] Speaker 03: Michael Morgan. [00:10:38] Speaker 01: Morgan? [00:10:39] Speaker 01: Okay. [00:10:40] Speaker 01: All right. [00:10:40] Speaker 01: Thank you very much. [00:10:40] Speaker 01: I'm so sorry. [00:10:41] Speaker 03: I'm a late entry into the proceedings. [00:10:43] Speaker 01: I see. [00:10:43] Speaker 01: Okay. [00:10:43] Speaker 01: That's my fault and I'm so sorry. [00:10:44] Speaker 01: Okay. [00:10:46] Speaker ?: Sorry. [00:10:48] Speaker 03: As the case is now presented, we have a discrete rahaif claim that was sort of like, it was concededly in the petition, but was certainly not the main thrust of the petition. [00:10:58] Speaker 03: So a lot of the briefing in the district court and in this court have focused on claims that have dropped out of the case. [00:11:05] Speaker 03: So the only claim that's left is a pure rahaif claim based on the failure at the 2010 plea colloquy to advise the defendant of the elements of the offense. [00:11:17] Speaker 03: That claim ripened in June of 2019 when Raheef was decided. [00:11:22] Speaker 03: There's a three-year period between June 19 and August 2022 that the defendant has never attempted to justify a delay for any reason other than, I didn't know about Raheef. [00:11:36] Speaker 04: During that period of time, did he have counsel? [00:11:39] Speaker 03: I assume no. [00:11:42] Speaker 03: That is an immaterial fact. [00:11:44] Speaker 04: When he pled guilty, though, on this charges in federal court, he was told. [00:11:52] Speaker 03: Oh, absolutely. [00:11:53] Speaker 04: He was told that what the elements were and why you're in federal court. [00:11:58] Speaker 04: Why don't you just believe that? [00:12:01] Speaker 04: What you're saying is that during that period of time, he should have gone out and consulted counsel about what's the state of the law today. [00:12:09] Speaker 03: That's not quite my position. [00:12:12] Speaker 03: My position is that up until 2019, he was correctly advised, at least under what the law was at the time. [00:12:18] Speaker 01: So what you're saying is that there are really two timeframes that needs to be justified for purposes of the timeliness analysis. [00:12:24] Speaker 01: It's from 2019 to 2022, and then again from 2022 to the time that the petition was filed. [00:12:31] Speaker 03: I don't think that's actually correct. [00:12:34] Speaker 03: I think the time he's tried to justify 2022 forward. [00:12:39] Speaker 03: I don't think he's adequately done that, but even assuming he had, he hasn't justified the three years prior, and he's got to justify the full period of delay. [00:12:47] Speaker 03: The government's not saying that he should have raised this claim in 2010. [00:12:50] Speaker 03: He couldn't have. [00:12:50] Speaker 03: That was not the law. [00:12:52] Speaker 03: But he could have raised it as of June of 2019. [00:12:58] Speaker 03: As Judge Desai pointed out, in the habeas context, we don't allow petitioners to come in and say, I didn't know about the law. [00:13:06] Speaker 03: That's a valid reason. [00:13:06] Speaker 03: That wouldn't be a valid reason for equitable tolling. [00:13:08] Speaker 03: It certainly wouldn't justify the statute of limitations that applies. [00:13:12] Speaker 03: There's no reason to carve out a different rule here. [00:13:15] Speaker 03: The law requires a certain amount of diligence on the part of petitioners if they want to come in and seek equitable relief. [00:13:21] Speaker 03: Essentially, this would be an exception that swallows the rule because any defendant could come in and say, and credibly I would argue, my conviction was done. [00:13:31] Speaker 03: I had no reason to go and read slip opinions and what have you to see what's happening with the law. [00:13:37] Speaker 03: True enough, but as a legal matter, that's not an excuse. [00:13:41] Speaker 03: That's not the kind of excuse that justifies delay under this court's quorum precedents. [00:13:47] Speaker 03: And I would direct the court's attention to a case that's not cited in our briefs, but it's the Munoz decision. [00:13:54] Speaker 03: It's from 2022. [00:13:55] Speaker 03: It's in the habeas context, but it's talking about when is a claim available to a habeas claimant. [00:14:02] Speaker 01: And there, the claimant tried to say, well, listen, I'm a... Is it key to graft the habeas law onto the quorum nobis area? [00:14:10] Speaker 01: I mean, one of the differences really is that, you know, Congress has legislated in the area of habeas. [00:14:14] Speaker 01: They've been very clear about what is permissible and not, and they've narrowed it quite a bit. [00:14:19] Speaker 01: But that's not true for quorum nobis. [00:14:21] Speaker 03: So... It's a common law writ that nobody's bothered to codify. [00:14:26] Speaker 03: the court's decisions do treat them as functional equivalents. [00:14:29] Speaker 03: I think there's actually decisions from this court saying that quorum is functionally habeas for petitioners who are out of custody. [00:14:38] Speaker 03: I'm not here advocating that you have to impose a one-year statute of limitations akin to [00:14:45] Speaker 03: what you have in the 20 to 55 context. [00:14:48] Speaker 03: But what I am saying is the court's decisions on equitable tolling, the equitable reasons for why we might excuse a habeas petitioner for delay, those do fit quorum. [00:14:58] Speaker 03: Because again, quorum is ultimately an equitable remedy. [00:15:01] Speaker 03: So if you couldn't qualify for equitable tolling claiming ignorance of the law, you shouldn't be able to qualify for delay in bringing your quorum petition, because it's essentially an equitable argument. [00:15:11] Speaker 03: If the court doesn't know what the question is on the timeless, I want to turn to the fundamental character portion of the case. [00:15:18] Speaker 03: The standard the defendant has to meet is he has to show there's a reasonable probability that had he been correctly advised, he would have rejected the plea offer and gone to trial. [00:15:28] Speaker 03: That's the standard. [00:15:30] Speaker 03: Not once in the petition, in his declaration, has the defendant ever said, if I was properly advised, I would have rejected the plea offer. [00:15:40] Speaker 03: Not once. [00:15:42] Speaker 03: That's a pleading failure that alone justified denying the petition. [00:15:47] Speaker 03: On the facts, the defendant has to come forward with evidence contemporaneous with the plea, not after the fact, contemporaneous with the plea that would support that inference. [00:16:00] Speaker 03: Again, the defendant has proffered not a single fact that would allow the court to say that you've raised an issue that warrants a hearing. [00:16:08] Speaker 03: That's why this case is unlike Whirl. [00:16:11] Speaker 03: Whirl actually had facts, contemporaneous with the plea, that would support a finding that the defendant wouldn't have pled guilty. [00:16:20] Speaker 03: Now Whirl just remanded for a hearing, it didn't say he was entitled to relief, but there was facts in the record that warranted a hearing. [00:16:27] Speaker 03: Here there were none. [00:16:28] Speaker 03: And that's why the district court did not abuse its discretion [00:16:32] Speaker 03: in denying this without a hearing. [00:16:33] Speaker 03: There was no factual dispute because the defendant never made the claim. [00:16:37] Speaker 03: The defendant's claim in his petition was that if I can show a Raheef error flat out, just that I wasn't advised of the elements, I get relief. [00:16:46] Speaker 03: That's legally incorrect. [00:16:48] Speaker 00: Had he even tried to do it at an earlier time before the court decided Raheef, what would have happened? [00:16:54] Speaker 00: Did Raheef change the law? [00:16:55] Speaker 03: Oh, Raheef definitely changed the law. [00:16:57] Speaker 00: So if he'd raised the claim before Raheef, he would have lost on the claim. [00:17:03] Speaker 03: Well, that was also true in Whirl. [00:17:05] Speaker 03: And the point in Whirl and the cases where we find hearings are necessary is when you have a defendant who is willing to roll the dice because he's more concerned about some other consequence than the conviction. [00:17:21] Speaker 03: So the most common consequence [00:17:23] Speaker 03: context is immigration, like the Supreme Court's decision in Lee, where the ability to avoid deportation was everything to the defendant. [00:17:33] Speaker 03: So even though the case against him, he had no defense. [00:17:37] Speaker 03: if he had been advised properly, a rational person in his position would go to trial, because he'll take that one in 100 chance to avoid deportation. [00:17:48] Speaker 03: We don't have any evidence here that there was any reason why, if back in 2010 the defendant had been properly advised, that he would have said, you know what? [00:17:58] Speaker 03: No, I don't want the government's plea offer. [00:18:00] Speaker 03: I'm going to go to trial. [00:18:01] Speaker 03: There's nothing in the record, nothing. [00:18:03] Speaker 03: And absent some contemporaneous evidence from that time, there's simply no reason to have a hearing. [00:18:10] Speaker 03: The defendant has simply failed to carry his burden. [00:18:15] Speaker 03: So that's the reason why he can't satisfy the fourth prong, because there's no evidence in the record sufficient to support a finding [00:18:24] Speaker 03: that there's a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea. [00:18:27] Speaker 04: Can we assume that the district court went through that analysis when it just denied the petition in one sentence? [00:18:32] Speaker 03: Well, we presume that the district judges know the law, and they're not required. [00:18:36] Speaker 03: I mean, would it have helped this court's decision to have a more fulsome opinion? [00:18:39] Speaker 03: Sure. [00:18:40] Speaker 00: What we got was a half a sentence. [00:18:44] Speaker 03: This is true. [00:18:46] Speaker 03: District judges are allowed to summarily deny applications, and especially here where the application was facially deficient. [00:18:54] Speaker 03: It was facially deficient. [00:18:55] Speaker 03: It was never an allegation that he would have rejected the plea, never. [00:18:59] Speaker 03: So this is a case where there's actually a good reason. [00:19:03] Speaker 04: Did you make this fundamental argument in your opposition to the petition? [00:19:08] Speaker 03: Not this particular one, no. [00:19:10] Speaker 03: not in opposition to the petition. [00:19:12] Speaker 03: We actually, in fairness to the defense, in our opposition to the petition, we focused on the Blake claims, because they were central. [00:19:21] Speaker 03: We missed the Reheaf claim. [00:19:23] Speaker 03: There's just no two ways about that. [00:19:26] Speaker 03: But the district court denied the petition, so there's no forfeiture, because the district court ruled. [00:19:30] Speaker 03: And we assumed that it ruled on all the claims raised in the petition, because we assumed the judges know the law. [00:19:35] Speaker 03: So it was poorly briefed in the district court. [00:19:39] Speaker 03: There's no hiding from that fact. [00:19:43] Speaker 03: But the fact remains that it is still the petitioner's burden to satisfy all the elements of quorum. [00:19:49] Speaker 03: He hasn't, and therefore the district's order should be affirmed. [00:19:53] Speaker 01: Thank you, counsel. [00:19:57] Speaker 01: Put 90 minutes on the clock for your rebuttal. [00:19:59] Speaker 01: Or 90 seconds, not 90 minutes. [00:20:01] Speaker 01: We don't have that much time today, unfortunately. [00:20:03] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:20:05] Speaker 02: Well, I want to touch on the habeas and the quorum nobis distinction, if any. [00:20:11] Speaker 02: Of course, there is a number of cases, both from the circuit and from the Supreme Court, that say that they're kind of functionally the same. [00:20:17] Speaker 02: But there is one big difference. [00:20:19] Speaker 02: in that it is relevant to this case, which is how they go towards notice and our argument. [00:20:26] Speaker 02: In a habeas petition, a person has to be under confinement of some sort. [00:20:30] Speaker 02: That inherently puts them on notice that they are under confinement of this conviction, and they want to take some action, whether to get out of prison, to get off of supervision, or whatever. [00:20:41] Speaker 02: In a quorum, a lot of these cases take place years later. [00:20:45] Speaker 02: In this case, he was off of supervision in 2015. [00:20:49] Speaker 01: So your argument is that without any sort of other consequence, you're not in custody, you don't have employment consequences, you don't have immigration consequences. [00:20:57] Speaker 01: So in this sort of narrow set of circumstances where there was nothing else that would put you on notice or put your client on notice, this is a narrow circumstance in which we could depart from our typical higher standard for [00:21:15] Speaker 01: having knowledge of the law sufficient to file? [00:21:20] Speaker 02: Generally, yes, Your Honor. [00:21:21] Speaker 02: I don't think we have to necessarily depart from the framework. [00:21:24] Speaker 02: I think we just have to say that in this specific context... What specific context are you talking about? [00:21:30] Speaker 02: The context of where an individual has no reason to be put on notice that they may have a claim. [00:21:35] Speaker 01: But how would you define that? [00:21:37] Speaker 01: I mean, if you were writing the opinion of this court with respect to, I think, what your [00:21:42] Speaker 01: trying to delineate, which is a narrow context, what would you say? [00:21:47] Speaker 02: I would say that the framework stands, but this is a valid reason. [00:21:55] Speaker 01: What is a valid reason? [00:21:56] Speaker 02: The lack of notice or any reason to be put on notice. [00:22:02] Speaker 02: So with that, Your Honor, I ask the court to reverse and remand. [00:22:05] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:22:05] Speaker 01: Okay. [00:22:06] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:22:07] Speaker 01: Thank you to both counsel for your helpful argument. [00:22:09] Speaker 01: This case will now be submitted.