[00:00:00] Speaker 00: May it please the court. [00:00:01] Speaker 00: I'm Mike French, counsel for the appellant. [00:00:04] Speaker 00: I'd like to reserve two minutes of my time for rebuttal. [00:00:08] Speaker 00: The standard of review here is de novo. [00:00:11] Speaker 00: The only question before the court is a question of law, and that is whether the district court erred in determining that the arrival on scene of a detective as opposed to a parole officer was sufficient to dissipate the threat that had been signaled to Mr. Watson that if he exercised his Fifth Amendment right, his parole would be revoked. [00:00:35] Speaker 03: But you agree that the parole officer never asked Mr. Watson any questions? [00:00:43] Speaker 00: That is correct. [00:00:44] Speaker 01: Well, that's not exactly correct, is it? [00:00:48] Speaker 01: Because it seems to me that the parole officer asked him if he would find anything in the vehicle, and he said, [00:00:59] Speaker 01: He lied to the parole officer, even though he said he won't. [00:01:04] Speaker 01: He did lie. [00:01:04] Speaker 01: He said, no, you won't find it. [00:01:07] Speaker 00: And I don't know two things on to that point, Judge. [00:01:10] Speaker 01: I mean, to be fair, that's a really tough way for you to argue about a penalty situation when the very penalty you would have had, he broke. [00:01:19] Speaker 01: He lied. [00:01:21] Speaker 00: With all due respect, Judge, I wouldn't say that he did lie. [00:01:24] Speaker 00: He didn't lie? [00:01:25] Speaker 01: When you say no, you're not going to find it when it was there? [00:01:28] Speaker 00: What he asked is, would you find anything in the car? [00:01:31] Speaker 03: And I think it's... And he didn't have any faith in the officer's ability to find it? [00:01:35] Speaker 03: I think it's... You could find it, but you won't, because you guys aren't good enough. [00:01:38] Speaker 03: Is that what he was saying? [00:01:40] Speaker 00: I think when you're in that situation, it's fair to say that it's not in the car, it's on the car. [00:01:46] Speaker 00: It's on the car. [00:01:47] Speaker 00: It's not in the car. [00:01:48] Speaker 03: I think my hypothetical was better, but... [00:01:52] Speaker 01: Let me ask you another question before we get too far in here. [00:01:55] Speaker 01: There was also a challenge to the search of the car, but that's not on appeal, right? [00:02:00] Speaker 00: That's correct. [00:02:01] Speaker 00: That's correct. [00:02:01] Speaker 00: We've conceded that. [00:02:02] Speaker 01: I just wanted to make sure. [00:02:03] Speaker 01: Now, if there is no challenge to the search of the car, is there enough evidence found from the car that the charge in sentence would be any different? [00:02:15] Speaker 00: I don't think so, Judge, and I think that that's an issue that would require remand. [00:02:20] Speaker 00: I think that the government then would have to pick up the pieces and look at what they're left with and what they would go forward with. [00:02:25] Speaker 01: I looked at what they found on the car, and I said to myself, well, if that's what they found in the car and we're not challenging the car anymore, why would the sentence be any different? [00:02:37] Speaker 00: Well, I think the facts on the ground would be different. [00:02:40] Speaker 01: I think that the knowledge that... I think when you go to the statement that we're trying to suppress here... I know what you're doing, but I'm just trying to give you another question before you get there, because it worried me that nobody is even thinking about that. [00:02:56] Speaker 01: But if that's your best answer, that's good. [00:02:58] Speaker 00: Well, I think Mr. Watson can't challenge the search of the car. [00:03:01] Speaker 00: I think that that falls squarely within his IDOC agreement of supervision that he gives up the search of his car. [00:03:08] Speaker 00: But I do think that it's a distinction without a difference. [00:03:12] Speaker 00: To go back to your question, Judge Nelson, wasn't it the parole officer didn't ask him the incriminating question. [00:03:17] Speaker 00: It was a detective. [00:03:18] Speaker 00: And I think what you've got here is a situation where it's like a [00:03:22] Speaker 00: basketball team, and they've got five players on the court, and they want that sixth player to come in, if they just put a different jersey on him, does he suddenly is on a different team? [00:03:31] Speaker 03: I don't think that... But that seems, I mean, if the document, if the parole restriction [00:03:41] Speaker 03: said if they're there, or it said any officer, but it didn't. [00:03:45] Speaker 03: I understand you're trying to analogize this, but I don't think that that's really fair, because the parole officer wasn't involved in Miranda Isaac and wasn't involved in the questions after. [00:03:56] Speaker 03: And that's really the relevant question we have here, was there pressure such that he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights? [00:04:04] Speaker 00: I think there's two key facts in the record. [00:04:08] Speaker 01: Before you get there, I think that you need to address, because you took a standard review and said it's all de novo. [00:04:15] Speaker 01: I'm a big standard review man. [00:04:17] Speaker 01: It is not de novo. [00:04:19] Speaker 01: What the district court found as to factual findings, we only review for clear error, right? [00:04:27] Speaker 00: That's correct. [00:04:28] Speaker 01: So everything, one of these questions that the Honourable is giving you is based on the Nampa police detective conveyed the Miranda rights to the defendant based on his reading of the Miranda card. [00:04:44] Speaker 01: A lack of recording a written waiver did not affect the adequacy of the Miranda warnings. [00:04:52] Speaker 01: The parole condition does not require truthfulness, but it does require answers to all inquiries, nor does it require answers to all inquiries or cooperation with law enforcement. [00:05:09] Speaker 01: The parole condition only requires cooperation with probation and parole, not law enforcement officers, and statements made by the defendant were always to the law enforcement. [00:05:22] Speaker 01: That's in Judge Windmill's underlying factual findings, right? [00:05:27] Speaker 01: So we, unless we, do you have any problem with those? [00:05:31] Speaker 01: Are any of those clearly erroneous? [00:05:34] Speaker 00: No, Your Honor. [00:05:35] Speaker 01: So based on that, now we move. [00:05:38] Speaker 01: to judge Nelson's question, which I think makes the answer, your answer, harder. [00:05:45] Speaker 00: I think you're correct. [00:05:46] Speaker 00: I think we do move then. [00:05:48] Speaker 00: The historical facts are not in dispute. [00:05:49] Speaker 00: It's the application of a lot of facts. [00:05:52] Speaker 00: But I do want to point out that there are some facts that I think are overlooked. [00:05:56] Speaker 00: And one of those comes at the supplemental excerpt to record at page 89. [00:06:00] Speaker 00: And it's when the first parole officer, not Mr. Watson's direct parole officer, but the first parole agent arrives on the scene [00:06:07] Speaker 00: When Mr. Watson is in the back of the car, he's cussed. [00:06:09] Speaker 00: Talk about Landers? [00:06:10] Speaker 00: Landers arrives, and Landers says to him, we're gonna conduct a parole search of your car and your house, and we've asked local law enforcement to cooperate with us. [00:06:23] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:06:24] Speaker 01: Now, then when Mr. Then he said, you got anything in the car? [00:06:28] Speaker 01: And he said, no. [00:06:30] Speaker 00: And I think he cursed that. [00:06:31] Speaker 01: And then they had a conversation about the trunk. [00:06:34] Speaker 00: And again, I think that Mr. Watson, in his mind, it's fair to say he parsed this, but stepping back, this is an objective test. [00:06:40] Speaker 03: I actually think it's the opposite. [00:06:41] Speaker 03: I don't think he parsed it. [00:06:43] Speaker 03: I mean, Mr. Watson, if he parsed it, he would have been honest with the parole officer and [00:06:49] Speaker 03: would have felt more freedom to be less honest with the non-parole officers. [00:06:53] Speaker 03: So I understand your point. [00:06:55] Speaker 03: It's interesting that you said we're going to cooperate, and it sort of did open this up. [00:07:00] Speaker 03: I agree that it puts it into a gray area, but I'm not sure how that gets you across the finish line here on the motion to suppress. [00:07:07] Speaker 00: Well, a couple of things. [00:07:08] Speaker 00: I think, just to state it out there, Garrity tells us that contract law is not how we interpret these parole agreements. [00:07:16] Speaker 00: This is not what the contract says, and you're stuck with that. [00:07:19] Speaker 00: It's what a reasonable person would think. [00:07:21] Speaker 03: And so to the extent... I'm not sure how that's different. [00:07:23] Speaker 03: I mean, contracts are generally interpreted based on what's a reasonable understanding of it. [00:07:29] Speaker 03: I mean, how would we do this otherwise? [00:07:31] Speaker 03: We can't just impose restrictions that aren't in there. [00:07:34] Speaker 00: Sure, but I think that what law enforcement does is they have to not muddy the water. [00:07:38] Speaker 00: And so they have to not come in and say, we've asked local law enforcement to cooperate with us. [00:07:44] Speaker 00: And then for his parole officer to come in and double down on that, and he says to him, I know about the investigation into you. [00:07:51] Speaker 00: So he puts his imprimatur on top of this investigation. [00:07:54] Speaker 03: So if I understand your argument correctly, you're saying that when the parole officer said, we've asked local police [00:08:03] Speaker 03: to cooperate with us. [00:08:05] Speaker 03: At that point, there was no way to get a proper Miranda voluntary waiver from him. [00:08:12] Speaker 03: That would be the conclusion that we'd have to reach to rule for you, I think. [00:08:18] Speaker 00: I think Maranda alone is not enough. [00:08:21] Speaker 00: What should have been given was a Gerrity waiver, should have been given the Gerrity warning. [00:08:27] Speaker 03: But even that, oh, you're saying if they had gone that further, that's how they could have cured the cooperation issue. [00:08:32] Speaker 00: Yes, and just to step back even further, the way that they could have cured this whole situation was not to muddy the waters. [00:08:38] Speaker 02: Not to bring the parole officers in. [00:08:39] Speaker 00: To get a warrant, exactly. [00:08:41] Speaker 02: But his agreement says, in paragraph one, that I will cooperate with the request of my probation or parole officer. [00:08:51] Speaker 02: Cooperation includes being truthful. [00:08:54] Speaker 02: And then in paragraph five, he consents to a search of his person, residence, vehicle, personal property, or structures owned or leased by me. [00:09:03] Speaker 02: conducted by an agent of the Department of Corrections or a law enforcement officer. [00:09:07] Speaker 02: There's nothing in there that says anything about cooperating with local law enforcement officers. [00:09:12] Speaker 00: And that's where I take it back to the Supplemental Excerptive Record, page 70, where Officer Nicholas testifies that he told Mr. Watson, I know about this investigation into you. [00:09:24] Speaker 00: And I would submit that that puts his imprimatur, parole's imprimatur, over the entire investigation. [00:09:29] Speaker 00: Detective Coronado shows up during the parole search of Mr. Watson's house. [00:09:33] Speaker 00: It's still a parole action. [00:09:35] Speaker 02: But if the parole officer is bracing his parolee, [00:09:40] Speaker 02: by stating, I know that you're up to no good, basically dealing dope again. [00:09:45] Speaker 02: Am I gonna find anything or are we gonna find anything in the car? [00:09:48] Speaker 02: I mean, why doesn't that relate directly to the authority of the parole officer to ensure that the parolee is abiding by the conditions of his parole? [00:09:58] Speaker 00: I think it can but I think what we have to go back to in the broad strokes here is that this is an objective test and so really it doesn't matter if Mr. Watson what he thought when he was equivocating about where the drugs were, where they weren't. [00:10:15] Speaker 00: It's an objective test and the coercion I would submit is inherently built in. [00:10:20] Speaker 02: But from a policy standpoint do we really want to say to our parole and probation officers [00:10:27] Speaker 02: You cannot enlist the assistance of local law enforcement officers when you're conducting some of these investigations. [00:10:35] Speaker 02: I mean, some of these investigations are being done under very dangerous conditions. [00:10:40] Speaker 02: And parole officers are pretty thinly staffed, so they need backup from local police when they're discharging their duties. [00:10:48] Speaker 00: And I and this case is the opposite. [00:10:50] Speaker 00: This is a case where Detective Coronado approached parole officer Landers to ask him about Tyler Watson. [00:10:59] Speaker 02: And so it was Mr. Watson came on because they knew that he that Watson was on parole. [00:11:03] Speaker 02: Right. [00:11:05] Speaker 00: They learned they suspected that. [00:11:07] Speaker 00: And so they wanted to confirm. [00:11:08] Speaker 02: I mean, that's easy for law enforcement to check. [00:11:10] Speaker 02: You just run them through the computer and pops up. [00:11:12] Speaker 02: He's on parole. [00:11:14] Speaker 02: OK. [00:11:16] Speaker 03: We'll give you time for rebuttal. [00:11:18] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:11:32] Speaker 04: May it please the court. [00:11:33] Speaker 04: My name is David Morse on behalf of the United States. [00:11:36] Speaker 04: Your honors, the government's asking the court to affirm the district court's holding in this case. [00:11:41] Speaker 04: The issue before the court [00:11:42] Speaker 04: It's whether the appellant was compelled to make a self-incriminating statement or face the revocation of his parole. [00:11:48] Speaker 04: The short answer is no. [00:11:50] Speaker 03: Well, it depends on how you look at it. [00:11:53] Speaker 03: You would agree that this would be an easy case if only the police had showed up, right? [00:11:59] Speaker 03: Absolutely, Aaron. [00:12:01] Speaker 03: It's less easy because there were parole officers there and the officers themselves referenced, or the parole officer referenced, we're gonna cooperate with the local police. [00:12:13] Speaker 03: What do we do with that muddied waters? [00:12:16] Speaker 03: Why doesn't that give the defendant in this case an argument? [00:12:24] Speaker 04: I believe it does money money the waters I think the distinction here and the clarity happens at the residence when detective Coronado special agent Ferguson and Intel Annals all Could you pull that mark all arrived to back our vehicle? [00:12:37] Speaker 01: We can't hear you too tall Can you you can move that up? [00:12:43] Speaker 04: As far as it goes I'm too tall for this podium We found the limit [00:12:52] Speaker 04: Your Honor, I think it does money the waters, but I think the thing that happened here that clarified this issue was when Detective Coronado, Special Agent Ferguson, and Intel Analyst Hall all approached Mr. Watson in the back of a police car with no parole officer in sight. [00:13:10] Speaker 04: Mirandized him, assured that he understood Miranda, and then began questioning him. [00:13:14] Speaker 03: Well, okay, fair enough, but that was after [00:13:18] Speaker 03: there'd already been this cooperation comment made, right? [00:13:23] Speaker 01: And not only that, but when Scott gets there, he tells the defendant that he's being detained and searched at the direction of probation and parole. [00:13:32] Speaker 01: That's correct, Your Honor. [00:13:34] Speaker 01: And then Landers tells the defendant that after searching the car, now we've got the parole officer now, after searching the car, the police are going to take you back to your house and search the house. [00:13:46] Speaker 04: That's correct, Your Honor. [00:13:47] Speaker 01: And then that occurred in the car where he was being detained. [00:13:52] Speaker 01: Landers tells him in the car, right? [00:13:55] Speaker 01: And Scott continues to detain him until they get to the police station. [00:14:00] Speaker 01: And then doesn't all that confuse him then about whose real investigation this is and what really pertains to me? [00:14:09] Speaker 04: I disagree, Your Honor, as far as confusion goes. [00:14:11] Speaker 01: Well, all I'm trying to do is just try to lay out the facts. [00:14:15] Speaker 04: And I think those facts are spot on, Your Honor. [00:14:16] Speaker 01: And aren't they all of the government's making? [00:14:19] Speaker 01: I mean, the government could have gone and got a warrant. [00:14:22] Speaker 04: The government could have gotten a warrant. [00:14:23] Speaker 04: And instead they went on. [00:14:25] Speaker 04: But the parole condition here allowed the government to search that vehicle. [00:14:30] Speaker 04: And upon search of that vehicle, they discovered the controlled substances. [00:14:33] Speaker 04: They went to his residence, searched that residence, did not find anything. [00:14:37] Speaker 04: However, based on information they had obtained from confidential informant, they knew that the drugs were stored at the grandmother's residence. [00:14:44] Speaker 04: They then told the defendant that they would be going to the grandmother's residence to search that residence. [00:14:50] Speaker 04: When they arrived at the grandmother's residence, they asked for consent to search the residence. [00:14:55] Speaker 04: The defendant did not tell them anything about where the drugs were until Detective Coronado, after he had provided him with his Miranda warning, and after there was a separation of time where there, again, no probation or parole officers were involved, he went outside and asked him [00:15:13] Speaker 04: You want to tell us where the drugs are? [00:15:15] Speaker 04: So nobody gets exposed. [00:15:17] Speaker 04: And he agreed. [00:15:18] Speaker 04: They could have avoided that and simply searched the garage and they still would have found the drugs. [00:15:23] Speaker 04: It just would have elevated the level of danger that they would have been exposed to. [00:15:27] Speaker 04: So I don't believe there is any condition here or any situation here where his rights were violated. [00:15:34] Speaker 04: And in fact, I want to visit back to this particular condition [00:15:40] Speaker 04: in the agreement, and that's condition one, and I will quote it, I will obey all municipal, county, state, and federal laws. [00:15:47] Speaker 04: I will cooperate with the request of my parole officer. [00:15:50] Speaker 04: Cooperation includes being truthful. [00:15:52] Speaker 04: If I am detained by a law enforcement officer, I will tell the officer that I'm on felony supervision and the name of my parole officer. [00:16:00] Speaker 04: It does not say anything about cooperating with a law enforcement officer. [00:16:04] Speaker 04: does not say anything about being truthful. [00:16:06] Speaker 03: But when a parole officer comes in and says, we're going to bring in the police, that seems to be the hook. [00:16:11] Speaker 03: It puts us into a gray area, I think. [00:16:16] Speaker 03: We've got the Murphy case that says, [00:16:20] Speaker 03: requiring truthful statements to a parole officer is okay. [00:16:25] Speaker 03: But then we've got Cecheo, which says the petitioner can, when he can't remain silent or he will lose his parole, that goes too far. [00:16:35] Speaker 03: This seems to fit within the middle of that. [00:16:36] Speaker 03: So how do we delineate the differences between what's required in the actual agreement when you connect it with what happened on the scene? [00:16:48] Speaker 04: I think several of Judge Windmill's findings, including the fact that the defendant at no point believed he had to cooperate with his parole officer, let alone law enforcement officer, because the first interaction, he lies and violates that parole condition to his parole officer, not a law enforcement officer. [00:17:06] Speaker 03: Can I ask about that? [00:17:07] Speaker 03: Because yeah, I hear what you're saying. [00:17:10] Speaker 03: We've got the argument it wasn't a lie. [00:17:13] Speaker 03: But even if it was a lie, [00:17:16] Speaker 03: What does that mean for the motion to suppress? [00:17:19] Speaker 03: How do you tie that into the motion to suppress? [00:17:21] Speaker 03: You might be able to tie it into revocation of the parole, but that's not what we're here for. [00:17:28] Speaker 03: We're here for a motion to suppress. [00:17:30] Speaker 03: How does that make it less voluntary, the fact that he lied or may have lied to the parole officer in the first instance? [00:17:38] Speaker 04: The fact that he had no compulsion to tell the truth from the get-go, Your Honor, shows that he was never concerned about his parole conditions, never concerned about who he was speaking to. [00:17:48] Speaker 02: Well, if he truthfully answered the parole officer's questions, that would be a violation of the terms of his parole, would it not? [00:17:54] Speaker 02: The parole officer says, am I going to find anything in the car? [00:17:56] Speaker 02: And he says, yeah, the drugs are fixed to the undercarriage of the vehicle. [00:18:01] Speaker 02: I think that's accurate, Your Honor, but that's not what happened. [00:18:04] Speaker 02: But I mean, to a certain extent, there is a penalty that the agreement attaches. [00:18:11] Speaker 02: If he is truthful with his parole officer, he could very well face provocation. [00:18:17] Speaker 01: Well, let's talk about the penalty, because this is a different kind of a penalty, too. [00:18:24] Speaker 01: This is not the normal penalty that we're talking about. [00:18:27] Speaker 01: The only thing that can happen on failure to do what was agreed is that it may result in the submission of a report of violation to the sentencing or parole authority. [00:18:38] Speaker 01: That's it. [00:18:39] Speaker 01: There's nothing there that you'll be grounds for arrest, your parole will be revoked, your probation will be revoked, your modifications will be done, or that there'll even be a revocation. [00:18:52] Speaker 01: All we're gonna do is have a submission of report for violation. [00:18:55] Speaker 01: That's not the norm. [00:18:58] Speaker 04: Is it? [00:18:58] Speaker 04: No, Your Honor, and that's the correct statement. [00:19:01] Speaker 04: There was no threat of loss of liberty, which was what was apparent in United States v. Seychau, and I think that's a distinction here that [00:19:09] Speaker 04: that merits some value, and then again, I wanna go back to the conditions that were in that parole agreement, and when we take a look at condition number five, and that condition states, I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real property or structured owned or leased by me, or for which I am in controlling authority conducted by an agent of IDOC or law enforcement officer. [00:19:31] Speaker 04: When we take a look at this condition, which is condition number five and condition number one, objectively, there is a difference there. [00:19:38] Speaker 04: between what a law enforcement officer and parole officer can do in condition number five, which puts those two together and allows them both to conduct that search, as opposed to condition number one, where it clearly distinguishes between what a parole officer is permitted to do or what the parolee is required to tell his parole officer versus what the law enforcement officer, what he may give information or what he's required to give for information to a law enforcement officer. [00:20:04] Speaker 04: So I think that distinction, again, comes into play here, Your Honors. [00:20:11] Speaker 04: I do wanna. [00:20:12] Speaker 04: finish with this, your honors, and this is a direct quote from Murphy. [00:20:17] Speaker 04: There is no evidence that Murphy confessed because he feared that his probation would be revoked if he remained silent. [00:20:23] Speaker 04: Murphy was not expressly informed during the crucial meeting with his probation officer that an assertion of privilege would result in the imposition of a penalty. [00:20:32] Speaker 04: And the fact that Murphy apparently felt no compunction about adamantly denying the false imprisonment charge on which he had been convicted before admitting to the rape and murder strongly suggests [00:20:42] Speaker 04: that the threat of revocation did not overwhelm his resistance. [00:20:46] Speaker 04: And I think that's exactly our situation here. [00:20:49] Speaker 04: The fact that he had no compulsion or no concern about lying to his parole officer from the get-go showed that there was no threat in his mind, and that did not overwhelm his resistance. [00:21:02] Speaker 03: And that is review, because you're saying that's what Judge Windmill found below. [00:21:05] Speaker 03: So we would be reviewing that for an abuse of discretion, for clear error, [00:21:11] Speaker 04: Factual findings are for clear. [00:21:13] Speaker 04: And with that, Your Honors, the government would ask the court to affirm the district's court's holding. [00:21:20] Speaker 04: Thank you. [00:21:20] Speaker 04: Thank you. [00:21:25] Speaker 01: Counselor, before you go very far, I didn't get to, he excused you before I asked the question. [00:21:30] Speaker 01: But what does this do, the fact that the agreement doesn't say the same things that is said in the normal agreement about [00:21:40] Speaker 01: a penalty situation. [00:21:43] Speaker 01: It doesn't talk about failure to comply will be grounds for arrest, revocation, all that. [00:21:48] Speaker 01: All it says is, in the submission of a report of violation to the sentencing or parole authority. [00:21:58] Speaker 01: How does that help your argument? [00:22:00] Speaker 01: It seems to me that destroys that this is really a penalty situation at all. [00:22:06] Speaker 00: Well, a couple of things. [00:22:08] Speaker 00: The district court did correctly find that this was a penalty situation. [00:22:13] Speaker 00: Well, but I'm not sure that's a question of fact. [00:22:17] Speaker 00: But more importantly, I think we're all missing the point and I think [00:22:22] Speaker 00: My co-counsel's argument misses the point that Seychau read subjectivity out of the case law. [00:22:29] Speaker 00: Murphy does talk about the subjectivity of the petitioner. [00:22:33] Speaker 00: Seychau reads that out. [00:22:35] Speaker 00: This is a wholly objective test, and so we're talking about the reasonable person. [00:22:38] Speaker 03: Wait, hold on. [00:22:39] Speaker 03: Help me out here. [00:22:39] Speaker 03: Murphy's a Supreme Court case, right? [00:22:42] Speaker 03: How can the Ninth Circuit read out what the Supreme Court put in? [00:22:46] Speaker 03: Thank you, and I miss... You've never stopped this before. [00:22:49] Speaker 00: Yeah, fair enough. [00:22:50] Speaker 00: I misspoke. [00:22:51] Speaker 00: Murphy left the question open. [00:22:53] Speaker 00: All right. [00:22:54] Speaker 00: And Seixiao answered that question in the objective. [00:22:57] Speaker 00: And so I think we have to take it back to the reasonable person. [00:23:01] Speaker 00: And I think a reasonable parolee would think that if they're having a report of submission, a violation submitted, that the next step is then [00:23:09] Speaker 00: violation. [00:23:10] Speaker 03: I just want to have a couple of quibbles on the factual... Is there any case law that addresses this nuance that's being raised where it's... I mean, because it does seem to me that not wanting to be written up is probably still... could be on your mind of whether you want that as a penalty. [00:23:31] Speaker 00: I would turn to the dissent in Murphy. [00:23:34] Speaker 01: I think that the dissent there talks a lot about... Well, I look very carefully at the dissent in Murphy. [00:23:38] Speaker 01: I don't think it helps you. [00:23:39] Speaker 00: Well, I think they talk a lot about the reasonable person there and what the reasonable person would understand. [00:23:45] Speaker 00: So, I just briefly... [00:23:48] Speaker 00: It's not true to say that there was no parole officer in sight when Coronado was conducting his questioning. [00:23:54] Speaker 00: That's an ambiguous fact. [00:23:56] Speaker 00: We don't know whether parole was observed by Mr. Watson or not. [00:24:00] Speaker 00: We know they were on scene. [00:24:02] Speaker 00: We know that they did avoid the car, but we don't know if they were seen or not. [00:24:05] Speaker 03: Does it matter? [00:24:06] Speaker 03: I mean, do you really think that's where your case turns on is whether Watson had direct sight of a parole officer? [00:24:11] Speaker 00: I think it's a brick in the wall. [00:24:14] Speaker 00: And then finally, again, just to go back, whether he lied, whether he felt compelled, whether he didn't, it's of no moment. [00:24:23] Speaker 00: It's an objective test. [00:24:25] Speaker 03: Okay. [00:24:27] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:24:27] Speaker 03: Thank you to both counsel for your arguments in the case and the case is now submitted.