[00:00:00] Speaker 01:
Good morning, everyone.

[00:00:07] Speaker 02:
We'll get started in a few minutes.

[00:00:45] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Jackie.

[00:00:50] Speaker 02:
All right, who are ready?

[00:00:51] Speaker 02:
Good morning, everyone.

[00:00:51] Speaker 02:
Welcome to the Ninth Circuit.

[00:00:54] Speaker 02:
Judge Bress and I are pleased to welcome back Judge Bennett from the District of Maryland.

[00:00:58] Speaker 02:
It's always a pleasure to have you, Judge Bennett.

[00:01:00] Speaker 01:
It's always an honor to be here.

[00:01:01] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:01:01] Speaker 01:
I'm sorry I forgot my glasses back there.

[00:01:03] Speaker 02:
No problem.

[00:01:06] Speaker 02:
I'll call the cases in the order that they're listed.

[00:01:08] Speaker 02:
The first one, Leon versus Bondy, has been submitted on the briefs and records.

[00:01:12] Speaker 02:
So the first case up for argument is Wilson versus Lynch.

[00:01:15] Speaker 02:
Morning, counsel.

[00:01:17] Speaker 00:
Good morning, your honor.

[00:01:21] Speaker 00:
Good morning.

[00:01:21] Speaker 00:
May it please the court?

[00:01:22] Speaker 00:
Anais Carell on behalf of petitioner Anthony Roy Wilson.

[00:01:26] Speaker 00:
I would like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal.

[00:01:28] Speaker 02:
All right.

[00:01:29] Speaker 00:
During the most critical moment of Mr. Wilson's trial, the prosecution deliberately informed the jury of a key out-of-court witness statement that impeached Mr. Wilson and went directly to his theory of defense.

[00:01:43] Speaker 00:
The state appellate court misapplied Darden in failing to find that this error had a reasonable probability of affecting the verdict in a case where the trial judge said that the error was, quote, very important.

[00:01:56] Speaker 00:
and a juror explicitly brought up the error in an interview.

[00:02:01] Speaker 00:
This question, the dude has a hammer question, was highly prejudicial for four reasons.

[00:02:08] Speaker 00:
First, Mr. Wilson's defense turned on his state of mind, namely if he was scared or surprised when he approached Anthony Stevens' car and Mr. Stevens emerged holding a gun.

[00:02:19] Speaker 00:
And this question implied that Mr. Wilson knew of the gun before approaching the car, directly undermining whether he was scared or surprised when doing so.

[00:02:28] Speaker 02:
And it also came at the most critical point of trial when Mr. Wilson... Counsel, let me ask you this, because I have a little bit of trouble with your argument.

[00:02:36] Speaker 02:
We're on very differential review.

[00:02:38] Speaker 02:
The trial judge had interviewed all of the jurors, most of them couldn't even remember, and had thoroughly instructed the jury to disregard the evidence.

[00:02:49] Speaker 02:
Is there anything in the record that indicates that admonishment was not followed?

[00:02:55] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, there's nothing that explicitly indicates the jurors did not follow the admonishment.

[00:02:59] Speaker 00:
However, there was a significant delay between the admonition and between the error and the admonition, which meant that the admonition was ineffective.

[00:03:08] Speaker 00:
There was a six-day gap between the highly prejudicial question and the jail call transcripts that the jury reviewed, and then the court's admonition, which restated word for word the problematic dude has a hammer question.

[00:03:21] Speaker 00:
And in those six days, the jury either may have forgotten the question and then were reminded of it word for word upon their return, or that question might have become cemented in their mind.

[00:03:30] Speaker 00:
And the Supreme Court instructs us in Greer that a curative admonition should occur immediately after misconduct.

[00:03:37] Speaker 00:
And while it's not binding precedent, I would like to point out the Sixth Circuit Sullivan case.

[00:03:42] Speaker 00:
in which the court stated that corrective measures should be taken immediately in instances of prosecutorial misconduct.

[00:03:48] Speaker 00:
And there the Sixth Circuit found that an admonition, a curative instruction given 20 minutes after the instance of prosecutorial misconduct was not sufficient.

[00:03:58] Speaker 04:
Is it so clear there even was misconduct here though?

[00:04:01] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor, there was misconduct.

[00:04:03] Speaker 00:
There was misconduct under the Supreme Court's Berger standard because the question suggested to the jury that the prosecutor had an out-of-court statement which contradicted Mr. Wilson's testimony, of which no proof was offered.

[00:04:16] Speaker 00:
The prosecutor herself admitted that she couldn't offer proof of the statement because the police interrogation that the statement had come from

[00:04:23] Speaker 00:
was never admitted into evidence.

[00:04:24] Speaker 00:
There was never any attempt to admit it into evidence.

[00:04:28] Speaker 00:
And Tanner himself could not be called to testify, which the prosecutor admitted to, because he retained the right to remain silent.

[00:04:34] Speaker 01:
Tanner had been a co-defendant and severed, correct, from the case?

[00:04:37] Speaker 00:
Correct, yes.

[00:04:38] Speaker 01:
Is it the colloquy, Ms.

[00:04:39] Speaker 01:
Carroll, that the prosecutor just merely asked, isn't it true, Mr. Wilson, that you never yelled, gun?

[00:04:46] Speaker 01:
The defense here wasn't so much as aware.

[00:04:49] Speaker 01:
He essentially had a defense of self-defense, correct?

[00:04:52] Speaker 01:
That would say he testified, and he testified as to acting in self-defense, correct?

[00:04:56] Speaker 01:
He did, yes.

[00:04:57] Speaker 01:
And does the record reflect that he indicated in that area of Oakland that everybody carries a gun?

[00:05:02] Speaker 00:
So two responses, Your Honor.

[00:05:04] Speaker 00:
First, there was testimony that he said everyone has a gun.

[00:05:07] Speaker 00:
But Mr. Wilson later backed off of that testimony upon cross-examination, saying to effect it was hyperbole.

[00:05:12] Speaker 00:
He didn't actually think that just because he said everyone had a gun, that Stevens had a gun when he approached the car.

[00:05:18] Speaker 00:
And he testified that in cross-examination.

[00:05:20] Speaker 01:
But that would go to his state of mind, necessarily, in terms of his self-defense argument, correct?

[00:05:25] Speaker 00:
That would go to a state of mind.

[00:05:26] Speaker 00:
And I would also like to point out, though, that defense counsel in closing also argued for the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.

[00:05:34] Speaker 00:
And again, this question went directly to the voluntary manslaughter element, which required showing that the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion.

[00:05:43] Speaker 00:
If Mr. Wilson knew of the gun before approaching the car, it would be far less likely that he would be acting under the influence of intense emotion, namely fear, surprise, when Stevens emerged from the gun holding a car, which Mr. Wilson was not expecting.

[00:05:57] Speaker 01:
The colloquy, though, is not, I believe, in the record is that, prosecutor, isn't it true, Mr. Wilson, that you never yelled gun?

[00:06:05] Speaker 01:
And then Wilson responds, I actually did.

[00:06:07] Speaker 01:
I probably didn't yell it loud, but I actually said gun.

[00:06:10] Speaker 01:
Isn't it true that you already knew he had a gun?

[00:06:13] Speaker 01:
And then that's where he said, I did not.

[00:06:15] Speaker 01:
And then that, and only that, triggered the prosecutor that didn't say, isn't it true that Kermit Tanner had already told you all, dude has a hammer.

[00:06:23] Speaker 01:
And then Mr. Wilson testified, he never said that.

[00:06:27] Speaker 01:
And then the question was, isn't that why you were afraid for Kermit Tanner to actually come and testify?

[00:06:32] Speaker 01:
And he said, no.

[00:06:33] Speaker 01:
That's the precise colloquial we were dealing with here, correct?

[00:06:36] Speaker 00:
That is, Your Honor, yes.

[00:06:37] Speaker 01:
And that, in and of itself, your argument is not constituted prosecutorial misconduct?

[00:06:42] Speaker 00:
Yes, the question, isn't it true that Kermit Tanner had already told you all dude has a hammer is misconduct because it incorporates an out of court police statement that could not be proved.

[00:06:53] Speaker 00:
And again, the first question, isn't it true that you already knew he had a gun?

[00:06:56] Speaker 00:
I did not, is fine, but to follow it up with a question incorporating an inadmissible extrajudicial police statement word for word is misconduct under the Berger standard.

[00:07:06] Speaker 04:
But didn't the trial court think it was, there was a good faith basis for asking the question?

[00:07:12] Speaker 00:
that the trial court did find that, and it struck the question.

[00:07:14] Speaker 00:
But again, that's not the federal standard for misconduct that Berger lays out, which says, quote, it's improper, excuse me, it's improper for a prosecutor to, quote, suggest by his questions that statements had been made to him personally out of court in retrospect of which no proof was offered.

[00:07:30] Speaker 00:
And that's exactly what happened here.

[00:07:32] Speaker 04:
I don't know that the prosecutor was saying that statements had been personally made to her.

[00:07:37] Speaker 00:
So the statement incorporated, again, an extraditional police statement.

[00:07:41] Speaker 00:
We know that there was no audio recording of the area in which the incident occurred.

[00:07:44] Speaker 00:
So the only reasonable inference that the jury could make, which is correct, is that that statement was given by Kermit Tanner, word for word, dude has a hammer, to the police, and that the prosecutor knew about that statement.

[00:07:56] Speaker 00:
And I would like to point out this court's ruling in Sanchez, which I think is factually on point, where this court held that it's improper under the guise of artful cross-examination

[00:08:06] Speaker 00:
to tell the jury the substance of inadmissible evidence.

[00:08:09] Speaker 00:
And there, the court found that extrajudicial statements made by the defendant's wife to an investigator could not be used on cross-examination of the defendant because there was no showing that they were admissible.

[00:08:21] Speaker 00:
And the court found that there was prosecutorial, prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct in that instance.

[00:08:26] Speaker 01:
But did not the district court as well as the California Court of Appeals essentially find that the prosecutor was not asking about the statement that Tanner made to the police

[00:08:35] Speaker 01:
but the statement that he may have made to Wilson before the murder of the decedent.

[00:08:40] Speaker 01:
Isn't that correct?

[00:08:42] Speaker 00:
They did find that, Your Honor, but the prosecutor cannot have an end run around the misconduct issue simply by leaving out the fact that the statement came from a police interrogation.

[00:08:54] Speaker 00:
It's still misconduct to suggest that she had those facts that she could not prove.

[00:08:57] Speaker 00:
And it went directly to Mr. Wilson's credibility into his state of mind.

[00:09:00] Speaker 00:
It was highly prejudicial.

[00:09:02] Speaker 01:
The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, I usually call it a DIPA, I guess is how you pronounce it.

[00:09:09] Speaker 01:
The review here is that this court can only grant the relief you request if every fair-minded jurist would find the California Court of Appeals decision was a result of an unreasonable application.

[00:09:21] Speaker 01:
It's a pretty high bar that you have to reach, isn't it?

[00:09:24] Speaker 00:
That is a high bar, Your Honor, and we can reach it.

[00:09:26] Speaker 00:
This was an unreasonable application of the Darden standard.

[00:09:29] Speaker 00:
The state appellate court held that the question was not prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct only because Wilson denied the statement and the inquiry was stricken from the record.

[00:09:39] Speaker 00:
But that failed to put the statement in the context of the trial, as is required by Darden.

[00:09:44] Speaker 00:
And there's various facts that the state appellate court did not consider as to prejudice, which demonstrate that the statement was highly prejudicial.

[00:09:51] Speaker 00:
It again came at the most critical point of trial when Mr. Wilson, the defendant, was taking the stand in his own defense, when the jury is highly tuned in in judging his credibility,

[00:10:01] Speaker 00:
It was bolstered by the jail call transcripts that were produced to the jury immediately after the statement and which indicated that Mr. Wilson was afraid of Mr. Tanner testifying.

[00:10:12] Speaker 00:
It went directly to the elements of self-defense and manslaughter.

[00:10:15] Speaker 00:
And this was a case where there was otherwise strong evidence for the lesser included offense of manslaughter or for a self-defense theory.

[00:10:23] Speaker 00:
Mr. Wilson testified that he would not have shot Mr. Stevens unless, if Stevens did not pull out a gun.

[00:10:30] Speaker 00:
Terrell, the co-defendant, also took the stand and corroborated Mr. Wilson's story.

[00:10:35] Speaker 00:
He said they did not know of the gun before approaching the car.

[00:10:38] Speaker 00:
and that they were afraid for their lives.

[00:10:40] Speaker 00:
There was no other motive for Mr. Wilson and his co-defendants to shoot Mr. Stevens other than fear for their lives.

[00:10:47] Speaker 00:
And I think the video actually backs that up, demonstrating that Mr. Wilson is backing up from Mr. Stevens when he's shooting.

[00:10:54] Speaker 00:
The body language of the other co-defendants suggests fear.

[00:10:56] Speaker 00:
They're running around the corner or backing away from Mr. Stevens.

[00:10:59] Speaker 02:
Counsel, I know you wanted to save a little bit of time.

[00:11:02] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor, thank you.

[00:11:03] Speaker 00:
And for that reason, this court should grant Mr. Wilson's habeas petition.

[00:11:08] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:11:25] Speaker 03:
Good morning, Your Honor.

[00:11:25] Speaker 03:
May it please the court, Jalimpe Giro, for respondent.

[00:11:28] Speaker 03:
The state court rejected appellant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct in a decision that reasonably applied the Supreme Court's holding in Darden.

[00:11:36] Speaker 03:
And it did not unreasonably determine any facts in affirming the trial court's denial of appellant's minstrel motion.

[00:11:43] Speaker 03:
As Your Honors have pointed out under EDPA, habeas relief is not warranted unless the state court's application of Darden was an unreasonable application.

[00:11:52] Speaker 03:
And as Your Honors have pointed out,

[00:11:56] Speaker 03:
An unreasonable application is one with which no fair-minded jurors could agree.

[00:12:00] Speaker 03:
In this case, a fair-minded jurors could agree in the first place that the state court's conclusion that the prosecutor had not committed misconduct in the first place was a reasonable application of the very general.

[00:12:15] Speaker 02:
Well, it was an error, wasn't it, to try to inject something into the trial that could not be proven.

[00:12:21] Speaker 03:
I would disagree with that, Your Honor.

[00:12:22] Speaker 03:
So at the time that the prosecutor had asked the questions of the defendant on cross-examination, the issue of Tanner's statement to appellant that Tanner had provided to the police had not been litigated.

[00:12:35] Speaker 03:
And so although the prosecution had informed the opposing counsel that she did not intend to call Mr. Tanner as a witness because Tanner was being tried separately,

[00:12:47] Speaker 03:
The issue of Tanner testifying had not been litigated and also there was no evidence, there was no indication that Tanner's statement could not have come in any other way.

[00:12:56] Speaker 03:
For instance,

[00:12:56] Speaker 03:
Appellant on cross-examination had already admitted to some savory evidence, and so the prosecution had no way of knowing that appellant would not have answered her questions in the affirmative when she asked, as an issue that Tanner had in fact told you that the victim was harmed.

[00:13:15] Speaker 02:
Well, I'm not sure I understand that argument.

[00:13:17] Speaker 02:
The prosecutor knew

[00:13:18] Speaker 02:
He wasn't going to call the witness and he didn't have another way to bring in the statement.

[00:13:22] Speaker 02:
So you can't just ask somebody a question that is harmful to the defense case and then argue the theory, well, he could have just admitted to it, right?

[00:13:33] Speaker 02:
So I think it's clearly improper to have asked the question.

[00:13:36] Speaker 02:
But the question in my mind is, well, the trial court realized that and attempted to cure it.

[00:13:42] Speaker 02:
And now it's whether, with the layer at the deference on top of it, whether the curative instructions were sufficient.

[00:13:51] Speaker 03:
I'll push back on that a little bit, Your Honor, only because, again, the issue of Tanner testifying had not been litigated by the parties.

[00:13:57] Speaker 03:
the prosecution had indicated to the defense that she did not intend to call Tanner, giving at that time the nature of Tanner having separated from the other co-dependents.

[00:14:09] Speaker 03:
And so I would argue that nothing would have prevented the prosecution from calling

[00:14:14] Speaker 03:
Tanner as a rebuttal witness to rebut Mr. Wilson's testimony.

[00:14:20] Speaker 03:
So I'd push back on the fact that the prosecution did not know, had no way of proving this evidence coming in.

[00:14:25] Speaker 03:
And of course, obviously, the prosecution, as the trial court and the state appellate court concluded, could have believed, given what had happened already during the track examination, that a pedant could have admitted to that unsavory fact, just like he had with other facts.

[00:14:41] Speaker 03:
And so

[00:14:41] Speaker 01:
If we move on and... Well, the question, the point is the comment had been made apparently according to the record acknowledged by the District Court that the statement was made to the police in advance of the criminal trial.

[00:14:55] Speaker 01:
But both, again, as I mentioned earlier in my question, the trial court and the California Court of Appeals acknowledged that the prosecutor was not asking about a statement Tanner had made to the police.

[00:15:05] Speaker 01:
The prosecutor was asking about a statement that may have been made to Wilson, correct?

[00:15:10] Speaker 03:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:15:11] Speaker 03:
And so that's why the prosecution had a good faith belief that the appellant could have essentially been reminded of what Tanner had told him before the shooting went down.

[00:15:21] Speaker 03:
And so I think that's the key point here, that the prosecution was not asking the defendant, didn't Tanner tell the police that you had the victim involved?

[00:15:31] Speaker 01:
His question was specifically, didn't Tanner tell you, meaning Wilson?

[00:15:35] Speaker 03:
Correct.

[00:15:35] Speaker 03:
And the state of the evidence as it stands today is that the answer is no.

[00:15:38] Speaker 03:
Appellant testified, no, he never told me that.

[00:15:41] Speaker 03:
And so the state of the evidence today is that appellant was never told by Tanner that the victim was armed.

[00:15:47] Speaker 03:
And so I think that's the key distinction as to whether the prosecution had a good faith belief that this evidence could come in in some way, form or fashion.

[00:15:58] Speaker 03:
But again, even if we can see that the

[00:16:02] Speaker 03:
the prosecution question and then providing the transcript to the jury was improper, I think a fair-minded jurist could agree with the state court's ultimate conclusion that it did not infect the Pellman's trial in such a way that it rendered his conviction a denial of due process.

[00:16:20] Speaker 03:
I would argue that my friend on the other side said that the appellate court did not put the trial in context in evaluating the effect of the prosecution's conduct.

[00:16:31] Speaker 03:
And I would disagree with that.

[00:16:32] Speaker 03:
In assessing whether the prosecutor's conduct rendered appellant's conviction adinology due process, the state court

[00:16:42] Speaker 03:
considered in context both the fact that the question asked concerning Tanner was just asked once.

[00:16:52] Speaker 03:
It was never admitted.

[00:16:52] Speaker 03:
Neither the question, the answer nor the transcript were admitted into evidence or argued to the jury.

[00:16:58] Speaker 03:
They were subject to a creative instruction and additional instructions were provided to the jury concerning what the jurors could consider as evidence and specifically they were told that just because

[00:17:08] Speaker 03:
a lawyer and attorney asked a question did not mean that they were to assume that the substance of the question was evidence.

[00:17:15] Speaker 03:
And also, the court considered whether Appellant's claim of self-defense actually relied on the fact that he knew that the victim was armed.

[00:17:24] Speaker 03:
And the court concluded that it did not.

[00:17:27] Speaker 03:
But even moving forward, even assuming that the prosecutor committed misconduct and that it rendered Appellant's trial fundamentally unfair,

[00:17:37] Speaker 03:
and that it led to a violation of due process, the state court went a little further and concluded that any violation, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman.

[00:17:48] Speaker 03:
And in doing so, again, the court considered not only the curative instructions, the additional instructions, the fact that the testimony, the question and the transcript were excluded from the record,

[00:17:59] Speaker 03:
from the evidence, but also that the evidence against Appellant was overwhelming.

[00:18:05] Speaker 03:
If we consider his conduct during the shooting and after the shooting, no reasonable jury could agree that he acted in self-defense.

[00:18:14] Speaker 03:
The video speaks for itself.

[00:18:15] Speaker 03:
The video shows Appellant and his co-defendant, Terrell, go up to the victim's car.

[00:18:21] Speaker 03:
Co-defendant Terrell approaches from the passenger side.

[00:18:24] Speaker 03:
Appellant approaches from the driver's side.

[00:18:27] Speaker 03:
Terrell opens the door.

[00:18:30] Speaker 03:
the victim comes out shortly or thereafter, and the appellant begins shooting.

[00:18:33] Speaker 03:
The appellant shot the victim 13 times altogether, and there's no evidence in the record, as shown by the video, that the victim ever raised his right arm, ever pointed his gun at Terrell or the defendant, or ever even shot his weapon.

[00:18:50] Speaker 03:
And so altogether, in context, the state court of appeal concluded that... What was the prosecution's theory for why

[00:18:59] Speaker 04:
why this murder was committed, that it was sort of retribution for the killing the day before of the defendant's half-brother?

[00:19:07] Speaker 04:
Is that why they thought Stevens was, why they shot him?

[00:19:12] Speaker 03:
I think it was the closest that they got to.

[00:19:15] Speaker 03:
And I say that because there was no evidence that the victim Stevens was connected to Appelan's brother who had been shot, who had been gunned down the night before.

[00:19:24] Speaker 03:
So there was no evidence that Stevens knew.

[00:19:26] Speaker 04:
Why was he there?

[00:19:28] Speaker 03:
I'm sorry.

[00:19:29] Speaker 04:
Why was he there?

[00:19:29] Speaker 04:
Why was Stevens at that corner?

[00:19:31] Speaker 03:
So according to the record, it shows that Stevens had made an appointment with, I think, a cousin or a brother or some family member for a haircut that day.

[00:19:39] Speaker 03:
And so according to the record, it shows that he was there that morning, presumably to get a haircut or some interaction with someone else.

[00:19:48] Speaker 03:
It does show him obviously parking his car initially and then leaving his car and coming back about maybe 8, 10 minutes later.

[00:19:56] Speaker 03:
And then it sounds like he was just resting in his car.

[00:20:00] Speaker 03:
definitively answered the honor's question, the evidence shows that he was there presumably to meet someone for a haircut is what I put up record.

[00:20:09] Speaker 03:
And so we don't know what the motive was for the ultimate shooting, but it sounds like that is probably the closest that we've gotten to, that it was in retaliation for the appellant's brother who had been killed the day before.

[00:20:25] Speaker 03:
And of course, appellant testified that

[00:20:27] Speaker 03:
when he approached Stevens was to ask him, hey, did you know what happened to my brother who was killed the night before?

[00:20:33] Speaker 03:
And so that's as close as we can get to a motive for the killing of Mr. Stevens in this case.

[00:20:38] Speaker 01:
Ms.

[00:20:38] Speaker 01:
Bergara, the question about the Confrontation Clause violation wasn't actually certified before this court, correct?

[00:20:45] Speaker 03:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:20:45] Speaker 01:
So the government really didn't respond in briefing, but I'm essentially wading the waters of Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington in terms of what has clearly established federal law.

[00:20:54] Speaker 01:
It seems to me it's a pretty high bar to find that it was so clearly established that there's a constitutional violation here, but I know you didn't have an opportunity to respond to that because it wasn't certified before this court, correct?

[00:21:06] Speaker 03:
That's correct, Your Honor.

[00:21:08] Speaker 03:
And again, the state court did address that, the Crawford issue, and it ultimately found that there was no constitutional violation.

[00:21:15] Speaker 03:
And so that would be our position that under Crawford, that if your amend this jury could agree with the state court's conclusion that there was no confrontation clause violation in this case.

[00:21:23] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:21:24] Speaker 03:
Unless the court has any questions, we ask that the district court judge may be affirmed.

[00:21:28] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:21:28] Speaker 02:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:21:39] Speaker 00:
Two quick responses, Your Honors.

[00:21:41] Speaker 00:
So as to the government's argument that the statements might have come into evidence or Tanner might have testified, this court in Sanchez addressed the government's similar argument that the extrajudicial statements could have been in evidence and said that was inapplicable because the statements were never offered into evidence at trial.

[00:21:57] Speaker 00:
And that's exactly what happened here.

[00:21:59] Speaker 00:
This is a case where the state appellate court misapplied Darden, where the question and error was highly prejudicial, and this court should grant Mr. Wilson's habeas petition.

[00:22:08] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:22:09] Speaker 02:
Thank you very much, counsel.

[00:22:10] Speaker 02:
Both sides for your argument.

[00:22:11] Speaker 02:
The matter is submitted.