[00:00:01] Speaker 00:
We're ready for United States versus Campbell.

[00:00:03] Speaker 00:
This is 24-5086, and we'll hear from Mr. Lawlman.

[00:00:09] Speaker 03:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:00:09] Speaker 03:
May it please the court, Justin Lawlman for the appellant, Caitlin Marie Campbell.

[00:00:13] Speaker 03:
I'm going to aim to reserve two minutes of my time.

[00:00:16] Speaker 03:
The district court in this case erred in enhancing Ms.

[00:00:19] Speaker 03:
Campbell's sentence based on three state court convictions entered in violation of federal law, ousting state court jurisdiction.

[00:00:29] Speaker 03:
While this court does not have a case that squarely addresses this precise issue, the governing Supreme Court precedent provides a clear answer.

[00:00:37] Speaker 03:
And I want to spend some time discussing that precedent and where this case fits within it.

[00:00:43] Speaker 03:
This case involves an application of a long-standing principle of American law, that a judgment entered by a court lacking jurisdiction is void and may not be given effect in a future case.

[00:00:56] Speaker 03:
That principle predates our nation's constitution, stretching all the way back to English common law.

[00:01:02] Speaker 03:
And as we note in our briefs, that principle has over time undergone some limitations.

[00:01:08] Speaker 03:
In 1938 in Stoll versus Gottlieb, the Supreme Court said if you previously litigated a jurisdictional determination in an earlier case, that you cannot then collaterally attack it in a later case, that principles of res judicata there apply.

[00:01:22] Speaker 03:
Two years later, in Chico County versus Baxter State Bank, the court said that if you had the opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional issue in the prior case and you didn't, then those same principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel can apply and bar you from challenging the judgment in a later case.

[00:01:41] Speaker 03:
But crucially, on the same day that Chico County was decided, the court also cited Cobb versus Spearstein.

[00:01:48] Speaker 03:
And in that case, the court recognized that where a state court enters judgment in violation of a body of federal law preempting state court jurisdiction, that the judgment is void and may be challenged in a later case, whether the issue of jurisdiction was raised in the previous case or not, or whether it could have been.

[00:02:12] Speaker 03:
Later that same year in United States versus US Guarantee and US Fidelity and Guarantee Co.

[00:02:19] Speaker 03:
The court applied that same principle again.

[00:02:22] Speaker 03:
In that case, it was a state court judgment entered without jurisdiction in violation of a tribe's sovereign immunity.

[00:02:29] Speaker 01:
I wanted to step back for a minute and make sure that I understood what the component parts were to your argument.

[00:02:37] Speaker 01:
So is it fair to say that to prevail, you have to show two things.

[00:02:42] Speaker 01:
One is that Custis would permit collateral attacks due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and then two, that McGirt is retroactive.

[00:02:50] Speaker 01:
Do you agree that you have to show both?

[00:02:52] Speaker 03:
So I agree with the first point.

[00:02:55] Speaker 03:
I think the second point, I don't know that that's the question the court has to reach.

[00:03:02] Speaker 03:
In this case, we're not talking about retroactive application.

[00:03:05] Speaker 03:
We're talking about whether or not this court is going to continue to give prospective effect

[00:03:10] Speaker 03:
To these judgments, which I think all sides in this case agree were entered without jurisdiction.

[00:03:17] Speaker 03:
And so if you look at if you look at Berget, it's in that case, it was a jurisdiction that was a judgment that was void because of the Sixth Amendment.

[00:03:27] Speaker 03:
But in that case, the court is talking about that if we don't allow for challenges in the context of this sentencing, that allows for the deprivation to be committed anew, the rights to be denied anew.

[00:03:38] Speaker 03:
And so that's the way that we see this issue is that we're really talking here about what perspective effect we're giving to this judgment.

[00:03:46] Speaker 03:
My client is not at all trying to challenge or undo her prior sentences.

[00:03:51] Speaker 03:
She's already fully served those sentences.

[00:03:53] Speaker 03:
We're not asking for a habeas remedy where we would essentially be released from that sentence.

[00:04:00] Speaker 03:
This is all about what kind of perspective effect we're going to give to these judgments.

[00:04:06] Speaker 01:
So is it your position then on that latter question about McGirt's retroactivity?

[00:04:10] Speaker 01:
If it's your position that that's not the question, then

[00:04:15] Speaker 01:
Is it your view that our cases that have passed on whether McGirt is retroactive in the habeas context are relevant at all to our analysis here?

[00:04:25] Speaker 03:
I don't think they are.

[00:04:27] Speaker 03:
I think when you're asking for a habeas remedy, there are different procedural bars that apply in that case because you're trying to undo something in the past.

[00:04:34] Speaker 03:
You're trying to undo a sentence that you're dealing with now.

[00:04:36] Speaker 03:
In this case, we're just talking about what is the prospective effect of these judgments.

[00:04:42] Speaker 03:
And so I do think that those cases don't bear on this issue.

[00:04:49] Speaker 00:
Can I make sure that I fully understand your argument?

[00:04:54] Speaker 00:
Obviously, I think we're talking about the applicability or inapplicability of Hagen.

[00:04:59] Speaker 00:
And I had understood that Hagen, obviously the inverse of McGirt, is essentially saying that even if you, at least as applied here, even if you can collaterally attack these state court convictions, to the extent that you're saying,

[00:05:21] Speaker 00:
well, those were a void because the state court in each of those three instances lacked jurisdiction that you should be able to rely on that voidness for purposes of federal sentencing now.

[00:05:39] Speaker 00:
And I thought that Hagen presented exactly not the same, but the inverse argument that a challenge to a federal

[00:05:51] Speaker 00:
a federal adjudication of guilt cannot be used to invalidate the effect of those prior federal convictions.

[00:06:04] Speaker 00:
Assuming that we adopt your first argument under Custis, why wouldn't Hagen prevent

[00:06:14] Speaker 00:
you from prevailing on the merits, even if those three state convictions are subject to collateral challenge.

[00:06:22] Speaker 03:
Sure.

[00:06:22] Speaker 03:
I think this is where you have to really look at the dividing line between Chico County and Cobb, which are these two cases decided in the 1940s on the same day by the Supreme Court.

[00:06:33] Speaker 00:
They're not dealing with criminal convictions.

[00:06:38] Speaker 03:
They're not dealing with criminal conviction, John, but the principles are the same.

[00:06:42] Speaker 03:
And so that you can find cases.

[00:06:44] Speaker 03:
In fact, coach from this court, the criminal case, it sites back to Chico County, Magnum versus Terrell, another criminal case, Judge Harts and his concurrence sites to Cobb for the exact principle we're relying on here.

[00:06:59] Speaker 03:
And more broadly, the court's decision in Bigford and the court's decision again in Magnum versus Terrell, while they might not always mention these cases, they're relying back on the same kind of core principle that applies in the civil or criminal setting.

[00:07:15] Speaker 03:
But coming back to it, I think the dividing line is really illustrated by Chico County and by Cobb.

[00:07:23] Speaker 03:
because they're both in the bankruptcy context.

[00:07:27] Speaker 03:
One involved a challenge to a federal bankruptcy judgment that was entered without jurisdiction, and the other one involved a challenge to a state court judgment that was entered in violation of

[00:07:41] Speaker 03:
exclusive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.

[00:07:44] Speaker 03:
So Chico County was the challenge to the federal judgment.

[00:07:47] Speaker 03:
And the court there said, nope, you cannot challenge this.

[00:07:50] Speaker 03:
You had the opportunity to raise it in the prior proceeding.

[00:07:53] Speaker 03:
But in Cobb, because it was a state court judgment interfering in an area where federal law preempted state court jurisdiction, the court in that case said that the collateral challenge could go forward.

[00:08:05] Speaker 03:
And that was the case whether the jurisdictional issue was raised

[00:08:10] Speaker 03:
in the previous case or not.

[00:08:12] Speaker 03:
And so, Cobb is the analog to the situation we're dealing with here with a state court judgment entered in violation of federal law.

[00:08:22] Speaker 03:
Cooch and Hagen, those fall on the Chico County side of the line.

[00:08:27] Speaker 03:
And I would just going back to emphasize Cobb is not the only decision that kind of takes this view.

[00:08:32] Speaker 03:
U.S.

[00:08:34] Speaker 03:
Supreme Court's decision later that same year in 1940 U.S.

[00:08:38] Speaker 03:
Fidelity recognized the same principle and in that case it was a state court judgment against enter without jurisdiction against an Indian tribe and

[00:08:46] Speaker 03:
And that tribe didn't raise sovereign immunity in the state court proceeding.

[00:08:51] Speaker 03:
Later on, they went to go challenge the state court judgment.

[00:08:56] Speaker 03:
And the court said that that challenge could go forward because the state court entered judgment in violation of tribal sovereign immunity, which is a federal law doctrine.

[00:09:08] Speaker 03:
I do want to address some of the government's arguments about Custis.

[00:09:12] Speaker 03:
And I think it's important that we read Custis in the context in which the issue is raised to that court, and we also have to take into account the court's reasoning.

[00:09:21] Speaker 03:
After the Supreme Court decided Bergenet versus Texas, a majority of circuits across the country interpreted that case as allowing a defendant in a federal criminal case to collaterally challenge his prior state convictions on any constitutional ground, jurisdictional or not.

[00:09:38] Speaker 03:
And the Fourth Circuit disagreed with that.

[00:09:41] Speaker 03:
That was Custis's case.

[00:09:42] Speaker 03:
Custis took it up on appeal.

[00:09:44] Speaker 03:
And his whole argument was that Berget should apply across the board for all constitutional violations.

[00:09:51] Speaker 03:
The government opposed that and said, no, the court should follow the traditional rule that's devised between merits or jurisdiction.

[00:09:58] Speaker 03:
And that's what the Supreme Court did.

[00:09:59] Speaker 03:
The Supreme Court said the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a unique constitutional defect precisely because it rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect.

[00:10:09] Speaker 03:
And the jurisdictional rationale is running throughout that opinion.

[00:10:13] Speaker 03:
And the Supreme Court, this court has been clear that interpreting Supreme Court precedent, the court's reasoning is just as binding on lower federal courts as its precise holding.

[00:10:22] Speaker 03:
And so we cannot divorce the jurisdictional reasoning in Custis from the court's ultimate decision.

[00:10:28] Speaker 01:
Are you aware of any circuit decision that has understood Custis in the way that you advance here?

[00:10:36] Speaker 03:
No, Your Honor, I'm not aware of any case addressing this one way or the other.

[00:10:40] Speaker 03:
I know that the government cited a bunch of cases in its briefs where courts have continued to come back to Custis and say you can't use it to raise non-jurisdictional constitutional challenges.

[00:10:51] Speaker 03:
And I think they just kind of just say you can't use it for anything other than the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

[00:10:56] Speaker 03:
I'm not aware of any other personal constitutional right that has been adjudged to be jurisdictional.

[00:11:02] Speaker 03:
But I'm not aware of any circuit cases one way or the other dealing with this precise question that we have here.

[00:11:08] Speaker 01:
So to endorse your argument, your argument proceeds under the guidelines.

[00:11:15] Speaker 01:
It's 4A1.2 under the commentary that says, this guideline and commentary do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior conviction or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise recognized in law.

[00:11:32] Speaker 01:
And recognized in law means already recognized in law, right?

[00:11:37] Speaker 01:
I mean, I'm trying to understand how we can endorse your reading of Custis as coming within what 4A1.2 permits.

[00:11:50] Speaker 03:
Your honor, I believe recognized in law follows from the, I mean, this case is just the natural progression of the reasoning in Cobb, US fidelity and Custis and Berget.

[00:12:02] Speaker 03:
And so we're just applying that same principle of that a state court judgment entered in violation of federal law ousting state court jurisdiction is void and can be collateral attacked.

[00:12:13] Speaker 03:
We're just applying that same principle in this setting.

[00:12:15] Speaker 03:
And so I believe that language does

[00:12:18] Speaker 03:
allow us to bring this challenge in the same way that anybody bringing a challenge on a Sixth Amendment ground, which is a recognized jurisdictional ground.

[00:12:29] Speaker 00:
Can I follow up on this Custis issue?

[00:12:31] Speaker 00:
Sure.

[00:12:33] Speaker 00:
And so one question, when you say that you're not aware of any other cases dealing with this, you know, the obvious question is, well, what about our own opinion in Garcia?

[00:12:44] Speaker 00:
And I assume that you're going to say, well, Custis and Garcia don't involve the precise situation of a prior jurisdictional defect.

[00:12:57] Speaker 00:
But if you look at the language of Garcia, it certainly seems to clearly cover this situation, doesn't it?

[00:13:07] Speaker 00:
You know, applying Custis, we hold that with the exception of collateral attack based on the complete denial of counsel,

[00:13:14] Speaker 00:
A district court sentencing a defendant under 4812 cannot consider a collateral attack on a prior conviction.

[00:13:21] Speaker 00:
So if we say, well, we're going to interpret our precedent based on the language that is used, aren't we bound to reject your Custis argument under Garcia?

[00:13:35] Speaker 03:
I don't think so, Your Honor, because I think you do have to read that.

[00:13:39] Speaker 03:
You have to read the court's decision and holding in light of the issue that was presented.

[00:13:42] Speaker 03:
And there was no argument about jurisdiction in that case.

[00:13:45] Speaker 03:
It's undisputed that the challenges that were raised in that case were non-jurisdictional challenges.

[00:13:51] Speaker 03:
And so to read the court's comments on that point as just extinguishing any sort of jurisdictional challenge, despite Custis's reasoning, I think is an over-broad reading of the decision.

[00:14:02] Speaker 00:
Okay, I don't want to went off most of the time, but let me ask you one other question.

[00:14:07] Speaker 00:
So by memory, maybe wrong as Justice Gorsuch and McGirt credited the continued existence of procedural impediments and said, this is not to say that we're opening the avenue under McGirt for the

[00:14:29] Speaker 00:
interim period of these 18 months or whatever.

[00:14:34] Speaker 00:
But under your argument, when we're all dead and our grandchildren are having kids that are occupying the 10th Circuit or whoever, 150 years from now,

[00:14:49] Speaker 00:
I could see the future mentees of Mr. Lowland saying, you know, back in the 21st century, we have this precedent that Judge Rossman Murphy and Bacharach created to say that there is no time limit.

[00:15:08] Speaker 00:
You know, your criminal history, you know, was 100 years ago.

[00:15:12] Speaker 00:
That's fair game because, you know, that was in Tulsa and that was, you know, that state court conviction was null and void.

[00:15:24] Speaker 00:
Boy, talk about opening the floodgates.

[00:15:26] Speaker 00:
You know, when we talk about opening up criminal history, enhancements, 401-2.

[00:15:33] Speaker 00:
This is a revolutionary argument that you're making, isn't it?

[00:15:38] Speaker 03:
Your Honor, to come back to the point you made at the beginning with Justice Gorsuch noting these procedural bars that apply, my argument is not against any of those.

[00:15:49] Speaker 03:
When we're talking about a retrospective remedy where you're trying to undo your sentence, a habeas remedy, those protections still apply.

[00:15:58] Speaker 03:
In that setting, you still have to bring the

[00:16:02] Speaker 03:
The state officer who's holding you in custody before the court.

[00:16:05] Speaker 03:
You have to go through that process.

[00:16:06] Speaker 03:
There are procedural protections there.

[00:16:08] Speaker 03:
We're we're just talking about the perspective effects, whether we're going to continue to give perspective effects to a judgment that that may have happened 50 years ago.

[00:16:21] Speaker 03:
That's correct.

[00:16:22] Speaker 03:
But we're talking here in a case where we're dealing with a judgment that all sides acknowledge was entered without jurisdiction.

[00:16:28] Speaker 03:
And so the question is, it's just a perspective issue as whether we're going to deny these rights anew to use Berget's language.

[00:16:36] Speaker 01:
Okay.

[00:16:37] Speaker 01:
Doesn't your perspective effects argument depend on the retroactive application of McGirt?

[00:16:45] Speaker 03:
I don't think so, Your Honor, because retroactive application is tied in with the habeas statute, tied in with habeas relief, which again, when you're trying to undo a sentence, trying to undo some sort of relief that's retroactive, those principles come into play.

[00:17:03] Speaker 03:
But I think there is a certain divide here with this perspective versus retroactive.

[00:17:09] Speaker 00:
Judge Rothspan, do you have any other questions?

[00:17:11] Speaker 01:
I don't, thank you.

[00:17:13] Speaker 00:
Judge Murphy, did you?

[00:17:14] Speaker 00:
All right.

[00:17:16] Speaker 00:
Sorry to steal so much of your time, Mr. Lohman.

[00:17:19] Speaker 00:
Mr. Bryden.

[00:17:23] Speaker 02:
May it please the court?

[00:17:25] Speaker 02:
Stephen Bryden on behalf of the United States.

[00:17:27] Speaker 02:
And if I could, Your Honor, I'd like to start off where both Judge Backerack and Judge Rossman were just discussing with my friend on the other side.

[00:17:37] Speaker 02:
First, I'd like to point out that not just Justice Gorsuch in the majority opinion in McGirt, but also the primary dissent authored by Justice Roberts, which would be all nine justices signed on between the two,

[00:17:50] Speaker 02:
made a specific point to discuss these procedural obstacles that the state had weighed for the purpose of McGirt that would likely keep these convictions from being found void in further situations in the state of Oklahoma.

[00:18:09] Speaker 02:
And that's important because if Mr. Lalman is correct on this argument, then all of that is superfluous.

[00:18:20] Speaker 02:
If the law is because these convictions were rendered without jurisdiction after the McGirt decision, that there was no reason to do a procedural analysis under Oklahoma law, then all of that was something that was unnecessary to add to the opinion.

[00:18:37] Speaker 02:
And that's generally not how we read Supreme Court opinions.

[00:18:41] Speaker 02:
And then also something that you touched on Judge Backrack about

[00:18:45] Speaker 02:
what this effect would be on the state of the law.

[00:18:48] Speaker 02:
Well, that's something that Cooch considered.

[00:18:50] Speaker 02:
It was a big part of why the Cooch case after the Hagen case came out the way it did, which is that basically retroactively saying none of these convictions count in the state of Utah after they redefined what was or wasn't Indian territory would result in an 18-year they called ex post facto lawless zone, where these convictions just don't matter.

[00:19:13] Speaker 02:
Well,

[00:19:14] Speaker 02:
Doing that in this case would create a hundred year ex post facto lawless zone because the state of Oklahoma for a hundred years has been prosecuting criminal cases believing that it had jurisdiction.

[00:19:29] Speaker 02:
You know, Cooch also in its discussion of the equities talks about the fact that when a defendant basically subjects themselves to the jurisdiction, they plead guilty, they accept responsibility for those offenses.

[00:19:40] Speaker 02:
Those are things that a court should consider

[00:19:42] Speaker 02:
as weighing against a need to retroactively eliminate those convictions.

[00:19:48] Speaker 02:
And that's the case here.

[00:19:49] Speaker 02:
Ms.

[00:19:49] Speaker 02:
Campbell pled guilty in all these cases.

[00:19:52] Speaker 02:
She did not assert any kind of jurisdictional defense, nor does she assert any kind of defense that there was something procedurally wrong that led to a deprivation of her rights other than the venue of prosecution in this case.

[00:20:07] Speaker 02:
And that's something that the Cooch Court found was important

[00:20:12] Speaker 02:
Another distinction I think it's important to make is between the civil cases that Ms.

[00:20:18] Speaker 02:
Campbell relies on, specifically Cobb and Chico and the cases just discussed.

[00:20:27] Speaker 02:
It is important that there are cases involving civil judgments and not criminal convictions.

[00:20:33] Speaker 02:
This court in the Mayfield case in 1987 said about as clear as it can

[00:20:39] Speaker 02:
The issue of whether a court has proper jurisdiction is a legal one, and hence no conviction is void from inception for lack of jurisdiction until a court with review authority has so declared.

[00:20:50] Speaker 02:
Whatever the law may be regarding the effect of civil judgments or default civil judgments, the law on how this court should treat criminal convictions is clear.

[00:21:01] Speaker 02:
They're void until reviewed by a court that's tasked with actually reviewing them.

[00:21:06] Speaker 02:
So in a 2255 situation or some other place where the court has the ability to question the conclusiveness of those convictions.

[00:21:15] Speaker 02:
I also reject the idea that there's a really strong... Can I test that?

[00:21:24] Speaker 00:
How far that goes?

[00:21:25] Speaker 00:
Let's say there was a fraud on the court.

[00:21:27] Speaker 00:
is not discovered until many years later.

[00:21:30] Speaker 00:
Let's say Mr. Campbell is challenging the use of one of the convictions that took place in state court.

[00:21:44] Speaker 00:
And he's not making a McGirt-type challenge, but he's saying, I have just learned that

[00:21:51] Speaker 00:
that the leading investigator in that case has been convicted of fraud.

[00:21:59] Speaker 00:
We've seen high profile cases involving forensic chemists and the like over the years.

[00:22:05] Speaker 00:
What if that had not been previously recognized and adjudicated as an invalidation of that prior conviction?

[00:22:13] Speaker 00:
Can someone

[00:22:14] Speaker 00:
come forward and say, well, there's been no prior recognition of the invalidity of that prior criminal conviction, but that's only because the court was the victim of fraud.

[00:22:30] Speaker 02:
No, they couldn't, Your Honor.

[00:22:32] Speaker 02:
Now, certainly in the case of conviction, they may have remedies under 2255 or some other statute.

[00:22:40] Speaker 02:
But part of the reasoning of Custis

[00:22:42] Speaker 02:
about what makes the complete deprivation of counsel so unique.

[00:22:46] Speaker 02:
It was two parts.

[00:22:48] Speaker 02:
One was how serious it is in terms of the defendant's ability to exercise any of the rest of their rights.

[00:22:53] Speaker 02:
But the second part was how clearly it can be proven on the face of the documents.

[00:22:59] Speaker 02:
And so being able to tell if there's a complete deprivation of counsel is easy.

[00:23:02] Speaker 02:
There's either counsel entered or there's not.

[00:23:05] Speaker 02:
In your question, trying to determine whether there was actually a fraud on the court in that scenario would require significant testimony.

[00:23:12] Speaker 02:
likely expert testimony and things like that.

[00:23:15] Speaker 02:
Likewise, the issue here, again, is not as simple as simply looking at a document to determine whether these convictions from the state of Oklahoma are valid or not.

[00:23:25] Speaker 02:
This court, over the last six to 12 months, has had a number of cases about the level of proof and the difficulty of proof in showing Indian and non-Indian status.

[00:23:35] Speaker 02:
to actually adjudicate whether these convictions are valid, there'd have to be a proof of actual Indian status at the time of the offense.

[00:23:43] Speaker 02:
There would have to be proof that it occurred with an Indian country and that it doesn't fall into any kind of exception that fit into that situation.

[00:23:53] Speaker 02:
And so that second important reason in Custis that they separated Sixth Amendment Capri deprivation from everything else

[00:24:01] Speaker 02:
doesn't apply your hypothetical nor does it apply to the situation here.

[00:24:07] Speaker 01:
Thanks.

[00:24:07] Speaker 01:
But in Custis, Custis said that the complete deprivation of the right to counsel is so significant because it rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect.

[00:24:19] Speaker 01:
And here we have literally the argument is a jurisdictional defect.

[00:24:24] Speaker 01:
So doesn't the logic of Custis here just compel us to

[00:24:28] Speaker 01:
endorse the appellant's argument.

[00:24:30] Speaker 01:
I mean, we don't have something that's like a jurisdictional problem.

[00:24:32] Speaker 01:
We have literally a jurisdictional problem.

[00:24:37] Speaker 02:
Your Honor, while I recognize that that is the quote from Custis, Custis also specifically says that the only exception that is considered is complete deprivation of counsel.

[00:24:49] Speaker 02:
And if what the Supreme Court meant was the only exceptions

[00:24:53] Speaker 02:
are complete deprivation of counsel or issues of subject matter jurisdiction, they easily could have said so.

[00:24:59] Speaker 02:
And to understand why they would say it rises to the level of jurisdictional defect, but that might not be justiciable in this situation, is because of the second half of what's important about that concern.

[00:25:12] Speaker 02:
The court acknowledges when they were looking at, well, how bad does the deprivation of counsel have to be?

[00:25:21] Speaker 02:
such an ineffective counsel that they're not able to actually defend any of your rights.

[00:25:27] Speaker 02:
And so it would be practically the same as having no counsel at all.

[00:25:30] Speaker 02:
But practically the same as having no counsel at all does not let you file a claim, a collateral attack under Custis.

[00:25:37] Speaker 02:
Because proving that would require a significant amount of proof where that new collateral court is having to review things that would be best reviewed by the original court.

[00:25:48] Speaker 02:
And it's the same with matters of jurisdiction here.

[00:25:51] Speaker 02:
If a district court was to sit on the validity of this conviction right now, not only would it have to discuss what I just talked with Judge Backrack, it would also have to walk through the procedural defenses that were discussed in McGirt about how Oklahoma's statutes would apply, how race to Dakota or lashes or equity, any of those things could apply on whether or not the conviction is void or not.

[00:26:17] Speaker 02:
I recognize that Ms.

[00:26:19] Speaker 02:
Campbell made an argument that the validity of the underlying conviction may not matter and that they're only arguing about a prospective use here.

[00:26:26] Speaker 02:
But as Judge Rossman discussed earlier, we're operating under a guidelines provision here.

[00:26:34] Speaker 02:
And the guidelines provision says to count convictions unless they've been rendered void by another court or if they've been

[00:26:45] Speaker 02:
given incomplete deprivation of counsel.

[00:26:50] Speaker 02:
And so, you know, essentially they're asking for a remedy and equity that goes beyond what's allowed by the guidelines to say, yes, there are situations where my conviction might not be legally void, but it would be unfair to give it to me going forward.

[00:27:06] Speaker 02:
And that's just not what's contemplated by that guidelines provision.

[00:27:10] Speaker 02:
And it's not what's contemplated by Custis.

[00:27:20] Speaker 02:
If the court has no further questions for me, I would ask that this court affirm the decision of the district court, and I would yield the remainder of my time.

[00:27:30] Speaker 00:
Judge Rossman or Judge Murphy, do you have questions?

[00:27:33] Speaker 00:
I have none.

[00:27:34] Speaker 00:
OK.

[00:27:36] Speaker 00:
Kevin, did I unintentionally cheat Mr. Logan out of all his rebuttal time?

[00:27:46] Speaker 03:
Judge, he went two minutes over.

[00:27:49] Speaker 00:
In other words, yes.

[00:27:51] Speaker 00:
Sorry about that, Mr. Bull.

[00:27:53] Speaker 00:
It's very well presented in any event by both sides.

[00:27:55] Speaker 00:
This matter will be submitted.

[00:27:57] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:27:57] Speaker 00:
Thank you both.