[00:00:00] Speaker 00: Next case this morning is United States versus Fairbanks 24-4047. [00:00:05] Speaker 00: Council for Appellant, please make your appearance and proceed. [00:00:15] Speaker 01: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:00:16] Speaker 01: Council, may I please the Court, Spencer Rice appearing for Mr. Fairbanks, who today asks you to reverse his conviction. [00:00:26] Speaker 01: for securities fraud on count two against Ms. [00:00:29] Speaker 01: Bernadustin. [00:00:31] Speaker 01: Because in this case, the district court erred in not granting our motion for judgment of acquittal. [00:00:37] Speaker 01: In this case, the government was allowed to present its theory of liability of guilt based entirely on evidence that dealt with count one regarding a Ms. [00:00:47] Speaker 01: Holloway. [00:00:48] Speaker 01: And there was evidence that the government presented, and it was strong. [00:00:52] Speaker 03: What is your understanding of the government's theory of liability under the statute, the charging statute? [00:00:57] Speaker 03: The indictment states facts that support sort of all the elements one through three, the three modes of fraudulent conduct. [00:01:06] Speaker 03: What was your understanding of the government's theory of liability? [00:01:09] Speaker 01: The closing argument, my understanding was that they were basing it on the third theory of liability, that the [00:01:15] Speaker 01: that the security here or that Mr. Fairbanks' supply line company was operated as a business or that he engaged in a course of business which operated as a fraud upon the purchases over the contract. [00:01:29] Speaker 03: And how is that theory of liability different from subsection one to employee scheme? [00:01:38] Speaker 01: Because my understanding [00:01:41] Speaker 01: of liability theory number one would be a scheme requires more than just two contracts. [00:01:49] Speaker 01: It requires a course of action related to several victims. [00:01:54] Speaker 01: to establish a scheme, which they didn't have here. [00:01:59] Speaker 01: And I think the district court pointed that out in our arguments that are in the record here. [00:02:03] Speaker 01: But to establish a scheme requires more than just two instances of conduct, two contracts that are separated in time here by over a year. [00:02:15] Speaker 03: So your position is that there were two schemes, or more than, or at least two schemes, that there wasn't one scheme. [00:02:23] Speaker 01: With multiple victims. [00:02:25] Speaker 03: Just so that I understand the theory of the defense on the charge. [00:02:29] Speaker 01: Our theory of the defense is that with regard to Ms. [00:02:33] Speaker 01: Holloway, the government could have proved their case on any one of these. [00:02:39] Speaker 01: They had evidence sufficient to do liability theory number one, number two, or number three. [00:02:44] Speaker 01: But to get in Ms. [00:02:45] Speaker 01: Dustin, they focused on [00:02:47] Speaker 01: Number the third prom which was that mr. Fairbanks operated a course of business that operated as a as a fraud upon miss Dustin because they clearly didn't have one and two they couldn't show a scheme to defraud miss Dustin [00:03:01] Speaker 01: They couldn't show that there was any false statements or untrue statements made to Ms. [00:03:05] Speaker 01: Dustin. [00:03:05] Speaker 01: She wasn't a witness. [00:03:06] Speaker 03: Could the jury have found that there was a common scheme that involved the victim for count one and for count two, and thereby the government satisfies number three? [00:03:16] Speaker 01: Our position is that would have required not only a speculation, but that would have been a huge leap for the jury to find that. [00:03:26] Speaker 01: I understand, we understand that the court can view all the inferences and evidence in the light most favorable to the government, but here these weren't reasonable inferences. [00:03:35] Speaker 01: These were leaps. [00:03:36] Speaker 01: For them to connect Ms. [00:03:38] Speaker 01: Dustin, who signed her contract in 2014, with all the fraud that was presented with Ms. [00:03:45] Speaker 01: Holloway, who signed her contract in 2015, required a huge leap. [00:03:49] Speaker 03: But weren't both supply line related? [00:03:52] Speaker 01: Yes, and we can see that both of the securities, the language and the contracts were very similar, if not identical. [00:04:00] Speaker 01: There was a few edits that the Holloway's made in 2015 when they signed their contract. [00:04:05] Speaker 01: The contract language in itself is not fraudulent. [00:04:10] Speaker 01: It's the performance of the contracts here that makes the two cases so disparate. [00:04:15] Speaker 01: And it was our real fear and why we filed the motion to sever, and I'm not going [00:04:20] Speaker 01: hit hard on the motion to sever today. [00:04:22] Speaker 01: We filed that motion to sever because we believe that there was a huge problem with the way the theory the government was going to present to the jury presented this risk that they would convict Mr. Fairbanks on the Holloway evidence and not on the Dustin evidence because there was a dearth of evidence regarding Ms. [00:04:41] Speaker 01: Dustin and any fraud that she experienced. [00:04:44] Speaker 01: She never complained about it. [00:04:46] Speaker 01: She actually said the opposite. [00:04:48] Speaker 01: Miss Dustin, in fact, and I think the most important point to drive home today is that she was specifically asked. [00:04:55] Speaker 01: She couldn't testify she had died. [00:04:57] Speaker 01: Unfortunately, we would have loved to have her as a witness. [00:05:01] Speaker 01: She was specifically asked by the government's agent. [00:05:04] Speaker 01: If the $30,500 check, which is the means of interstate commerce that the government alleged was fraudulently used here, if that check had any connection to the 2014 contract that she signed, that check was written in December of 2015, 18 months after she signed this 2014 contract. [00:05:28] Speaker 01: And the basis for the 2014 contract was a 40,000 cash investment. [00:05:33] Speaker 01: The government had to prove here that there were some means of interstate commerce that was fraudulently used in connection with the 2014 contract. [00:05:42] Speaker 03: Wasn't supply line in the memo of the check? [00:05:44] Speaker 01: It was. [00:05:45] Speaker 01: It was. [00:05:46] Speaker 01: And our theory there is that that is the only thing the jury had to connect any fraud with regard to Ms. [00:05:53] Speaker 01: Dustin, is they saw the supply line name in the memo on the check, and they said, [00:05:59] Speaker 01: Miss Holloway had a supply line contract also, and she was here to testify in court, and she testified that her experience was terrible, that she was defrauded. [00:06:09] Speaker 01: And so it has to be that this contract from a year earlier, money was lost. [00:06:17] Speaker 01: So we'll find her guilty also. [00:06:19] Speaker 01: We'll find Mr. Fairbanks guilty of that count also, and we think that was the inappropriate part here. [00:06:24] Speaker 00: That's why the- Mr. Rice, you've given me a lot of basis for questions, but let me hit one initial one first. [00:06:34] Speaker 00: If you say you aren't going to spend a lot of time on the motion to sever today, but if you lose on your motion to sever argument, [00:06:46] Speaker 00: What impact does it have on your sufficiency of the evidence argument? [00:06:50] Speaker 00: And the reason I say that is a lot of your argument is predicated on the notion that they included all of this evidence related to the Holloway transaction and that that evidence was used [00:07:03] Speaker 00: and to support the conviction relative to the Dustin transaction count too. [00:07:09] Speaker 00: Well, if you lose on severance, why isn't all of that evidence fair game? [00:07:14] Speaker 00: I mean, why isn't all of that evidence in? [00:07:19] Speaker 01: I think that the way to respond there is the facts available to the district court at the time we filed our motion to sever, we warned her that this could happen. [00:07:31] Speaker 01: Was there enough in front of her to say it will happen or that the prejudice is going to be so high? [00:07:37] Speaker 01: We thought there was. [00:07:38] Speaker 01: But it should have been clear. [00:07:40] Speaker 01: And I think if you look at the way the district court struggled with this decision, even weeks after the jury returned their verdict, it was still under advisement. [00:07:50] Speaker 01: The way the evidence came in was clear, that the government presented a theory of liability as to the Holloway contract. [00:07:59] Speaker 01: And then they were allowed to argue that, well, [00:08:01] Speaker 01: Because the contractual language is the same and because Ms. [00:08:06] Speaker 01: Dustin lost money, you can also find Mr. Fairbanks guilty on the Dustin count also. [00:08:12] Speaker 00: The government said that this was one scheme to defraud and that these were representative examples of that scheme. [00:08:23] Speaker 00: And the district court said that it was very likely that even if they had severed this case, then the Holloway evidence would come in. [00:08:35] Speaker 00: I accept the notion that conceptually you could have all of this evidence and say, well, you still have to be able to say that discreetly that there was sufficient evidence as it relates to count two. [00:08:49] Speaker 00: I accept that premise. [00:08:50] Speaker 00: But all of this sort of joint scheme evidence, all of this testimony of Holloway [00:08:56] Speaker 00: Unless there was some objection to specific aspects of that, why wouldn't that evidence be fair game for determining the guilt of the defendant as it relates to the Dustin transaction? [00:09:11] Speaker 00: And to be more clear, all the evidence about scheme, all the evidence about supply line, why isn't all of that evidence, except for perhaps anything uniquely related to Holloway, why isn't all of that evidence [00:09:26] Speaker 00: Considered in connect properly considered in determining whether count two was sufficient. [00:09:32] Speaker 01: We don't think it would have been properly Considered we believe that the year of time that passed or the 18 months to pass between the two contracts make two separate [00:09:42] Speaker 01: It's two separate contracts. [00:09:43] Speaker 01: And there was nothing in the dusting contract from 2015 to the dusting contract in 2014, excuse me, to the Holloway contract in 2015 to connect the two. [00:09:56] Speaker 03: Well, your position, I think, is, as you said, is that you don't think there was a scheme at all. [00:10:03] Speaker 01: There was no scheme between the two contracts. [00:10:05] Speaker 03: Between the two contracts. [00:10:06] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:10:06] Speaker 01: And the government cites here, [00:10:09] Speaker 01: to support their argument that we don't need to present all of the witnesses or all of the potential victims in a securities fraud scheme. [00:10:18] Speaker 01: They cite to cases that are very instructive and helpful when you have what normally happens in securities fraud. [00:10:25] Speaker 01: You have [00:10:26] Speaker 01: multinational, multi-state schemes that are sent through the mail out to many victims, and you have many people responding, and those cases are allowed to go forward even if some of the victims don't respond. [00:10:38] Speaker 01: They're still added as counts because the scheme is clear. [00:10:42] Speaker 01: And I would, I don't think the government could, and I don't think this court could find a case where there's been a securities fraud scheme with just two securities contracts, so disparate in their performance here. [00:10:55] Speaker 04: Well, how were they disparate in their performance? [00:10:57] Speaker 04: I understand that one of the contracts, he basically refused to return their money and said he'd spent the money working on a brief or something. [00:11:11] Speaker 04: The other contract, he did actually pay some of that money to another business that he was connected with, and then that business ends up [00:11:22] Speaker 04: paying some of that money to a business that his wife was connected to. [00:11:28] Speaker 04: But neither of these two contracts ever paid out a penny as a return on the investment, right? [00:11:36] Speaker 04: Isn't that true and isn't that important? [00:11:39] Speaker 04: Identical contracts which were completely, I mean, essentially had no effect. [00:11:47] Speaker 04: They just lost their money. [00:11:50] Speaker 01: It is true the money was spent on both and not returned on either one. [00:11:54] Speaker 04: Isn't that significant? [00:11:56] Speaker 01: It is significant but it would be just a breach of contract then. [00:11:59] Speaker 01: It wouldn't be securities fraud. [00:12:00] Speaker 01: With regard to the dusting contract [00:12:03] Speaker 01: She was specifically asked about that means of interstate commerce, the $30,500 check, and where it went to. [00:12:10] Speaker 01: She knew exactly where it went to. [00:12:11] Speaker 01: She intended it to go to a dear friend, and it was a small business. [00:12:14] Speaker 04: She said he was a dear friend. [00:12:15] Speaker 04: She said that she basically didn't apparently mind that she lost her money. [00:12:21] Speaker 04: Couldn't the jury choose to [00:12:23] Speaker 04: Maybe not disbelieve her but believe that she had been a victim of fraud and didn't quite understand What had happened here without any evidence? [00:12:33] Speaker 04: Why isn't that possible for the jury to make some inferences there? [00:12:36] Speaker 01: Our position would be that's not just an inference well not an inference. [00:12:40] Speaker 04: That's a basically disbelieve her I [00:12:43] Speaker 01: It's a leap past the facts. [00:12:46] Speaker 01: It's a leap over and saying, well, she said this, but we're going to really believe Ms. [00:12:50] Speaker 01: Holloway. [00:12:51] Speaker 00: Well, the investigator said that Ms. [00:12:54] Speaker 00: Dustin didn't understand her financial affairs and the indictment itself. [00:12:59] Speaker 00: essentially paints a picture that what's at issue here is preying on vulnerable people. [00:13:05] Speaker 00: So why couldn't a jury believe that Ms. [00:13:08] Speaker 00: Dustin didn't know really what was going on? [00:13:11] Speaker 00: She liked Mr. Fairbanks. [00:13:13] Speaker 00: Why couldn't a jury believe the investigator was right? [00:13:18] Speaker 00: And that is evidence that's in the record. [00:13:21] Speaker 00: The investigator said she didn't understand what was going on. [00:13:24] Speaker 01: The investigator said she didn't think Ms. [00:13:27] Speaker 01: Dustin understood that the money was gone. [00:13:29] Speaker 01: The evidence at trial was that Miss Dustin, although she had had a stroke, was fully competent capable. [00:13:36] Speaker 01: The adult protective services gentleman who went to her house several times concluded that she was not being abused or badly treated by Mr. Fairbanks and that she in fact was of sound and competent mind. [00:13:52] Speaker 04: Fully competent people are defrauded all the time by [00:13:57] Speaker 04: you know, talented fraudsters. [00:13:59] Speaker 04: It happens all the time. [00:14:00] Speaker 04: And when there's evidence of it... The fact that she was competent doesn't mean that she wasn't defrauded. [00:14:04] Speaker 01: Right, but if there were any evidence that she specifically had been defrauded, [00:14:10] Speaker 01: That would be different, but we're dealing with the performance on the Holloway contract. [00:14:14] Speaker 01: Ms. [00:14:15] Speaker 01: Holloway testified about what happened before she even signed the contract. [00:14:18] Speaker 01: She was made assurances outside of the four corners of the contract, told that other rich people had given their money, and that reassured her. [00:14:27] Speaker 01: She was told she could ask for an accounting at any time. [00:14:29] Speaker 01: She was told that she could get the money back at any time she wanted. [00:14:33] Speaker 04: She was more discerning, it sounds like. [00:14:35] Speaker 04: Certainly asked more questions. [00:14:36] Speaker 04: She and her husband then did Ms. [00:14:39] Speaker 04: Dustin, as far as we know. [00:14:40] Speaker 04: We don't know, but... And that's the problem. [00:14:43] Speaker 04: I mean, it's the difference between two investors and two individuals, one who accepts what's told to her and another who asks a lot of questions. [00:14:54] Speaker 01: And it's a shame that Ms. [00:14:56] Speaker 01: Dustin could not be there at trial. [00:14:57] Speaker 01: And that's one of the reasons we asked for the motion to sever, is we did not have [00:15:01] Speaker 01: We did not have the ability to put on a fence and didn't have an accuser to confront. [00:15:06] Speaker 00: I have five seconds. [00:15:07] Speaker 00: Did you challenge the jointer to begin with under Rule 8? [00:15:12] Speaker 01: My time is up. [00:15:12] Speaker 01: Can I respond? [00:15:13] Speaker 01: Yes, please. [00:15:14] Speaker 01: We did not challenge the jointer. [00:15:15] Speaker 01: We challenged the severance. [00:15:19] Speaker 01: Things were chaotic after Ms. [00:15:20] Speaker 01: Dustin passed away. [00:15:21] Speaker 01: We challenged the severance right before trial because the government dismissed two of the largest counts of wire fraud that involved Ms. [00:15:29] Speaker 01: Dustin. [00:15:30] Speaker 01: right before the trial. [00:15:32] Speaker 01: We anticipated they were gonna dismiss all of the dusting counts and they did not. [00:15:36] Speaker 01: They just dismissed two. [00:15:37] Speaker 01: That's why our motion came in the day before. [00:15:38] Speaker 01: It was a fluid situation right before trial. [00:15:46] Speaker 00: Thank you, Council. [00:15:46] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:15:53] Speaker 02: It pleased the court counsel, Tyler Murray, on behalf of the United States. [00:15:58] Speaker 02: In response to Judge Rochman's question earlier about whether this was a scheme or a course of practice, it was both. [00:16:06] Speaker 02: The methods of proving securities fraud are like overlapping concentric circles. [00:16:12] Speaker 02: And some conduct that is covered by some is also covered by the other. [00:16:16] Speaker 02: So this was both a scheme and a course of conduct, and we argued [00:16:22] Speaker 02: both, and with respect to Judge Moritz's question about the disparate performance in the two contracts. [00:16:31] Speaker 02: Even without the testimony from Ms. [00:16:34] Speaker 02: Holloway, the jury could reasonably conclude that Ms. [00:16:38] Speaker 02: Dustin, in count two, was a victim of securities fraud. [00:16:44] Speaker 02: Consider this. [00:16:45] Speaker 02: She entered into a supply line contract. [00:16:48] Speaker 02: Supply line itself, the evidence shows, had no operational status. [00:16:52] Speaker 02: It was not registered with the state. [00:16:54] Speaker 02: It had no business, no license to issue securities. [00:16:58] Speaker 02: So it was essentially a non-existent business. [00:17:00] Speaker 02: So Miss Dustin was induced to invest in a non-existent business. [00:17:08] Speaker 02: He never received the promised return. [00:17:10] Speaker 02: And with respect to the use of the money, it is true that it went to a business with which Mr. Fairbanks was associated, ERA Realty. [00:17:21] Speaker 02: But the jury could reasonably conclude that he took that money and used it for his own purposes, just like he did the Holloways, because he never repaid any of that money, even when they had the opportunity. [00:17:32] Speaker 02: The money went from ERA Realty back [00:17:36] Speaker 02: to a company called Sunnybrae, which was associated with Mr. Fairbanks and his wife. [00:17:43] Speaker 02: And then the jury also heard when Mr. Fairbanks was confronted about this that he didn't say, yeah, it was a business deal that went bad. [00:17:52] Speaker 02: I really wish it would have worked out better. [00:17:53] Speaker 02: Things were bad. [00:17:55] Speaker 02: He said supply line is just an idea. [00:17:59] Speaker 02: And I never solicited any investments in supply line. [00:18:02] Speaker 02: You're kidding me? [00:18:03] Speaker 02: And then when he was confronted with the contracts, he told a different story. [00:18:07] Speaker 02: So on those facts, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Fairbanks committed securities fraud. [00:18:14] Speaker 02: And so the difference in the performance of the contracts is really not material. [00:18:18] Speaker 02: They were both part of the supply line scheme, the supply line course of business here that was the subject of the indictment and the evidence at trial. [00:18:28] Speaker 04: Are you suggesting then, I guess what you're saying is that had the contract with Ms. [00:18:33] Speaker 04: Dustin been on the up and up, he'd have had no reason to make these kinds of denials or kind of cover up his activity later? [00:18:44] Speaker 02: I think that's correct, Your Honor, yes. [00:18:46] Speaker 04: He could have just said, okay, well, this particular contract was, yes, I did enter into this, but it was valid. [00:18:55] Speaker 02: Yeah, he could have said any of those things, but he just flat out denied those things. [00:19:00] Speaker 02: And the jury saw and considered all that evidence. [00:19:05] Speaker 03: What evidence would the government have presented if the trials were severed? [00:19:09] Speaker 02: We would have prevented evidence from both things. [00:19:12] Speaker 02: We would have presented evidence of what Mr. Holloway said Supply Line was. [00:19:17] Speaker 02: We would have submitted evidence of his website, of his pamphlet that he gave. [00:19:22] Speaker 02: of his PowerPoint that he prepared about supply line. [00:19:24] Speaker 02: We would have put on evidence about the representations he made at seminars and other things, and that came admittedly from Mrs. Holloway, but she was the witness to that. [00:19:34] Speaker 02: That evidence would have come in in both trials. [00:19:36] Speaker 02: Then we also would have put on evidence [00:19:38] Speaker 02: that Mr. Holloway never registered Supply Line as a real business, even though he touted himself as the CEO of that business. [00:19:47] Speaker 02: He would put on evidence that he never was authorized to issue securities. [00:19:52] Speaker 02: We would have put on evidence that he used the money that he obtained by soliciting investments in Supply Line to basically, he said it was to fund [00:20:02] Speaker 02: a bucket that was the idea was a collaboration among local businesses to help each other buy assets and they'd be collateralized and important and we'd get a return on that. [00:20:13] Speaker 02: It would turn out that the jury would have seen that the evidence of that bucket was really truly Mr. Fairbanks' pocket and that he was able to use that money in the way that he wanted. [00:20:24] Speaker 03: It sounds like, based on what you're saying, that if there were two trials, the trial as to count two, as to Ms. [00:20:29] Speaker 03: Dustin, would have involved all the same proof. [00:20:34] Speaker 03: It would have relied heavily on the Holloway proof, except for proving the interstate commerce element. [00:20:39] Speaker 03: So I guess my concern is that you didn't have any, the government didn't have any specific Dustin-related fraudulent conduct evidence. [00:20:49] Speaker 02: We didn't have, let me push back on that just a little bit Judge Rossman. [00:20:54] Speaker 02: We didn't have evidence of direct misrepresentations that were made to Ms. [00:20:59] Speaker 02: Dustin, in part because she had passed away, we didn't have her testimony, although her hearsay statements came in in part in the trial. [00:21:07] Speaker 02: But what we did have is we had her contract, we had the checks showing that money that she came from Supply Line, we had the [00:21:18] Speaker 02: evidence that the jury saw that when shortly after she had her stroke, that Mr. Fairbanks opened a joint account with her, funded it with her money, [00:21:30] Speaker 02: and a little bit of his, and then invested in Supply Line. [00:21:35] Speaker 02: We would have still had the same evidence that Supply Line was not operational. [00:21:39] Speaker 02: We would have Mr. Fairbanks' statement that Supply Line had no operational status. [00:21:43] Speaker 02: We would have had his denials. [00:21:44] Speaker 03: So you didn't have any specific misrepresentation as to Dustin. [00:21:48] Speaker 03: And so you would be relying on the scheme evidence. [00:21:53] Speaker 02: Yes, yes. [00:21:54] Speaker 02: And the inference, I think, is a reasonable inference to make that when she invested in the supply line contract that she would have heard similar ideas. [00:22:03] Speaker 02: I mean, the supply line contract itself, it says capital creation and business development, the bucket. [00:22:11] Speaker 02: It would have been a reasonable inference for the jury to consider that she heard a similar pitch to the Holloways based on that evidence. [00:22:18] Speaker 00: Is it in fact true that in your view that as the district court said, even if there were separate trials, you would have had the Holloway, Holloway would have testified, right? [00:22:30] Speaker 02: Absolutely. [00:22:31] Speaker 02: Absolutely, Your Honor. [00:22:32] Speaker 02: And the district court had already made that decision earlier on as part of the motion in limiting practice. [00:22:37] Speaker 02: I think that's in the supplemental record volume one. [00:22:43] Speaker 02: With respect to our case law and the idea that a scheme has to involve more than two people, this court's decision, Massey, rejects that concept. [00:22:58] Speaker 02: And it says that a scheme refers to an overall design to defraud one, [00:23:03] Speaker 02: or many. [00:23:04] Speaker 02: So the principles of scheming and defrauding or courses of practice aren't limited to whether a bunch of people are defrauded or just one is defrauded. [00:23:14] Speaker 02: And I think the fundamental problem with the argument, the sufficiency argument that the defendant is making here, my friend is making here, [00:23:23] Speaker 02: is that he's trying to import a reliance element into essentially what is a criminal charge. [00:23:31] Speaker 02: A reliance element in a securities fraud charge or count is an important part of a private securities fraud action or a private fraud action. [00:23:40] Speaker 02: But the law does not require nor is it an element to have individual reliance in a securities fraud criminal prosecution. [00:23:51] Speaker 02: There's no requirement that each of the victims testify. [00:23:53] Speaker 02: There's no requirement of any of that, or the government is not required to prove individual reliance. [00:24:00] Speaker 02: The focus is on the defendant's conduct, not on the victim's reliance on that conduct. [00:24:08] Speaker 02: And so for those reasons here, [00:24:11] Speaker 02: We think the case that we cited, Massey and Kennedy and the others in our brief, are very helpful in showing that this was a scheme and that the government, the evidence was sufficient at trial for a reasonable jury to conclude that a scheme to defraud or a course of prisoners that acted as a deception happened here. [00:24:37] Speaker 02: And unless the court has any additional questions, we'd ask the court to affirm. [00:24:42] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:24:42] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:24:48] Speaker 00: Case is submitted. [00:24:48] Speaker 00: Thank you, counsel, for your fine arguments.