[00:00:01] Speaker 03:
All right, our first case is 24-4089, United States versus Ogilvie.

[00:00:06] Speaker 03:
And I think Ms.

[00:00:07] Speaker 03:
Stengel, you're up first.

[00:00:09] Speaker 03:
Welcome.

[00:00:09] Speaker 04:
May it please the court, Jessica Stengel appearing on behalf of Mr. Ogilvie.

[00:00:16] Speaker 04:
A law that infringes on a person's Second Amendment rights is presumptively unconstitutional.

[00:00:22] Speaker 04:
The presumption can be overcome, and the government bears the burden.

[00:00:26] Speaker 04:
Mr. Ogilvie submits that the government has failed to satisfy that burden and asks this court to find 922N on its face unconstitutional.

[00:00:38] Speaker 04:
The government offered two primary arguments to overcome the presumption, and neither are persuasive.

[00:00:45] Speaker 04:
The first argument the government offered is bail.

[00:00:49] Speaker 04:
Quite frankly, history doesn't support this, but let's go through

[00:00:53] Speaker 04:
the test that Bruin set out and that Rahimi demonstrated how it worked.

[00:00:59] Speaker 04:
First, the government must identify a historical firearm regulation.

[00:01:06] Speaker 04:
Mr. Ogilvie submits that at that first step, the government fails.

[00:01:10] Speaker 04:
At the founding, bail was not a historical firearm regulation.

[00:01:14] Speaker 04:
And the government has offered no evidence to suggest that anyone was disarmed as a function of bail at the founding, assuming we can get past that.

[00:01:24] Speaker 03:
Although for serious felonies, bail was not permitted.

[00:01:32] Speaker 03:
And when bail was not permitted, that was a complete deprivation of your liberty.

[00:01:38] Speaker 03:
including your right to keep and bear arms.

[00:01:41] Speaker 03:
Why wouldn't the restriction here kind of be a lesser intrusion on Second Amendment rights than a complete deprivation of liberty?

[00:01:54] Speaker 03:
Why isn't that a good comparator?

[00:01:57] Speaker 03:
And that's what most of the other cases, the other circuit cases have latched onto.

[00:02:02] Speaker 04:
We've only had two circuit decisions that have found bail to be a relevant

[00:02:07] Speaker 04:
analog.

[00:02:08] Speaker 04:
And I would first argue that the evidence for, quote, serious felonies is split amongst not scholars, but there were two theories of camp at the founding.

[00:02:24] Speaker 04:
There was this assenting view and the primary view.

[00:02:26] Speaker 04:
And Baal was not contemplated really for serious felonies.

[00:02:33] Speaker 04:
And the Baal that was contemplated

[00:02:36] Speaker 04:
wasn't a deprivation of liberty, it was a deprivation of property because the primary and motivating concern for bail was making sure that people show up.

[00:02:48] Speaker 04:
Second of all, the government has offered no evidence to suggest that the deprivation of liberty was concomitant with the deprivation of a Second Amendment right, which makes sense given that for those who couldn't find sureties, who couldn't find someone to put forth

[00:03:02] Speaker 04:
some type of collateral to ensure their appearance, if they were detained, it was often the sheriff's or the magistrate's house.

[00:03:11] Speaker 04:
And in fact, I think Blackstone identifies that the only situation in which there was a deprivation of the ability to have a gun was for libel and slander, which quite frankly was a serious felony back at the founding.

[00:03:32] Speaker 03:
A crime like murder, maybe a serious violent crime, don't you think part of the rationale at the founding was public safety for certain types of defendants?

[00:03:47] Speaker 03:
You think it was purely making sure they show up on time?

[00:03:51] Speaker 04:
What I think is absolutely irrelevant, the government has offered no evidence to suggest that anything other than appearance was the motivating purpose for bail.

[00:04:01] Speaker 05:
What about just the fact that they were capital crimes?

[00:04:04] Speaker 05:
There was automatic bail, wasn't it?

[00:04:07] Speaker 05:
Or no bail?

[00:04:09] Speaker 05:
Wasn't it automatic detention for capital crimes?

[00:04:12] Speaker 04:
For capital crimes?

[00:04:13] Speaker 05:
And capital crimes were much more serious.

[00:04:15] Speaker 05:
There were a lot more capital crimes then than there were now.

[00:04:18] Speaker 04:
Everything was a capital crime.

[00:04:20] Speaker 05:
Everything was a capital crime?

[00:04:22] Speaker 04:
No, I'm sorry.

[00:04:23] Speaker 04:
I interrupted you.

[00:04:24] Speaker 04:
Go ahead.

[00:04:25] Speaker 04:
Most every felony was a capital crime.

[00:04:28] Speaker 04:
And we didn't have the significant procedural protections in place that we do now.

[00:04:36] Speaker 05:
So most every felony was a capital crime.

[00:04:39] Speaker 05:
And was there an individual determination in a capital case in our founding era?

[00:04:45] Speaker 05:
Was there individual determination in a capital case of whether they were entitled to bail?

[00:04:54] Speaker 04:
No, Your Honor.

[00:04:56] Speaker 04:
My understanding from having looked at far too many law review articles is that there was no individual determination, as you say, but none of the procedural protections that Rahimi found critical to allowing any type of infringement on an individual's

[00:05:15] Speaker 04:
Second Amendment rights.

[00:05:16] Speaker 04:
There was no notice.

[00:05:16] Speaker 05:
Well, let me just push back this a little before we get to the procedural protections.

[00:05:22] Speaker 05:
Just the concept that for all capital crimes in our founding era, you were not entitled to bail is pre-trial detention.

[00:05:31] Speaker 05:
And you're suggesting that that had nothing to do with safety and only had to do with appearance and guaranteeing appearance?

[00:05:37] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:05:38] Speaker 05:
And that is based on- What's the basis for that?

[00:05:40] Speaker 04:
myriad law review articles.

[00:05:42] Speaker 04:
The first, the one that comes to mind is the 2024 Harvard Law Review article by Mason and Funk.

[00:05:52] Speaker 04:
There's a 2024 law review article in the University of Pennsylvania, and I will file a 28-J with the author's name.

[00:06:01] Speaker 04:
But what that gentleman incites is that not only was

[00:06:07] Speaker 04:
There are no individual determination, but also at the founding, disarmament was not a consequence of bail.

[00:06:15] Speaker 04:
And there's been no evidence to suggest that there was.

[00:06:17] Speaker 04:
And it's the government's burden to come forward with affirmative evidence, not just sort of high-minded ideals.

[00:06:23] Speaker 04:
And Justice Spirit, in her concurrence in Rahimi, cautions that if we take a principle too far, if we read it at such a high level of generality, the right loses all meaning.

[00:06:33] Speaker 04:
And that's what the government is saying.

[00:06:34] Speaker 00:
We do have some help here, though.

[00:06:36] Speaker 00:
You referenced that two circuits have opined on this.

[00:06:38] Speaker 00:
I assume you're talking about the fifth and the sixth.

[00:06:40] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:06:41] Speaker 00:
The Quiroz and Gore.

[00:06:42] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:06:43] Speaker 00:
And neither is favorable for your position, is that correct?

[00:06:47] Speaker 04:
That is correct.

[00:06:47] Speaker 00:
And if we were to adopt the reasoning of those two cases, would that be the end of your appeal, or do you distinguish them in some fashion other than saying that they're wrongly decided?

[00:07:03] Speaker 04:
I'm going to try and answer, and please interrupt me if I don't answer your question.

[00:07:08] Speaker 04:
I think those cases, as they both rely on bail,

[00:07:12] Speaker 04:
fail to undertake the analysis.

[00:07:16] Speaker 04:
And it's a rigorous analysis that Bruin required.

[00:07:19] Speaker 04:
And they are doing precisely what Justice Barrett cautions against.

[00:07:24] Speaker 04:
They are saying that bail, as we understand it today, in 2025, disarming people, we have processes in place, must have been the same at the founding.

[00:07:33] Speaker 04:
And that's incorrect.

[00:07:35] Speaker 04:
There's no evidence supporting that.

[00:07:37] Speaker 04:
And what I would argue, what Mr. Ogilvie submits,

[00:07:42] Speaker 04:
is that doing what Bruin requires produces a different result.

[00:07:49] Speaker 00:
Well, Rahimi acknowledges that categories of people can qualify, and here we have a category.

[00:07:57] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor, and I think the distinguishing feature there is the categories of people that Rahimi identified are people who have already gone through

[00:08:06] Speaker 04:
what Rahimi calls the significant procedural protections, the processes involved.

[00:08:12] Speaker 04:
There's notice, there's hearing, there's an opportunity to respond, and then there's a judicial determination about a particular individual.

[00:08:23] Speaker 00:
Is that really, I understand the difference, where in Rahimi you're talking about there's a particular person who's endangered, a domestic partner or something, whereas here it's a more general societal interest in administration of justice, prosecutors, witnesses, so forth, that may be endangered.

[00:08:40] Speaker 00:
I understand that distinction, but still, Rahimi says that opinion doesn't suggest, that's the court's word, doesn't even suggest.

[00:08:52] Speaker 00:
that you can't have categories of people, and there is this societal danger, potentially, to witnesses, to prosecutors, to the administration of justice.

[00:09:04] Speaker 00:
Why isn't that good enough?

[00:09:05] Speaker 00:
If it was good enough for those two circuits, why shouldn't it be good enough for us?

[00:09:11] Speaker 04:
It's not good enough because the categories of people that Rahimi suggests might be able to be disarmed.

[00:09:21] Speaker 04:
are fundamentally different than people who are simply charged with a crime.

[00:09:27] Speaker 04:
That is a critical distinction.

[00:09:30] Speaker 04:
Second of all, I'm going to quibble with Your Honor's notion that public safety today is what controls this decision.

[00:09:41] Speaker 04:
Bruin makes clear it does not.

[00:09:44] Speaker 04:
If we're going to go with bail, we look at what bail was doing at the founding, and the government has not shown anything to suggest that bail at the founding was motivated at all by a fear of danger or public safety.

[00:09:58] Speaker 04:
Bail at the founding, unequivocally, regardless of the crime charged, any discussion of bail was to ensure a person's presence.

[00:10:07] Speaker 00:
In Rahimi, and back to categories, two of the categories the court seems to reaffirm are legitimate categories are felons and mentally adjudicated individuals for unfitness.

[00:10:20] Speaker 00:
And neither of those have a specific victim like Rahimi in a domestic order.

[00:10:25] Speaker 00:
Instead, it's a societal protection, isn't it?

[00:10:28] Speaker 00:
That if you're a felon, we don't want you to have a firearm because you're the kind of person who might hurt someone.

[00:10:34] Speaker 00:
It seems to be the same thing with someone under indictment.

[00:10:37] Speaker 00:
And it's not as though there was an individual determination for that person who's under indictment, but there is a grand jury indictment.

[00:10:45] Speaker 00:
And so it's not as though it is just a willy-nilly decision.

[00:10:50] Speaker 00:
A body of your fellow citizens has determined that there's probable cause that you committed an offense.

[00:10:57] Speaker 00:
So it's not bare naked where someone is just completely unable to respond or have his or her side heard.

[00:11:08] Speaker 04:
Agree, Your Honor.

[00:11:09] Speaker 04:
I think there's a distinction, though, that we need to be careful to draw.

[00:11:14] Speaker 04:
That an indictment is, as you put, it is simply a charge that you may have done some wrongdoing.

[00:11:22] Speaker 04:
And there's nothing to say that that charge will stick.

[00:11:27] Speaker 04:
With both, and you can't hold me to this because I'll probably be back arguing 922-G1, with both felons and those who have been

[00:11:38] Speaker 04:
determined to be mentally ill.

[00:11:40] Speaker 04:
We have a judicial determination about that particular individual.

[00:11:47] Speaker 04:
And I would argue that we need to be careful with felons.

[00:11:51] Speaker 04:
And I think we can learn from, again, Justice Barrett, but this time her dissent in Canterbury Bar, that the mere fact of it being adjudicated a felon should not be outcome determinative, as felons are different and individuals are different.

[00:12:06] Speaker 04:
And I think Congress,

[00:12:08] Speaker 04:
quite frankly, can easily fix this as they know how to define crimes of violence.

[00:12:14] Speaker 04:
But I think what we are dealing with here in 922N, we have a bizarre restriction on indictees' Second Amendment rights that has no analog, not even relevantly similar, not even similar in history.

[00:12:32] Speaker 04:
Unless there are further questions, I'm going to reserve them.

[00:12:35] Speaker 03:
I was actually curious.

[00:12:38] Speaker 03:
You've brought only a facial challenge, and do you think your argument would work equally well for an as-applied challenge by your client?

[00:12:50] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:12:51] Speaker 04:
This is the rare subsection where I think a facial challenge is appropriate.

[00:12:58] Speaker 04:
I think the fact of the indictment itself, this is a strict liability crime.

[00:13:03] Speaker 04:
lose, your Second Amendment rights are severely curtailed by the fact of the indictment.

[00:13:10] Speaker 04:
So regardless of what you're indicted for is irrelevant.

[00:13:14] Speaker 00:
Judge Easterbrook said maybe it would be unconstitutional for an antitrust violator, but not for someone who were violent.

[00:13:22] Speaker 00:
Do you disagree with that position?

[00:13:23] Speaker 04:
Yes, I do, Your Honor.

[00:13:24] Speaker 04:
And again, I think I harken back to Justice Barrett's dissent in Canterbury Bar.

[00:13:32] Speaker 04:
If we're going to judge people,

[00:13:34] Speaker 04:
If we're going to make wholesale arguments about Second Amendment rights, minimally, it should be after that judicial determination in which the defendant is afforded.

[00:13:46] Speaker 04:
What I'm going to use shorthand for is due process.

[00:13:50] Speaker 04:
I think the fact of the indictment is what you're indicted for is irrelevant under 922M.

[00:13:56] Speaker 04:
So I will reserve the remainder of my time.

[00:13:59] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:14:00] Speaker 04:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:14:09] Speaker 01:
May it please the court, Nathan Jack of the United States.

[00:14:13] Speaker 01:
I'd like to begin just by clarifying unsafety as a purpose for pre-trial detention.

[00:14:17] Speaker 01:
This was discussed extensively in the United States response brief, specifically the Funk and Mason article that my friend referenced.

[00:14:25] Speaker 01:
And their conclusion was that contrary to the conventional academic wisdom, the historical record reveals that Bell

[00:14:32] Speaker 01:
clearly served a public safety function.

[00:14:36] Speaker 01:
And it did that by looking at actual historical data in Pennsylvania at the time of the founding and found that there was a fuzzy line between peace bonds and appearance bonds, and that, in fact, bail and pretrial detention was for public safety, not just for appearance.

[00:14:51] Speaker 05:
That was one example in one location for a six-month period, right?

[00:14:56] Speaker 01:
It looked at more than a six-month period.

[00:14:59] Speaker 01:
But yes, but also Pennsylvania was probably the most permissive when it came to bail.

[00:15:03] Speaker 01:
They were the early adopters of the reformed model.

[00:15:06] Speaker 01:
And they also had a more narrow list of capital offenses than most other states did at the time.

[00:15:11] Speaker 01:
So if there were ever a place where bail was the most prevalent, it would have been in Pennsylvania at that time.

[00:15:19] Speaker 01:
And again, it's still found that most people were detained.

[00:15:24] Speaker 01:
and they were detained for public safety reasons.

[00:15:26] Speaker 05:
Is that the reference in the bonds in that case to good behavior?

[00:15:30] Speaker 05:
I mean, where does that come from?

[00:15:31] Speaker 01:
Yes, correct.

[00:15:32] Speaker 01:
Bonds for good behavior.

[00:15:33] Speaker 05:
So you could interpret that to be not just good behavior by sticking around and appearing, but good behavior by not committing crimes?

[00:15:41] Speaker 01:
Precisely.

[00:15:42] Speaker 01:
By not committing crimes, by not being violent.

[00:15:45] Speaker 05:
At least that's how it's interpreted.

[00:15:46] Speaker 01:
Correctly.

[00:15:47] Speaker 01:
That is what the scholars said, is that that was equivalent to a public safety function rather than just an appearance

[00:15:56] Speaker 01:
And so Bill, and specifically, we're not talking about Bill, but pre-trial detention did serve a public safety function.

[00:16:05] Speaker 01:
Now, the only question for this court is whether 922N is facially unconstitutional.

[00:16:12] Speaker 01:
And that is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully.

[00:16:16] Speaker 01:
All we need is a single application to defeat a facial challenge.

[00:16:20] Speaker 01:
And I think we have that here with Mr. Gilby's own case.

[00:16:25] Speaker 01:
This is someone who has repeated firearms violations, someone that the district court deemed to be a dangerous person, to be the very type of person that poses a threat that Congress has been trying to protect against.

[00:16:37] Speaker 01:
922N is certainly constitutional, as applies to Mr. Ogilvie, and there are two primary principles from our historical tradition of firearms regulations to support that.

[00:16:49] Speaker 01:
The first, as I've kind of already alluded to, is pre-child detention.

[00:16:53] Speaker 01:
And the second, of course, being protections for dangerous individuals, whether individually through surety laws or going armed laws or also categorically.

[00:17:04] Speaker 03:
But 922N really assumes that all indicted felons are dangerous, whether it's Martha Stewart or

[00:17:19] Speaker 03:
Donald Trump or anybody else, you can't obtain a gun if you're under indictment.

[00:17:25] Speaker 03:
And I think Judge Phillips raises a good point while an indictment is some type of determination, but it's not an individualized determination of dangerousness or public safety.

[00:17:41] Speaker 03:
So 922N really seems very overbroad for

[00:17:47] Speaker 03:
the purposes that the government set forth.

[00:17:51] Speaker 03:
How do we deal with a statute that seems to sweep in a lot of behavior that couldn't seriously be considered for public safety reasons?

[00:18:02] Speaker 01:
Yeah, so the first principle doesn't deal with dangerousness at all.

[00:18:05] Speaker 01:
And if we look at the founding, forgery, for example, was a capital offense at the founding.

[00:18:14] Speaker 01:
And so those who were indicted of forgery at the founding were detained.

[00:18:17] Speaker 01:
There was no discretion there.

[00:18:21] Speaker 01:
Detention was required.

[00:18:22] Speaker 01:
And even though there was no sense of danger, no public safety necessarily for forgery, they were still detained.

[00:18:28] Speaker 01:
They did not have a Second Amendment right to possess a firearm in that instance.

[00:18:32] Speaker 01:
So under that historical analog, Congress today can, under 922N,

[00:18:38] Speaker 01:
prohibit those under diamond, even if it's not for a dangerous felony, from receiving or shipping or transporting a firearm.

[00:18:47] Speaker 01:
It's only on that second principle that then kind of turns to maybe more of a dangerous element.

[00:18:52] Speaker 01:
But I think specifically when we look at categorical disarmament, whether the underlying offense itself was dangerous,

[00:19:00] Speaker 01:
I think Congress was right to recognize that there is a public safety concern of those under endowment given the fraught and stressful period and relying on a public safety reason, rationale there.

[00:19:12] Speaker 00:
Was the October 2022 offense or episode in which there was gunfire at an automobile, is that part of the proper consideration as far as an applied challenge here and that the gun was received before that?

[00:19:28] Speaker 01:
I think so, and I think we can look at Rahimi to that.

[00:19:31] Speaker 01:
Rahimi also looked at the specific conduct of the offense at issue.

[00:19:35] Speaker 01:
And so here, even though he was already indicted and already had the gun, I think we can still look to what transpired.

[00:19:44] Speaker 01:
But even if we don't look at that incident offense, we can look at what he was under indictment for.

[00:19:49] Speaker 01:
This is someone who became a restricted person under Utah state law for felony discharge of a firearm.

[00:19:55] Speaker 00:
Which I don't know what that means.

[00:19:57] Speaker 00:
He shot it in his backyard?

[00:19:58] Speaker 01:
He shot it.

[00:19:59] Speaker 01:
Again, it was another instance of shooting it into, I believe, a group of people.

[00:20:05] Speaker 01:
And then, as a restricted person, he possessed a firearm.

[00:20:09] Speaker 01:
And that's what he was under indictment for.

[00:20:11] Speaker 01:
So we can look.

[00:20:13] Speaker 01:
Even if we set aside the conduct of this incident defense, this is still someone that this court reasonably found

[00:20:20] Speaker 01:
is a dangerous person, the very type of person that Congress is trying to prevent for public safety reasons.

[00:20:26] Speaker 00:
What about an antitrust violator?

[00:20:28] Speaker 01:
Again, I think that's akin to forgery, which at the founding, they were detained.

[00:20:35] Speaker 01:
Even though it was not a dangerous felony, it was a capital offense they were detained for.

[00:20:39] Speaker 01:
And so someone who is under indictment for antitrust still reasonably, not reasonably, but under the historical analog, can't be disarmed under 922N.

[00:20:49] Speaker 01:
But at the very least, 922 and it's certainly constitutional as it applies to people like Mr. Ogilvie, people who commit violent felonies, people who are dangerous.

[00:20:59] Speaker 01:
And again, all we have before this court is a facial challenge.

[00:21:04] Speaker 05:
Can you address the comment from Appellants' Council that basically there's just no evidence that the capital, the practice of

[00:21:19] Speaker 05:
not allowing bail and having pretrial detention for capital defendants or defendants indicted on capital crimes is somehow not related to public safety.

[00:21:31] Speaker 05:
I mean, it does seem kind of like common sense to think that a more serious crime, and there were many at that time, that was punishable by death would presumably have something to do with public safety in terms of

[00:21:47] Speaker 05:
not allowing bail, but we can't just rely on common sense, I suppose.

[00:21:52] Speaker 05:
What evidence is there that this was based on public safety reasons, as opposed to, again, just guaranteeing appearance?

[00:22:01] Speaker 01:
Yes, again, the Funk and Mason article discussed extensively in the United States response brief.

[00:22:05] Speaker 05:
Anything besides the Funk and Mason article?

[00:22:07] Speaker 01:
But that is the most prevalent one that looks at actual historical data to see what magistrates of the piece were actually doing at the time.

[00:22:16] Speaker 05:
I mean, there's certainly some historical data.

[00:22:18] Speaker 05:
Isn't there indicating otherwise?

[00:22:20] Speaker 01:
As far as I can tell, a lot of these law review articles are based on just conventional wisdom at the time.

[00:22:29] Speaker 05:
What do you mean by that?

[00:22:30] Speaker 01:
Meaning it's professors saying what judges say, what professors say, what judges say.

[00:22:36] Speaker 01:
The Funk and Mason article actually looks at historical data, digs into the record books of the justice of the peace to see, OK, what were the reasons given for these issuing to show that it was for public safety reasons.

[00:22:50] Speaker 01:
There's a reason why all the circuit courts to consider this have found that there was a public safety function at the time.

[00:22:57] Speaker 01:
The historical data does play that out.

[00:23:05] Speaker 03:
What should we do about my over-breath concern?

[00:23:11] Speaker 03:
I think you're standing tall on that, equating forgery and antitrust, but it does seem that the N sweeps in far more persons than would have been envisioned at the founding, even for non-bailable.

[00:23:32] Speaker 03:
offenses and you may be Mr.. Old will be was a violent person, but a lot of indictees are not violent and and 922 and doesn't care I Mean should that be part of our I don't in the first if we were in the first amendment land we'd be worried about

[00:23:49] Speaker 03:
over breath.

[00:23:50] Speaker 03:
Shouldn't we be worried about it in Second Amendment jurisprudence also?

[00:23:55] Speaker 01:
No, because, again, we look at the way Bruin and Rahimi have outlined it.

[00:23:59] Speaker 01:
And it is kind of a different analysis than we find in other constitutional amendments.

[00:24:03] Speaker 01:
We no longer have the means and scrutiny for Second Amendment.

[00:24:05] Speaker 01:
We look at historical analogs.

[00:24:07] Speaker 01:
And that means, in some instances, it is going to be broader than maybe rights of other amendments.

[00:24:14] Speaker 02:
Sometimes it's going to be narrower.

[00:24:16] Speaker 02:
Well, there's the why and the how.

[00:24:18] Speaker 02:
Right here, I'm concerned about the how.

[00:24:20] Speaker 01:
Yeah, and we can look at the how.

[00:24:22] Speaker 01:
And the how matches on to pre-trial detention at the time of the offending because, again, pre-trial detention went to more than just those who were violent.

[00:24:31] Speaker 01:
It went to serious offenses, which included horse theft, which included forgery among these other cases.

[00:24:40] Speaker 01:
And if the court is concerned about it, it can certainly consider that as a pie challenge in the future.

[00:24:46] Speaker 01:
Again, the only question before this court

[00:24:48] Speaker 01:
is whether 922 is facially unconstitutional.

[00:24:53] Speaker 01:
And I think certainly, at least as applied to violent people, there is no question that it is constitutional.

[00:25:00] Speaker 01:
So if the court is concerned, it can narrow it to that.

[00:25:02] Speaker 01:
But I think that we can look to the historical analog and see that at the founding, the Second Amendment didn't apply to those indicted of a serious offense, even if it was a nonviolent one.

[00:25:27] Speaker 01:
All right, if there are no other questions.

[00:25:29] Speaker 00:
Does your argument extend past Quiroz and Gore?

[00:25:35] Speaker 00:
Or do those cover your whole argument today?

[00:25:40] Speaker 01:
I think it largely falls within those cases.

[00:25:44] Speaker 01:
I think there may be things on the outskirts, but I'm trying to think off the top of my head of what that necessarily would be.

[00:25:53] Speaker 01:
But I think those are great guiding principles, and I think if the court were confined to adopt this to Gore and Quiroz, I think we would be square with that.

[00:26:05] Speaker 01:
All right, I ask this court to affirm.

[00:26:06] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:26:08] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:26:09] Speaker 03:
Stangle, you had some rebuttal?

[00:26:16] Speaker 04:
Just to follow up on a few things that my learned friend mentioned.

[00:26:22] Speaker 04:
922N does not simply apply to quote-unquote violent people.

[00:26:26] Speaker 04:
It applies to anybody anywhere who's been indicted for any reason.

[00:26:32] Speaker 04:
To assume bail, which again the government has offered no affirmative proof that it was designed for public safety at the founding, to assume that bail is the proper analog for

[00:26:46] Speaker 04:
disarming anybody who's been indicted would be a misstep and a misapplication of brewing in this application.

[00:26:53] Speaker 04:
And you know what?

[00:26:54] Speaker 04:
I think I'm going to leave it there and submit the case for decision.

[00:26:56] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:26:57] Speaker 03:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:26:58] Speaker 03:
We appreciate the arguments.

[00:27:01] Speaker 03:
We'll look forward to seeing everybody back on other 922 subparts.

[00:27:06] Speaker 03:
So keep reading those law review articles.

[00:27:08] Speaker 03:
The case is submitted and counsel are excused.