[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
This is 25-4041 Carlson versus Carrington Square.

[00:00:06] Speaker 00:
Yes, sir.

[00:00:07] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:00:08] Speaker 00:
My name is Amanda Reynolds.

[00:00:10] Speaker 00:
I have the honor of representing Danny Carlson in this case, pro bono.

[00:00:14] Speaker 00:
He is an individual who is humbled by multiple sclerosis.

[00:00:21] Speaker 00:
He, on May 7, 2021, fell in his bathroom as a result of the absence

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
of grab bars in his bathroom.

[00:00:30] Speaker 00:
He was later evicted constructively from his apartment on July 30th under the guise of a construction remodeling project.

[00:00:39] Speaker 00:
The district court dismissed our case outright carte blanche.

[00:00:43] Speaker 00:
We argued that they were erroneous in nearly every single holding against us and their failure to render holdings on certain cases, including the expert testimony, preclusion motions,

[00:01:00] Speaker 00:
and the motions to compel.

[00:01:03] Speaker 00:
As a matter of housekeeping, the district court held in favor of the defendants, respondents in this case, with respect to local rules that allegedly weren't followed or were violated by the plaintiff, including in the motions to compel, claiming that we didn't comply with the word count certification or the word count whatsoever.

[00:01:28] Speaker 02:
You make some extraordinary claims in your brief.

[00:01:38] Speaker 02:
In particular, are you alleging that the district court was biased in its ruling against your client?

[00:01:47] Speaker 02:
And if so, I was wondering what evidence was produced or what part of the record would demonstrate that.

[00:01:58] Speaker 02:
Sure.

[00:02:00] Speaker 00:
And yes, we're arguing that the district court was biased.

[00:02:03] Speaker 00:
We were confronted.

[00:02:05] Speaker 00:
When I brought this case, I was not aware that the Colmore defendants were politically affiliated in Utah.

[00:02:12] Speaker 00:
And I also didn't know that I wouldn't be able to refer to any other attorneys in Utah because there simply are none who would take this case.

[00:02:19] Speaker 02:
Why is that relevant?

[00:02:21] Speaker 00:
It's relevant because these Colmore defendants also represent 80 percent

[00:02:26] Speaker 00:
of the landlord defendants.

[00:02:27] Speaker 00:
Why is that relevant?

[00:02:29] Speaker 00:
Because their lease in Utah is unconscionable, yet it's accepted by Utah courts everywhere.

[00:02:35] Speaker 00:
It should not be enforced, and it is.

[00:02:38] Speaker 00:
Nobody understands why it's enforced.

[00:02:40] Speaker 00:
There should be a class action to render it inherently unconscionable.

[00:02:46] Speaker 02:
You sued lawyers in the law firm here.

[00:02:49] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:02:50] Speaker 02:
What's the factual basis for that claim?

[00:02:53] Speaker 00:
They are, we sue them under a third-party beneficiary theory because in Conlin v. Colmore defense, they've been sued before for this reason and the court found that they had a duty to these plaintiffs who were tenants under the third-party beneficiary theory because they are in a unique position as the so-called kings of eviction debt collectors in Utah for drafting and advising

[00:03:24] Speaker 00:
Utah landlord tenants as to how to essentially amass fees and collect fees that are not necessarily warranted and then to evict their unwanted tenants.

[00:03:41] Speaker 02:
Is there a Utah case that supports that third-party beneficiary?

[00:03:45] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:03:46] Speaker 00:
In the case Conlin v. Colomore defendants in which they were sued, the court ultimately dismissed the motion for summary judgment but found that there was a duty and there was causation against these defendants.

[00:03:58] Speaker 00:
So they were on notice that they were and had a duty under a third party beneficiary theory.

[00:04:04] Speaker 00:
This is not news to these defendants, which is why... Can I stop you for a minute?

[00:04:09] Speaker 01:
I'm interested in the case you just mentioned and I didn't quite get the name.

[00:04:14] Speaker 01:
The case that?

[00:04:16] Speaker 00:
Conlin v. Cullimore.

[00:04:17] Speaker 01:
C-O-N-L-I-N?

[00:04:19] Speaker 00:
Yes, sir.

[00:04:20] Speaker 01:
V?

[00:04:21] Speaker 00:
Cullimore, the defendant's respondent's here.

[00:04:24] Speaker 00:
C-U-L-L-I-M-O-R-E.

[00:04:28] Speaker 01:
OK.

[00:04:28] Speaker 01:
And that's a Utah state case?

[00:04:30] Speaker 00:
Yes, sir.

[00:04:31] Speaker 00:
OK.

[00:04:31] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:04:32] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:04:38] Speaker 00:
So really, I would rather just be of service to the court and answer any questions that you might have.

[00:04:43] Speaker 00:
But there are some points of clarification that I do have with respect to the brief that I just want to point out expediently, if I may.

[00:04:52] Speaker 00:
Under McDonald Douglas, a burden shifting framework, defendants allegedly, well, defendants proffer to pretext.

[00:05:01] Speaker 00:
The district court found that it wasn't pretext.

[00:05:04] Speaker 00:
We're saying that it is.

[00:05:05] Speaker 00:
The district court then,

[00:05:08] Speaker 00:
went beyond the province of the court, and instead of remanding it or permitting it to proceed to trial through a jury, made its own assessment as to whether or not it was pre-taxed.

[00:05:18] Speaker 01:
So right here, are you talking about your fair housing claim or your ADA claim?

[00:05:23] Speaker 00:
Both of them.

[00:05:23] Speaker 01:
Both of them, OK.

[00:05:26] Speaker 00:
So we have essentially defendants who said to my client, we don't have an apartment for you to rent.

[00:05:36] Speaker 00:
Because we know you're handicapped, but we gave it to someone else four days later, right before we evicted you, without giving you sufficient notice.

[00:05:44] Speaker 00:
Because there's no such thing as sufficient notice when you're evicting someone on the basis of discrimination.

[00:05:50] Speaker 00:
And then the district court refused to grant our motion to compel, on the basis of some Utah local rule, which they then used in favor of the defendants,

[00:06:07] Speaker 00:
and claim that we had no evidence in support.

[00:06:10] Speaker 00:
But we have hundreds of thousands of pages of evidence.

[00:06:13] Speaker 00:
We also had affidavits, declarations of my client.

[00:06:19] Speaker 00:
And his testimony is evidence.

[00:06:22] Speaker 00:
So why I think the district court, if they're not biased, might be a little confused is because we supported everything.

[00:06:29] Speaker 02:
And perhaps in reviewing- You're briefed in this court.

[00:06:37] Speaker 02:
Seemed to not give us it was kind of hard to find in the record Because you didn't give citations to where we would find these made it really difficult for us to follow your argument I'm sorry I think

[00:06:53] Speaker 00:
I'm sorry for any difficulty I caused you in not being able to follow my argument, but I think where I rested was mostly on my papers.

[00:07:01] Speaker 00:
I don't think I could have argued any more arguments.

[00:07:05] Speaker 00:
And that's why it's also baffling.

[00:07:07] Speaker 00:
Then I did in my motions to summary judgment and my oppositions in the over 200 pages of argument, and none of those arguments were accepted by the court.

[00:07:19] Speaker 00:
It's insane.

[00:07:20] Speaker 00:
And even if the arguments weren't accepted, certainly there had to be an issue of fact somewhere, which we don't think there is an issue of fact.

[00:07:27] Speaker 00:
We think that everything should have been ruled in our favor.

[00:07:29] Speaker 00:
But at the very least, you could have said that there is an issue in fact because we say there is discrimination, and they say that there's not.

[00:07:38] Speaker 02:
Yeah, but our rules require you in your opening brief here to cite to specific points in the record that support your allegations that there's a fact question.

[00:07:49] Speaker 02:
And you didn't do that here, did you?

[00:07:52] Speaker 00:
To support the allegations that... Of pretext.

[00:07:56] Speaker 00:
Yes, I do believe that I cited to the specifics in the record.

[00:08:01] Speaker 00:
Oh, I understand what you're saying now.

[00:08:03] Speaker 00:
Not in the record, I cited to the specific

[00:08:06] Speaker 00:
docket that is correct.

[00:08:10] Speaker 00:
So I cited to the docket, not necessarily to the record, if that's what your honor is referencing.

[00:08:18] Speaker 00:
And I think that's what the district court may have misunderstood as the absence of evidence in the lower court briefs, where it was my failure to cite two specific pieces of evidence in the argument, but I cited to those pieces of evidence in the statement of facts and in every other

[00:08:36] Speaker 00:
area of the brief.

[00:08:37] Speaker 00:
So there's not a lack of evidence.

[00:08:39] Speaker 00:
There may have been a lack of citation.

[00:08:43] Speaker 01:
Can I ask you a question about your ADA claim?

[00:08:46] Speaker 01:
The other side has asserted that the ADA doesn't apply to apartments because they're not public accommodations.

[00:08:58] Speaker 01:
Do we have a case on that?

[00:09:03] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:09:07] Speaker 00:
It starts with a P. So the public accommodations case was the one.

[00:09:22] Speaker 00:
You know what?

[00:09:23] Speaker 00:
It escapes me offhand the name of the case, but I can tell you also that the 2023 DOJ regulations, which were rendered after those cases which the district court relied upon, rendering them obsolete,

[00:09:37] Speaker 00:
indicate and clarify that those cases don't even matter because the DOJ is saying that ADA does apply to these apartment complexes, which are not private, by the way.

[00:09:50] Speaker 00:
They're private at the time that the lease is entered into, but at the time that they're held out to the public for rental, they're not private.

[00:10:01] Speaker 00:
I mean, they're essentially leasing them to the public.

[00:10:07] Speaker 00:
And there's a duty to the public to provide, as they are in the common areas, as they are in this courthouse, for the most part.

[00:10:14] Speaker 01:
OK, so you just brought up something I was going to ask you about.

[00:10:19] Speaker 01:
So I've seen some ADA cases where they said that the apartment itself is not a public accommodation, but that the common areas, the pool, the clubhouse, all those things, are public accommodations.

[00:10:37] Speaker 01:
Can you address why those cases that make that distinction would be incorrect?

[00:10:47] Speaker 01:
Have you seen those cases that make a distinction?

[00:10:51] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:10:52] Speaker 00:
I think, and that's where I was getting to with the discussion of prepossessory interest rights in the property is because there's a difference as to whether they're private or public.

[00:11:04] Speaker 00:
with respect to who you are framing that in relation to.

[00:11:08] Speaker 00:
If it's a tenant who already lives in the apartment versus people who are entering the apartment.

[00:11:14] Speaker 00:
And in this case, in public places where, let's say, there's a parking lot, there are a certain number of spaces that are required to be held out for handicapped individuals.

[00:11:29] Speaker 00:
That's the same thing with an apartment complex.

[00:11:31] Speaker 00:
If you're looking at it from the point of construction,

[00:11:34] Speaker 00:
which these were undergoing construction, which are supposed to be held out for certain handicapped people.

[00:11:40] Speaker 00:
So it's different to say that something is completely private, and that's exactly where we go to the definition, because in the private definition, they're talking about places that are exempt because they're under four or three apartments.

[00:11:57] Speaker 00:
In this case, we have an apartment complex with hundreds of apartments, held out to the public first.

[00:12:04] Speaker 00:
We also know that they were being remodeled since after 1998.

[00:12:09] Speaker 00:
They hadn't been.

[00:12:10] Speaker 00:
And they're required to have certain amenities, including, well, actually, forgive me.

[00:12:17] Speaker 00:
It's not an amenity to my client.

[00:12:19] Speaker 00:
We call them amenities.

[00:12:21] Speaker 00:
But they're not amenities.

[00:12:23] Speaker 00:
They're required to have them.

[00:12:25] Speaker 00:
So when you say that Danny Carlson wasn't disparately impacted by discrimination, by defendants who

[00:12:35] Speaker 00:
intentionally gave away an apartment to a non-disabled tenant four days before they evicted him at the threat of not having Section 8 benefits or a place to live, having to go into a hotel, pay with his own money, which he already has none of because he's on federal welfare.

[00:12:51] Speaker 00:
The defendants made it sound like he was on vacation.

[00:12:55] Speaker 00:
And that's why it's so sad.

[00:12:58] Speaker 00:
But I'd like to reserve the rest of my time for rebuttal that's amenable with the court.

[00:13:04] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:13:06] Speaker 02:
Are you splitting arguments today?

[00:13:09] Speaker 02:
Yes, sir.

[00:13:10] Speaker 02:
All right, Mr. Barlow first.

[00:13:12] Speaker 03:
Yes, thank you.

[00:13:14] Speaker 03:
I told Mr. Todd that I would give him exactly half the time, so he didn't want it.

[00:13:25] Speaker ?:
Good luck.

[00:13:25] Speaker 03:
Your Honors, thank you so much for taking this time to hear these oral arguments on this important case.

[00:13:31] Speaker 03:
My name is Pete Barlow, and I'm with the law firm of Strong and Hanny in Salt Lake City, Utah.

[00:13:39] Speaker 03:
Here we have a case that involves some federal statutes and state statutes that are designed to be shields and protections for certain people who are disadvantaged.

[00:13:54] Speaker 03:
Here, we learn what happens when these statutes are not used as shields, but rather are attempted to be used as swords or clubs to gain better or additional benefits that nobody else has.

[00:14:10] Speaker 03:
And that's the argument that the plan of Mr. Carlson made consistently throughout

[00:14:17] Speaker 03:
the lower court proceedings and which continue here today.

[00:14:22] Speaker 03:
So I'd like to use an example that's near and dear to my heart.

[00:14:25] Speaker 03:
I'm a terrible golfer and golf has an handicap system where with my handicap I can play against Scottie Scheffler and lose, but not lose as bad because of my handicap.

[00:14:41] Speaker 03:
And that handicap system allows me to compete on an even playing field, which is a great system.

[00:14:49] Speaker 03:
It doesn't allow me to hit a ball into the water and force my playing partner to go into the lake and get my ball for me.

[00:14:59] Speaker 03:
It doesn't allow me to force the golf course to give me a free golf cart because I don't want to walk.

[00:15:07] Speaker 03:
It doesn't allow additional benefits that aren't within the rules of the game.

[00:15:13] Speaker 03:
And consistently throughout these arguments, this is essentially what Mr. Carlson has argued, that he deserves to be treated better, not equally better.

[00:15:25] Speaker 03:
So let me start at the ADA.

[00:15:34] Speaker 03:
The ADA simply doesn't apply to private residences or private apartments.

[00:15:42] Speaker 03:
I appreciated Judge Carson's questions about the public areas or common areas because the ADA could be applicable to those areas and cases find that way.

[00:15:55] Speaker 03:
Here what we're dealing with is an individual

[00:16:00] Speaker 03:
apartment residence that Mr. Carlson lived in for about six and a half years, and whether he should be able to continue to reside in that residence based on his own demand, again, being treated better.

[00:16:22] Speaker 01:
Is there a circuit court case that you're aware of that holds that the ADA is applicable to apartment complexes or to the apartment itself?

[00:16:36] Speaker 03:
The circuit court cases that I'm aware of, including that FIPS versus

[00:16:46] Speaker 03:
American Property Management, that's a case by D. Benson, Judge Benson in Utah, which held that it wasn't applicable.

[00:16:58] Speaker 01:
Okay, that would be a district court case.

[00:17:01] Speaker 01:
I mean, I'm talking about Court of Appeals.

[00:17:03] Speaker 01:
Court of Appeals.

[00:17:04] Speaker 01:
In any circuit.

[00:17:05] Speaker 03:
Let's see, yeah, there is the Third Circuit, the Regents of Mersenburg College versus Republic, Franklin,

[00:17:15] Speaker 03:
insurance company case held that the ADA is not applicable to private residences.

[00:17:26] Speaker 03:
And frankly, Your Honor, I don't know if it addressed the issue of

[00:17:33] Speaker 03:
whether the ADA could be or would be applicable in that case under those facts to a common area.

[00:17:40] Speaker 03:
I assume that it would be actually, but not to private residences and rights to have the ADA apply to residences that only a private individual rents from a private company.

[00:17:56] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:17:58] Speaker 03:
So the distinction is basically based on the definition of

[00:18:06] Speaker 03:
of public accommodation found in the ADA.

[00:18:10] Speaker 03:
And the definitions use terms like hotel, motel, place of lodging, so short term residences.

[00:18:20] Speaker 03:
Here we have the six and a half year lease by Mr. Carlson, obviously long term.

[00:18:28] Speaker 03:
And Judge Shelby was,

[00:18:32] Speaker 03:
unwilling in the face of no persuasive authority against, well, that he recognized, I'll put it that way and I'll explain what I mean, that the ADA should apply to that particular private residence, which is what the dispute is over.

[00:18:53] Speaker 03:
Mr. Carlson claimed that there were DOJ-like regulations or something that were applicable that I think I just heard today that essentially overruled or superstated the court cases.

[00:19:11] Speaker 03:
The way I understand it is the DOJ is the arm of the executive branch and I hold the judicial branch very dear to my heart.

[00:19:20] Speaker 03:
And so the thought of the DOJ being able to overrule any court to me seems unfounded.

[00:19:29] Speaker 03:
So, but Mr. Carlson failed to cite to evidence in the record that would be able to show that these cases that we've cited in our brief should be disregarded or a different result should have been reached below in the summary judgment motion.

[00:19:48] Speaker 03:
Any questions on the ADM?

[00:19:49] Speaker 03:
I was gonna move on to the Fair Housing Act.

[00:19:55] Speaker 03:
Okay, thank you.

[00:19:57] Speaker 03:
So with regard to the Fair Housing Act, we agree that the Fair Housing Act applies to places like Carrington Square Apartments.

[00:20:09] Speaker 03:
And what the plaintiff has alleged is that there was both disparate treatment and intentional discrimination that doesn't have to be proven through circumstantial evidence or presumptions or anything like that.

[00:20:29] Speaker 03:
or a disparate impact, which is basically based on the circumstantial evidence, because it is hard to prove discrimination.

[00:20:39] Speaker 03:
You don't know what's going on in my mind.

[00:20:41] Speaker 03:
I'm afraid, by the way.

[00:20:43] Speaker 03:
But you know, you don't have to prove that with the disparate impact arm of this claim.

[00:20:51] Speaker 03:
So the district court below,

[00:20:55] Speaker 03:
I believe that Judge Shelby, and he expressed this in his opinion, had the same types of concerns that you expressed with Mr. Carlson, that there wasn't proper citation to the record or that there were citations to

[00:21:15] Speaker 03:
claimed evidence that Judge Shelby did not find to be competent evidence.

[00:21:20] Speaker 03:
And in terms of determining what evidence is admissible, what evidence is not admissible, those determinations are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, which I really haven't seen any argument from Mr. Carlson about.

[00:21:40] Speaker 03:
There is a, there are many claims that Judge Shelby was biased or prejudiced or whatever the claims are.

[00:21:50] Speaker 03:
But the proper standard of review and the reason why the evidentiary decisions were made or not made the way that they were made were not really addressed in the brief.

[00:22:04] Speaker 03:
And so to the extent that those arguments weren't briefed, they're waived.

[00:22:10] Speaker 03:
With regard to the disparate treatment arm, that goes under the McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting analysis, which requires a plaintiff to set forth his prima facie claim of discrimination, and then the burden shifts to Carrington to submit a legitimate non-pretextual reason for the action.

[00:22:37] Speaker 03:
So here,

[00:22:38] Speaker 03:
Carrington was involved in a apartment-wide complete renovation of the properties.

[00:22:46] Speaker 03:
Carrington was built in 1998.

[00:22:48] Speaker 03:
No renovations until about 2021.

[00:22:53] Speaker 03:
People were complaining about the outdated styles.

[00:22:59] Speaker 03:
I don't get it, but my wife would.

[00:23:05] Speaker 03:
In order to bring it up to the community standards and protect the investments, they decided to invest millions in this project.

[00:23:15] Speaker 03:
And there were declarations affidavits to that effect, which were not rebutted.

[00:23:21] Speaker 03:
In fact, Mr. Carlson seemed to acknowledge that this was a process that was happening.

[00:23:29] Speaker 03:
Judge Shelby found that that was a legitimate non-pretextual reason.

[00:23:34] Speaker 03:
So the burden shifted back to Mr. Carlson to show that the legitimate reasons were pretextual.

[00:23:44] Speaker 03:
Now, follow me here.

[00:23:47] Speaker 03:
A company spends millions of dollars on a renovation project just to get rid of one

[00:23:53] Speaker 03:
disabled tenant that they had been accepting rent from for the last six and a half years.

[00:24:03] Speaker 03:
That's a terrible way to go about that business.

[00:24:07] Speaker 03:
And so Judge Shelby rejected that claim of being pretextual.

[00:24:13] Speaker 03:
I'm out of time.

[00:24:13] Speaker 03:
I need to reserve the rest for my co-counsel.

[00:24:16] Speaker 02:
All right.

[00:24:17] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:24:19] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:24:26] Speaker 04:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:24:26] Speaker 04:
May it please the Court.

[00:24:28] Speaker 04:
My name is David Todd.

[00:24:29] Speaker 04:
I am here representing the law offices of Kirk A. Colomor, LLC, Kirk A. Colomor, and representing myself, David R. Todd.

[00:24:41] Speaker 04:
I'll refer to us as the Colomor defendants.

[00:24:47] Speaker 04:
And I just would like to point out that

[00:24:53] Speaker 04:
The difficulty with this has been for many years going through this litigation is really trying to pin down exactly what the claims have been against the Colomor defendants and how they're interspersed throughout the pleadings.

[00:25:12] Speaker 04:
But I will just address essentially where Judge Shelby got this right, and that is that the Colomor defendants

[00:25:21] Speaker 04:
There was no factual dispute at all that any of the Colmore defendants were housing providers or governed by the Fair Housing Act related to these circumstances.

[00:25:34] Speaker 04:
The motions that were filed with the district court provided facts that just were undisputed.

[00:25:42] Speaker 04:
And that's been the issue with this case from the beginning, is there's just a lack of facts that would support

[00:25:48] Speaker 04:
Mr. Carlson's claims against the Colemore Defendants.

[00:25:53] Speaker 04:
So the undisputed facts show the Fair Housing Act just does not apply in this situation to the Colemore Defendants.

[00:26:00] Speaker 04:
Also the breach of contract claim and the third, it initially was, and I can't recall if it was included in the district court case, but it was a theory of third party beneficiary and fourth party beneficiary.

[00:26:15] Speaker 04:
Essentially Carlson claiming that

[00:26:18] Speaker 04:
What had always been claimed to us was that he was claiming that he was somehow a third party or fourth party beneficiary of the legal services contract between the Colomor defendants and the Carrington defendants.

[00:26:37] Speaker 01:
So your opposing counsel says that in another case with apparently Kaylee Conlin as the plaintiff,

[00:26:48] Speaker 01:
that a court said that Ms.

[00:26:52] Speaker 01:
Conlin was a third-party beneficiary to some contract of yours.

[00:26:58] Speaker 01:
Is that true?

[00:26:59] Speaker 04:
I don't believe that that's true, and I will admit I haven't read that case in a little bit.

[00:27:07] Speaker 04:
that case would not have had a holding that the client agreement between attorneys and the other party somehow brings in a third party beneficiary claim.

[00:27:21] Speaker 04:
And that's been one of the, again, one of the difficulties with this case is that that's continued to be a claim is this third party beneficiary claim.

[00:27:29] Speaker 04:
And we haven't really been able to nail down is that a claim third party beneficiary related to the lease agreement between

[00:27:36] Speaker 04:
our clients, the Carrington defendants, and Mr. Carlson?

[00:27:40] Speaker 04:
Or is it a claim of third-party beneficiary from the client agreement to provide legal services?

[00:27:48] Speaker 04:
And so the Colmore defendants have continued to request some kind of precedent to show that that exists, that there's something out there about a third-party beneficiary where somebody who's an opposing party can come and say,

[00:28:06] Speaker 04:
No, I'm a beneficiary to your legal services contract with your client.

[00:28:12] Speaker 04:
And really, the only, well, maybe not the only, but at least one case that was found that we did include in our motion that Judge Shelby heard and granted was a case in Utah at Sunridge Development Corporation versus RBNG Engineering.

[00:28:32] Speaker 04:
And that kind of outlines what is needed for a third party beneficiary claim.

[00:28:37] Speaker 04:
And one of the things is that the contract itself has to specifically indicate that there's an intent for that other party to be a beneficiary.

[00:28:48] Speaker 04:
And that just does not exist here.

[00:28:51] Speaker 04:
What was argued at the motion for summary judgment stage, again, was related to the client agreement between the Colmore defendants and the Carrington defendants.

[00:29:01] Speaker 04:
The contract was provided.

[00:29:03] Speaker 04:
It was not disputed.

[00:29:04] Speaker 04:
That contract, the only written one that existed that was provided was, I believe it was a 2012 contract.

[00:29:12] Speaker 04:
That was well before Mr. Carlson was even a tenant at the property.

[00:29:16] Speaker 04:
And it would be very unusual to see that Mr. Carlson would have been included in a client services contract like that.

[00:29:28] Speaker 04:
So again, it was a little bit difficult to determine which of the claims were all related to the Colmore defendants, but the Fair Housing and ADA, again, the facts were never disputed.

[00:29:42] Speaker 04:
At no time has Mr. Carlson made a claim that there are some facts that show that the Colmore defendants were involved in providing housing, denying reasonable accommodation requests,

[00:29:56] Speaker 04:
Engaging in any type of negotiation to rent any property I'm going to Stop there unless the court has any questions You're a nun you may be excused.

[00:30:10] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:30:10] Speaker 00:
Thank you and we had some some rebuttal time left Thank you your honors with respect to the column or defundance it's been a

[00:30:25] Speaker 00:
four years, thousands of pages of briefing and research and Mr. Todd stands here before you today claiming that he still doesn't understand the allegations against him.

[00:30:40] Speaker 00:
That is case in point legal malpractice and there is evidence that he was working beyond the scope of whatever document he provided that wasn't authenticated, his affidavit wasn't

[00:30:53] Speaker 00:
prepared, notarized, sworn to be true based on personal knowledge doesn't indicate who he was representing.

[00:31:00] Speaker 00:
I advised him that because there were malpractice claims against him that there was a conflict of interest.

[00:31:04] Speaker 00:
He persisted in the representation of these defendants until somehow Mr. Barlow became privy and is now seated before you, which seems odd.

[00:31:17] Speaker 00:
And then Mr. Barlow talks about some sort of

[00:31:22] Speaker 00:
Golfing metaphor.

[00:31:23] Speaker 00:
My client can't golf.

[00:31:27] Speaker 00:
This isn't about sports metaphors.

[00:31:29] Speaker 00:
This is about a client who wasn't being treated better than anyone.

[00:31:34] Speaker 00:
He was being kicked while he was down.

[00:31:36] Speaker 00:
The salt was being thrown in the wound.

[00:31:39] Speaker 00:
And he wasn't being treated better than anyone.

[00:31:42] Speaker 00:
He was, in fact, being treated worse because they gave a handicapped apartment to someone who was not handicapped four days before they evicted my client.

[00:31:50] Speaker 00:
who, if eviction proceedings were commenced against him, would have lost any federal funding that he had and would not have had a place to live.

[00:32:01] Speaker 00:
He would have been homeless more than the four-day vacation he spent in a hotel.

[00:32:06] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:32:08] Speaker 02:
Thank you, Counsel.

[00:32:09] Speaker 02:
Counselor excused and the case is submitted.