[00:00:00] Speaker 00:
25-3157, Schmidt versus Huff.

[00:00:07] Speaker 00:
Council, are you ready to proceed? I am, Your Honor. Yes. Thank you.

[00:00:14] Speaker 01:
Go ahead.

[00:00:16] Speaker 01:
May it please the court.

[00:00:18] Speaker 01:
My name is Greg Goheen. I represent the defendants in this appeal. I would like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal to the extent I can do so.

[00:00:27] Speaker 01:
The present appeal involves the denial of a motion to dismiss that was filed on behalf of several school district employees, which was based on qualified immunity. That's the sole issue that's in front of the court today.

[00:00:38] Speaker 01:
Specifically plaintiff who is a parent of a current and former student of a Kansas high school asserts several claims presented to 42 USC 1983 for damages against certain school officials in their individual capacities for alleged violations of her rights under the first and 14th amendments to the United States constitution.

[00:01:00] Speaker 01:
The defendants in this case are as follows. Defendant Huff is a superintendent of schools. He is alleged to have been the individual who determined to issue a letter to plaintiff that's the main issue in this case. And that letter advised plaintiff in February of 2025 that she was no longer allowed to be on school district property due to some conduct that she engaged in of being in areas of the high school off limits to parents during the evening without permission.

[00:01:28] Speaker 01:
moving certain personal items, taking pictures that she had submitted for TikTok to be posted and created a disruption to the school environment.

[00:01:38] Speaker 01:
Dr. Huffing advised plaintiffs she would not be allowed to be on school property or school events for approximately four and a half months following this incident or until June 30th of 2024, or 2025 rather, I believe.

[00:01:52] Speaker 01:
In any event, the district court referred to this as the social media incident. There are two incidents that are involved in this lawsuit.

[00:02:00] Speaker 01:
Defendant Booth is the assistant superintendent of schools. His only alleged conduct in this case is that he advised local law enforcement on the no trespass order edict issued by the superintendent of schools at the superintendent's direction.

[00:02:16] Speaker 01:
Defendant Bell is the high school principal. Defendant Bell was tasked with receiving requests from plaintiff after the issuance of this letter by the superintendent and determining whether her request to attend certain events or be on school property were to be granted.

[00:02:35] Speaker 01:
There are no alleged incidents where plaintiff requested to be on school property or attend an event after this issuance of this letter that were denied.

[00:02:46] Speaker 01:
Defendant Chapman is a former school board member and the allegations against him relate to a different incident. The allegations against him relate to a school board meeting that occurred approximately six months or seven months rather before the incident in August of 2024.

[00:03:02] Speaker 01:
At that meeting and surrounding that meeting, plaintiff had come to the school board and made comments during open session. regarding disagreements with certain school district or school books that were in the school library and read content from those school books to the board during open session. She and defendant Chapman got engaged in several communications, including during the open comment where defendant Chapman was critical of plaintiff's approach, disagreed with her position, and voice those concerns to her, both in the school board meeting, as well as in some online and email communications following that meeting.

[00:03:44] Speaker 03:
Council, thank you for going through the facts attended to each defendant. I think that's helpful.

[00:03:52] Speaker 03:
Let me ask you about defendant Chapman. Sure. So can you...

[00:03:59] Speaker 03:
speak to what it is that you think the district court got wrong and be specific as to each prong of the qualified immunity analysis, specifically as to Chapman.

[00:04:11] Speaker 01:
So the starting points to Chapman is, and as the court's aware, this is on interlocutory appeal. So this is not to challenge the court's interpretation of the factual conclusions that it reached out of the complaint or any disagreements as factual conclusions. However, the second threshold issue of the qualified immunity analysis, there has to be clearly established law that exists that would put the government official on notice that his or her actions violated the Constitution. And that case law has to be particularized to the facts or circumstances involving the complainant issue.

[00:04:46] Speaker 01:
Part of the issue or the problem I have with defendant Chapman and the dial summary judgment relates to him is he's essentially being, he's not alleged to have done anything actually to prohibit plaintiff from engaging in free speech. He's not actually alleged to have done anything in retaliation for having engaged in free speech. In fact, the retaliation claim was dismissed by the district court.

[00:05:10] Speaker 01:
What he's alleged to have done essentially is to voice his opposition to plaintiff's comments and engage in this sort of back and forth discussion with her, both on social media and in email exchanges.

[00:05:26] Speaker 03:
Wasn't Ms. Schmidt's microphone muted for the portion of her remarks? And And I mean, I think that that's what the complaint alleges and that's what the district court found. And I'd like to know your thoughts on how we should be thinking about that. Is it your position that defendant Chapman didn't mute her mic so he hasn't engaged in the kind of particularized conduct we're looking for under 1983?

[00:05:48] Speaker 01:
Yeah, there's no allegation in my recollection from the petition that defendant Chapman had anything to do with her mic being muted or not being turned on correctly.

[00:06:00] Speaker 01:
And she was allowed to make comments.

[00:06:02] Speaker 01:
He's only alleged to have engaged in, first of all, making his own comments during the same meeting.

[00:06:10] Speaker 01:
And then I think he argued with her a little bit during the course of the meeting, perhaps at the end of her comments, as well as post after the meeting, engaging the social media back and forth and the email back and forth. But I don't believe there's any allegation that he specifically was involved in or had anything to do with the fact that her mic may have not been operating correctly during that meeting. And that goes to the whole issue of an individual official is only responsible for his or her conduct. and absent some allegation that he was involved in that or did that on purpose or that he somehow had something to do with that, the only acts he's alleged to engage in are his own speech, which we contend and contended before the district court are protected in their own right under the US Constitution.

[00:06:58] Speaker 01:
And so you can't really have a somebody being held liable for voicing their own opposition or their own speech, even if it's contrary to the speech that's being presented by somebody else. And even if it's in an argumentative fashion, even if it's sort of this back and forth argument, say they've gotten to a knockdown drag out.

[00:07:16] Speaker 03:
Who is the appropriate defendant? And I mean, I take it you don't disagree because the complaint alleges that Ms. Schmidt was silenced. effectively. She was not heard when she wanted to speak at the board meeting.

[00:07:30] Speaker 03:
And so you don't disagree with that, right?

[00:07:32] Speaker 01:
I do, only in the sense that although her mic, her allegations of the mic was muted in the mic, there clearly was an issue with the mic. You can hear that. But the recording of the meeting does exist. It was on broadcast. You can hear what she is saying during the meeting. Those present could hear what she was saying. And it is retained on the audio and video recording.

[00:07:56] Speaker 03:
Well, let's assume you could not hear her. In other words, let's assume that there was a constitutional violation here. Your position is that the law is not particular or specific enough to satisfy the clearly established prong, or is it your position that the wrong defendant is sued here, that it's not Chapman's? He didn't engage in any unconstitutional conduct.

[00:08:19] Speaker 01:
I think it's that he didn't engage in any unconstitutional conduct himself, and he's the defendant who's named in this case, and he's the one who we've asserted qualified immunity on his behalf in connection with this dismissal motion.

[00:08:31] Speaker 00:
Was he conducting the meeting?

[00:08:33] Speaker 01:
He was not. He was not the chair of the meeting. He was not the president.

[00:08:37] Speaker 00:
And you're saying there's no allegation in the complaint that he had anything to do with the mic? That's correct.

[00:08:44] Speaker 02:
Did I hear you say, I'm sorry, that you're not making a lack of clearly established argument?

[00:08:51] Speaker 01:
No, I am. Yes.

[00:08:52] Speaker 02:
You are? Yeah. Okay. In answer to Judge Rossman, I thought I heard you say, oh, we're focused on the, was there a violation?

[00:09:03] Speaker 01:
If I did, I misspoke and I apologize. I didn't mean to say that.

[00:09:08] Speaker 00:
Okay. You were saying that with respect to the microphone issue though, weren't you?

[00:09:12] Speaker 00:
Your focus on the microphone issue is that he didn't do anything, not that muting the mic. Right, right.

[00:09:21] Speaker 01:
My focus on the microphone issue is he's not alleged to have had anything to do with the microphone itself. The allegations against him, this is why it becomes important from the particularization of facts as to each defendant.

[00:09:34] Speaker 01:
is that for qualified immunity purposes, what he's alleged to have done, I'm not aware of any case law that prohibits or would find him to have violated the Constitution based on what he is alleged to have done in the complaint.

[00:09:50] Speaker 01:
Are we clear on that? I don't want to make sure I'm misleading the court in some way in the argument.

[00:09:56] Speaker 00:
Without other defendants.

[00:09:57] Speaker 01:
Yeah.

[00:10:01] Speaker 01:
As it relates to the other defendants in this other issue regarding the incident that the court referred to as the social media incident.

[00:10:13] Speaker 01:
The issue here, again, is really focused on whether there's any clearly established law that under the context and circumstances alleged that relate to what occurred in this case, that defendant Huff, defendant Booth, or defendant Bell have done anything that the law would would demonstrate to them as school officials would be clearly established as violating constitutional rights. And we don't believe there's been any case law that's been cited by either the district court or by plaintiff in connection with any arguments made to the court that does do that for purposes of qualified immunity.

[00:10:51] Speaker 03:
What is your understanding of what claims remain in the case? This is, I guess, a housekeeping question, but I was uncertain about that. Maybe you can help me with it. I I think the district court, as to the retaliation claim, that was a primary focus of the district court's ruling for both Huff and Bell and Booth. But the court didn't seem to, at least as I read, it didn't seem to rule on some of the other claims in the case.

[00:11:22] Speaker 03:
So can you help me with that housekeeping matter? Sure.

[00:11:25] Speaker 01:
Yeah, I had the same issue when I was reading the district court's order, and I don't think it was intentional by the district court, but the district court clearly did focus on the...

[00:11:35] Speaker 01:
the retaliation claim that was primarily what was discussed by the district court. I took that to mean because there was no clear ruling that the other claims are probably still live as well. And so include those as part of the overall argument on appeal that dismissal is warranted on qualified immunity as to any claims that remain against these individualized defendants.

[00:11:57] Speaker 01:
The district court did dismiss the school district finding that the school district was not liable for any of the claims and did clearly dismiss the retaliation claims that related to defendant Chapman.

[00:12:10] Speaker 01:
But as I read the district court's order, it wasn't entirely clear to me what specifically was left in the case, other than it was clear that qualified immunity had been denied as it related to these other defendants.

[00:12:22] Speaker 03:
As to these other defendants on the specific claims that the court reached, right?

[00:12:29] Speaker 01:
And I am past my three minutes. I would like to reserve for rebuttal unless the court's got any specific questions it would like me to answer at this point.

[00:12:36] Speaker 03:
I have one more question, if that's all right. Maybe Judge Hartz will give you a little more time.

[00:12:41] Speaker 01:
No, you're fine.

[00:12:43] Speaker 03:
How should we be thinking about the district court's factual findings as they relate to the injunction? So, you know, in the district court's injunction order, There's specifically a couple of findings that I'm unsure what to do with, and I'd like your take on those. I mean, the district court says the defendants have failed to show plaintiff violated the law or any school policy. At the same time, the court says, well, schools have the right to control access to specific locations without implicating a liberty interest. So I guess the two questions are, generally, what do we do with the findings made attendant to the PI?

[00:13:19] Speaker 03:
And specifically, what do you make of these findings that I just recited?

[00:13:24] Speaker 01:
Yeah. So let me try and break that into two points, and I'm going to run low on time. So if I go over time, please indulge me for a minute or tell me to stop. The first issue is the injunction order is interesting in the context of this case. It was a temporary injunction order. It was issued before we had filed and sought dismissal of the case based on our motions to dismiss. Interestingly, for a temporary injunction, there has to be a finding that there's a likelihood of success on the merits.

[00:13:54] Speaker 01:
The injunction was granted as to all defendants, and then the court turned around and after hearing the dismissal motion, dismissed the school district, which was one of the defendants, finding that there weren't grounds for a claim against the school district.

[00:14:07] Speaker 01:
The other thing with the injunction is that obviously the injunction was in place to address the, it had nothing to do with the board meeting incident had everything to do with the incident relating to the social media. And as it relates to the social media incident, it was primarily directed at the determination by Huff that she cannot attend school property events until June 30th. And so since that time has passed, that whole injection has moved at this point as a separate matter.

[00:14:41] Speaker 01:
The findings, I think any findings in terms of an injunction hearing are always preliminary and they're always subject to reinterpretation and determination by the court based upon later evidence. After evidence has been marshaled in a case, it's on a very shortened record.

[00:14:58] Speaker 01:
And so I don't know that those are binding necessarily on the court at all past the injunction hearing itself. An injunction can always be reconsidered.

[00:15:08] Speaker 01:
those findings are not law of the case or anything like that. It can be reconsidered in a motion to dismiss facet. Ultimately, the dismissal that's being sought was purely directed at qualified immunity and purely directed at the pleadings in the case, which are set forth in the complaint itself. And I think that's what the court should focus on as it relates to those findings.

[00:15:32] Speaker 03:
Thank you. That's very helpful.

[00:15:35] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:15:39] Speaker 04:
please the court. Um, well, let's start with Chapman.

[00:15:44] Speaker 04:
Um, the, the complaint simply says what Chapman did. And it said that Ms. Schmidt's microphone was muted, uh, favorable inferences.

[00:15:59] Speaker 04:
Uh, you can connect the dots. You ask if, uh, board member Chapman was presiding board member. No, he wasn't, but he stood up and took over the meeting and read his statement.

[00:16:14] Speaker 04:
So that's his individual participation. He took it over.

[00:16:21] Speaker 00:
The other- You want us to draw an inference from the fact that he took it over that he was responsible for the mic being turned off. Is that correct?

[00:16:30] Speaker 04:
I think you can make that favorable inference.

[00:16:33] Speaker 00:
Then what do you mean exactly by he took it over? It's one thing for him to speak for a minute or more. But did he in any other way show that he was?

[00:16:46] Speaker 04:
Sure. So here's how that works. You get three minutes.

[00:16:49] Speaker 04:
And so when and you get an audit, three minutes, Kerry Schmidt stands up. It's her time to speak.

[00:16:56] Speaker 04:
There's no provision in the public comment that, hold it, Kerry Schmidt, before you start talking, let me take over your three minutes and interject something that's going to chill your speech. That's not part of the process. They don't do that to speakers. But Chapman did that. So he read... He says, I kind of know what you're going to say, Carrie. And so let me muddy the water. Let me put you in a bad light. Let me say that you're a pervert. You get sexual pleasure out of reading what I think you're going to read.

[00:17:29] Speaker 04:
Now, that is viewpoint discrimination. That is chills anybody. And let that be a lesson to all you parents that think you're going to come up here and read literature that's in our library.

[00:17:43] Speaker 04:
That has to do with his motive and his intent.

[00:17:47] Speaker 00:
Did she end up getting the full three minutes? Was the time given back to her?

[00:17:54] Speaker 04:
No, actually, she fussed with them because she got muted. She says, nobody can hear what I'm saying.

[00:18:01] Speaker 04:
And as Judge Milgram said, the microphone was muted. Closed captioning was unavailable on the district's YouTube page. said that Chapman's remarks demonstrated he disagreed with plaintiff's views and likely due to those views, he subjected plaintiff to less favorable treatment than other speakers. Namely, one of the things is he made his speech before she talked and put her in a bad light. You don't do that to other speakers. And then we say he muted her.

[00:18:34] Speaker 00:
So just with respect to the time she was afforded, though, did she end up not being able to speak for three minutes?

[00:18:41] Speaker 04:
She could speak the three minutes. She didn't get the full benefit of what the public comment provision.

[00:18:49] Speaker 00:
Not because her time was restricted. Is that right?

[00:18:53] Speaker 00:
Let me make sure I understand.

[00:18:58] Speaker 00:
So she didn't get the benefit you're saying because of the comment that put her in a bad light. Did she also not get the benefit because she was restricted to less than three minutes? Did that happen?

[00:19:13] Speaker 00:
Was that even alleged?

[00:19:15] Speaker 04:
I don't believe we alleged she was cut off prior to the three minutes. Okay. That benefit she got, but it was skewed, as I've said, which is she didn't get the benefit that other speakers get, which is you got an open mic, everybody can hear you, you get closed captioning, and oh, by the way, I'm not beat up before I get to talk.

[00:19:40] Speaker 00:
The defendants argue, though, that you have no clearly established law that the person, the official can be liable for putting someone in a bad light by speaking beforehand. Do you have any case law? to support that proposition?

[00:19:59] Speaker 04:
Well, viewpoint discrimination. That's viewpoint discrimination. So one of the tools in the toolbox is I'm going to say bad things about you, and that's viewpoint discrimination. Judge Melvin said that's been clearly established for years and years, and it is.

[00:20:18] Speaker 02:
Can I stop you there?

[00:20:19] Speaker 04:
Sure.

[00:20:20] Speaker 02:
Haven't we said repeatedly that you can't simply say this is viewpoint discrimination in order for clearly established law to be established. You have to come up with something, a case that had some similar facts, something similar to what you're alleging, that just saying there's viewpoint discrimination is not specific enough.

[00:20:50] Speaker 04:
Well, sure. Siemens speaks to, well, Siemens 1 and 2. Siemens 1 says that government may not deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected interest.

[00:21:03] Speaker 04:
So your inquiry is, did they deny a benefit to Kerry Schmidt? Well, they did. They did it over and over and over.

[00:21:13] Speaker 04:
And that was because of the things that she said. Now, we've called that viewpoint discrimination, but the principal set out in Siemens says that. And in Siemens 2, where they came back and tried to get qualified immunity at summary judgment, the panel said at page 1030, school authorities may not penalize students for their speech when that speech is non-disruptive, non-unseen, and not school-sponsored. The case then, this becomes apparent speech. So all the policy reasons that they have to impede student speech would not apply.

[00:21:53] Speaker 04:
There's a case out of the Sixth Circuit, McElhaney v. Williams, 81F43.

[00:22:01] Speaker 04:
550 of Sixth Circuit 2023. That case, the court, Sixth Circuit reversed qualified immunity and held it was clearly established. School official may not retaliate against a parent for the content of his speech criticizing school personnel. So this is a case that where these individual defendants penalized Kerry Schmitt.

[00:22:26] Speaker 02:
So can I stop you there? I'm sorry. That's a Sixth Circuit case that you're signing?

[00:22:31] Speaker 04:
That is, but it lines perfectly with Semen 1 and Semen 2, which simply say you cannot deny benefits to a parent or a student because of protected speech. And so everything that the defendants did in this case, Chapman did it because of her speech. She was reading protected speech books. Huff said he didn't like what she was saying.

[00:23:05] Speaker 04:
And then Booth and Bell, then I call it supersized. They filed police reports. They put more conditions on her to do what other parents could otherwise do. In fact, they went so far as to say that she couldn't even go to church on Sunday at a church on school premises. And Superintendent Huff said, oh, by the way, I'm going to extend this ban beyond Gardner property to other school districts, which was incredible.

[00:23:43] Speaker 00:
Let me ask about those allegations. I'd like to focus on Mr. Booth.

[00:23:50] Speaker 00:
And what are the allegations regarding his participation in this alleged retaliation?

[00:23:59] Speaker 04:
He gave the ban police force. He filed a police trespass report identifying Ms. Schmidt as an offender, even though the complaint alleged no unlawful entry, no victim.

[00:24:13] Speaker 00:
You're trailing off. Can you speak more into the mic?

[00:24:15] Speaker 04:
I'm sorry. I'm sorry, Judge.

[00:24:17] Speaker 00:
Okay.

[00:24:22] Speaker 04:
even though the complaint alleged no unlawful entry, no victim, no refusal to leave, no crime, and no applicable policy violation. And let me say this. The complaint clearly said that Ms. Schmidt did not violate any policies. And that was confirmed in the injunction hearing when Superintendent Huff, who was handing all the policies, says identify any of that she violated. He couldn't identify one. This goes to Judge Rossman, your question about what to do with the injunction facts.

[00:24:55] Speaker 04:
It goes to plausibility. You look at the complaint and look at the favorable inferences. The injunction itself, the hearing will add or support plausibility to what we've alleged in the complaint. But you're going to look at that complaint.

[00:25:12] Speaker 00:
Let me. OK, so so Booth.

[00:25:17] Speaker 00:
the allegations against him and and correct me if i'm wrong but i my recollection is that the only allegations regarding his participation in this is that he forwarded or filed the complaint that went to the police department is that correct well he filed a police report himself and he is the person that made the allegations so like i recited he gave superintendent false allegations you're just saying those allegations I want to make sure, did he make false allegations or is it that the allegations didn't rise to the level of an offense?

[00:25:59] Speaker 04:
He filed a complaint alleging no crime.

[00:26:05] Speaker 00:
So she had committed a crime. Did he say anything in the complaint that was factually false?

[00:26:13] Speaker 00:
The conclusion you're saying was wrong because there was no crime. But did he say anything factually false in the complaint?

[00:26:21] Speaker 04:
Well, I would say he did misconstrued. He said there was no victim.

[00:26:25] Speaker 04:
He misconstrued exactly what she had done. You don't file a police report when no crime has been committed. and no victim or anything like that. But the point is there, Judge, he is giving a fact. He's putting something in addition to the Huff ban. He's putting police force and a trespass that he didn't have to do that. Huff didn't do it, but Booth did.

[00:26:56] Speaker 04:
So that would chill a person of speech when you get Huff.

[00:27:02] Speaker 00:
I want to focus on not on the consequence of the complaint, but Booth's complicity in that.

[00:27:14] Speaker 00:
Does the complaint allege that Booth did this on instruction from the superintendent or the principal?

[00:27:25] Speaker 04:
I don't know how the complaint necessarily framed that.

[00:27:30] Speaker 04:
But if you're asking if it's just following orders, Booth did that act. He participated. That is his actions. So I don't know.

[00:27:41] Speaker 00:
I'll get to the heart of this. I'm just trying to get your position on this.

[00:27:51] Speaker 00:
If you do something, but you don't have discriminatory intent, then you're not liable.

[00:27:57] Speaker 00:
And you're saying his, I'm sorry, go ahead.

[00:28:00] Speaker 04:
Well, you'll never get to that on a motion to dismiss. Intent and motive, Judge, is, I mean, maybe summary judgment, but maybe not intent.

[00:28:10] Speaker 00:
You don't think you have to allege any facts that would imply discriminatory intent? Sure, we've done that. Well done with respect to Booth. Sure.

[00:28:21] Speaker 04:
He filed a police report and there was no crime. You can infer from that that he is, that is his actions. That is how he is participating. He knows that Huff, Superintendent Huff, has no policy that she violated and he is going to be the vessel, if you will, to up the ante.

[00:28:44] Speaker 00:
Is it relevant to his intent whether He was instructed to do this or did it on his own initiative. Is that relevant to his?

[00:28:52] Speaker 04:
I don't think it is. I don't think it is. And you would have to give a favorable inference to to Booth to say to move that gauge on the other side, maybe. And that's an issue of credibility. Was he motivated because he was instructed or did he have to do it? Could he have refused and said to you, I don't want to do this. Don't make me file a police report. So the fact that he did it at a motion to dismiss favorable inferences, discriminatory intent.

[00:29:28] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:29:31] Speaker 03:
So what is the we're talking about retaliation and there's Retaliation claims alleged against all the defendants except for, well, for the Chapman one was dismissed.

[00:29:46] Speaker 03:
And you have three elements, right, in a retaliation claim. You have to show protected activity and the kind of government action that would chill and motive, right? So can we just, I'd like to have your position on the retaliation claim at in that structure. What do you contend is the protected activity here?

[00:30:11] Speaker 04:
Well, her protected speech.

[00:30:13] Speaker 03:
Okay, but with more specificity, I mean, based on what you've alleged in the complaint, is it that she took pictures? Is it that she sent pictures that were reposted? What is the protected speech exactly as alleged in the complaint?

[00:30:28] Speaker 04:
Public comment, she's protected speech. She's not yelling fire in the house. She's just reading books out of the library. That's protected. At the school, she took pictures of things available to students.

[00:30:40] Speaker 04:
She then took those photos, sent them to TikTok. That's protected.

[00:30:46] Speaker 04:
She didn't do anything. And so those are the protected things that she did. They weren't crimes. They didn't violate any policy. That's all protected.

[00:30:57] Speaker 04:
Now, so then that's the protected part of that equation. They tried to ascribe to her the idea that, well, you're responsible for what TikTok does. And Judge Melvin says, no, that's not that's not fair. And there's no indication that Eve from the complaint that Carrie Schmidt wanted anybody to get in trouble with or to be targeted or anything like that. Didn't happen.

[00:31:24] Speaker 04:
And so the the other protected. And so she was denied benefits because of that. They say it.

[00:31:33] Speaker 04:
That's what they say.

[00:31:35] Speaker 04:
They didn't say she wasn't, you know, whatever. So that's the protective part. The retaliation.

[00:31:46] Speaker 04:
She got adverse consequences up and down the line.

[00:31:49] Speaker 04:
That's retaliation. And it's all based on speech. Judge Milgram goes into it.

[00:31:56] Speaker 04:
And talking about that, he said that he didn't like what she said. He didn't like what she posted. Finding images posted to a Popular social media account offensive is insufficient reason to strip plaintiff of her rights to speak, associate, and exercise religion. It's unreasonable for a person acting in such a way that such conduct did not infringe upon plaintiff's First Amendment rights. And that's all she did.

[00:32:23] Speaker 04:
And with that, she was banned from going to other benefits that other parents got to do, which was attend your child's graduation, attend your child's wrestling, all of those things.

[00:32:37] Speaker 04:
Can you get the benefit of speaking without getting slandered?

[00:32:42] Speaker 00:
All that chills speech.

[00:32:45] Speaker 00:
You're more than two minutes over your time. I'm sorry, Jamie. No, I just wanted to make sure. Does any member of the panel have any Any further questions?

[00:32:54] Speaker 02:
I'm good.

[00:32:56] Speaker 00:
Thank you, counsel. Mr. Goheen, we'll give you another minute.

[00:33:01] Speaker 01:
If I turn the mic on, I guess. Sorry about that.

[00:33:10] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honors. I just want to touch briefly on a couple of points made to try and get some clarity. One thing is it relates to this police report that Mr. Booth submitted to the law enforcement.

[00:33:27] Speaker 01:
Police reports get submitted to law enforcement for a variety of reasons, not necessarily always to report a crime. Obviously, if you're in a car accident, you file a police report. In Kansas, where you have a trespass that is going to attempt to be enforced by law enforcement, there first has to be an advisement to law enforcement that the person is prohibited from being on property. That's the purpose of the filing of the report with the police department. It has nothing to do with reporting a crime.

[00:33:56] Speaker 00:
Is that clear in the complaint? How do we know this?

[00:33:58] Speaker 01:
Well, the complaint just says that he filed a report with law enforcement. It doesn't say...

[00:34:06] Speaker 01:
anything that was done untoward in terms of him falsifying information in the report. As counsel points out, he doesn't identify plaintiff as an offender in the report. He doesn't identify a crime in the report. He reports that she is not permitted on school property. And I think that's reflected. I thought that no trespass was attached to the complaint, but I may be mistaken about that.

[00:34:28] Speaker 00:
Very briefly, anything else you wanted to respond to?

[00:34:31] Speaker 01:
I don't think anything else, unless the court's got any questions for me.

[00:34:34] Speaker 00:
Okay. Thank you, counsel.

[00:34:36] Speaker 00:
Case is submitted. Counselor, excuse, but I have a question for you, Mr. Goheen. That's an unusual name, at least maybe it's not in Kansas. When I was in school, the president of Princeton was a Goheen. Yes.

[00:34:50] Speaker 01:
Only very distantly. All the Goheens came into the United States that I'm aware of through Pennsylvania back prior to the Revolutionary War and then A large number stayed in Pennsylvania area, including the former president of Princeton. My family, there were two brothers and a cousin that moved to Manhattan, Kansas sometime in the 1800s. And there's a handful of Goheens in the state of Kansas that are all resulting from that branch.

[00:35:23] Speaker 00:
Thank you. We'll shut down in the...

[00:35:27] Speaker 00:
Why don't the judges stay on a moment and we'll play in our conference.

[00:35:31] Speaker 00:
Thank you very much, counsel.

[00:35:32] Speaker 01:
Appreciate it.