[00:00:00] Speaker 01: begin with our first case, which is Docket 25-1326, Vance v. Aldrich. Counsel, when you're ready. [00:00:08] Speaker 03: Good morning. [00:00:09] Speaker 01: Good morning. [00:00:10] Speaker 03: May it please the Court. [00:00:11] Speaker 03: The state-created danger doctrine is a deeply rooted part of Section 1983 jurisprudence. For decades, this court and nearly every circuit have recognized the same basic constitutional principle. While the government ordinarily has no duty to protect the public from private violence, it cannot use its power to make people more vulnerable to that violence. Plaintiffs plausibly allege that here. [00:00:34] Speaker 03: Your Honors, this appeal turns on a basic distinction that runs through this court's cases. On the one hand, failure to protect cases which are not actionable, and interference with protection cases which are. [00:00:48] Speaker 03: Starting with that first category, the first category includes cases like Castle Rock, Gray, Ruiz, and Ulrich. In those cases, government officials allegedly failed to prevent harm, failed to regulate, or failed to intervene before the harm occurred. Castle Rock involved, of course, officers who failed to intervene before a father tragically murdered his children. Ruiz involved negligent licensing and oversight of a daycare facility. Gray involved hospital policies that allegedly failed to protect a patient from medical risk. [00:01:21] Speaker 03: In each case, the government failed to reduce risk, but it did not use its official authority to make people more vulnerable to private violence. Now that second category. That second category is different. These are the interference with protection cases. Currier, estate of BIC, Freeman, and Duarez. In those cases, state actors did not really fail to help. They used government authority to interfere with protective services otherwise available in the community, placing people in a more dangerous position than they otherwise would have occupied. [00:01:55] Speaker 03: In Courier, a state actor, Shirley Medina, told a mother to stop making reports of abuse. In Freeman, a police chief directed officers not to respond to domestic violence complaints. In Juarez, police officers allegedly told a group of counter-protesters that they could attack demonstrators with impunity. [00:02:14] Speaker 03: The common thread here is official conduct that made private violence more likely. [00:02:21] Speaker 01: Is more likely enough, or does it have to be immediate and to specific persons? [00:02:27] Speaker 03: Your Honor, under the case law, it has to be a substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm. [00:02:34] Speaker 03: And this was a central point in the briefing, so I want to address it here. The critical question is risk. It is not how long after the affirmative acts does the ultimate harm materialize. MacArthur makes that clear, and this court's case, Ulrich, makes that clear as well. [00:02:54] Speaker 00: So what about the question that Judge Phillips asked about whether it has to be to a specific person as opposed to just a general group of people out in the community? [00:03:06] Speaker 03: Your Honor, I believe... there are two elements that are critically important here. The risk needs to be obvious or known, and the plaintiffs need to be members of a limited and specifically definable group. I'd like to talk about the danger here and the risk, which I think illustrate the point. [00:03:22] Speaker 03: The danger here, plaintiffs allege, the danger is not merely of gun violence in general. The danger is that individuals who intended to commit mass violence would retain firearms because deputies were effectively blocked from using the red flag law. And the risk was to a specifically indefinable group, to vulnerable persons, here, patrons of an LGBTQ nightclub. And that was foreseeable because individuals Anderson Aldrich, as plaintiffs alleged in their complaints, visited Club Q at least seven times in 2021 and 2022, and because LGBTQ patrons are more likely to be at risk of targeted mass violence. [00:04:07] Speaker 01: So patrons at that establishment have more protection than McDonald's or somewhere? [00:04:15] Speaker 03: Your Honor, I believe that patrons at Club Q did not have more protection at a practical level from a security perspective than at a place like McDonald's. But I do believe that patrons of McDonald's wouldn't fulfill the specifically unlimited group under this court's case law. [00:04:36] Speaker 01: Do you have to tie that to the shooter, that the shooter had exhibited some animus or given some telltale signs that he indeed was targeting a specific population? [00:04:48] Speaker 03: Yes, Your Honor. I believe the risk was obvious or known. And I think about this in a twofold way. First, we can look at the public hearing on the county's resolution. This was in 2019. And the district attorney, District Attorney May, at the time said the red flag law could have been used to stop a mass shooting in the Colorado Springs community in 2015. [00:05:14] Speaker 03: That was a Halloween Day massacre. [00:05:17] Speaker 03: So the risk was obvious or known at the time of the policy. In 2021, El Paso County committed affirmative acts. [00:05:25] Speaker 03: They responded to the scene of an alleged kidnapping. Anderson Aldrich was holding his grandparents up at gunpoint, and they heard him say he wanted to become the next mass shooter. So they took steps with respect to the arrest and the investigation, and at that point, the risk of targeted mass violence was already known. But the risk specifically with respect to Aldrich became known in that moment. And when the order of protection was dismissed in August 2022, just three months before the shooting, that risk became concrete, Your Honor. [00:05:56] Speaker 01: They kept his firearms as a result of that. Is that right or no? [00:06:02] Speaker 03: I believe that is correct, Your Honor. That is what we allege in our complaints. [00:06:05] Speaker 01: And then he assembled more firearms in the interim. [00:06:08] Speaker 03: Yes, Your Honor. [00:06:08] Speaker 01: And so how would... How would having the red flag have mattered if he can just go out there and get more firearms? [00:06:16] Speaker 03: The red flag law would have prevented Mr. Aldrich from temporarily possessing firearms. And we can look at a similar example in the same community as an illustration. In 2022, as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, Colorado Springs Police Department officers sought an ERPO, an Emergency Risk Protection Order, to prevent a similar mass shooting in that community. This is alleged in plaintiff's complaint. The individual is referred to as RC, and the supporting documentation is attached as exhibit A to plaintiff's complaints. [00:06:51] Speaker 03: In that case, the ERPO was entered, and that individual was prevented from possessing firearms for 364 days. [00:07:00] Speaker 03: But for the county's affirmative acts in this case, Aldridge would have been prevented from possessing or buying firearms for 364 days. [00:07:11] Speaker 01: prevented when he showed up at the gun shop and presented his identification. There would have been something that... popped up on the screen that said you can't sell to this person. That's what you mean. [00:07:21] Speaker 03: Yes, Your Honor. It would have been prevented, the gunshot. But from a lawful perspective, an ERPO would have prevented him from possessing those. And I think we have every reason to believe that Aldrich would have followed the law. I think we assume that people follow the law, particularly at the bleeding stage. But moreover, Your Honor, the day after the order of protection was dismissed, Mr. Aldridge called up El Paso County officials and asked for his guns to be released. He affirmatively took steps right after those charges were dismissed and right after the order of protection was dismissed. [00:07:58] Speaker 00: I guess I still struggle even if Aldridge himself was a risk. In order for you to have a claim here, the risk has to be specific to a limited number And it seems that you're arguing that all members of the LBGT community are at risk generally from mass shooters. [00:08:28] Speaker 03: Yes, Your Honor, I believe that members of the LGBT community and patrons of LGBT establishments are more vulnerable and are more at risk for targeted mass violence. [00:08:38] Speaker 00: Well, would you agree with me that that's not enough to meet the state created danger claim? [00:08:46] Speaker 00: The particularity required. [00:08:48] Speaker 03: I believe just that standing alone is not enough. [00:08:51] Speaker 00: Okay. [00:08:51] Speaker 03: But I do believe we have additional factors here, which is that Aldrich specifically said that he wanted to remain in this community, and he wanted his mass shooting to occur in this community. [00:09:03] Speaker 00: But again, that would be the whole community. Right? And that wouldn't be enough for the, you would agree, right, that for the state created danger. [00:09:12] Speaker 03: Yes, Judge. The entire Colorado Springs community would not be enough. [00:09:15] Speaker 00: Okay. So you've also said that Aldridge went, I think, seven times to visit. [00:09:24] Speaker 00: Do the people who adopted the red flag law, is there any requirement that they have knowledge of that? [00:09:33] Speaker 03: Your Honor, we believe that at the pleading stage, El Paso County officials either knew or they should have known that Aldridge was visiting Club Q to plan his attack. [00:09:44] Speaker 00: How would they should have known that Aldridge was visiting Club Q? I don't see anything in the complaint that would give me that. [00:09:53] Speaker 03: Your Honor, because these visits began in 2021 when the criminal charges were pending. These visits went through when the criminal charges were dismissed and then even immediately afterwards. [00:10:06] Speaker 03: And specifically with respect to the limited and specifically definable group, I'd like to point this court to the Second Circuit's decision in Pena v. DePrisco. This was cited in the party's briefing. And here, the Second Circuit found that there was a plausible state-created danger claim where police officers gave implicit assurances to a fellow officer that he could drink in excess and operate his vehicle after a shift. There, the specific and limited definable group were simply people on the road and pedestrians on the road because that officer, who ultimately was intoxicated, he hit several pedestrians and killed them. [00:10:46] Speaker 03: The Second Circuit found there to be a plausible state-created danger claim there. [00:10:55] Speaker 03: I'd also like to talk, oh, I see that I have four minutes remaining. If I could reserve the balance of my time for a bottle. Thank you. You're welcome. [00:11:12] Speaker 04: May it please the court. Good morning, Your Honors. Nathan Whitney on behalf of the county defendants. I am arguing with Mr. Kuhn, who is counsel for the club appellees, and I'll try and reserve a little bit of time for him as well. [00:11:26] Speaker 04: The facts of this case are undeniably tragic, but as the Supreme Court made clear in Deshaney v. Winnebago County, tragic facts alone do not make out a 14th Amendment violation. Such is the case here. Plaintiffs are all victims of the horrific shooting in Club Q that occurred in November of 2022. They are seeking to hold the county defendants liable under the state created danger doctrine, which first requires them to show affirmative conduct. This court has defined affirmative conduct to mean conduct that imposes an immediate threat of harm, immediate threat of harm that has a limited duration and is directed at a discreet plaintiff rather than the public at large. [00:12:09] Speaker 04: There are three criteria this court has set out to show affirmative conduct. Plaintiffs claims falter at this first hurdle. Plaintiffs essentially argue that the Club Q shooting would not have occurred if the county defendants had sought an extreme risk protection order against Aldrich following their arrest in 2021 on unrelated criminal charges. [00:12:34] Speaker 04: In pages 10 through 12 of the second brief, I've done my best to lay out those allegations of inaction. The complaint is full of allegations that the county failed to act. The county failed to take steps to prevent the shooting. The county failed to act. This is a classic case of inaction, which cannot suffice to show a claim. [00:12:57] Speaker 00: Well, the county took an action in that the county made the affirmative decision not to enforce the red flag law. [00:13:06] Speaker 04: Justice McHugh, and you jump to the next point. [00:13:08] Speaker 00: I'm just a judge, not a justice. [00:13:11] Speaker 04: Thank you, Judge McHugh. [00:13:13] Speaker 04: My outline says no amount of wordsmithing can change this. And the closest the plaintiffs come are when they talk about the enactment of the resolution in 2019 and the sheriff's statement that was issued in 2020. And while those may be affirmative acts in the broader sense of the word, They don't meet this court's definition of affirmative conduct, and there are a couple reasons why. [00:13:36] Speaker 04: Gravy, University of Colorado Hospital Authority, I think is dispositive on this issue. In that case, there was a patient who was at the hospital seeking seizure treatment, and the patient was told he wouldn't be left alone. The patient was left alone, I think fell and was injured. and sued saying that the hospital's policy of leaving patients unattended caused the risk of his injury. In that case, the Tenth Circuit said, the implementation of generally applicable policies don't foist upon anyone an immediate threat of harm with limited duration and scope. [00:14:15] Speaker 04: Generally applicable policies simply aren't affirmative conduct because they are open-ended and they apply to everyone. In that case, that policy was actually a little bit narrower than the general public. It applied to all EMU emergency medical unit patients. Even with that narrowing, it was still too broad to establish affirmative conduct. As well, Ruiz v. McDonald involved a case about daycare licensure. Oh, plaintiffs had sued the state for issuing a daycare licensure to individuals with criminal histories. [00:14:50] Speaker 04: The state didn't detect those when they did a background check. The parents then took their children to the daycare where they were abused and injured. And the court right there also found that that licensure applied to the public at large, or all participants in the daycare. [00:15:08] Speaker 04: Also, We're not talking about hospital policies. We're talking about policies that were implemented by locally elected officials. The Board of County Commissioners are all locally elected county officials. The Sheriff is a locally elected county official as well. And they're making policy decisions about the use of local resources at the core. And this Court and the Supreme Court has also indicated in cases like Collins that those locally elected decisions, those policy decisions, shouldn't generally be second guessed by this court. [00:15:47] Speaker 04: For those reasons, we believe that the allegations related to the policy, the resolution, the statement, are simply insufficient to establish affirmative conduct. And that's highlighted by the timeline of this case. We have a very prolonged timeline that really takes place over three years. [00:16:08] Speaker 01: The argument that you made there almost raises the specter of the county having to spend money. Resources, I think, is the word that you use. But here it's simply a matter of entering someone into a computer system, isn't it? And as far as whether it's an affirmative act or not, the resolution says we'll actively resist the red flag law, which suggests something more than we're not going to pursue that? [00:16:40] Speaker 04: Judge Phillips, I will concede that's what the resolution states, but the complaint is devoid of any active... First, let me back up and say, number one, this resolution was passed by the Board of County Commissioners at a point in time when the red flag law had not yet been acted. So it was somewhat of a commentary on a pending piece of legislation at the time. But once that law was passed... [00:17:08] Speaker 04: The complaint is still devoid of any plausible allegations showing that the sheriff's office, which is the law enforcement agency in the county, actively resisted the implementation of a protection order here. The sheriff's statement is different than the resolution. The sheriff is the law enforcement officer in the statement that he issued. discussed the limited circumstances under which his office would seek a protection order. So it wasn't carte blanche, we won't do it. The sheriff did allow for limited circumstances under which his deputies might pursue a red flag protection order. [00:17:42] Speaker 01: Probable cause of a crime. [00:17:44] Speaker 04: Correct. [00:17:44] Speaker 01: So is your bottom line that this is an electoral question? If you don't like your county officials and their positions, then vote them out and get someone else. [00:17:54] Speaker 04: So I have two arguments. One, obviously there was no affirmative conduct. But I believe the court does need to provide deference to locally elected officials because different jurisdictions are going to have different electorates with different priorities, different points that they want their elected officials to advocate for. So yes, and I think that's what the Supreme Court guidance would say in Collins, is this is an elected official function rather than a court function to second guess whether that resolution was correct, wise, with the benefit of hindsight here. [00:18:32] Speaker 00: Let me ask you about the limited group portion of the affirmative conduct definition. One of the things they bring out is that Aldridge visited this specific nightclub repeatedly. [00:18:52] Speaker 00: Their allegation is casing the joint, checking out security. [00:18:57] Speaker 00: How does that fact play into the analysis here? [00:19:02] Speaker 04: So number one, I do not believe there are any plausible allegations indicating that any of the county defendants had knowledge of any of this. I think that was all information that was gleaned in the investigation after the shooting. [00:19:14] Speaker 04: Even if the county had been aware of that, which I don't believe any county official was, and they didn't do anything about it, That's still not affirmative conduct. [00:19:28] Speaker 04: It may be deplorable in hindsight. It may be regrettable. But if you look back to the DeShaney case, the Supreme Court said we don't have a duty to protect individuals from harm by third parties. And if we impose an obligation, on the government to act, simply when we have notice of potential harm by a third party, the liability would be endless. [00:20:03] Speaker 04: And I will end with one final point here to leave my colleague a little bit of time for his argument. [00:20:10] Speaker 04: What my friends on the other side are trying to do here is impose a constitutional violation based off the red flag statute, when the statute itself doesn't even impose a tort duty on my client. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said the substance due process provision of the 14th Amendment should not be used as a font for tort law. Those are decisions that are left to the state court to make. [00:20:38] Speaker 00: Is this your Dobbs argument? [00:20:41] Speaker 04: This is not right on the Dobbs argument, but I wanted to highlight that one section of the Red Flag Protection Order, 13-4.5-113, subsection 4, says the Red Flag Order does not require a law enforcement officer or agency to file a petition for a temporary emergency risk protection order or a petition for an extreme risk protection order. So there is no tort duties. There is no duty imposed by Colorado statutory law, and I don't believe there's any duty imposed to act under these circumstances under Colorado common law, tort law. [00:21:20] Speaker 04: So what my friends on the other side are trying to fashion a constitutional violation, a violation of the substantive due process provisions of the 14th Amendment, when there isn't even... a violation or a duty owed under state tort law. And Judge McHugh, I'll finally just bring up the following point. I did raise a new argument, and I will concede that, about the Dobbs decision and where does the state-created danger doctrine come from. I will concede I was not quite smart enough to raise that in the trial court. [00:21:52] Speaker 04: It came to my attention as I was briefing, so if I waive that, I waive that. But that is a question that I believe At some point, this court is going to have to address. [00:22:03] Speaker 04: Whether it's this case or another case, this court, I believe, is going to have to ask itself, where did this doctrine come from? Is it deeply rooted in our nation's history? Or does it come from two stray sentences that suggest possibly the Supreme Court left open the door for this type of liability? I don't think the court needs to answer that question today to resolve this case because there clearly is a failure to allege affirmative conduct. [00:22:34] Speaker 04: But whether it's this case or another case in the future, I believe the court will need to address that question. Thank you, judges. And with that time, I'm going to reserve a whole three minutes and 24 seconds for our colleague, Mr. Kuhn. [00:22:58] Speaker 00: Mr. Kuhn, I assume you're dealing with whether the district court correctly held that the negligence and wrongful death claims were not preempted by the CPLA. Is that? [00:23:12] Speaker 02: That and primarily, Your Honor, I think the first question the court has to determine is whether or not the trial court had supplemental jurisdiction. [00:23:21] Speaker 02: And our position is that it did not. Under Gibbs, there has to be a common nucleus of operative fact between the claims, and second, they must be the type of claims that a plaintiff would ordinarily expect to try in the same proceeding. And Your Honors, admittedly, the claims against Club Q and the claims against the county share some general background information, such as the identity of the shooter. They might even share some distant link in the but-for causal chain. But a mere commonality is not sufficient for supplemental jurisdiction. [00:23:55] Speaker 02: Gibbs commands that the facts be the operative facts. meaning those facts giving rise to liability and that you would use to prove your case. [00:24:04] Speaker 00: Can we first, you don't cite any cases that support the argument that a federal court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over a case that is nonetheless dismissed is sufficient to create an injury on your behalf that would be redressed. [00:24:28] Speaker 02: appeal with respect your honor our position is that the district court couldn't decline something for us that it didn't have and that the Club Q parties were injured as a consequence in part because the tolling that you get under section 1367 is only applicable if the court declines supplemental jurisdiction and because the court never had jurisdiction it couldn't have declined it and had to have dismissed under 12b1 and thus the claims would be time barred and as a consequence We have been injured because there is now newly filed litigation in El Paso County for the claims over which the trial court purported to decline supplemental jurisdiction. [00:25:04] Speaker 00: Well, couldn't under 1367D, didn't the plaintiffs have a right to commence a new action within 90 days? Either way, it was dismissed. [00:25:21] Speaker 02: Our position is that Section D says the period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection A. Our position is asserted means where the court has supplemental jurisdiction over the claims. I submit that you couldn't simply allege any sort of claim in federal court to avail yourself of the benefits of tolling under Section D, that there must have been supplemental jurisdiction in the first instance. [00:25:45] Speaker 02: Being that I have 30 seconds left, I would just point the court to the Third Circuit's opinion in Leon, where the court said that, look, general background facts aren't sufficient for supplemental jurisdiction. And additionally, the D.C. Circuit, not cited in our case, it's a very recent opinion, Joyner v. Morrison-Forsetter stands for the same proposition. [00:26:05] Speaker 00: Can you give a cite for that? [00:26:07] Speaker 02: Yes, ma'am. It is 140 F. 4th, 523. And with that, Your Honor. Do you contend that the 2022 amendment to the CPLA [00:26:19] Speaker 01: requires a dismissal for any mass shooting? [00:26:23] Speaker 02: Your Honor, I see I'm out of time. Is it all right if I take a minute to answer that question? [00:26:28] Speaker 01: As much time as you need. [00:26:29] Speaker 02: Oh, don't. [00:26:32] Speaker 02: Careful what you... Your Honor, our position, it does not create a categorical rule. What the amendment says is... that courts cannot consider... [00:26:49] Speaker 02: excuse me, that the Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood case should be disregarded to the extent it allows landlord liability without considering whether a third-party criminal act was the predominant cause of the harm. And the statute importantly says, as noted by the dissenting justices and judge. And so in the Planned Parenthood case, what the dissenting justices said is that the premeditated and intentional actions of a mass shooter are the predominant cause of the injury he inflicts, such that any negligence on the part of the property owner simply is not a substantial factor. [00:27:24] Speaker 01: So is it a yes or a no? [00:27:27] Speaker 02: There could be certain criminal acts where it could be considered, but in the context of mass shooting cases, the Colorado Supreme Court has said it's a matter of law. The CPLA bars those claims. [00:27:38] Speaker 01: Okay. Well, thank you very much. [00:27:40] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:27:41] Speaker 01: We all have to be careful because whatever you overrun, I give the other side that time as well. [00:27:54] Speaker 01: So you'll have an extra minute and 30, but you don't have to use it. [00:27:56] Speaker 03: Thank you, Judge. [00:27:58] Speaker 03: I'll do my best to be brief. I'd like to start by talking about resources and deference. We heard a lot about resources and deference from my friend's argument. [00:28:10] Speaker 03: My friend talked about Gray and Ruiz. Again, Gray and Ruiz are about a failure to protect. These are about a failure to regulate and a failure to mitigate risk. My friend also began predictably by talking about DeShaney. Of course, DeShaney being a case where Children were left in the custody of a parent who was dangerous, and the government officials didn't do anything. I'd like to point this court to Freeman v. Ferguson, which was relied upon in this court's decision, Currier v. Doran. [00:28:43] Speaker 03: And in Freeman, the police chief told his officers, don't respond to domestic violence complaints. And that is where this court has drawn the line. where there's an interference with protection, that is constitutionally significant. Now let's talk about resources and deference. [00:29:02] Speaker 03: There was no discussion of resources at the public hearing for the resolution, for the Red Flaw resolution. No discussion at all. [00:29:11] Speaker 03: Resources are about where to deploy officers and which calls to prioritize. Resources They can't hide behind resources when they interfere with protective services otherwise available to community. That is the line that Currier drew. With respect to deference, county officials are required to follow the law. County officials are also required to defer to the legislature, and that's what they should have done here. [00:29:38] Speaker 03: Now, the other side calls this a classic case of inaction, and no amount of wordsmithing can change this. But Judge Phillips, as you correctly pointed out, county officials said that they would actively resist the red flag law. [00:29:56] Speaker 03: There is official action here. [00:29:59] Speaker 03: And Your Honor, I would just point to Governor Paulus' statements after the Club Q shooting. Governor Paulus said himself that this is an instance when the red flag law could have and should have been used and it would have prevented this tragedy. [00:30:17] Speaker 03: But for the county's affirmative acts, their active resistance, their active interference with the law, this tragedy would have been stopped. I'd like to just briefly address the supplemental jurisdiction point. [00:30:35] Speaker 03: My friend on the other side said that plaintiff's claims share general background information. What I think my friend may have overlooked is that that general background information includes wrongful conduct that contributed to the same deaths and injuries. That is, five deaths and 25 injuries. [00:30:56] Speaker 03: I would ask this court to look to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Fiegler v. Tydex, where a plaintiff was injured off the coast of Nigeria. He injured his back. Upon coming home from the airport, he got into a car accident, and he filed suit in federal court. And that motor vehicle accident was a state law claim that was appended to the federal claim. [00:31:15] Speaker 03: And the Fifth Circuit, on the issue of supplemental jurisdiction, said, yeah, there's supplemental jurisdiction here. These are totally different injuries. These are totally different causes of action that occurred in entirely different places, but they contributed to the same injury. And therefore, they should be tried together. The jury should be entitled to look to all of the factors that led to the injury. And that Fiegler decision was relied upon last year by a district court sitting in the Eighth Circuit in Wiley versus Fleet Farm in a shooting case involving a gun retailer and claims against a bar for negligent security. [00:31:52] Speaker 03: I would say that there is, as this court just noted, no case law support for my friend's position. Deny the request to rewrite district court's decision, please. [00:32:02] Speaker 03: Furthermore, I think my friend just recognized that there is no categorical pleading stage rule under the 2022 amendment to the CPLA. The 2022 amendment to the CPLA had a narrow corrective intent. It merely tried to echo Justice Hart's concerns that the Wagner majority might rewrite proximate cause framework under Colorado law. [00:32:30] Speaker 01: With that... Same duty of care for the negligence as well as the CPLA claim? [00:32:40] Speaker 03: Yes, Judge, except that the negligence and CPLA relate to different conditions. One just conditions on the land, the other one to operational negligence. [00:32:49] Speaker 01: Further questions? [00:32:51] Speaker 01: All right. Thank you, counsel. Thank you. [00:32:54] Speaker 01: And thank you to all counsel for your very helpful briefing. The case is submitted and counsel are excused.