[00:00:03] Speaker 00: Case number 14-5109, Ryan Davis, Appellant, Charles Edward McIntyre versus United States Sentencing Commission. [00:00:11] Speaker 00: Mr. Fogdahl for the Appellant, Mr. Burch for Appellee U.S. [00:00:15] Speaker 00: Sentencing Commission. [00:00:17] Speaker 03: Good morning. [00:00:18] Speaker 03: Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the Court. [00:00:21] Speaker 03: I'd like to address at the outset an error that underlies many of the commission's arguments in this case, as well as the district court's analysis below. [00:00:32] Speaker 03: And that is the tendency to conflate the 100 to 1 crack to powder quantity ratio in the original mandatory minimum sentence provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act with the [00:00:47] Speaker 03: commissions 100 to 1 ratio that it created when it mechanically incorporated the statutory ratio into the sentencing guidelines. [00:01:00] Speaker 03: Now in 1995, it was clear that the major contributor of the sentencing disparity between black and white cocaine offenders was not due to the mandatory minimum sentence provisions, but was in fact due to the commission's decision to incorporate the 100 to 1 ratio into the guidelines. [00:01:22] Speaker 03: And it's important to keep in mind that the commission didn't just incorporate it at the minimum threshold level, [00:01:29] Speaker 03: extended it through 17 other quantity levels. [00:01:34] Speaker 03: Now, to its credit, the Commission recognized the problem and took steps to correct it by passing the 95 amendments. [00:01:45] Speaker 03: Congress thwarted that effort in the Disapproval Act. [00:01:48] Speaker 03: If you prevail, what do you get? [00:01:49] Speaker 03: This is a mandamus action. [00:01:51] Speaker 03: You win, what do you get? [00:01:53] Speaker 03: We get an order directing the Commission to give effect to the 1995 Amendment. [00:01:59] Speaker 03: To one-to-one, right? [00:02:01] Speaker 03: Not 18-to-one, but to the one-to-one ratio. [00:02:03] Speaker 03: Am I understanding it? [00:02:05] Speaker 03: Under 28 U.S.C. [00:02:06] Speaker 03: 994-P, [00:02:10] Speaker 03: The amendments shall take effect if not disapproved. [00:02:14] Speaker 03: So the Commission would have an order to implement the one-to-one ratio. [00:02:19] Speaker 03: Yes, and then take the next step of making a determination of interactivity. [00:02:24] Speaker 03: That's right. [00:02:25] Speaker 05: I'm just trying to address the standing issue because there's a redressability argument by the government. [00:02:30] Speaker 05: Right? [00:02:31] Speaker 05: That says that, as I understand it, that you wouldn't get anything different than the 18 to 1 that you have. [00:02:39] Speaker 05: Therefore, there's no reason for you to be here. [00:02:41] Speaker 05: You've already got the relief you want. [00:02:43] Speaker 05: But I just wanted to flesh out, you disagree with that. [00:02:45] Speaker 05: You think the result of Mandana's action would be a 1 to 1 ratio. [00:02:50] Speaker 05: in front of the Commission for them to determine whether it's retroactive or not, right? [00:02:54] Speaker 03: Yes, yes. [00:02:55] Speaker 03: And there's two components to the redressability argument that the Commission is making, as I understand it. [00:03:01] Speaker 03: And the first component is that the initial determination as to retroactivity is discretionary. [00:03:08] Speaker 03: And then the second component is this issue with [00:03:11] Speaker 03: the 18 to 1, more recent. [00:03:15] Speaker 05: How do you respond to the discretionary, or the argument that it's discretionary, therefore not redressable? [00:03:20] Speaker 03: As to the retroactivity determination? [00:03:21] Speaker 03: Yes, yes, yes. [00:03:22] Speaker 03: That's clear. [00:03:22] Speaker 03: The statute mandates that the commission make a determination as to retroactivity. [00:03:28] Speaker 03: And this court's standing cases are clear. [00:03:31] Speaker 03: That's enough. [00:03:33] Speaker 03: Right. [00:03:33] Speaker 03: Where an agency is obligated to make a decision one way or the other, that's enough. [00:03:38] Speaker 03: to support mandamus. [00:03:40] Speaker 03: Now, on the 18 to 1 issue, we recognize that's more complicated. [00:03:45] Speaker 03: But at the end of the day, the mandamus remedy is ultimately an equitable remedy. [00:03:52] Speaker 03: And if there's been a violation, the court... But what do you mean it's more complicated? [00:03:56] Speaker 05: Why isn't it simply a matter of if you get the mandamus, we're asking the law to return... [00:04:05] Speaker 05: Congress has nothing to do with this now. [00:04:08] Speaker 05: What they did was unconstitutional and we're left with the one-to-one ratio. [00:04:12] Speaker 05: Is it not that straightforward? [00:04:14] Speaker 03: No, that's right. [00:04:14] Speaker 03: That's right. [00:04:15] Speaker 03: That's our argument. [00:04:16] Speaker 03: That's our argument. [00:04:17] Speaker 03: The 95 amendments shall take effect given that the disapproval act is a nullity. [00:04:22] Speaker 03: the question and the 95 amendments would displace the 18 to 1 ratio. [00:04:28] Speaker 03: Now, it may not be necessary for the court or the district court on remand to go that far. [00:04:35] Speaker 03: A remedy could simply give effect to the 95 amendments from the date of disapproval until the date that the 18 to 1 ratio took effect so that that category of [00:04:49] Speaker 03: crack cocaine prisoners can get the benefit of the amendment. [00:04:54] Speaker 03: So it isn't necessary for the court to go the complete steps. [00:04:59] Speaker 05: But your problem is, if you survive the standing hurdle, you've got a pretty significant merits problem on mandamus, don't you? [00:05:06] Speaker 05: I mean, what's the duty here? [00:05:10] Speaker 05: We've already looked at this and said that the disapproval act was constitutional. [00:05:14] Speaker 03: How do you get around that? [00:05:21] Speaker 03: This court's precedents on the crack cocaine disparity fall into two categories. [00:05:27] Speaker 03: Most of the precedents deal only with the statutory mandatory minimum sentence provisions, which aren't at issue. [00:05:34] Speaker 03: Now, there is United States versus Pickett. [00:05:37] Speaker 03: There is. [00:05:37] Speaker 03: The Pickett footnote. [00:05:40] Speaker 03: And our response on that is threefold. [00:05:42] Speaker 03: Number one, it is dicta. [00:05:45] Speaker 03: The court did not need to reach that issue. [00:05:47] Speaker 04: The Booker issue in that case was a sufficient basis to vacate the sentence and remain. [00:05:58] Speaker 04: The fact of the matter is that we're resting on that ground. [00:06:01] Speaker 04: So that there's an article by Henry Friendly, and I forget what it's called, in praise of Erie and the new general federal common law that makes that point rather powerfully. [00:06:18] Speaker 04: because the matter with Brandeis was being criticized because he was stating dictated in Erie v. Tompkins. [00:06:28] Speaker 04: So I think it's clear it was argued and it was rejected. [00:06:34] Speaker 03: And I'm cognizant that Your Honor wrote the opinion. [00:06:37] Speaker 03: If you're telling me it's not dicta, I understand that. [00:06:41] Speaker 03: There are two additional responses that we have to the picket footnote. [00:06:46] Speaker 03: The second is that the posture is fundamentally different in this case from that case. [00:06:52] Speaker 03: That was a direct appeal reviewing a sentence and that holding by definition, [00:06:59] Speaker 03: It's a holding. [00:07:00] Speaker 03: By definition is simply that on the record in that direct appeal, the defendant did not demonstrate a constitutional violation. [00:07:10] Speaker 03: This is a pleading stage case. [00:07:13] Speaker 03: We're under ruling. [00:07:14] Speaker 03: We're entitled to have the facts assumed in our favor, inferences drawn in our favor. [00:07:20] Speaker 03: And the issue in this case is whether Mr. Davis has adequately alleged [00:07:27] Speaker 03: that the Disapproval Act is unconstitutional, whether under strict scrutiny review or rational basis review. [00:07:33] Speaker 03: That's the issue here. [00:07:35] Speaker 03: That was not the issue in Pickett. [00:07:37] Speaker 03: So the posture is critical. [00:07:40] Speaker 03: And it clearly differentiates the holding in Pickett from the case we have before you today. [00:07:55] Speaker 03: So. [00:07:57] Speaker 03: And I hope I've addressed your question, Your Honor. [00:08:00] Speaker 03: Again, just turning to the merits issues, [00:08:15] Speaker 03: As I was saying before, most of the precedents before this court addressed only the statutory mandatory minimum sentence provisions. [00:08:24] Speaker 03: That issue does not control the outcome here. [00:08:28] Speaker 03: In fact, this court said very well in Pickett [00:08:33] Speaker 03: that the function of the mandatory minimum sentence provisions was simply to create a two-tiered penalty structure for major and serious drug offenders. [00:08:42] Speaker 03: And that two-tiered structure, whatever its merits, [00:08:47] Speaker 03: That two-tiered structure doesn't dictate the shape that the sentencing guidelines should take. [00:08:53] Speaker 03: The commission's decision to implement the rigid 100 to 1 ratio in the sentencing guidelines is a separate and distinct constitutional problem from the statutory mandatory minimum sentence provisions. [00:09:08] Speaker 03: And therefore, Congress's disapproval of the 95 amendments that would have fixed the problem [00:09:15] Speaker 03: is a distinct constitutional injury that isn't controlled by the court's prior precedents. [00:09:21] Speaker 02: Just on the merits, if there weren't precedent, [00:09:25] Speaker 02: How do we second-guess Congress's judgment at the time that there was more societal harm from crack than from powder cocaine? [00:09:36] Speaker 02: And maybe that's wrong as a matter of policy or maybe subsequent study has proved that to be based on ill-considered judgment, but that was Congress's judgment at the time. [00:09:46] Speaker 02: They make judgments all the time in the criminal code, as you're well aware, [00:09:51] Speaker 02: They have to make judgments about different kinds of crimes and different kinds of societal harm and attach different penalties to them. [00:09:57] Speaker 02: How do we second-guess that? [00:09:58] Speaker 03: And two responses to that, Your Honor. [00:10:03] Speaker 03: First, what the evidence cited by the Commission shows is that it's possible that some enhanced ratio is appropriate for crack and powder cocaine. [00:10:15] Speaker 03: But that can explain why there would be a disparity with respect to the mandatory minimum sentence provisions. [00:10:23] Speaker 03: And maybe a disparity there is appropriate. [00:10:26] Speaker 03: The issue here is not that disparity. [00:10:29] Speaker 03: The issue here is that the sentencing guidelines at the time took that disparity, the 101 disparity, and projected it rigidly [00:10:38] Speaker 03: through all the quantity levels in the guidelines. [00:10:41] Speaker 03: And so if there's a rational basis for some disparity between crack and powder, that doesn't mean there's a rational basis for 100 to 1. [00:10:50] Speaker 03: It also doesn't mean that there's a rational basis to project the same ratio rigidly over all quantity levels. [00:10:56] Speaker 03: And it was really that decision, the fact that the ratio was used at every quantity level and was mandatory, [00:11:04] Speaker 03: It had to be applied by district. [00:11:06] Speaker 03: It was that that caused the racial disparity in sentencing. [00:11:10] Speaker 03: So it's not the mandatory minimum sentence provisions that caused the disparity. [00:11:15] Speaker 03: It's the decision by the commission to use that disparity in the guidelines in the way that it did. [00:11:21] Speaker 03: And so we're not second guessing a congressional judgment about a differential in the mandatory minimums. [00:11:29] Speaker 03: That may or may not have been appropriate. [00:11:31] Speaker 03: We're not challenging that. [00:11:33] Speaker 03: We're challenging the rigidity of the guidelines, which at the time, pre-Booker, had to be applied. [00:11:40] Speaker 03: And it was really that, and the Commission recognizes this, it was really that that created the Disparity Incentives Act. [00:11:48] Speaker 05: Thank you very much. [00:11:49] Speaker 05: Thank you. [00:11:49] Speaker 05: We'll give you back a couple minutes. [00:11:50] Speaker 05: You didn't ask for a bottle, but I presume you want some. [00:11:52] Speaker 05: We'll give you back a couple minutes for a bottle. [00:11:54] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:11:54] Speaker 05: Okay. [00:11:55] Speaker 05: Mr. Birch. [00:11:58] Speaker 01: Good morning. [00:11:59] Speaker 01: Good morning, Your Honor. [00:12:00] Speaker 01: May it please the Court? [00:12:02] Speaker 01: The distinction that the Council is trying to draw between the actions of the Commission and the actions of Congress don't make any material difference to the equal protection analysis. [00:12:10] Speaker 01: The equal protection analysis for minimum rationality looks at the government reason or any conceivable reason. [00:12:16] Speaker 05: But 101, 101. [00:12:19] Speaker 05: Congress itself decided that 101 was a bit much, right? [00:12:22] Speaker 05: Eventually, yes. [00:12:24] Speaker 05: And going back to 18 to 1, I think you've got a strong rational basis argument that 18 to 1 is fine. [00:12:28] Speaker 05: What about this, what I call the echo effect, the idea that 100 to 1 was, the effect of it was scattered throughout the guidelines and that Congress didn't address that? [00:12:39] Speaker 05: What do you do about that? [00:12:41] Speaker 05: Do you just say 100 to 1 is okay? [00:12:43] Speaker 01: Yes, that's what the case law says, and that's the level of generality that the case law requires for this issue, is you look at any conceivable basis, whether it's what Congress articulated or not, and then you say, is this not irrational? [00:12:59] Speaker 01: And if you can find a rational basis for it, that suffices. [00:13:03] Speaker 01: And that's explicitly what the case law says. [00:13:05] Speaker 01: Not just Holton and Pickett, but the cases they cite. [00:13:09] Speaker 01: Johnson before that, Thompson, Cyrus before that. [00:13:12] Speaker 01: This Court has passed on the 101 ratio many, many times and found that the fairly summary explanation of the reasons suffices. [00:13:22] Speaker 01: That same analysis controls here. [00:13:25] Speaker 01: It's that simple. [00:13:27] Speaker 05: You don't need to get that far though, right? [00:13:29] Speaker 05: I mean, isn't Pickett your strongest argument? [00:13:31] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:13:31] Speaker 01: Pickett is clearly our strongest argument. [00:13:33] Speaker 01: The footnote one, as Judge Randolph pointed out, explicitly rejects a claim. [00:13:41] Speaker 01: That's a holding. [00:13:42] Speaker 01: It rejects a claim. [00:13:43] Speaker 01: It's not dicta. [00:13:44] Speaker 01: And it's the same claim that is made here, that the disapproval act is somehow different and that analysis needs to be somehow run through the mill again. [00:13:52] Speaker 01: The analysis has been run through the mill again generously and pick it and reject it. [00:13:58] Speaker 01: That controls here and that suffices to affirm. [00:14:02] Speaker 01: The district court's decision below, indeed, it's hard to find how it could possibly have gone any differently. [00:14:07] Speaker 01: It identified the correct case law, it interpreted it correctly, and it applied it correctly. [00:14:15] Speaker 01: There's simply no other outcome that this panel can reach without going en banc and then potentially in gross conflict with the Supreme Court case law on equal protection analysis. [00:14:28] Speaker 01: There are no further questions. [00:14:29] Speaker 01: I prepared the rest on a brief on the other issues. [00:14:32] Speaker 05: Thank you. [00:14:33] Speaker 05: Thank you. [00:14:41] Speaker 05: Just to rebut nothing new, but just if there's something Mr. Burt said that you want to take issue with, please do. [00:14:56] Speaker 03: Number one, while this court, again, has passed on the 101 ratio in the statutory mandatory minimum, aside from Pickett, this court has not addressed the constitutionality of the disapproval act. [00:15:16] Speaker 05: But what's a phrase like that supposed to mean, aside from Pickett? [00:15:20] Speaker 03: With Pickett, we did it. [00:15:21] Speaker 03: It only takes one. [00:15:23] Speaker 03: And again, the issue in Pickett was different. [00:15:25] Speaker 03: The posture was different. [00:15:29] Speaker 05: But if we disagree with you on that, [00:15:32] Speaker 03: The case is over, right? [00:15:33] Speaker 03: I mean, if Pickett controls, there's no mandamus. [00:15:36] Speaker 03: The posture has to mean something. [00:15:38] Speaker 03: I mean, to my knowledge, to our knowledge, this issue has never been raised in a Rule 8 case. [00:15:47] Speaker 03: All of the analysis of this issue has taken place in the context of direct appeals of criminal sentences. [00:15:57] Speaker 03: There's never been a situation in which the issue of whether the plaintiff, in this case, Mr. Davis, had adequately alleged a constitutional violation, is entitled to emphasis in his favor, maybe some discovery, [00:16:10] Speaker 03: to build a record, that's never been decided in this court or, to my knowledge, in any other court. [00:16:17] Speaker 03: So the posture has to mean something. [00:16:20] Speaker 03: And then the last thing I'll say is, in the picket footnote, as we point out in the briefs, the focus is on whether there was a race-neutral reason to reject one-to-one. [00:16:31] Speaker 03: The focus was not on whether there was a race-neutral reason to [00:16:37] Speaker 03: require 100 to 1, which is what Congress in fact did. [00:16:41] Speaker 03: Thank you very much.