[00:00:01] Speaker 01: Case number 13-5370, Canonsburg General Hospital Appellant v. Sylvia Matthews Burrell, Secretary, U.S. [00:00:08] Speaker 01: Department of Health and Human Services. [00:00:11] Speaker 06: Mr. Collins for the appellant, Mr. Schulz for the appellate. [00:00:29] Speaker 05: Mr. Collins. [00:00:52] Speaker 03: Good morning, may it please the court. [00:00:58] Speaker 03: I'm Sven Collins representing Kansburg General Hospital. [00:01:02] Speaker 03: This appeal concerns a subject near and dear to the hearts of all federal judges, the orderly and efficient disposition of cases. [00:01:10] Speaker 03: But the district court's ruling below, perhaps expedient as a one-off decision, is contrary both to the very principles the district court sought to advance as well as to this circuit's precedent. [00:01:22] Speaker 03: The fundamental flaw in the district court's decision is its failure to accord proper significance to the unique procedural circumstances of appeals from administrative adjudications, which under the Administrative Procedures Act are reviewed by the district court sitting in an appellate role. [00:01:41] Speaker 03: Instead, the district court treated this case as if it were a garden variety civil suit originating in court [00:01:49] Speaker 03: The district court's misunderstanding is reflected in its misapplication of two fundamental principles governing review at final agency adjudications. [00:01:59] Speaker 03: First, the rule in SEC versus Chenery, which is that the district court's decision is to be reviewed solely on the grounds articulated by the agency. [00:02:09] Speaker 03: Second, the rule that the affirmative defense of issue preclusion is waived if it is not timely asserted during the trial phase of the case. [00:02:18] Speaker 03: The rule that the district court, in fact, broke new ground with this decision, contrary to the but two key rules. [00:02:25] Speaker 06: Would you say that the Western District of Pennsylvania order was a appellate order? [00:02:31] Speaker 03: An appellate order? [00:02:33] Speaker 06: Like you're saying this one is. [00:02:35] Speaker 03: Yes, Your Honor, the decision by the Western District of Pennsylvania in the first Cairnsburg case would have been the appellate review of the agency's determination in that prior dispute. [00:02:49] Speaker 03: Is that why you didn't appeal it? [00:02:51] Speaker 03: Your Honor, we didn't appeal it because my client did not have the resources to appeal the case. [00:02:57] Speaker 05: So all of the factors for issue of preclusion were in place? [00:03:01] Speaker 05: We would say that can win on pooling or nothing, right? [00:03:05] Speaker 05: Because issue preclusion is otherwise clear. [00:03:07] Speaker 03: Your Honor, I right. [00:03:10] Speaker 05: Usually usual factors you resting on pool and that's it. [00:03:14] Speaker 03: We're resting on Chenery and Poole, and also had the administrative review level, the CMS administrator applied issue preclusion, we might have a different situation. [00:03:26] Speaker 03: And had they attempted to do so before the board, we would have argued that there was a change in law. [00:03:32] Speaker 03: currently and didn't say you had to pull and really observed that the agency in that place case explicitly declined to and made it clear that they will reopening the merits that's not what happened in this case yes your honor but i would say that we have an even stronger case for waiver here than in poland because in poland it is truly not in and you a adversarial proceeding where is it just the proceedings before the provider reimbursement review board by contrast are like a trial [00:04:02] Speaker 03: The intermediary is represented by National Coordinating Council for Blue Cross Blue Shield. [00:04:08] Speaker 03: The same intermediary was present in the first Cannonsburg case. [00:04:11] Speaker 05: The final decision in this case is perfectly consistent with what the Western District of Pennsylvania upheld. [00:04:19] Speaker 05: The final agency decision is perfectly consistent. [00:04:23] Speaker 05: And there was no declaration that the agency meant not to rest on race judicata issue preclusion. [00:04:32] Speaker 05: And there was nothing to suggest that the agency meant to reopen the merits issue. [00:04:36] Speaker 05: They simply had the last decision maker in this case had to decide the way it did because the intermediary went off in a way that was inconsistent with the established rule of the agency. [00:04:49] Speaker 03: Well, I disagree with that, Your Honor. [00:04:51] Speaker 05: Why can't you disagree with that? [00:04:52] Speaker 05: I'm just stating the facts. [00:04:54] Speaker 03: You know where it leads, but you can't disagree with the facts. [00:04:57] Speaker 03: I disagree with the conclusion Your Honor is reaching from the fact. [00:05:00] Speaker 03: But I would say that here, as in any case under the Administrative Procedure Act, the decision that the appellate court, which is the district court below, is supposed to look at is the decision of the CMS administrator. [00:05:14] Speaker 03: It's not supposed to look at the decision that was made 14 years prior. [00:05:19] Speaker 03: and determine whether that should be upheld. [00:05:21] Speaker 03: It is reviewing the agency's decision on the grounds that were articulated. [00:05:25] Speaker 03: And the Chenary Rule, which this Court has applied frequently, including in recent decisions by this panel, [00:05:32] Speaker 03: holds that very clearly. [00:05:33] Speaker 03: I mean, there's a very limited exception to that. [00:05:36] Speaker 03: And that's where the result is mandated by law and the agency reached the right decision mandated by law for the wrong reason. [00:05:46] Speaker 03: But here, however, you cannot say that the agency was mandated to reach that decision. [00:05:52] Speaker 04: If we're applying preclusion. [00:06:03] Speaker 04: If we decide on threshold grounds rather than on the articulated ground. [00:06:09] Speaker 04: Generally, it usually comes into play when you've got two different merits of ground. [00:06:15] Speaker 04: I don't recall a case with this panel or any others that we can't decide on threshold grounds even though the agency [00:06:25] Speaker 03: Well, your honor is correct. [00:06:27] Speaker 03: We've not seen this case. [00:06:28] Speaker 03: This is a situation that's come up. [00:06:30] Speaker 03: For example, the Poulin case, there was a waiver at two levels. [00:06:34] Speaker 03: The Morris case, there was... Yeah, right. [00:06:35] Speaker 04: In Poulin, they failed to raise the reclusion in their first opportunity before the court. [00:06:42] Speaker 04: Correct. [00:06:43] Speaker 04: But that's not the case here. [00:06:45] Speaker 03: That's absolutely correct, your honor. [00:06:47] Speaker 04: Right. [00:06:47] Speaker 04: So this is distinguishable from Poulin. [00:06:49] Speaker 03: Yes, and I would say, however, that Poulin did not establish a rule that where there is a complete waiver before the agency by re-deciding the case on the merits, it makes... I'm not sure of that part about who waived it before the agency. [00:07:00] Speaker 04: The agency was not an adverse party at the time of the agency's decision. [00:07:07] Speaker 04: The intermediary was the adverse party there, right? [00:07:09] Speaker 03: Well, the intermediary was the agency's agent for purposes of the adjudication [00:07:20] Speaker 04: led to the adjudication. [00:07:22] Speaker 04: That's not the same thing. [00:07:23] Speaker 04: Who was representing the adjudication? [00:07:25] Speaker 03: Who was representing the adjudication? [00:07:28] Speaker 03: Who was representing the national coordinating council for Blue Cross Blue Shield? [00:07:32] Speaker 04: Right. [00:07:32] Speaker 04: Not the government lawyers. [00:07:34] Speaker 03: That's correct. [00:07:35] Speaker 04: Not the agency council or the department of justice, but a private council was representing them. [00:07:41] Speaker 04: There is separate [00:07:46] Speaker 03: It waived it by deciding the case on the merits at a minimum by the CMS administrator. [00:07:56] Speaker 03: In fact, the prior Kansasburg decision was expressly brought to the attention of the administrator. [00:08:02] Speaker 03: The agency decided the case on the merits, notwithstanding. [00:08:05] Speaker 04: Consistent with the prior Kansasburg decision, correct? [00:08:10] Speaker 05: It was perfectly consistent with what the Western District of Pennsylvania had upheld. [00:08:15] Speaker 03: Of course, I agree with that, Your Honor. [00:08:17] Speaker 03: The Seamus Administrator applied the rule yet again that it had applied previously, yet it did not say, we're deciding this on preclusion grounds. [00:08:26] Speaker 03: In fact, it went to the merits. [00:08:27] Speaker 05: Why would they have to say that? [00:08:29] Speaker 05: They don't have to say that. [00:08:30] Speaker 05: They had an intermediary that had gone off the tracks. [00:08:32] Speaker 05: And so they said, look, this is just wrong. [00:08:35] Speaker 05: Here's what the rule is. [00:08:38] Speaker 05: It seems terribly efficient for an agency to do that. [00:08:42] Speaker 05: It's not waving preclusion. [00:08:44] Speaker 05: It's efficient, making it clear we haven't changed our mind. [00:08:47] Speaker 05: This is what we do. [00:08:48] Speaker 05: We're not reopening this. [00:08:50] Speaker 05: It's closed. [00:08:51] Speaker 05: And here's the explanation again, for those of you who are confused. [00:08:56] Speaker 05: And then when they come into court, they raised it. [00:08:59] Speaker 05: And Poulin did not raise it when they came to court, because they had expressly declined at the agency level. [00:09:05] Speaker 03: Yes, Your Honor, and Poulin raised it in their post-answer motion to affirm, which to me is fairly close in time to an answer. [00:09:13] Speaker 03: But the more important point, I believe, Your Honor, is that the agency decided it on the merits. [00:09:19] Speaker 03: And if the district court disregards that, we believe, is contrary to the Channery doctrine. [00:09:25] Speaker 04: I thought you agreed that Channery does not necessarily bar this court deciding on a threshold ground with the agency deciding on merits. [00:09:34] Speaker 03: I do not agree with that, your honor, at least based on existing precedent. [00:09:39] Speaker 04: What case do you have where we've said that the generic cases that I recall generally involve the question of a different marriage as opposed to a threshold around that is antecedent to the marriage? [00:09:54] Speaker 03: Well, as the as the Chenery rule has been formulated, it states the exception is where the agency reached the result that's mandated by law. [00:10:03] Speaker 04: And the agency argued that if it doesn't apply, then you don't need it. [00:10:07] Speaker 04: Do we have a case where we have applied to the use by the court of antecedent ground as opposed to America? [00:10:15] Speaker 03: There is a case in which the court considered whether Chenerey and Barr, however, decided that the agency had not in fact waived and had in fact decided the case on the preclusive grounds. [00:10:29] Speaker 03: That's not cited in our brief, so it was considered, but it didn't apply. [00:10:39] Speaker 03: one thing that's very important is the agency set administrative precedent and your honor, to your question, the agency was not simply repeating the exact same position it had provided in 2001. [00:10:55] Speaker 03: In fact it went beyond that position to [00:10:59] Speaker 03: base its grounds on newly submitted material from the Division of Acute Care that related to additional supposed legislative history, some previews of studies to Congress. [00:11:15] Speaker 03: That was not in the record for the 2001 case. [00:11:18] Speaker 05: I understand what you're saying, but I think the point is [00:11:21] Speaker 05: The disposition here was based on the same principle that was upheld by the Western District of Pennsylvania. [00:11:29] Speaker 05: That principle was applied again here. [00:11:32] Speaker 05: Of course, each case may involve different pieces of evidence. [00:11:36] Speaker 05: What's important here is whether that principle was the agency intended to reopen it, they did not say they intended to reopen it, and whether they followed it, and they did follow it, and did they raise the issue of preclusion at the first opportunity when they came here? [00:11:50] Speaker 05: They did. [00:11:52] Speaker 05: That's entirely different from pooling. [00:11:55] Speaker 03: I would say that they did not raise it at the first available opportunity because they didn't raise it. [00:12:00] Speaker 03: It was not raised by the CMS administrator. [00:12:02] Speaker 03: And in fact, the administrator reached a decision for different grounds. [00:12:06] Speaker 03: And yes, it was the same matter. [00:12:08] Speaker 05: I mean, that just goes to, I understand what you're trying to argue on Channery, but I mean, Judge Santel has really asked you the pertinent question. [00:12:15] Speaker 05: I'm not aware of any case either where we are foreclosed from attending to a threshold ground. [00:12:21] Speaker 03: and i was ordered by jennery that just doesn't make sense i'd love to know the case where we have said that that's the law of the land i i'd really be surprised let me just get back for a minute herein here is what i think is the most important thing about where why i think the agency [00:12:38] Speaker 03: should have been required to address that affirmative defense before we got to court. [00:12:43] Speaker 03: Because the parties went through a trial, because the decisions were made. [00:12:48] Speaker 03: And the basis for upholding a defense of collateral estoppel or issue of preclusion is to avoid waste of resources and retrying a case. [00:12:58] Speaker 03: Well, by the time you get to the district court, that has already occurred. [00:13:01] Speaker 04: And those- That is April. [00:13:05] Speaker 03: correct your honor it's also avoid inconsistent decisions and so we had an inconsistent decision by the by the board and [00:13:20] Speaker 03: it frankly if if it's if it doesn't apply in the circumstance the rule of law is that the agency can wait until it gets to court as it did here and it can have an administrative precedent set with no chance for review because the agency got the final word and i don't believe that our system president was already set [00:13:44] Speaker 05: That's the frailty of your argument. [00:13:46] Speaker 05: There was nothing new here. [00:13:48] Speaker 05: The precedent was already in place. [00:13:50] Speaker 05: And it is not – you are absolutely right if it's a pooling situation – and we have this in other contexts – if the agency says, we are reopening, then they're fair game. [00:14:02] Speaker 05: We are redoing this, then the court has an opportunity and the parties have an opportunity to go at them again. [00:14:07] Speaker 05: That's not what happened here. [00:14:09] Speaker 03: And your honor, I respectively disagree that the facts actually are that they did far more than just reopening. [00:14:16] Speaker 03: They heard the case on the merits. [00:14:18] Speaker 03: I don't understand how there's much of a difference between the two. [00:14:21] Speaker 03: And I think it's even stronger in the case where the agency decides a case expressly on the merits. [00:14:28] Speaker 03: We would submit that the district court applied a special rule to agency adjudications. [00:14:36] Speaker 03: And that rule is that [00:14:38] Speaker 03: issue preclusion should always be applied on appeal, always. [00:14:43] Speaker 03: And there's no precedent supporting that special rule. [00:14:45] Speaker 03: Indeed, as this Court has held, issue preclusion on appeal is supposed to be, is disfavored. [00:14:51] Speaker 03: That's a trans era case. [00:14:54] Speaker 03: And this rule, as we argue, conflicts directly with Channery. [00:14:59] Speaker 03: The standing case the agency relied on, where it was applied sui sponte on appeal, [00:15:05] Speaker 03: did not involve an issue of waiver. [00:15:07] Speaker 03: In fact, not a single case that the agency cited or that the district court relied on for sui sponte application involved a situation where it's being applied to an administrative agency's adjudication that's occurred not once but twice. [00:15:24] Speaker 03: And I would say, we say that had the agency not decided the case on the merits, [00:15:32] Speaker 03: or had the agency not withdrawn its prior appeals in this court, we probably wouldn't be here today. [00:15:40] Speaker 03: And much of the resources that the courts, that the agency, and that the parties have been forced to expend would have been spared. [00:15:48] Speaker 05: Do you have a more interesting argument if the board had followed precedent and then the administrator [00:15:56] Speaker 05: had pursued a long, drawn-out procedure, then you could have maybe tellingly argued, look, the administrator was reconsidering it, as in Poland, and we're entitled to go after it again. [00:16:06] Speaker 05: They didn't have to. [00:16:08] Speaker 05: They could have simply argued issue preclusion. [00:16:10] Speaker 05: That's not what happened to you. [00:16:12] Speaker 05: The board went the wrong way, and the administrator had to get it straight to get it back in line with precedent. [00:16:18] Speaker 03: Well, what the administrator did was get it back out of line with the most recent decisions of the DC District Court that the agency took to appeal in this court and then voluntarily withdrew after questions from the bench. [00:16:33] Speaker 03: I think those facts matter. [00:16:36] Speaker 03: In summary, the district court erred in failing to afford the proper significance to the unique circumstances of reviewing an agency adjudication on the merits. [00:16:43] Speaker 03: And it turned the rules of tenory and waiver on their head. [00:16:47] Speaker 03: But effectively, the district court found that waiver must never be found, that issue of conclusion must always be applied, [00:16:56] Speaker 03: And the court should always go beyond the grounds actually asserted on the merits and reach the issue of a preclusive defense in every case. [00:17:10] Speaker 06: was saying the same thing. [00:17:12] Speaker 06: Channery prevents us from affirming or reversing on a different ground, but here we're dismissing the appeal. [00:17:19] Speaker 06: We're not even getting to the merits. [00:17:21] Speaker 06: And so a dismissal of an appeal is our decision to make, separate and apart from the merits or the affirming or reversing of whatever it is we're reviewing from the agency. [00:17:35] Speaker 03: Well, that would be true if the court were applying sua sponte issue preclusion. [00:17:43] Speaker 03: Then it would be a different ground. [00:17:45] Speaker 03: But if the court is actually firming the agency on the basis of issue preclusion, it is reaching an affirmance for a different ground. [00:17:59] Speaker 06: We'll give you some time. [00:18:00] Speaker 06: OK. [00:18:01] Speaker 03: I'll reserve my remaining time for both. [00:18:04] Speaker 06: OK. [00:18:05] Speaker 06: Mr. Schultz? [00:18:16] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:18:17] Speaker 02: May it please the Court, Benjamin Schultz, on behalf of the government. [00:18:21] Speaker 02: It's undisputed in this case that nothing in the Medicare statute or in the relevant regulations required preclusion to be raised during the administrative proceedings. [00:18:31] Speaker 02: At that point, the plaintiff's claim really just reduces to the idea that somehow Poulin or Chenery creates a source of law that required the agency to do this before it got to district court. [00:18:44] Speaker 02: I think the court has already adequately explained why neither Poulin nor Chenery requires that result. [00:18:49] Speaker 05: Do you think there were regulations in Poulin indicating that the issue of preclusion has to be raised, could be raised by the government? [00:18:57] Speaker 02: Your Honor, there are regulations in Poulin that allowed for reopening, and the Court's decision in Poulin concluded that the agency had invoked those regulations and actually reopened the decision. [00:19:07] Speaker 02: And as I think the Court has pointed out, there was no such reopening here. [00:19:11] Speaker 02: If the Court has any questions about any of the issues in the case, I'd be happy to address them. [00:19:16] Speaker 02: Otherwise, I think the briefs adequately state our position. [00:19:20] Speaker 06: Okay. [00:19:20] Speaker 06: All right. [00:19:21] Speaker 06: Thank you. [00:19:29] Speaker 06: Mr. Collins, remember this is reply. [00:19:35] Speaker 03: The court asked. [00:19:38] Speaker 03: whether the agency was any press, any rules requiring them to raise the affirmative defense and whether they could have, the board could have relied on collateral estoppel. [00:19:49] Speaker 03: And as we noted in our briefs, the agency didn't contest that point below the district court and has made additional argument in its briefs in the circuit, but we cited a case, Baptist Memorial, see joint appendix at 357 that proves this point. [00:20:05] Speaker 03: The board would have been well within its authority to address issue preclusion as part of its decision. [00:20:13] Speaker 03: And the board has a statutory right to rule on matters not advanced by the intermediary. [00:20:18] Speaker 03: That's under 42 USC 139500D. [00:20:22] Speaker 03: Further, the agency's regulations state that the administrator may rely on prior decisions of the agency in courts, even if not raised by party. [00:20:33] Speaker 03: That's 42 CFR 405 1875. [00:20:36] Speaker 03: And finally, the board's rules require that board rule 25.1 and 27 require that the intermediary identify all arguments and authority they intend to present in support of their position, [00:20:51] Speaker 03: in twenty seven point four says the board may execute new arguments presented for the first time in a hearing. [00:20:57] Speaker 03: And the final point I'll make is that the PRRB, the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, sits as a court effectively and adjudicates the decision on the merits between the parties.