[00:00:02] Speaker 00: Case number 14-7048 at L. Henry Debra M. Stevenson, Eugene Smith, and Debra M. Stevenson, appellants, versus First American Title Insurance Company at L. Mr. Smith for the appellants, Mr. Stedman for the appellees. [00:00:47] Speaker 05: Good morning. [00:00:48] Speaker 05: Good morning. [00:00:50] Speaker 05: Eugene Smith, pro se, on behalf of the appellants. [00:00:58] Speaker 05: Your Honor, this case may be viewed as a remnant of the recent financial crisis. [00:01:04] Speaker 05: However, this case comes down to fundamental issues of law. [00:01:09] Speaker 05: Summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff should not be granted here for several reasons. [00:01:15] Speaker 05: First reason, standing issues. [00:01:19] Speaker 05: Second reason, equitable subrogation does not apply in this case. [00:01:24] Speaker 05: And third, the defenses that were raised below are not affirmative defenses, but rather statutes designed to protect the public which may not be waived [00:01:37] Speaker 05: With respect to standing issue, this case was brought by First American Insurance Company in 2007. [00:01:44] Speaker 05: Nowhere in the pleadings did the insurance company indicate an injury in fact, which is required by the Supreme Court case on Luan. [00:01:56] Speaker 05: You're required to meet two factors, constitutional standing as well as prudential standing. [00:02:03] Speaker 05: The other plaintiffs weren't joined in the case until 2008. [00:02:07] Speaker 05: So this case proceeded only with First American. [00:02:13] Speaker 05: Nowhere in the pleadings did they allege an injury in fact. [00:02:18] Speaker 05: There's no evidence of an injury in fact. [00:02:20] Speaker 05: In fact, this court has held in span B Colonial that litigation costs may not be considered as a factor in determining an injury in fact. [00:02:34] Speaker 05: In 2008, the other plaintiffs were allowed to join the case. [00:02:41] Speaker 05: They never presented a note, the Fremont note in this case. [00:02:45] Speaker 05: All notes that were presented prior to the sudden appearance of the note in October 2008 did not bear any endorsement, either specially or in blank. [00:02:58] Speaker 05: Given that the first American did not meet the standards of constitutional standing, the case should have ended there. [00:03:07] Speaker 05: They should not have been allowed to substitute in other parties to create jurisdiction for this court. [00:03:18] Speaker 03: If we do get to the next issue, your point there is that you didn't sign the key document. [00:03:27] Speaker 05: Exactly, Your Honor. [00:03:31] Speaker 05: My mother asked me to attend the settlement for the refinance. [00:03:36] Speaker 05: I looked over the paper. [00:03:37] Speaker 05: I decided that this was not a good idea. [00:03:41] Speaker 05: So I tried to persuade my mom, but she was persuaded by the mortgage broker at the time that this was a good idea. [00:03:49] Speaker 05: She would be able to refinance at a lower rate later. [00:03:53] Speaker 05: I decided that I [00:03:55] Speaker 05: didn't want any part in this. [00:03:57] Speaker 05: I'm a joint tenant on the property. [00:03:59] Speaker 05: I decided to leave since my mother regrettably didn't listen to me at the time. [00:04:04] Speaker 05: I did not sign any of the documents. [00:04:07] Speaker 05: The court acknowledged that Fremont knew at the time that I did not intend to transfer my interest in the property. [00:04:15] Speaker 05: I did not intend to sign any of the documents, yet still they went through with the refinance and years, almost a year later, they approached me to say that you need to sign these documents. [00:04:31] Speaker 05: I said I'm not signing these documents. [00:04:33] Speaker 05: The point with respect to equitable subrogation, the plaintiffs wish to apply the doctrine in a way that's never been applied before. [00:04:45] Speaker 05: The doctrine is typically applied in the context of a refinance when there are competing liens on the property. [00:04:54] Speaker 05: Here, there's no competing liens in the property. [00:04:57] Speaker 05: Even the cases that the plaintiffs rely on indicate that the doctrine should not be applied in those instances where there's no competing liens. [00:05:09] Speaker 05: In Eastern's case, it pointed out that the plaintiffs rely on [00:05:16] Speaker 05: in the restatement of property, which the plaintiffs rely on. [00:05:22] Speaker 05: In comment A there, it says that the doctrine does not apply in instances where there's no compute lien. [00:05:29] Speaker 04: Should it be the case that they usually lien on half the value of the property now or no lien? [00:05:35] Speaker 04: I'm sorry. [00:05:36] Speaker 04: Your mother did sign the documents, right? [00:05:40] Speaker 05: My mother did sign the documents, Your Honor. [00:05:45] Speaker 05: We would argue that based on our defenses, one of which is that the loan was illegal from the beginning. [00:05:54] Speaker 04: But forget about that for a moment. [00:05:56] Speaker 04: As far as the state of the title, assume that you fail on that defense. [00:06:01] Speaker 04: Should there be a lien on half the value of the property or no lien? [00:06:05] Speaker 04: I think that no lien on the property... Why would there not be a lien valid as against your mother? [00:06:13] Speaker 05: Your Honor, assuming that our defenses aren't appropriate in this case, then there possibly should be a lien on one half of the interest, but I don't think that that's the doctrine of equitable suffocation. [00:06:36] Speaker 05: Your Honor, furthermore, the plaintiffs are requesting that the court ignore long-standing law in the District of Columbia. [00:06:44] Speaker 05: The bankruptcy court noted that neither Eastern Savings Bank nor Bergun applied or decided the issue of what should happen in the case of actual knowledge. [00:07:00] Speaker 05: That is not disputed here. [00:07:02] Speaker 05: When there's an issue of common law that's undecided, the District of Columbia usually looks to Maryland for... Usually, but not always. [00:07:11] Speaker 01: And there's case law that says they would look to the restatement here, right? [00:07:16] Speaker 01: If they look to the restatement here, you lose on this point. [00:07:20] Speaker 05: Yes, Your Honor. [00:07:21] Speaker 01: So how are we supposed to decide whether we should look to the common law of Maryland or the restatement? [00:07:29] Speaker 01: How are we to know which to do? [00:07:31] Speaker 05: Well, the case law in DC, in Johnson v. Fairfax, [00:07:36] Speaker 05: The court stated in a long history, long line of cases, that DC isn't required, but they said that special consideration should be given to Maryland law. [00:07:48] Speaker 05: Here, even if you would decide to, you know, assuming that you were persuaded that the restatement would apply, which is not the majority approach when dealing with actual knowledge, [00:08:02] Speaker 05: But the D.C. [00:08:05] Speaker 01: Court of Appeals has looked to the restatement before. [00:08:07] Speaker 01: Right. [00:08:08] Speaker 01: And in this case, that's what we're supposed to imagine what they would be doing, right? [00:08:13] Speaker 05: Exactly. [00:08:13] Speaker 05: The court did look to the restatement in the Eastern Savings Act case, but the court said that that issue, whether actual knowledge would bar the application of the doctrine, wouldn't be decided. [00:08:26] Speaker 01: No, that's right. [00:08:27] Speaker 01: That wouldn't be decided. [00:08:28] Speaker 01: But isn't it instructive that they look to the restatement? [00:08:31] Speaker 05: I mean, I think that there are three considerations, and one of them is the restatement that the D.C. [00:08:38] Speaker 05: court could look at. [00:08:39] Speaker 05: Even assuming that the court was to look at that, again, back to what the restatement says is that when there is no competing lien, then the doctrine should apply. [00:08:49] Speaker 05: Even the case that the plaintiff cite in Bankers of America B. Preston, they look to the Washington Supreme Court. [00:09:04] Speaker 05: Even the Washington Supreme Court and Ken B. Lee stated that when there's a negligent insurance company involved that the doctrine would not apply. [00:09:16] Speaker 05: Here we have [00:09:17] Speaker 05: insurance company trying to neglect their contractual obligations here and ask the court to apply the doctrine in a way that would be unprecedented. [00:09:32] Speaker 01: I don't remember you asking for rebuttal time, but I bet you you want some. [00:09:35] Speaker 01: Two minutes, yes. [00:09:36] Speaker 01: Okay, so we'll give you back two minutes for rebuttal. [00:09:57] Speaker 02: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:09:59] Speaker 02: Please support Mike Steadman on behalf of the appellees. [00:10:05] Speaker 01: Could you address the point the opposing council made on equitable subrogation about which law applies here? [00:10:13] Speaker 01: Common law of Maryland, restatement, and if restatement, which I presume you're going to say, how do you respond to Pona's point that the restatement doesn't really apply here because we don't have competing lien holders? [00:10:26] Speaker 01: If you could address that. [00:10:27] Speaker 02: I will, Your Honor, absolutely. [00:10:31] Speaker 02: First, clearly, I'm going to argue that the Maryland law, as urged by Mr. Smith, does not apply. [00:10:37] Speaker 02: I also think he misinterprets the Maryland law. [00:10:39] Speaker 02: I'll talk about that in a brief moment. [00:10:41] Speaker 02: But in both Burgum, when that was the highest court for the state court equivalent in the District of Columbia, and in Eastern Savings, [00:10:49] Speaker 02: reaffirming and embracing the logic in Vergoen, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia said they canvassed all the various interpretations of the equitable lean, equitable subrogation doctrines in this country and said very consciously we choose the most liberal approach of all of these. [00:11:09] Speaker 02: The sort of equitable assignee test embraced by Eastern Market was [00:11:15] Speaker 02: And I would incite it in the brief, but where the rights of innocent third persons have not intervened, the release will not prevent the person making the payment from becoming an equitable signing. [00:11:25] Speaker 02: In other words, [00:11:28] Speaker 02: It's a balancing of equities test like any other equitable lien question. [00:11:31] Speaker 02: So I would very much disagree with the idea that what the various plaintiffs sought below on behalf of HSBC Bank is the successor in interest to the deed of trusted issue. [00:11:43] Speaker 02: The notion that asking for the declaration of an equitable lien under these circumstances is unprecedented. [00:11:51] Speaker 04: It is a bit, at least, passing strange that [00:12:04] Speaker 02: There can be no argument that had the settlement agent done everything they're supposed to do, we wouldn't be standing here today. [00:12:09] Speaker 02: It's absolutely true. [00:12:10] Speaker 02: And so that is why we're talking about an equity claim rather than something else, because the question becomes, under these circumstances, what should happen? [00:12:20] Speaker 03: Mr. Smith, the one who chose not to sign it, yet Mr. Smith, the one who's going to have to lose his interest [00:12:33] Speaker 02: I disagree and this is why. [00:12:37] Speaker 02: This is what the bankruptcy court below and district court after that had no problem seeing. [00:12:42] Speaker 02: There is no dispute in this case that Mrs. Stevenson and Mr. Smith acquired the property in the first place with a purchase money loan [00:12:52] Speaker 02: in her name for which both of them signed a deed of trust. [00:12:55] Speaker 02: He was a grantor on that first deed of trust. [00:12:59] Speaker 02: I would argue a little clever by half in the briefing below, and here when they say Mr. Smith was never in Albuquerque under the promissory notes, that's true, but there is no doubt that he did sign as a grantor on the purchase money deed of trust by which they got their property. [00:13:14] Speaker 02: There was a refinance loan sometime later conducted by Wells Fargo. [00:13:19] Speaker 02: There was also no dispute at all that at that refinance loan, which paid off the first loan, Mr. Smith again signed as a co-grantor. [00:13:28] Speaker 02: Here on the third loan, the second refinance loan again, my client's predecessor, Fremont, paid off the purchase money loan for which Mr. Smith had signed a deed of trust. [00:13:43] Speaker 02: It would be no different functionally if my client had come in and paid Wells Fargo directly and asked for an assignment. [00:13:49] Speaker 02: They would have gotten it. [00:13:50] Speaker 02: There would have been no questions asked. [00:13:52] Speaker 02: The only remaining issue as to any change in status for Mr. Smith here was addressed below, and the court said as a matter of equity, the only real difference between Mr. Smith being [00:14:03] Speaker 02: A grantor on that prior deed of trust and Mr. Smith being subject to the equitable lien imposed now would be a potential difference in interest rates. [00:14:12] Speaker 02: And so they consciously ordered below the same interest rate that the loan was subject to under the Wells Fargo lien. [00:14:20] Speaker 02: So in terms of where Mr. Smith is today, he's exactly where he was when he willingly signed the last deed of trust that was paid off. [00:14:29] Speaker 02: And again, there's no dispute at all in this case that my clients paid that off. [00:14:34] Speaker 02: There was talk about a rescission attempt by Ms. [00:14:38] Speaker 02: Stevenson. [00:14:38] Speaker 02: What's never really addressed in any of the briefing by the appellants in this case is that they took the money and they've never given it back. [00:14:47] Speaker 02: The reality is that $118,000 did go to pay off a loan that she did take out, that Mr. Smith did co-sign for on a deed of trust. [00:14:56] Speaker 02: And that's just the fact of it. [00:14:58] Speaker 02: So to reach any conclusion other than that the lien attaches to the property is to conclude that at least Mr. Smith, and possibly Ms. [00:15:06] Speaker 02: Stevenson, you would say no, but at least Mr. Smith is the windfall of a payoff along for which he had pledged an interest for no reason other than that a settlement agent clearly did something wrong. [00:15:17] Speaker 02: And there's no dispute that a mistake was made there. [00:15:21] Speaker 02: Again, what Burgoon and what Eastern Savings looked at and consciously embraced was a notion that where there was no just or equitable reason to punish that lender, then they shouldn't be punished. [00:15:37] Speaker 02: And here is a case where, again, Mr. Smith makes a number of arguments. [00:15:40] Speaker 03: But there's two approaches here, right? [00:15:42] Speaker 03: The majority approach and the restatement approach. [00:15:46] Speaker 02: Here, that is true. [00:15:48] Speaker 02: That is certainly true in knowledge. [00:15:51] Speaker 03: No, no, the majority approach you would lose. [00:15:53] Speaker 02: I don't know that we do, Your Honor, because in the majority approach, again, those cases don't deal necessarily with the fact pattern and the issues presented in this case. [00:16:03] Speaker 02: In Mr. Smith, like you said. [00:16:05] Speaker 03: But it's the actual knowledge is the key distinction. [00:16:07] Speaker 02: The actual knowledge is an issue. [00:16:08] Speaker 02: But the actual knowledge in those sort of majority rule cases [00:16:12] Speaker 02: again pertains to intervening lien holders in circumstances where, again, intervening lien holders, and I would submit to this court as we did below, Mr. Smith analogizes himself to an intervening lien holder, but he's not really, right? [00:16:30] Speaker 02: He was someone, yes, the settlement company and by default the lender were certainly aware of Mr. Smith, but his interest was on record. [00:16:38] Speaker 02: As an owner subject to a purchase money loan for which he granted an interest, I don't think he falls in the same category as at least some of those majority rule cases. [00:16:49] Speaker 02: I would point out, this circles back to your first question, Judge Griffith, the G.E. [00:16:56] Speaker 02: Levinson case relied upon by the appellants, the Maryland case, [00:17:01] Speaker 02: wholly factually distinguishable. [00:17:04] Speaker 02: That case does talk about actual knowledge, but it also talks about actual knowledge within the context of a judicially monitored foreclosure process in the state of Maryland. [00:17:16] Speaker 04: prevail even under the Maryland rule? [00:17:19] Speaker 04: Is that correct? [00:17:21] Speaker 02: No, Your Honor. [00:17:21] Speaker 02: I'm saying that the case cited by the appellants doesn't address this issue. [00:17:26] Speaker 04: What I would also point out is as to what would happen if the restatement were not out there and we were following the Maryland or majority rule? [00:17:36] Speaker 02: I don't know. [00:17:37] Speaker 02: I don't really answer that. [00:17:39] Speaker 02: Other than to say again that I don't know this, I believe this case [00:17:43] Speaker 02: A new general equitable principles establishes that we are entitled to the relief branded below. [00:17:48] Speaker 02: I didn't want to circle around quickly. [00:17:50] Speaker 03: Did the mayor have a question? [00:17:52] Speaker 03: Just on Mr. Smith's, your position treats Mr. Smith as if he had signed when he didn't sign. [00:18:04] Speaker 02: I suppose functionally with the caveat that the Mr. Smith's status has been shaped carefully by court considering the equities I would say subject to that caveat that's true. [00:18:18] Speaker 04: What would the caveat be? [00:18:19] Speaker 02: Well, again, the caveat meaning that the only, as I said before, the only real difference between where Mr. Smith was then and where he is now is that it's couched in terms of inequitable lien rather than a deed of trust interest because he had certainly promised without, there's no dispute that he promised Wells Fargo on that. [00:18:36] Speaker 03: Right, on that one, but that's not the one. [00:18:38] Speaker 03: I mean, you've termed it a windfall, but it's, [00:18:42] Speaker 03: It seems another way to look at it is getting the benefit of your bargain or lack thereof by not signing something and therefore not being obligated. [00:18:54] Speaker 03: I would assume your clients will hammer anyone who signs a document and force them to live up to their obligations. [00:19:04] Speaker 03: Here someone does not sign a document. [00:19:08] Speaker 03: and still being forced to act as if he did sign the document. [00:19:15] Speaker 02: I agree that that is true again, but again your honor, I do think it wouldn't amount to a windfall for Mr. Smith. [00:19:20] Speaker 04: He did sign the original note, no question. [00:19:25] Speaker 02: But that note has been paid off. [00:19:27] Speaker 02: Yes it has. [00:19:28] Speaker 04: Why my client's marker? [00:19:30] Speaker 04: Your client didn't get an obligation from Mr. Smith. [00:19:33] Speaker 04: They did not. [00:19:34] Speaker 04: No. [00:19:35] Speaker 04: But I'm not sure why it's equitable to [00:19:39] Speaker 04: impose the benefit of your bargain on somebody who didn't enter the bargain. [00:19:43] Speaker 02: Well, Your Honor, again, I can only go back to the, in balancing these equities, the reality of it is the money that was expended in a refinance loan by HSBC through its predecessor in interest did pay off the loan for which Mr. Smith had securities. [00:20:02] Speaker 04: Why isn't it the case, as your opposing counsel has suggested on the brief, that you're a volunteer [00:20:12] Speaker 02: uh... we've made up his mind we address that in the briefer honor and i think i know it but not very successfully tell me again why you're not a volunteer [00:20:32] Speaker 02: Again, Your Honor, because certainly it would sort of defy logic to think that a lender would go out and expend $118,000 in a refinance loan. [00:20:38] Speaker 02: Except that we know they did. [00:20:39] Speaker 02: We know they did, and we know that it was an error. [00:20:40] Speaker 04: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:43] Speaker 04: They did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:43] Speaker 02: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:44] Speaker 04: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:45] Speaker 01: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:47] Speaker 01: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:48] Speaker 01: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:49] Speaker 01: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:50] Speaker 01: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:51] Speaker 01: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:52] Speaker 01: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:53] Speaker 01: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:55] Speaker 01: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:56] Speaker 01: We know they did, and we know they didn't. [00:20:57] Speaker ?: We know [00:20:58] Speaker 01: You call it a mistake, but it was a mistake from your vantage point. [00:21:02] Speaker 01: It wasn't a mistake from his vantage point. [00:21:03] Speaker 01: It was a hard bargain, and he won. [00:21:06] Speaker 01: Are we in the business of... [00:21:09] Speaker 01: fixing up bad negotiating strategies by banks? [00:21:13] Speaker 02: Well, I don't know that I would characterize it thusly, Your Honor. [00:21:15] Speaker 02: There was a settlement agent in the room, certainly not Fremont Bank. [00:21:18] Speaker 02: And yes, that settlement agent very clearly did make a mistake. [00:21:21] Speaker 04: You use the word agent, but he is correct. [00:21:25] Speaker 02: Fremont was in that room through that agent. [00:21:28] Speaker 02: Yes, Your Honor. [00:21:29] Speaker 02: I understand that point. [00:21:32] Speaker 02: I did want to circle in very briefly to the question about the Maryland common law. [00:21:38] Speaker 03: The consideration for what they did in paying off was the interest, Ms. [00:21:44] Speaker 03: Stevenson's interest. [00:21:46] Speaker 03: I mean, that's the problem. [00:21:47] Speaker 03: They assumed something was going to happen that didn't end up happening, right? [00:21:51] Speaker 03: That Mr. Smith's interest was going to be transferred. [00:21:54] Speaker 03: I think that was the assumption, at least the briefs and the submissions below portray it. [00:21:59] Speaker 03: Correct. [00:21:59] Speaker 03: That didn't end up happening. [00:22:02] Speaker 03: And then the question is whether the document is treated as if he signed it when he didn't sign it. [00:22:08] Speaker 03: I'm saying the same thing, and you've responded to it, but it strikes me that if the positions were reversed here, there'd be no mercy. [00:22:21] Speaker 02: Well, Your Honor, in part, I suppose I respond to that by pointing out that I realize I'm going well over my time. [00:22:27] Speaker 01: That's fine. [00:22:29] Speaker 01: I apologize. [00:22:30] Speaker 01: We're asking you questions. [00:22:32] Speaker 01: The red light only works for you. [00:22:33] Speaker 01: It doesn't work for us. [00:22:34] Speaker 02: Very good. [00:22:35] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:22:37] Speaker 02: I think that was a reality wrestled with by the court below, the courts below, when they did strike our first claim, the first count of the two count complaint address, [00:22:45] Speaker 02: sort of an attempt to reform the deed of trust to include Mr. Smith's signature. [00:22:50] Speaker 02: And that's, again, why the count that survived was the equity count. [00:22:53] Speaker 02: The court looked at it and said he didn't sign it. [00:22:56] Speaker 02: There's no excuse for that. [00:22:57] Speaker 02: We can't compel him to sign it. [00:22:59] Speaker 02: But looking at these tests as laid out in [00:23:02] Speaker 02: the governing case law in the district, we think the equities favor the imposition of a lien under the set conditions included in the order. [00:23:10] Speaker 01: And why do you think the D.C. [00:23:12] Speaker 01: Court of Appeals would follow the restatement rule and not the Maryland common law? [00:23:17] Speaker 02: Two reasons. [00:23:19] Speaker 02: One, because the D.C. [00:23:20] Speaker 02: Court of Appeals has made clear in each of the two governing cases that the most liberal of the possible standards is the one embraced in this jurisdiction. [00:23:29] Speaker 02: The second is the Maryland case... Well, they haven't addressed this issue specifically. [00:23:33] Speaker 02: Not this specific issue, no. [00:23:34] Speaker 02: But as a doctrine, they've said they brought us to the possible test. [00:23:39] Speaker 01: The other reason... Should we send it to them and have them tell us what they would do? [00:23:42] Speaker 01: Or is it so clear what they would do in your mind? [00:23:47] Speaker 02: I think the latter, Your Honor. [00:23:48] Speaker 02: I think that the imposition of winning under these circumstances was clear, yes. [00:23:52] Speaker 02: But the second point I'd make mention is that the GED Levinson case, which I've already attempted to distinguish in any event, is a case that was rendered well into the late 20th century. [00:24:07] Speaker 02: The notion that DC follows Maryland common law is true up into the incorporation of the District of Columbia because the common law was carved out of Maryland. [00:24:17] Speaker 02: GE v. Levenson is obviously a case well after the Charter for D.C., and so it's not binding into the extent it could be viewed as persuasive. [00:24:27] Speaker 02: I point out again that it is contrary, or at least in tone, and I think broad brushstrokes contradicted by Eastern Market. [00:24:36] Speaker 01: Okay, great. [00:24:36] Speaker 01: Thank you very much. [00:24:37] Speaker 01: We have another one. [00:24:39] Speaker 01: Mr. Smith, two minutes to rebut. [00:24:43] Speaker 01: Nothing new, just rebuttal from what you heard. [00:24:46] Speaker 05: With respect to the plaintiff's issue with regard to controlling precedents here in the District of Columbia, they point to Burgund and the quote unquote liberal approach. [00:25:01] Speaker 05: The Burgund court in that decision warned against extending the liberal approach too much. [00:25:10] Speaker 05: Quote, for while the liberalization of the law by equity [00:25:14] Speaker 05: was and is necessary and wholesome, it is not to be gainsaid that it is the price of uncertainty of decision which should be extended with great caution. [00:25:25] Speaker 05: Moreover, the relief from their folly of those who in respect of contemplated property transactions do not consult available lien records seem more the task of school than of the court. [00:25:38] Speaker 05: There it suggests that the Bagoom Court would, you know, in this day and age, follow the Maryland approach, which takes that actual knowledge would bar the application. [00:25:50] Speaker 05: The plaintiffs point to the equities here. [00:25:53] Speaker 05: The equities aren't the only points that they have to make to establish equitable segregation here. [00:26:02] Speaker 05: They have to, first of all, show that there are competing liens on the property, which is not. [00:26:10] Speaker 05: The defendants aren't requesting a windfall here. [00:26:12] Speaker 05: What the defendants are saying is that the equities do not [00:26:19] Speaker 05: favor the plaintiffs here, even in the Washington Supreme Court case in Ken B. Lee, that the jurisdiction which the plaintiffs rely on, the court there said that the insurance company should not be relieved from their obligations, contractual obligations. [00:26:36] Speaker 05: We think that that should control the issue. [00:26:39] Speaker 05: Thank you. [00:26:41] Speaker 01: Thank you very much. [00:26:41] Speaker 01: The case is submitted.