[00:00:01] Speaker 01: Case number 15-1082 at L, Ambersand Publishing, LLC, doing business at Santa Barbara News Press, petitioner, versus National Labor Relations Board. [00:00:11] Speaker 01: Mr. Dale for the petitioner, Ms. [00:00:12] Speaker 01: Roger Paske for the respondent. [00:00:59] Speaker 03: May it please the Court. [00:01:00] Speaker 03: Good morning. [00:01:01] Speaker 03: Good morning. [00:01:02] Speaker 03: My name is Joshua Robert Dale. [00:01:04] Speaker 03: I'm here arguing on behalf of Petitioner Ampersand Publishing LLC doing business as the Santa Barbara News Press. [00:01:11] Speaker 03: Primarily what this Court is faced with deciding is whether the issuance of investigatory subpoenas by the newspaper constituted a Section 8A1 violation. [00:01:22] Speaker 03: In the board finding that it did, it applied an impermissible per se standard for the issuance of any investigatory subpoenas that include a request for Cenk's statements. [00:01:34] Speaker 03: The board's per se rule that is now adopted and applied [00:01:38] Speaker 03: is contrary to both the Supreme Court's, it's not contrary, but it's not mandated by both the Supreme Court's decision in the NLRB v. Robbins tire and rubber company, nor is it supported by this circuit's still standing decision in retail clerks International Association AFL-CIO versus NLRB. [00:02:00] Speaker 03: Both of these cases stand only for the proposition that there's a possibility that requests for Cenk's statements prior to hearing could potentially be coercive. [00:02:12] Speaker 03: They do not, as the board has contended, has adopted a rule and has applied it against my client, stand for the proposition that such requests are inherently coercive or that they have an inherent danger of witness intimidation. [00:02:25] Speaker 03: And so what the board asks essentially is that it changes this court's prior precedent and follows a holding of a limited number of circuits in order to find that a per se rule should apply. [00:02:40] Speaker 03: Now, all of this comes within the context of the newspaper attempting to defend itself from multiple attacks on its exercise of its First Amendment rights, as has been recognized by [00:02:53] Speaker 03: The U.S. [00:02:54] Speaker 03: District Court for the Central District has been recognized in McDermott 2, recognized by the Ninth Circuit. [00:03:01] Speaker 03: I'm sorry, that was McDermott 2, and recognized by this court in Ampersand 1. [00:03:06] Speaker 03: And so the question becomes whether or not, and this will be addressed by my co-counsel in the hearing following this one in greater detail, whether or not the unconstitutional taint [00:03:18] Speaker 03: that this court found in Amfersand 1 that permeated all of the ULPs in that case has somehow been attenuated such that this ULP and the ULPs you will have... Have you forfeited the constitutional argument in this case? [00:03:33] Speaker 03: Our positions we have not. [00:03:34] Speaker 03: First, I would point... Tell me why you haven't. [00:03:36] Speaker 03: I would point out that actually within the record, within the answer itself to the charging document, the third affirmative defense that was presented by the newspaper, and that would be at specifically 189 of the record, they raised the issue of the general counsel is overstepping his constitutional authority. [00:03:59] Speaker 03: Now there's a question of whether that's sufficient [00:04:01] Speaker 04: Well, and it can certainly be read broadly. [00:04:07] Speaker 03: So, and we admit that it can be read broadly and perhaps not as narrow enough for purposes of NLRA issues in order to raise the issue. [00:04:18] Speaker 03: But the question then is whether the extraordinary circumstances doctrine applies. [00:04:22] Speaker 03: And as we have pointed out to this court in our briefing, the extraordinary circumstances doctrine most keenly applies here in a situation where there were two circumstances. [00:04:32] Speaker 03: First, you had repeated rejection by the board of the First Amendment arguments that had been raised below in the district court, again in McDermott 2, and again even in Ampersand 1. [00:04:46] Speaker 03: Then the second issue is, after the prior board decision was vacated pursuant to constitutional infirmity issues with the actual board, there was a subsequent order issued by the board that specifically said, we do not believe that any of the issues in ampersand 1 apply to this prior decision that we've made finding that a ULP exists. [00:05:11] Speaker 02: And that you didn't, in that period, while that was when the reconsideration petition was pending, the board said you hadn't asked the board to apply the ampersand one opinion from our court. [00:05:28] Speaker 02: Is that right? [00:05:29] Speaker 03: Well, and that is true with the context of it was permeating the issues throughout the ULPs you're going to hear about, as well as even this ULP. [00:05:38] Speaker 03: For example, in the motion for reconsideration, while this issue wasn't specifically addressed, there were discussions about issues related to the First Amendment that were being dealt with at the same time as they were dealing with the issue of this particular ULP, specifically issues having to do with discovery into the boycott [00:05:55] Speaker 03: the boycott out ULPs that ultimately were found in ampersand one were ultimately found similar in ampersand one to impugn the First Amendment rights of the client. [00:06:09] Speaker 02: Mr. Gorin, can you just help us out in explaining [00:06:13] Speaker 02: maybe sort of just putting aside the lead up, and I realize that that's not your position. [00:06:18] Speaker 02: You wouldn't put aside the lead up and the purpose of the unionization effort, but if this case came to us as a standalone, what is the threat to the newspaper's editorial control of the board's determination here? [00:06:38] Speaker 03: How is? [00:06:39] Speaker 03: Well, outside the context of the lead-up, there is no threat. [00:06:43] Speaker 03: I will concede that. [00:06:44] Speaker 03: But again, the issue here is the fact is there has been the lead-up. [00:06:49] Speaker 03: This newspaper is not Gannett, or the Tribune Company is a small newspaper that has been fighting for 10 years to try to deal with these issues. [00:06:59] Speaker 02: So that's really helpful. [00:07:02] Speaker 02: In what way, then, does the context [00:07:06] Speaker 02: color this, how is, just to spell it out a little bit more concretely, how the newspaper's First Amendment prerogatives and rights are affected by the application to it of the board's general rule about the confidentiality of its contact with employees. [00:07:26] Speaker 03: Well, it's affected only in the sense that it is yet another ULP that the newspaper has to defend against, and one in which there is a quick rush to judgment of an adverse finding, including a reliance on prior decisions of an ALJ that are ultimately vacated by this court in ampersand one. [00:07:53] Speaker 04: U.L.P. [00:07:54] Speaker 04: charges in dispute with the union. [00:07:59] Speaker 04: Doesn't that sound like what you're saying now that we're immunized from any U.L.P. [00:08:04] Speaker 04: proceedings because of the prior unconstitutional decisions of the board? [00:08:10] Speaker 03: Our position is that there is a limited immunization to the extent that there has been no evidence that the improper purpose for which the Union was originally formed and continued to bargain with regard to editorial content issues continued up through 2012. [00:08:28] Speaker 03: It continued through the period in which this ULP and the ULPs you'll hear about in 1074 were filed. [00:08:35] Speaker 03: So to the extent there's been no establishment that the union has changed course, that we would say there is in fact a limited ability to be immunized, particularly in the context of... [00:08:59] Speaker 04: unconstitutional purpose or anti-constitutional purpose of the union. [00:09:05] Speaker 03: I think it comes directly out of Ampersand 1 itself. [00:09:08] Speaker 04: I don't remember exactly that in language. [00:09:11] Speaker 04: No, but I am somewhat familiar with that. [00:09:15] Speaker 03: I think I remember reading that somewhere. [00:09:16] Speaker 03: It comes out of Ampersand 1 itself. [00:09:21] Speaker 03: And remember, these same arguments about individual ULPs not necessarily touching upon constitutionally-informed issues was raised throughout that argument. [00:09:31] Speaker 03: And ultimately, in deciding Ampersand 1, and in preparing for this, there was a brief filed on behalf of the paper. [00:09:37] Speaker 03: There was 95 pages of which five were devoted [00:09:40] Speaker 03: This is Ampersand 1 to the issue of the First Amendment, and the other 90 were devoted to each of the individual ULPs. [00:09:48] Speaker 03: And in Ampersand 1, this court said, well, wait a second. [00:09:50] Speaker 03: The scope of this taint, the impact of the infringement upon the newspaper is so great that we're not even going to go through this analysis. [00:10:00] Speaker 03: case-by-case analysis, we are going to, based on the First Amendment issue, say that the board should not be enforcing ULPs on behalf of a union that has this improper purpose. [00:10:12] Speaker 02: So who needs to dispel the taint and how would you envision that that would be done? [00:10:21] Speaker 02: Your view is that there's kind of a presumptive immunity from ULPs unless and until [00:10:29] Speaker 02: Fill in the blank. [00:10:31] Speaker 03: I think there's probably the easiest way is the union would have to be decertified and recertified. [00:10:38] Speaker 03: Or alternatively, perhaps if the board could demonstrate that it was prosecuting these ULPs on the basis of something other than the ongoing board's or the ongoing union's desire to control editorial content. [00:10:55] Speaker 03: And again, maybe we've reached that point already. [00:10:57] Speaker 04: What does this one today have [00:10:59] Speaker 04: with the data to work on. [00:11:03] Speaker 03: Well, this specific one does not. [00:11:07] Speaker 03: You're going to hear in 1082 about how there are some. [00:11:11] Speaker 03: Well, that'll be in 1082. [00:11:13] Speaker 03: But again, remember, this is a ULP that the newspaper is defending after being charged with a bunch of other ULPs and is fighting tooth and nail to defend itself against the second onslaught of attempts by the Union [00:11:30] Speaker 03: to try to cede editorial control. [00:11:34] Speaker 04: And so without getting too much into attending... But I don't see what this particular ULP has to do with whether the union is going to see this or... [00:11:43] Speaker 03: Well, it doesn't necessarily have to do, again, unless you deal with it in the context. [00:11:51] Speaker 03: And ultimately, if this court were to find that the First Amendment issue maybe didn't pervade 1082 but did pervade 1074, our position is that we still succeed because the test that has been applied here by the board is overbroad. [00:12:08] Speaker 03: and has not been adopted by a majority of the circuits. [00:12:12] Speaker 03: And there are compelling public policy reasons why it shouldn't be adopted by this circuit. [00:12:18] Speaker 03: And I see my time has expired. [00:12:20] Speaker 03: Okay, we'll give you some time on rebuttal. [00:12:23] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:12:36] Speaker 00: May it please the court? [00:12:38] Speaker 00: My name is Neelakshmi Rajapaksa. [00:12:40] Speaker 00: I'm counsel for the National Labor Relations Board. [00:12:43] Speaker 00: I'd like to begin by addressing the unfair labor practice. [00:12:48] Speaker 00: The board used a standard here that it has announced since the 1960s in cases like Winn-Dixie stores and Braswell Motor Freight. [00:12:57] Speaker 00: The board considers pre-hearing requests for affidavits to be inherently coercive, and that is because [00:13:04] Speaker 00: Employees necessarily would feel inhibited by an employer's expression of inquisitive interest in what the employees had to say to the board. [00:13:13] Speaker 00: It's a very sort of elementary proposition that was recognized by the Supreme Court in Robin's Tyre as well in the context of a FOIA case. [00:13:21] Speaker 00: In terms of the company's contention that some different standard applies, the standard applied by the Fourth Circuit in other cases, even assuming that that were the standard, the company wouldn't win under that standard because even if this court took in the circumstances surrounding the company's request, the coercion was apparent on the face of what the company did here. [00:13:43] Speaker 00: The company served official government subpoenas on employees, two employees directly, eight employees through an agent, and essentially indicated to the employees that they had to produce their affidavits. [00:13:57] Speaker 00: They had to appear before a judge and produce the affidavits that were given to the board during the investigation. [00:14:03] Speaker 00: So taking in the circumstances in the board's view doesn't eliminate the unfair labor practice here. [00:14:10] Speaker 00: In terms of the company's argument that there's a First Amendment issue and a sort of impediment to finding the unfair labor practice in this case, [00:14:20] Speaker 00: I'll first say the board adheres to its position that this issue is not before the court because it wasn't properly raised in the proceedings below and the company had multiple opportunities to raise it. [00:14:32] Speaker 00: The company could have raised it on exceptions to the board. [00:14:35] Speaker 00: The company could have raised it in a motion for reconsideration of the 2012 decision of the board. [00:14:41] Speaker 00: The company could have raised it on a motion for reconsideration of the 2015 reissued decision. [00:14:48] Speaker 00: And so there's really no excuse for the dereliction here by the company that should warrant considering this issue at this point. [00:14:58] Speaker 00: If the court wanted to look at the First Amendment issue, I respectfully submit that there is nothing to see, as Judge Santel, I believe, has suggested somewhat in his questioning of my opposing counsel. [00:15:13] Speaker 00: This case has nothing whatsoever to do with the newspaper's right to control the content of its paper. [00:15:21] Speaker 00: That is the essence of the First Amendment protection that we agree belongs to the publisher of the newspaper, and we certainly [00:15:28] Speaker 00: appreciate the court's findings in Ampersand 1. [00:15:32] Speaker 00: But just to be clear, Ampersand 1 was a case in which the company was reacting to employee efforts that were mainly driven by their desire to take control over some editorial aspects of the newspaper. [00:15:47] Speaker 00: this case does not involve a reaction to unprotected employee activity. [00:15:52] Speaker 00: It involves the company's proactive coercion of employees in regard to something that has nothing to do with the content of the newspaper. [00:16:01] Speaker 02: Well, the union itself has characterized its whole effort as really motivated by this desire to push back and a desire that has been decided by this court in Ampersand 1 to have been [00:16:17] Speaker 02: overreaching in violation of the paper's First Amendment rights. [00:16:20] Speaker 02: So the whole point of having a union, being part of a union, asserting rights within the union from the perspective of these employees was to gain more control over what they call journalistic ethics. [00:16:37] Speaker 02: Then is there not any burden on the union to expunge that taint? [00:16:47] Speaker 00: Well, I'll say two things, Your Honor. [00:16:49] Speaker 00: In the first place, because this issue was not raised before the board, there isn't a record of what the employees' ongoing activities were and whether they were related to content control. [00:17:02] Speaker 00: I think you'll see that in the other case. [00:17:04] Speaker 00: There will probably be discussion of the employees' activities. [00:17:08] Speaker 00: But in terms of expunging taint, there is no precedent for the kind of remedy, the extraordinary remedy, [00:17:17] Speaker 00: that the company is asking for. [00:17:19] Speaker 00: And again, along the 10 E-lines, the company didn't ask the board to impose that. [00:17:24] Speaker 02: Did the company ever move to decertify the union on that ground? [00:17:28] Speaker 00: Could the company? [00:17:29] Speaker 02: Did they? [00:17:30] Speaker 00: No, they didn't. [00:17:31] Speaker 00: And they, frankly, Your Honor, they couldn't petition to decertify the union based on its view that the union is illegitimate. [00:17:43] Speaker 00: Because certifications, petitions regarding certifications usually have to do with gauging employee interest and being represented. [00:17:52] Speaker 00: But the company could have refused to bargain with the union, which it has not done, to my knowledge. [00:17:58] Speaker 04: In this record, you don't- That subjects them to an unfair labor practice proceeding in itself. [00:18:04] Speaker 04: It does, but if they believe- There is really no procedure for an employer to litigate certification or decertification without subjecting itself to the possibility of ULP. [00:18:16] Speaker 00: That's correct, Your Honor. [00:18:17] Speaker 00: That is correct. [00:18:19] Speaker 00: the company could have addressed this just by arguing in this case for this remedy. [00:18:26] Speaker 00: The problem here is really that it's asking a court to impose, to basically add a remedy that the board never had an opportunity to consider, which is the essence of what the... It would be your position, contrary to your opposing counsel, that's why you're in opposition, that this is asking us to [00:18:50] Speaker 02: yes exactly that's precisely the point your honor but they would have had to to raise it before the board would they not have had to amend their petition for re [00:19:07] Speaker 02: Consideration? [00:19:08] Speaker 02: I'm just trying to get the timing straight. [00:19:10] Speaker 00: Well, they filed a motion for reconsideration in 2012. [00:19:16] Speaker 00: But then after Noel Canning issued, the board took this case up again and then issued another decision. [00:19:24] Speaker 00: At that point, which was 2015, so long after Ampersand 1 issued, to the extent that the court thinks that Ampersand 1 [00:19:32] Speaker 00: uh... was relevant to the employer's decisions about what to argue and percent one had been on the books for years and so in two thousand fifteen it was really incumbent on the company to bring this up if in fact it truly believed that there is an ongoing attack on its first amendment rights that should be considered as a part of this very straightforward case about improper requests for affidavits. [00:19:59] Speaker 00: The court has no further questions. [00:20:00] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:20:02] Speaker 04: We'll give you a minute for a bottle. [00:20:09] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:20:11] Speaker 03: Without regard to the First Amendment issue, I think it's important for this Court to be made aware of the circumstances under which these particular subpoenas were issued and how they've been characterized such that [00:20:24] Speaker 03: To find that they exhibit the level of coerciveness that you would see in a case like, for example, Winn-Dixie or even retail clerks, this own circuit's decision, would be unfair and particularly inapt to this case. [00:20:40] Speaker 03: You have a situation where the board is asking the court to determine that the issuance of subpoenas themselves, which are a recognized investigatory tool, not only in NLRB proceedings, but in court proceedings in general, that somehow the receipt of a subpoena is inherently coercive. [00:20:58] Speaker 03: And I think that's a [00:21:00] Speaker 03: a bridge too far. [00:21:02] Speaker 03: And the reason why is you go back to the Robbins decision and Robbins was specifically concerned with balancing the interests of the ability of investigatory [00:21:12] Speaker 03: acts by the employer with the right of the board to conduct its own investigation free of intimidation. [00:21:18] Speaker 03: So to apply or adopt a per se rule that holds the receipt of a subpoena is inherently coercive is anathema to that. [00:21:25] Speaker 03: And with that, unless the court has any further questions. [00:21:29] Speaker 04: Thank you. [00:21:29] Speaker 04: This case is submitted.