[00:00:02] Speaker 00: Case number 16-7102, Pamela Duarte, appellant versus Michael Edward Nolan at L. Miss Outlaw for the appellant, Miss Graham for appellate Michael Edward Nolan, and Miss Aleppo for appellate Helix Electric Inc. [00:00:48] Speaker 05: Yes. [00:00:49] Speaker 05: Good morning. [00:00:59] Speaker 06: I query this morning as to how I wanted to allot my time. [00:01:03] Speaker 06: So I'm going to do 12 minutes for my oral argument, and then three minutes. [00:01:09] Speaker 06: That's fine. [00:01:11] Speaker 06: Your Honor, looking at this case, it almost sounds as if [00:01:18] Speaker 06: the appellant plaintiff was required to prove the fact that Helix, the corporation in this case, was in fact doing business in the District of Columbia, rather than deal with how the facts were pled in the complaint. [00:01:39] Speaker 06: So when the court looks at the record, it will note that [00:01:45] Speaker 06: Several complaints were filed and amended to comply with the arguments raised by the defendants in this case. [00:01:56] Speaker 06: Of course, it's a diversity action where the plaintiff [00:02:00] Speaker 06: is a resident of the District of Columbia and where the driver of the vehicle resides in California. [00:02:07] Speaker 06: And the corporation that he was employed with and who he was working for at that time was, in fact, a California corporation. [00:02:18] Speaker 06: When the motion was filed to dismiss the case, it was filed based upon lack of personal jurisdiction. [00:02:25] Speaker 06: And they cited 13-4-2-3. [00:02:30] Speaker 06: So the plaintiff, in fact, responded to that motion and therefore amended the complaint to comply with 13-423. [00:02:46] Speaker 06: But the court, and submitted evidence, what I'm impressed with, this court seems to know the cases very well. [00:02:53] Speaker 06: So I will assume the court has looked at the evidence that was submitted to support the fact that Helix Corporation, in fact, [00:03:03] Speaker 06: I was doing business in the District of Columbia. [00:03:06] Speaker 06: When the case was first filed, we had no reason to believe that they were doing business except that they were in fact advertising for employees to work for their company in the District of Columbia, and they listed Washington, D.C. [00:03:20] Speaker 06: as one of their offices. [00:03:22] Speaker 06: That address was listed as Chantilly. [00:03:26] Speaker 06: So once the opposition was filed, [00:03:29] Speaker 06: Then that led us to look further to see that on the court system, see had they ever been sued before and found that there were three cases in the District of Columbia where they had been sued. [00:03:43] Speaker 06: Two of them they were the plaintiffs and one of them they were the defendant. [00:03:47] Speaker 06: So we produced the evidence to the district court indicating that based upon the website, based upon the fact that they were listing Washington, D.C., where they do business, that they were seeking employees to work in the District of Columbia, and that they had been sued and sued in the District of Columbia, that that constituted personal jurisdiction. [00:04:11] Speaker 06: The court did not accept that argument and, in fact, dismissed the case. [00:04:18] Speaker 06: And in dismissing the case, they wrote in their opinion, they cited 13-422. [00:04:24] Speaker 06: Well, that prompted plaintiffs to do further research. [00:04:31] Speaker 06: And at that point, because [00:04:34] Speaker 06: We also relied on the fact that when the defendant, Helix, filed their opposition, they attached two exhibits, one and two, showing that Helix was in fact incorporated in Virginia and in California. [00:04:52] Speaker 06: So there was no reason for us to doubt that they were not in fact incorporated in the District of Columbia. [00:04:58] Speaker 06: But once the case was dismissed, [00:05:01] Speaker 06: we decided to do further research to see what connections did this company in fact have with the District of Columbia. [00:05:08] Speaker 06: And the driver has been with the company over 23 years as a superintendent there and when he was involved in the accident with the plaintiff had represented that he was working for his employer at the time. [00:05:22] Speaker 05: Isn't the problem on that? [00:05:24] Speaker 05: The Supreme Court has set a very high standard to the principal place of business where the company's incorporated or the contacts or affiliations have to be so constant and pervasive as to render it essentially at home in the foreign state. [00:05:42] Speaker 05: And I acknowledge what you've produced, but that seems a bit shy of what the Supreme Court has set as the standard. [00:05:51] Speaker 05: of contacts or affiliations, I should say, that are so constant and pervasive as to render it at home. [00:05:59] Speaker 06: Yes, Your Honor, and I feel that the at-home clause is a bit subjective because it requires the court, especially if it's a single-member court, to decide what's at home. [00:06:09] Speaker 06: And so with the court citing Daimler, we found the Ross case where the facts were so very, very similar to this case where the driver was an out-of-state driver, the corporation was the California Corporation, but they were in fact registered to do business in the District of Columbia. [00:06:28] Speaker 06: So after finding that case, and I raise this because due diligence was raised in one of the motions, we went to the DC website and found no records of Helix being incorporated in District of Columbia. [00:06:42] Speaker 06: We have in fact included in the appendix a copy of the website where it says no records found. [00:06:50] Speaker 06: We had to literally call [00:06:53] Speaker 06: again, down to the Consumer Regulatory Affairs. [00:06:56] Speaker 06: And they went into some special code. [00:06:59] Speaker 06: And there we found that they were, in fact, licensed to do business in District of Columbia. [00:07:03] Speaker 06: So they're licensed. [00:07:05] Speaker 06: Then they fall under 13-422. [00:07:07] Speaker 06: And not only did it show they were licensed, it showed that they've been filing annual reports since 2012. [00:07:14] Speaker 06: It showed that they're building the Navy Yard over a $5 million complex. [00:07:20] Speaker 06: It showed that we then decided to go even further and look at the court records in the Superior Court, where they were parties to the suit. [00:07:29] Speaker 06: And the answer, the complaint stated that they were licensed to do business in DC. [00:07:35] Speaker 06: And he looks, answer, yes, we are. [00:07:36] Speaker 06: They admitted that. [00:07:37] Speaker 03: But lots of companies and corporations are licensed to do business in various states. [00:07:45] Speaker 03: That doesn't mean that they are essentially at home in every one of those states. [00:07:50] Speaker 06: Your Honor, I understand what the court is saying, but I would argue they are at home, but they feel comfortable enough to file suit in the District of Columbia. [00:07:57] Speaker 06: And if they are, in fact, being sued in the District of Columbia, and they are not objecting to jurisdiction and admitting in two or three other cases that, yes, we do businesses here, so we're subjecting ourselves to this jurisdiction, I don't think the spending gets to pick and choose when they want to be subject to the jurisdiction of this court and when they don't. [00:08:18] Speaker 03: But I mean, the company, I mean, I can, let's say I'm a traveling salesman and I go to California. [00:08:29] Speaker 03: and I get into a car accident, and I sue someone because of that car accident. [00:08:35] Speaker 03: And let's say I also make sales in California. [00:08:40] Speaker 03: But then on something completely unrelated, somebody sues me in California. [00:08:46] Speaker 03: Well, just because I had previously filed suit in California related to an incident that happened in California, [00:08:55] Speaker 03: And because I occasionally go there to do business, doesn't mean that I'm at home in California if I'm resident here in Washington. [00:09:04] Speaker 06: Your Honor, I would agree with the court if it wasn't for the fact, had they filed a motion to dismiss the case where they were sued in the District of Columbia based on lack of personal jurisdiction, then I would say, yes, they don't feel at home. [00:09:16] Speaker 06: But the fact that they did not raise that issue in that case [00:09:22] Speaker 06: then you can't have defendants subjecting themselves to jurisdiction. [00:09:27] Speaker 06: And not only that, this court would be bound. [00:09:28] Speaker 06: At DC, Superior Court is recognizing them. [00:09:31] Speaker 03: So if they waive personal jurisdiction defense in one case or don't raise it in some case, then they can't. [00:09:37] Speaker 03: They're forever barred from raising it in other cases. [00:09:39] Speaker 06: I think it's a clear indication when you take it in totality, when you take the fact that they have a registered agent in D.C., when you take the fact that they are licensed to do business in D.C., that they've been doing business since 2012, that they have a Board of Governors filed with the Consumer Regulatory Affairs, that they're suing and being sued, that they are at home in the District of Palau. [00:10:01] Speaker 03: But you didn't serve a registered agent in D.C. [00:10:06] Speaker 03: in this case. [00:10:07] Speaker 06: Well, at that time, we did not know they were doing business in the District of Columbia. [00:10:11] Speaker 06: We served them as a California under diversity of jurisdiction. [00:10:14] Speaker 06: We complied with that statute. [00:10:16] Speaker 06: Had the defendant not raised the fact that personal jurisdiction was required, we would not have been looking into that avenue. [00:10:24] Speaker 06: And when they filed their motion and said they're only incorporated in two states, Virginia and California, there would be no reason to think that they were even incorporated here. [00:10:35] Speaker 06: We had no reason to believe that. [00:10:38] Speaker 06: So, the Dahmer case, which the court relied on, seems to act as if it's negating the Ross case. [00:10:50] Speaker 06: But the Ross case is still the law. [00:10:52] Speaker 06: It has not been overruled. [00:10:55] Speaker 03: Can you talk about the Ross case from the U.S. [00:10:57] Speaker 03: District Court? [00:10:58] Speaker 06: I'm talking about [00:11:01] Speaker 06: Ross versus product development, 736 federal supplement, 285. [00:11:06] Speaker 06: And this is a 1989 case. [00:11:10] Speaker 06: And in that case, the court determined that the employee, there was not sufficient contact with the employee. [00:11:18] Speaker 06: But there was, because the California corporation was registered in DC, that there was sufficient context for them to, in fact, be sued in the District of Columbia. [00:11:27] Speaker 03: But we have a problem, as Judge Kavanaugh points out, we have a more recent U.S. [00:11:34] Speaker 03: Supreme Court case that is binding on us. [00:11:38] Speaker 03: Ross case isn't binding on us. [00:11:40] Speaker 03: U.S. [00:11:41] Speaker 03: District Court opinions aren't binding on us. [00:11:44] Speaker 03: U.S. [00:11:44] Speaker 03: Supreme Court opinions are. [00:11:47] Speaker 06: I would contend that [00:11:49] Speaker 06: The Daimler case does not negate Ross. [00:11:52] Speaker 06: Ross just defines what constitutes being at home without saying that. [00:11:57] Speaker 06: It says, if people are doing this kind of activity in the state, they can receive it in the District of Columbia. [00:12:03] Speaker 06: If Daimler wanted to overrule it, it would say that. [00:12:06] Speaker 06: It just says, make sure the company feels like they're at home. [00:12:11] Speaker 06: So we could have one court, and it didn't define it. [00:12:14] Speaker 06: It didn't break it down. [00:12:16] Speaker 06: It didn't break down what at home is. [00:12:18] Speaker 05: Well, it did seem to rely on where the company's incorporated, where its principal place of business is, and then indicated there could be exceptional circumstances that would allow you to declare a company at home even without those two. [00:12:34] Speaker 05: So I think it did flesh it out to some extent. [00:12:38] Speaker 06: And use the language that doing consistent, systematic, continuous business in that jurisdiction. [00:12:45] Speaker 06: And that's where 13-422 faltered. [00:12:48] Speaker 06: And we contend with all of the evidence. [00:12:51] Speaker 06: And Your Honor, we ask for a hearing. [00:12:54] Speaker 06: And we ask for discovery because we feel that the evidence will show that when Ms. [00:13:00] Speaker 06: Stewart was hit by Mr. Nolan, and he indicated he was working on a project in Virginia, that he was driving a vehicle [00:13:10] Speaker 06: registered in California. [00:13:12] Speaker 06: So he had drove all the way from California to Virginia. [00:13:17] Speaker 06: So after 23 years of being a superintendent, it's highly likely that he's working on projects here in the District of Columbia as well. [00:13:26] Speaker 06: So we'd ask for a hearing, and we'd ask for discovery. [00:13:30] Speaker 06: And we relied on the law in the District of Columbia that says discovery is permitted to prove personal jurisdiction. [00:13:38] Speaker 06: We weren't given the hearing, and we weren't given discovery. [00:13:41] Speaker 06: this case was dismissed because the complaint did not plead sufficiently. [00:13:48] Speaker 06: And we've amended it three times. [00:13:49] Speaker 06: And if you look at the Third Amendment, everything I'm saying to you now, Your Honor, is there coupled with evidence to support it. [00:13:57] Speaker 06: So we feel like it was abuse of the court's discretion to just dismiss this case without the evidence in your hand, which is permitted. [00:14:07] Speaker 06: by Rule 12. [00:14:09] Speaker 06: Now, one other thing I would ask this Court to consider is that the defendants raised the point of 13-423 in their responsive plea. [00:14:20] Speaker 06: They never raised 13-422. [00:14:22] Speaker 06: We would contend under Rule 12H, they've waived this defense, and that we cannot dismiss this case based upon [00:14:32] Speaker 06: a personal jurisdiction 13-423, since we're now dealing with 13-422, which they did not raise in their initial plea. [00:14:42] Speaker 06: So we'd ask the court to remand this to the lower court, have it either allow discovery to determine the connection and the continuous contact that we believe will show that Nolan is in fact doing business in the District of Columbia with his employer. [00:15:01] Speaker 06: and that a hearing be set to prove their connections with the district. [00:15:06] Speaker 06: If it is determined that this was not sufficient, that what we have here is not sufficient enough evidence. [00:15:12] Speaker 04: OK. [00:15:12] Speaker 04: Thank you. [00:15:13] Speaker 04: We'll give you time for a rebuttal. [00:15:14] Speaker 06: All right. [00:15:14] Speaker 06: Thank you. [00:15:22] Speaker 02: Good morning, Honors. [00:15:24] Speaker 02: May it please the court, Eric Leppo of Semsbone and Sims on behalf of Hewlett's Electric. [00:15:31] Speaker 02: The district court was correct in dismissing this matter for lack of personal jurisdiction, both over Helix Electric and Mr. Nolan in the District of Columbia. [00:15:41] Speaker 02: It's a motor vehicle accident. [00:15:42] Speaker 02: It's a personal injury case that occurred in Richmond, Virginia. [00:15:46] Speaker 02: There's no question about that. [00:15:48] Speaker 02: There is a lot of mixing up of facts and terms with regard to the relevant law. [00:15:55] Speaker 02: and issues. [00:15:56] Speaker 02: There's a mixture of general jurisdiction versus specific jurisdiction. [00:16:01] Speaker 02: There's a mixture of whether or not a company is incorporated in the District of Columbia versus whether it's registered to do business there. [00:16:07] Speaker 02: And there's a mixing kind of of the, you know, what falls under the state's long arm statute versus constitutional due process. [00:16:15] Speaker 02: The plaintiff failed to plead an adequate basis for personal jurisdiction over Helix in her original complaint. [00:16:21] Speaker 02: or any of the papers submitted thereafter under the current state of the law, which is the law post Goodyear and Daimler. [00:16:30] Speaker 02: This isn't talking about the District of Columbia's jurisdictional statutes or the long arm statute, but rather all of the case law that says even if you're going to apply the long arm statute, it still has to comport with [00:16:43] Speaker 02: due process of the Constitution, which is what Daimler is looking at. [00:16:47] Speaker 02: And that's looking at general jurisdiction when the underlying facts have nothing to do with the corporation's contacts with the location or the place that the matter is filed. [00:17:00] Speaker 02: Here, it might not be clear from the briefing, but Helix has never indicated that we're not registered to do business in the District of Columbia or that they don't have projects in the District of Columbia. [00:17:11] Speaker 02: Any assertion otherwise is not accurate. [00:17:16] Speaker 02: They are not incorporated in the District of Columbia. [00:17:19] Speaker 02: In fact, they incorporated in California and their principal place of business is in California. [00:17:24] Speaker 02: It's a little bit unclear, both from the pleadings and the briefing, which provision appellant is relying on, whether it's 13-422, 13-423, or one that's really never been asserted [00:17:40] Speaker 02: clearly 13334 of the D.C. [00:17:43] Speaker 02: Code, and that is the code provision regarding foreign corporations. [00:17:49] Speaker 02: The law is clear. [00:17:50] Speaker 02: It's in Ross that it doesn't just apply to serving a foreign corporation. [00:17:56] Speaker 02: It does provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant. [00:18:02] Speaker 02: However, there's a couple of problems with using it here. [00:18:07] Speaker 02: As Judge Wilkins had already noted, there wasn't service on Helix in the District of Columbia. [00:18:15] Speaker 02: In fact, the service was made on Helix on CT Court in Glen Allen, Virginia, and I believe the summons indicate that as well. [00:18:24] Speaker 02: The case law is clear. [00:18:25] Speaker 02: I believe this Court's opinion in Gorman versus Ameritrade [00:18:29] Speaker 02: F3rd 506 at 514 talks about the fact that service in the District of Columbia is necessary in order for that code provision to be used for jurisdiction. [00:18:45] Speaker 02: Appellant, I believe she's already stated, there's an acknowledgement that the DC area office of Helix is in Chantilly, Virginia. [00:18:53] Speaker 02: It is not in the district. [00:18:56] Speaker 02: And to the extent Ross is a case that's significantly on point. [00:19:00] Speaker 02: There's an out of state motor vehicle accident. [00:19:03] Speaker 02: The case was filed in the District of Columbia. [00:19:05] Speaker 02: There's two problems with Ross, the biggest of which, first of course is Ross was decided, it was a district court opinion, [00:19:12] Speaker 02: But it was decided 25 years before Daimler, and Ross clearly says that the statute being applied from District of Columbia has to also comport with constitutional due process. [00:19:27] Speaker 02: So there's no question about that, and what constitutional due process is now is different than it was at the time of Ross, certainly based on Goodyear and Daimler, as we've indicated in our papers. [00:19:38] Speaker 02: And then, beyond that, Ross also relies on 13334, again, which requires that service be made in the District of Columbia on a resident agent in the district. [00:19:54] Speaker 02: The plaintiff could have pursued this action properly in Virginia or California against both Helix and Mr. Nolan for a vehicle accident that occurred in Virginia, and they simply failed to do so. [00:20:08] Speaker 02: I am happy to address any questions that the court might have. [00:20:11] Speaker 02: I don't believe there's any need to address the court's second order, which declined to set aside the original decision. [00:20:20] Speaker 02: But otherwise, I would submit on our papers if there are no questions. [00:20:23] Speaker 02: OK, thank you very much. [00:20:24] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honors. [00:20:39] Speaker 01: Good morning, Your Honors. [00:20:41] Speaker 01: Allison Graham on behalf of the appellee, Michael Edward Nolan, who was a defendant below. [00:20:47] Speaker 01: As you've heard today, this action arises out of a lunar vehicle accident that took place in Virginia. [00:20:54] Speaker 01: The issue before this court is whether or not plaintiff met her burden of pleading sufficient facts to overcome the issue of personal jurisdiction. [00:21:04] Speaker 01: I submit to you that plaintiff has not met that burden. [00:21:08] Speaker 01: With regard to the defendant's helix of corporation and my client, defendant Nolan, this court has to evaluate personal jurisdiction separately as to each defendant. [00:21:21] Speaker 01: Doing that analysis, [00:21:23] Speaker 01: one would conclude personal jurisdiction is not met here. [00:21:27] Speaker 01: Personal jurisdiction has two subcategories, general and specific. [00:21:32] Speaker 01: There is no general personal jurisdiction as to defendant Nolan because that's based on domicile. [00:21:39] Speaker 01: It's clear from plaintiff's pleadings that Defendant Nolan is a resident and citizen of California and therefore is not domiciled in the District of Columbia for purposes of obtaining general jurisdiction. [00:21:52] Speaker 01: And as such, as to Defendant Nolan 13-422 is inapplicable. [00:21:59] Speaker 01: With regard to specific jurisdiction, you look to the District of Columbia's long-arm statute and also to whether or not it comports with due process. [00:22:09] Speaker 01: Here, neither of those two branches is met. [00:22:14] Speaker 01: Specifically, the pleadings and various motions to dismiss oppositions in reply filed in the court below, it's very unclear which aspect of the District of Columbia long-arm statute is trying to be applied by plaintiff with regard to defendant Nolan. [00:22:33] Speaker 01: Regardless, however, you read the statute and by its plain language it says that the claim for relief must arise from the person transacting business in the District of Columbia. [00:22:45] Speaker 01: The plaintiff filed a series of complaints, two of which were ever accepted by the court. [00:22:50] Speaker 01: The other three were filed as missions to amend and have the amended complaint accepted filing. [00:22:57] Speaker 01: However, in all these iterations of that complaint, including the ones that were not ever accepted but were in fact considered by the court below, the allegations don't mean that the accident arose from transacting business in the District of Columbia. [00:23:13] Speaker 01: Rather, it's clear that the accident occurred in Virginia and in the second amended complaint that was never accepted and the other two [00:23:24] Speaker 01: She, plaintiff, alleges that at the scene of that accident in Virginia, the defendant, Nolan, stated he was working on a project in Virginia. [00:23:34] Speaker 01: She also, in those subsequent iterations, alleges that defendant Nolan was a superintendent. [00:23:41] Speaker 01: Taking those two statements together, a superintendent oversees specific jobs. [00:23:45] Speaker 01: If he was working in Virginia, he would have been overseeing jobs in Virginia. [00:23:49] Speaker 01: And regardless, the fact that the accident happened in Virginia defeats the fact that it could have occurred while transacting business in the District of Columbia. [00:23:57] Speaker 01: And therefore, it doesn't need 13-423A1. [00:24:03] Speaker 01: Similarly, there's no allegations in any iteration of the complaint. [00:24:07] Speaker 01: that defendant Nolan was contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia, thus defeating 13423A2 of that. [00:24:16] Speaker 01: As this incident happened in Virginia, we overcome 13423A3. [00:24:23] Speaker 01: And the fourth component of the personal jurisdiction long-arm statute [00:24:32] Speaker 01: Talks about causing injury inside of the District of Columbia for an act to do that took place outside of the District of Columbia. [00:24:41] Speaker 01: That too, however, does not apply here because [00:24:44] Speaker 01: it wouldn't comport with the due process requirements that must be met. [00:24:50] Speaker 01: And based on the allegations in the complaint as to Defendant Nolan, it doesn't meet one of those plus factors that has been discussed by this court in the Crane case and also discussed in the Copley Batiglia case. [00:25:05] Speaker 01: And that's essentially that he has to regularly either solicit business, engage in business, [00:25:12] Speaker 01: or other or derived substantial revenue from goods and services in the District of Columbia. [00:25:17] Speaker 01: There's not a single allegation in the complaint to meet that. [00:25:20] Speaker 01: And therefore, there's no allegations in any of the iterations of the complaint to satisfy the requirements of the District of Columbia long-arm statute as to defendant Nolan. [00:25:31] Speaker 01: And as such, she did not meet her burden with regard to pleading. [00:25:36] Speaker 01: In addition, as you can see from the record, there was numerous iterations of the complaint. [00:25:41] Speaker 01: We don't file complaints and pleadings by error. [00:25:44] Speaker 01: It's not, you know, I get an infinite number of shots to get this correct. [00:25:50] Speaker 01: There is sufficient information without any discovery to have pledged sufficient facts to get you into the District of Columbia if the District of Columbia were in fact the appropriate court to oversee this case. [00:26:04] Speaker 01: Here, however, based on the facts pled and the facts at issue in this case, personal jurisdiction simply is not present in the District of Columbia, whereas it would have been present in Virginia or California. [00:26:21] Speaker 01: With that being said, if you all have any questions, please feel free to ask. [00:26:26] Speaker 01: OK. [00:26:27] Speaker 04: Thank you. [00:26:29] Speaker 04: We have your submission. [00:26:31] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:26:32] Speaker 04: We'll give two minutes for a bottle. [00:26:50] Speaker 06: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:26:51] Speaker 06: Your Honor, in our brief recited will be comment notes to Rule 15, which says the right to amend once as a matter of course is no longer terminated by service of a responsive pleading. [00:27:05] Speaker 06: The responsive pleading may point out issues that the original pleader had not considered. [00:27:10] Speaker 06: and persuade the pleader that amendment is wise. [00:27:14] Speaker 06: So based upon that rule, we would not want to be penalized because we did not anticipate that the defendants were going to raise 13-423. [00:27:27] Speaker 06: And as the court will note, there were a series of responsive pleadings that kept raising new issues, and each time a new issue was raised, [00:27:35] Speaker 06: then we were amended to conform because our whole goal was to conform with any issues that were raised so that we would not lose this case. [00:27:43] Speaker 06: Miss, and when I say lose the case, have it dismissed because Miss Duart has no other legal recourse. [00:27:51] Speaker 06: She cannot file in Virginia. [00:27:53] Speaker 06: The statute has run. [00:27:54] Speaker 06: She cannot file in California. [00:27:56] Speaker 06: The statute has run. [00:27:58] Speaker 06: It would be cost prohibitive for her to have to bring a host of doctors, fly them to either jurisdiction to testify. [00:28:06] Speaker 06: So we determined it would be economically feasible for Ms. [00:28:11] Speaker 06: Duarte, who is not employed, to have this matter heard in the District of Columbia. [00:28:16] Speaker 06: So that was a decision that was made to protect her interests. [00:28:21] Speaker 06: We also had indicated in our third amendment that it stated in paragraph number 11, JA 257, as the superintendent of Defended Helix, Defendant Michael Edward Nolan, engages in persistent course of business in the District of Columbia on their projects and projects around the country. [00:28:43] Speaker 06: We contend that that conforms with [00:28:45] Speaker 06: The first provision of 13.423, which says if you're conducting business in the District of Columbia, then you can in fact have personal jurisdiction. [00:28:57] Speaker 06: We also contend that's why discovery in this matter is important to connect the dots in the case. [00:29:05] Speaker 06: As it relates to Helix, Council has pretty much stated that [00:29:14] Speaker 06: They did, in fact, file two certificates to show where they are incorporated, and we would contend that if you look at Dahmer that talks about this pervasive, continuous contact with the District of Columbia, that it certainly falls within that and that the defendants had an obligation when they filed their motion to dismiss to also file the certificate showing that [00:29:38] Speaker 06: He looks for some fact license to do business in the District of Columbia. [00:29:41] Speaker 06: And the question becomes, why wasn't that done? [00:29:44] Speaker 06: And I think that was a concerted effort to avoid jurisdiction in this matter. [00:29:49] Speaker 06: We asked the court to not reward that kind of behavior. [00:29:53] Speaker 06: Thank you. [00:29:53] Speaker 04: OK. [00:29:54] Speaker 04: Thank you very much. [00:29:55] Speaker 04: The case is submitted.