[00:00:00] Speaker 00:
Case number 16-5284, United States of America, care of the United States Attorney's Office versus $17,900 in the United States currency.

[00:00:13] Speaker 00:
Joyce Copeland at Elle Appellants.

[00:00:15] Speaker 00:
Ms.

[00:00:15] Speaker 00:
Laser for the Appellants, Mr. Brown for the Appellate USA.

[00:00:44] Speaker 04:
Good morning.

[00:00:45] Speaker 04:
Good morning, and may it please the court.

[00:00:47] Speaker 04:
I am Krista Laser from Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the claimants, Angela Rodriguez and Joyce Copeland.

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I've reserved four minutes for rebuttal.

[00:00:58] Speaker 04:
This is a simple case of an incorrect application of the summary judgment standard.

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The district court below granted summary judgment on the ground that claimants lacked Article III standing to challenge the forfeiture of property that they owned.

[00:01:11] Speaker 04:
By rejecting uncontroverted evidence of claimant's ownership of the funds as, and I quote, simply defying common sense, unlikely, improbable, and exceeding the bounds of rational acceptance, the district court made an improper credibility determination that was not appropriate at the summary judgment stage.

[00:01:33] Speaker 04:
Looking at the facts of this case, it was clear that the claimants had provided sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on the issue of ownership.

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So they had their statements, and there are references in your brief to the fact that they had provided other documents to the government during the administrative process.

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One was the bank account.

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What were some of the other documents?

[00:01:59] Speaker 04:
There were many documents provided to the government.

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Like what?

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This included, for example, receipts for withdrawals of funds from their bank accounts, bank statements that indicated the date upon which funds were deposited into those accounts, including the rapid refund

[00:02:21] Speaker 04:
advance of their tax refunds, statements indicating withdrawal from their retirement funds, in fact a closing of that account.

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There were receipts for the purchase of the main coats they sold and receipts for alterations of those coats immediately prior to the date that they claimed to have sold them.

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In short, there were a number of pieces of evidence and many of those pieces of evidence were admitted by the government in their briefing.

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There was a table in the government's briefing below

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that set out precisely which documentation provided what dollar amount of the funds.

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Furthermore, there's other evidence here that supports or cooperates their sworn statements.

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In addition to the detailed sworn statements they provided, the complaint makes clear that they are not strangers to the funds.

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The funds were found in their son's backpack, which had their son's name on it.

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or excuse me, in papers that were inside the backpack.

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And they reached out to police shortly after it was seized.

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Does the fact that the claimants themselves were not in possession of the property when it was seized affect the nature of what they would have to show, what they do have to show in order to have standing and be the claimants?

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Although there are cases that say that there must be an assertion of ownership plus some evidence of ownership, it's clear that... You think that's the right standard, by the way?

[00:03:50] Speaker 01:
We do believe that's the correct... That's what the other circuits of most of them have felt, right?

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That there has to be ownership combined with some evidence of ownership, right?

[00:04:00] Speaker 04:
Correct, and we would assert that the case law in this circuit makes clear that a sworn affidavit that provides details rather than new assertions, as is the case here, would constitute some evidence.

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Of course, the government admits that a sworn affidavit is competent evidence of summary judgment.

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So possession, in your view, is irrelevant?

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Possession is not necessary.

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There are cases that show that possession further corroborates those statements, but that's not necessary.

[00:04:23] Speaker 03:
So it's enough if I swear that that's my money?

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If it was simply a raw statement, I swear that that's my money, that would not.

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And I used some tax refunds, and I withdrew some money from my bank account.

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Here, there's far more than that.

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To answer your question, though, a simple assertion that that's my money would not be enough.

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I'd be under the mere assertion standards.

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If you start providing more evidence, such as receipts for how the funds were sourced, that brings you further towards the line.

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Here, it certainly crossed the line

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of some evidence and more than a conclusory statement when you provide not only the detail of how those funds were sourced, but also details as to the travel with those funds, the dates of that travel, where they were traveling to, and how the funds were traveling back, which in fact is corroborated by the... So the district court's point was no reasonable jury could credit claimants' claims.

[00:05:23] Speaker 03:
That's inappropriate.

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They're taking what they said themselves, for instance, what they did with the money in North Carolina, and yet they asked the very person they had no faith in to bring the money to them in New York.

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I mean, they're talking out of both sides of their mouth, so to speak.

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The decision may have been one that's different from one that you or I might have made.

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It may have even been a foolish decision, but that doesn't make it a decision that is so unlikely.

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No, I don't think that's what the judge was saying, because he was questioning about that.

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I don't know if you personally, but he was questioning about that, that he didn't understand that poorer people

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don't always deal in credit cards and fancy transactions.

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And he said, well, these people had money markets.

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They had bank accounts, et cetera.

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So I don't think he outlawed the notion that it could be reasonable to trade in cash.

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But there was just nothing, he said.

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And then you have these contradictory, internally inconsistent statements.

[00:06:23] Speaker 04:
It's not internally inconsistent when you look at the full context.

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If you look through the interrogatories, it explains why they left the funds in that location at that time and why they then asked him to bring it back.

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Specifically, they stated that they- The judge took their statements at face value and said they didn't want to tell him they left it because they were concerned he might take some of it.

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Later, they asked him to bring it from North Carolina to New York, the very person they didn't trust with the money.

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That was an improper credibility determination?

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That's what your client's statement said.

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If you look at the full context, it states that they believed that they were going to return shortly to North Carolina, and of course,

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The travel with currency is not necessarily without its risks.

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They might not have wanted to bring the funds back to New York when they were expecting to immediately return to North Carolina.

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When post-surgery, she realized that she had to stay in New York for a longer period of time, and her son was returning.

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Then she asked to bring the funds back up.

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But if you look at the full context, there are explanations for this.

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And it was improper on a summary judgment standard for the court to deny that.

[00:07:34] Speaker 01:
Maybe just pursuing the question Judge Rogers asked, the government makes a lot of this first circuit case, United States versus, was it $9 million or something?

[00:07:47] Speaker 04:
$8 million, yeah.

[00:07:48] Speaker 01:
$8 million, okay.

[00:07:49] Speaker 01:
Well, the district court there said that the claim there that he was gonna go back and get the money, quote, defies common sense.

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And that's sort of what the district court did here, too, right?

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The district court said, look, this just defies common sense.

[00:08:04] Speaker 01:
So what's your best way?

[00:08:08] Speaker 01:
Because the district court there was not offending the rules of summary judgment.

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The district court can reject perfectly admissible evidence if it's just completely contrary to, just makes no sense.

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You can do that.

[00:08:28] Speaker 04:
Specifically, it's not the standard simply that they disagree with.

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And I should note that in the $8 million case, the court specifically noted that the contention of ownership as to the bails of currency that were thrown into the ocean was contradicted by other evidence in the record.

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So that's the difference here.

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Your view is, if you take the standard from the other circuits, assertion of possession and evidence.

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There's no evidence to contradict any of that.

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That's your bottom line.

[00:08:58] Speaker 04:
Well, there are three buckets under which you can possibly throw out a sworn statement, one of which is when it's contradicted.

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That's not the case here.

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There's no evidence at all in the record that the government put forward.

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The other is if it's a mere assertion.

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This is not merely a statement where we said we own the property.

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And the last is the Lombardo case, which is

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the situation where there is entirely impossible allegations.

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The court made clear there.

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This is not a situation where the allegations are merely unlikely or improbable, but are so implausible as to be frivolous.

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This is certainly not a case of frivolous assertions.

[00:09:34] Speaker 05:
So I take it it's your view that even though the claimants here believe that they will be able to produce documentation of various aspects of the transactions that they narrate in their declaration, it's sufficient at the effectively summary judgment stage simply to describe that in a sworn declaration.

[00:09:54] Speaker 04:
It is correct, it is sufficient at the summary judgment stage to simply describe it in the sworn declaration.

[00:09:59] Speaker 04:
However, note that there are also corroborating statements such as the admission from the government in the complaint as to the way that the currency was being transported at the time that it was

[00:10:11] Speaker 04:
sees in particular that it was on a train headed to New York, which is where claimants lived, and that it was in the backpack of their son with his name on it.

[00:10:19] Speaker 04:
These are all facts that further corroborate their ownership of the funds.

[00:10:22] Speaker 04:
It's not merely a case of a detailed affidavit, although that would be sufficient under the case law.

[00:10:27] Speaker 05:
And he didn't know about it, even though it was in the backpack he was carrying, because they said, just take that paper bag and put it in the backpack and come.

[00:10:36] Speaker 05:
Don't look at it.

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And he, being a good, obedient child, did not look.

[00:10:41] Speaker 04:
It's not in the record whether or not he looked at it.

[00:10:44] Speaker 05:
Well, he said when he was confronted by the police that he had no awareness of having any currency, right?

[00:10:49] Speaker 04:
Correct.

[00:10:50] Speaker 04:
However, it's certainly plausible that if your parents say, please bring this shopping bag to me.

[00:10:56] Speaker 04:
You could think it's newspapers.

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You could think it's anything.

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You might not be very interested in something that your parents put in a bag and say, you know, we left this there.

[00:11:04] Speaker 04:
Could you bring that with us?

[00:11:05] Speaker 04:
OK, sure.

[00:11:05] Speaker 04:
I'll just stuff it in my backpack and take it.

[00:11:07] Speaker 03:
Sure.

[00:11:07] Speaker 03:
It's 100 pounds of cocaine.

[00:11:09] Speaker 03:
Well, that's not what was the case here.

[00:11:11] Speaker 03:
No, no.

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But that's my point.

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You better look and see what it is you're being asked to transport.

[00:11:18] Speaker 04:
There are many people that do not look to see what they're being asked to transport.

[00:11:21] Speaker 04:
I'm sure it generates many cases before the court.

[00:11:24] Speaker 04:
It's certainly not an implausible or impossible allegation, especially at the summary judgment stage.

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I should note with my last remaining seconds here that in the forfeiture cases in particular, it is very important that the threshold for standing is one that is very low.

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Recall that the Supreme Court stated

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that the court should not allow recourse to rules that would foreclose consideration on the merits.

[00:11:50] Speaker 01:
We already have circuit precedent on that, right?

[00:11:52] Speaker 01:
In this circuit, it has to be colorable.

[00:11:56] Speaker 04:
I'm sorry.

[00:11:56] Speaker 01:
It's colorable, right?

[00:11:57] Speaker 01:
That's what we've said.

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It's not a heavy burden, but it has to be colorable.

[00:12:02] Speaker 04:
Correct.

[00:12:02] Speaker 04:
It's a low threshold.

[00:12:03] Speaker 01:
It's a low threshold.

[00:12:04] Speaker 01:
So we've already said that.

[00:12:06] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:12:07] Speaker 04:
And in compliance with this court's prior precedent, we would say that there's certainly a detailed affidavit like this that's corroborated by statements in the complaint is sufficient to satisfy that low threshold.

[00:12:18] Speaker 04:
All right.

[00:12:18] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:12:19] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:12:31] Speaker 01:
Good morning.

[00:12:32] Speaker 02:
Good morning, and may it please the court, Christopher Brown, for the government.

[00:12:37] Speaker 02:
The claimants have cited no case in which a party affidavit standing by itself without something more like a possessory interest that is undisputed has been deemed sufficient to carry their burden of proof by preponderance of the evidence on motion for summary judgment.

[00:12:52] Speaker 02:
In here, we don't just have a party yet.

[00:12:55] Speaker 01:
Let me just ask you about the standard.

[00:12:57] Speaker 01:
I want to ask you the same question I asked counsel for appellant, which is, do you agree with these other circuits, the 1st, 5th, 7th, 9th, that the standard is there must be an assertion of ownership combined with some evidence of ownership?

[00:13:17] Speaker 01:
Is that the right standard?

[00:13:19] Speaker 02:
Yes, we would agree with that standard.

[00:13:20] Speaker 01:
You would accept that standard, OK.

[00:13:21] Speaker 02:
Assuming the nature of the interest asserted in the property is ownership, and yes.

[00:13:25] Speaker 01:
Yeah, OK.

[00:13:26] Speaker 01:
So we've got an agreement on both sides here that that's the standard this circuit should adopt.

[00:13:33] Speaker 01:
So given that, tell us, we clearly have here, quote, an assertion of ownership.

[00:13:41] Speaker 01:
in many respects, and we have evidence of ownership in terms of their answers to the interrogatories.

[00:13:49] Speaker 01:
So, given that, and given the summary judgment standard, which is, you know, this is admissible evidence, courts can't make credibility determinations at this stage, tell us what is, why this doesn't survive our summary judgment standard in this court.

[00:14:10] Speaker 02:
Well, under Anderson, to survive a motion for summary judgment, you don't just provide some evidence.

[00:14:17] Speaker 02:
That evidence has to be sufficiently probative for a reasonable jury to claim my favor.

[00:14:21] Speaker 01:
I was asking, why doesn't this evidence do that?

[00:14:26] Speaker 02:
There are contradictory statements in the record, and I dispute the claim.

[00:14:30] Speaker 01:
What's contradictory?

[00:14:31] Speaker 02:
So, within the record, the claimants have made different statements about how that money ended up in Peter Rodriguez's backpack.

[00:14:39] Speaker 02:
At one point, which is cited at paragraph 14 of our complaint, they said that they themselves deposited the money into his backpack without telling him.

[00:14:48] Speaker 02:
In their interrogatories, however, they said that they handed the money to him and then later asked him to carry the money back up.

[00:14:54] Speaker 02:
That's important because then when Mr. Rodriguez is confronted by law enforcement, he denies not only that there's money in his backpack, but that there's a shopping bag.

[00:15:05] Speaker 02:
And so there we have a contradiction within the record that undermines their statement.

[00:15:11] Speaker 02:
And that combined with all of these other implausible elements.

[00:15:14] Speaker 02:
The most fundamentally implausible element is that you entrust your retirement savings to somebody who is a known drug trafficker and whom you affirmatively distrust.

[00:15:24] Speaker 02:
to handle your currency.

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And you do this when you have a viable alternative.

[00:15:28] Speaker 02:
You've shown no qualms about carrying that currency, keeping it in a locked filing cabinet, carrying it on a road trip from New York City down to North Carolina.

[00:15:36] Speaker 02:
And then instead of taking that currency with you, as you've shown a habit of doing, you entrust it to this very untrustworthy custodian.

[00:15:44] Speaker 05:
But why aren't those issues that have to be dealt with

[00:15:47] Speaker 05:
at a hearing, not on summary judgment.

[00:15:49] Speaker 05:
I mean, it may be the fact that he's had some experience with drug trafficking, that he doesn't want to identify cash because he thinks it's going to be forfeit and this is my mom's cash.

[00:15:59] Speaker 05:
They're just going to think what they think when they see people like me traveling and take it away.

[00:16:05] Speaker 02:
Well, to answer- And that would be lying, and he may be a bad guy, he may be a drug trafficker, but does that speak to their- But the purpose of a hearing is to observe a witness's demeanor and make that kind of credibility determination.

[00:16:20] Speaker 02:
Courts reject non-movement affidavits on summary judgment all the time, and at some level, those are credibility determinations.

[00:16:28] Speaker 05:
If you look at Scott- Courts reject non-movement affidavits on summary judgment all the time?

[00:16:32] Speaker 02:
I mean, well, it's certainly not unheard of.

[00:16:34] Speaker 02:
If you look at Scott B. Harris, the Jeffries case, this First Circuit case, the 8.4.

[00:16:38] Speaker 05:
Scott B. Harris was a case where they looked at a video that everyone could look at.

[00:16:41] Speaker 05:
That was a video where the assessment was what was happening in the video.

[00:16:45] Speaker 05:
It wasn't a non-moving affidavit.

[00:16:48] Speaker 05:
uh... well if you look at matsushita matsushita was an expert and it was an expert who they thought was coming up with an economic theory that was just on the economics implausible right and that is we would argue that that's that's what this case is here in matsushita it wasn't contradictory these are not experts these are fact witnesses these are people who say we were there you were not whereas the court when they're looking at a video or the court when they're assessing expert testimony

[00:17:20] Speaker 05:
the entirety of what's going to be proffered.

[00:17:22] Speaker 05:
There isn't any further credibility to be determined.

[00:17:25] Speaker 05:
It's about the content.

[00:17:26] Speaker 05:
Whereas, these are lay witnesses who were there.

[00:17:30] Speaker 05:
It's a very different kind of evidence.

[00:17:32] Speaker 05:
Do you have any case on that, where there's a lay witness affidavit that's ignored on summary judgment?

[00:17:37] Speaker 02:
Well, the $8.4 million case from the First Circuit involves a lay witness, who's the party claimant.

[00:17:44] Speaker 05:
And that's the people throwing bales of money into the water and saying, we really intended to keep it.

[00:17:48] Speaker 02:
Right.

[00:17:48] Speaker 02:
And it's the government's decision.

[00:17:49] Speaker 01:
Also, his story had changed completely.

[00:17:52] Speaker 01:
His story had totally changed.

[00:17:54] Speaker 01:
And there wasn't a detailed affidavit like there is here.

[00:17:57] Speaker 01:
I mean, that evidence, the First Circuit evidence, I was just looking here at our standard.

[00:18:04] Speaker 01:
In this circuit, okay, so in this circuit we hold it, you can put aside sworn testimony in three conditions, undermined by other credible evidence, physical impossibility, or evidence that can be attributed to it.

[00:18:18] Speaker 01:
All three of those are met in the First Circuit case.

[00:18:20] Speaker 01:
But there's nothing, well, I won't make a statement.

[00:18:24] Speaker 01:
What is there in this record that meets any one of these three requirements, undermined by other credible evidence, that's number one, physical impossibility, or evidence that plaintiff committed perjury?

[00:18:39] Speaker 01:
Those are the three.

[00:18:40] Speaker 02:
Well, to take those in order, I think, undermined by other evidence.

[00:18:44] Speaker 02:
Other credible evidence.

[00:18:45] Speaker 02:
All of the record evidence, which is in the government's complaint, supporting the government's theory that this is drug trafficking money, the Peter Rodriguez's drug trafficking money.

[00:18:53] Speaker 01:
No, no, no.

[00:18:54] Speaker 01:
That's not the issue at this point.

[00:18:55] Speaker 01:
That's not the issue at this point.

[00:18:57] Speaker 01:
The question at this point, you agreed with me, that the proper standard is, has there been an assertion of possession

[00:19:04] Speaker 01:
and some evidence of it.

[00:19:07] Speaker 01:
That's the standard, not whether this is drug money.

[00:19:10] Speaker 01:
That's the merits.

[00:19:12] Speaker 01:
So what is there in the record that shows that the appellate testimony is, quote, undermined by other credible evidence?

[00:19:26] Speaker 01:
What is that credible evidence that undermines what they've said at this stage?

[00:19:31] Speaker 02:
Well, on that point, I think the son's denial of money or a shopping bag in his backpack undermines their contention that they handed him a bag.

[00:19:41] Speaker 05:
And surely that would be something you'd argue at a factual hearing, but you're saying no reasonable juror, no reasonable juror could credit

[00:19:52] Speaker 05:
that these women's account, given their son's waffling?

[00:19:59] Speaker 02:
That's not the only reason why.

[00:20:02] Speaker 02:
The court's job is to assess the totality of the circumstances.

[00:20:08] Speaker 05:
Do the eye of clitoris will jerk.

[00:20:10] Speaker 01:
I don't think that's right at this stage.

[00:20:12] Speaker 01:
That's not right at this stage.

[00:20:14] Speaker 01:
You keep going to the merits.

[00:20:17] Speaker 01:
The question here is a very specific summary judgment question.

[00:20:21] Speaker 01:
And you've agreed with us that the issue is, is there evidence of possession?

[00:20:26] Speaker 01:
It's clearly assertion.

[00:20:27] Speaker 01:
So is there evidence?

[00:20:29] Speaker 01:
And you have to, to help us decide this case, you, like us, have to look at this through the summary judgment lens.

[00:20:38] Speaker 01:
And so far what I've heard is, I haven't heard any, there's no evidence of physical impossibility, right?

[00:20:45] Speaker 02:
No evidence of physical impossibility.

[00:20:48] Speaker 01:
And there's no evidence of perjury, right?

[00:20:50] Speaker 02:
Well, we do have inconsistent statements by the claimants.

[00:20:54] Speaker 01:
No, but is there evidence that that's perjury testimony?

[00:20:58] Speaker 02:
These are two different factual system situations that are mutually inconsistent.

[00:21:05] Speaker 01:
To your honest point... Well, isn't that what juries... Excuse me.

[00:21:07] Speaker 01:
That sounds like what juries are for.

[00:21:11] Speaker 01:
What juries are for?

[00:21:12] Speaker 01:
I mean, in the First Circuit case, there was actually evidence of perjury because his story... You know, first story was, I'm just carrying all this money for somebody else, and by the way, they paid me this money, and then suddenly his story changes.

[00:21:26] Speaker 01:
So, you know, not only is it inconsistent, but it's pretty powerful evidence that the guys lie.

[00:21:33] Speaker 01:
But here, I don't – is there anything like that here, other than the government has one view of the facts and the accounts have another view of the facts, which to me, again, sounds like a jury question?

[00:21:43] Speaker 02:
Your Honor, two points.

[00:21:46] Speaker 02:
One, it's a combination of factors.

[00:21:47] Speaker 02:
It's the inconsistent statements combined with the utter implausibility of numerous details in their narrative, the combination of which is more unlikely than any one of those occurring in isolation.

[00:21:58] Speaker 02:
And as for the jury question, the jury's job is to assess witnesses' demeanor and determine whether or not they are telling the truth.

[00:22:05] Speaker 02:
Look at the advisory committee notes to Rule 56.

[00:22:08] Speaker 01:
That's what the jury does, right.

[00:22:11] Speaker 02:
What renders the claimant's story implausible here is not that they are unreliable people.

[00:22:17] Speaker 02:
It's that the story they're telling just doesn't hold together.

[00:22:22] Speaker 01:
But I know we're looking at this de novo.

[00:22:25] Speaker 01:
And you agree the district court doesn't make credibility determinations at this stage, right?

[00:22:30] Speaker 01:
He's not supposed to do that.

[00:22:31] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:22:31] Speaker 01:
But here, look.

[00:22:35] Speaker 01:
Okay, so when the district court rejects the appellate's reason for leaving the money in North Carolina, he says, quote, simply unbelievable.

[00:22:44] Speaker 01:
As to the banking habits, he says he's been given, quote, no reason to believe, to believe that she was logistically unequipped to pay for it.

[00:22:58] Speaker 01:
And then when he rejected Peter's testimony, quote, simply unbelievable.

[00:23:04] Speaker 01:
So, and I agree, we're de novo, but the district court's basis for rejecting most of this was he just didn't believe these people.

[00:23:14] Speaker 02:
With respect, the standard on summary judgment is whether a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-movement.

[00:23:22] Speaker 02:
At some level, that is a statement of no reasonable jury could believe what they're saying.

[00:23:26] Speaker 02:
That's a kind of credibility determination.

[00:23:28] Speaker 01:
Let's go back to the standards.

[00:23:31] Speaker 01:
What we have here

[00:23:32] Speaker 01:
is admissible evidence, namely their sworn interest interrogatories, which tell a story, which is A, evidence of possession.

[00:23:42] Speaker 01:
Now, the only way at summary judgment that can be rejected is based on the standards you and I have been talking about.

[00:23:51] Speaker 01:
And the only thing I've heard from you so far, and correct me if this isn't right, is that there's some inconsistencies, right?

[00:23:58] Speaker 01:
There's nothing else that I've heard.

[00:24:00] Speaker 01:
Inconsistencies in their own testimony.

[00:24:02] Speaker 02:
I think it's a combination of all of these factors.

[00:24:05] Speaker 02:
It's the inconsistencies combined with the implausibility, combined with the lack of coming forward with more persuasive evidence, like the Supreme Court in Massachusetts.

[00:24:14] Speaker 01:
But what's the evidence of implausibility?

[00:24:16] Speaker 01:
In the First Circuit case, there was evidence of implausibility.

[00:24:18] Speaker 01:
The money was sinking.

[00:24:23] Speaker 01:
It was sinking.

[00:24:24] Speaker 01:
It had sunk.

[00:24:26] Speaker 01:
It was impossible for him to go back and get the money.

[00:24:30] Speaker 01:
I don't see anything like that here.

[00:24:32] Speaker 02:
Here, I think the decision to entrust your retirement savings when you have no reason to do so into a known drug trafficker, whom you affirmatively, in sworn statements, feared that he would steal some of that money if he knew about it, that is totally implausible.

[00:24:48] Speaker 02:
And the district court got that right, that no reasonable jury could hear that and say, that makes sense to me.

[00:24:55] Speaker ?:
OK.

[00:24:55] Speaker ?:
All right.

[00:24:56] Speaker 03:
I'm done.

[00:24:59] Speaker 03:
Anything further?

[00:25:01] Speaker 03:
Alright, we'll take the case under advisement.