[00:00:01] Speaker 00: Case number 17-7056. [00:00:03] Speaker 00: Clarence Jackson, Appellate versus Justice of the Mayor of the District of Columbia and Elm. [00:00:08] Speaker 00: Ms. [00:00:08] Speaker 00: Jackson for the Appellate. [00:00:09] Speaker 00: Ms. [00:00:10] Speaker 00: Boyce for the Amicus Cari. [00:00:11] Speaker 00: Ms. [00:00:12] Speaker 00: Pittman for the Appellate. [00:00:14] Speaker 00: Ms. [00:00:14] Speaker 00: Boyce, good morning. [00:00:18] Speaker 00: Let me just put on the record that Clarence Jackson was given five minutes for argument. [00:00:24] Speaker 00: He is caught in traffic and I don't think we'll get here even [00:00:30] Speaker 00: with all the arguments we have in the other cases. [00:00:32] Speaker 00: So we're going ahead. [00:00:36] Speaker 03: Go ahead. [00:00:36] Speaker 03: May it please the court, my name is Sarah Boyce and I'm the court appointed amicus for the appellant, Mr. Jackson. [00:00:42] Speaker 03: I'd like to reserve one minute of time for rebuttal. [00:00:46] Speaker 03: At their core, Russ Judicata, Rooker Feldman, and Younger Abstention are all doctrines that bar a plaintiff from asking a federal court to second-guess the judgment of a state court. [00:00:56] Speaker 03: If that were indeed what Mr. Jackson was doing, his federal complaint would be barred. [00:01:01] Speaker 03: But that is not what Mr. Jackson is doing. [00:01:03] Speaker 03: Mr. Jackson's federal complaint raises different claims that implicate a different jurisdictional question. [00:01:09] Speaker 03: For that reason, the three doctrines on which the district court relied are inapposite, and the district court should be reversed. [00:01:16] Speaker 03: Appellees have conceded that Rooker Feldman and Younger Extension do not apply in this case. [00:01:22] Speaker 02: Have they conceded? [00:01:22] Speaker 02: I guess we'll hear from them. [00:01:23] Speaker 02: It seems to me they're a little equivocal in their briefs. [00:01:26] Speaker 03: I think they've effectively conceded. [00:01:28] Speaker 03: They've said that it likely does not apply. [00:01:29] Speaker 02: I'm just down to res judicata. [00:01:32] Speaker 03: Yes, they've focused on res judicata. [00:01:34] Speaker 03: So unless the court has questions on the other doctrines, I'll focus on that as well. [00:01:38] Speaker 03: Res judicata does not apply in this case for two primary reasons. [00:01:42] Speaker 03: That doctrine requires both that a party be raising the same claims that he raised before, or claims he could have raised, and that there has been a final valid judgment on the merits. [00:01:52] Speaker 03: Here, neither of those requirements has been satisfied. [00:01:55] Speaker 03: To start with the second, the Superior Court dismissed Mr. Jackson's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which is obviously not a decision on the merits. [00:02:04] Speaker 03: Appellees have tried to invoke a narrow exception from this Court's decision in GAF Court versus United States, but that exception does not apply here. [00:02:11] Speaker 03: Mr. Jackson is not asking the federal court to second-guess whether, in fact, the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. [00:02:20] Speaker 03: Instead, he's asking the federal court to assure itself of its own subject matter jurisdiction and then exercise that jurisdiction in his favor. [00:02:28] Speaker 03: To give an example to illuminate that point, if, for example, Mr. Jackson had brought a family law claim in federal district court, a divorce claim or a child custody claim, and the federal district court had dismissed that claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, [00:02:42] Speaker 03: That narrow jurisdictional holding would not preclude a state court down the road from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the same claim. [00:02:50] Speaker 03: That's essentially what's happening here. [00:02:52] Speaker 03: The Superior Court has said that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, but that has absolutely no bearing on the precise jurisdictional question of whether the federal district court had jurisdiction over his claims. [00:03:02] Speaker 00: Well, he's brought different claims here, too. [00:03:05] Speaker 03: Yes, that's the second reason that Deres Judicata does not apply. [00:03:08] Speaker 03: So moving on to that reason, in his superior court complaint, Mr. Jackson was raising a straightforward challenge to the District of Columbia's decision not to let him sit for the bar exam. [00:03:19] Speaker 03: In his federal complaint, he's raising a different claim, and I'd like to draw the Court's attention to a few paragraphs in the federal complaint that I think illuminate that. [00:03:28] Speaker 03: In particular, there's two paragraphs four, but the second paragraph four, paragraph five, and paragraph six make it clear that in his federal complaint, Mr. Jackson is raising a broader constitutional challenge to the procedures the District Court has put in place for appealing a denial of a bar admissions application. [00:03:48] Speaker 03: And that kind of broader constitutional challenge does not fall within the scope of res judicata. [00:03:57] Speaker 03: Particularly, I'd like to draw the court's attention to [00:03:59] Speaker 03: the language at the end of paragraph five that says that the District of Columbia has a process that keeps the courts in Washington favoring the mayor's office 100% of the time. [00:04:09] Speaker 03: So essentially what Mr. Jackson is arguing in his federal complaint is that there's an unfair thumb on the scale that means that applicants who wish to protest a certain decision of the Committee on Admissions do not enjoy due process in raising that appeal. [00:04:23] Speaker 03: Specifically, he challenges the lack of a hearing, [00:04:26] Speaker 03: He challenges the refusal of the district to give him any discovery, and he chooses the inefficient processes by which he receives mail. [00:04:33] Speaker 02: If we were to agree with your analysis, what happens? [00:04:35] Speaker 02: What do we do? [00:04:36] Speaker 02: What's the disposition? [00:04:38] Speaker 03: If the court agrees that the district court was in error, then this court should reverse the district court's holding and remand the case for the district court to attempt to decipher Mr. Jackson's complaint and decide whether, in fact, he has stated a claim in that complaint. [00:04:53] Speaker 03: So the proper course is a reverse and a remand, and at that point the appellees of course could argue that the complaint should be dismissed for other reasons, but that's for the district court to decide particularly, whereas here we have a pro se complaint that should be liberally construed. [00:05:09] Speaker 01: Didn't the defendants raise 12b6 arguments below? [00:05:18] Speaker 01: Why couldn't we look at the complaint and say that it really doesn't comply with Rule 8? [00:05:24] Speaker 03: The Appellees did raise 26 grounds in their motion to dismiss, but they have not briefed that here. [00:05:30] Speaker 03: And the district court would be well suited, perhaps better suited, to decipher this complaint and ascertain whether, in fact, there is merit to his claims. [00:05:38] Speaker 03: So this court would have jurisdiction to do that, but particularly where it hasn't been briefed, where Mr. Jackson could perhaps be appointed counsel below or be given the opportunity to amend his complaint. [00:05:47] Speaker 03: the better course would be for this court to remand for the district court to assess the claims in the first instance on the merits. [00:05:54] Speaker 03: If there are no further questions. [00:05:55] Speaker 02: You realize that question came from a former district court judge. [00:05:58] Speaker 01: I mean, we're competent. [00:06:00] Speaker 01: Two of us are former district court judges. [00:06:03] Speaker 03: Yes, I certainly do not mean to impugn your competence to do so. [00:06:07] Speaker 03: But particularly where it's a pro se plaintiff. [00:06:09] Speaker 02: What do you mean two? [00:06:10] Speaker 02: Two are competent. [00:06:13] Speaker 03: Particularly where it's a pro se plaintiff and the issue has not been briefed, the better course would be to remand for the district court to decipher the complaint in the first instance. [00:06:22] Speaker 00: If there are no further questions, I'll reserve the room. [00:06:40] Speaker 04: Good morning. [00:06:40] Speaker 04: May it please the court, I am Lucy Pittman on behalf of the Mayor's Office and the DC Court of Appeals Committee on Admissions. [00:06:48] Speaker 04: I think this court can affirm the dismissal of the District Court complaint on the grounds of race judicata with that narrow ruling of it being related to the subject matter jurisdiction. [00:06:58] Speaker 02: So you are conceding the [00:07:00] Speaker 02: Rooker Feldman and Younger Extension points. [00:07:03] Speaker 02: We shouldn't think about those. [00:07:05] Speaker 04: Well, so I don't know that I can concede a jurisdictional issue like Rooker Feldman, but certainly I think it's fair to say we're not pushing that in our briefs or here. [00:07:14] Speaker 04: And Younger Extension, I think, I don't think that would apply at this point, given that everything in the local courts has been resolved. [00:07:23] Speaker 04: But instead, you're right, we have been focusing more on the race to how to issue. [00:07:27] Speaker 04: And that's because the Superior Court complaint and the District Court complaint, as the District Court found, have claims that are effectively the same. [00:07:35] Speaker 04: And that is that Mr. Jackson is challenging the denial of his D.C. [00:07:40] Speaker 04: bar application. [00:07:42] Speaker 04: In the Superior Court, he challenged it with various grounds. [00:07:47] Speaker 04: And in the District Court, he lays out the same grounds, although some of them were slightly different labels. [00:07:53] Speaker 04: I would disagree with amicus that these are, in fact, new claims. [00:07:58] Speaker 04: And if you look very closely at the District Court complaint, specifically the references to paragraphs, the Senkert Paragraph 4. [00:08:05] Speaker 02: dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [00:08:09] Speaker 02: Don't we have case after case after case after case that says race judicata does not apply when you haven't reached the merits? [00:08:19] Speaker 02: And you're asking us to apply race judicata to merits determinations that have never been made. [00:08:25] Speaker 04: Well, I think that there is an exception in GAF Corp, which is cited in our brief, as well as Dozer, where when there is a jurisdictional ruling in one court, that jurisdictional ruling, when it's on the same issue on another... A jurisdictional ruling, but not the merits. [00:08:41] Speaker 04: That's right, but the subject matter jurisdiction is equally applicable here in the District Court, which is that the claims that he's putting forth, the exclusive jurisdiction is with the D.C. [00:08:52] Speaker 04: Court of Appeals. [00:08:53] Speaker 04: That's the same for the District Court complaint as it is for the Superior Court complaint. [00:08:57] Speaker 04: And so under that narrow view of what he's asking for, the only place he can ask for it is before the D.C. [00:09:03] Speaker 04: Court of Appeals. [00:09:04] Speaker 04: That's something that Feldman, the Supreme Court held in Feldman, it's been held in other cases in this court as well as in local courts that the exclusive jurisdiction is with the DC Court of Appeals. [00:09:18] Speaker 04: And so under that narrow jurisdictional ruling that the Superior Court made, that's equally applicable here in the [00:09:25] Speaker 04: district court here, and then I think warrants a race judicata ruling. [00:09:32] Speaker 04: And I do believe that GAF Corp and Dozer both support that. [00:09:38] Speaker 04: Now those are both federal. [00:09:39] Speaker 04: I will say that the GAF Corp in footnote 72 does refer to a state court determination of jurisdiction that does carry over to a federal court as well. [00:09:48] Speaker 04: That's a 10th Circuit case. [00:09:51] Speaker 04: But I wanted to just return back to the references to paragraph four, five, and six of the district court complaint. [00:10:00] Speaker 04: The second paragraph four is not actually about the bar application itself or a challenge to anything that happened before the committee got admissions. [00:10:09] Speaker 04: And so I do want to make sure that we are being fair to his complaint. [00:10:13] Speaker 04: He does have two claims in there. [00:10:15] Speaker 04: One is about [00:10:16] Speaker 04: the bar application and one is about a notice of claim that has been fairly forfeited. [00:10:21] Speaker 04: So paragraph four of the complaint, the second paragraph four of the complaint. [00:10:24] Speaker 04: is an issue that has been forfeited before this court with regard to the notice of claim. [00:10:29] Speaker 04: Similarly, so is paragraph 5. [00:10:31] Speaker 04: He's referring to the mayor's office with the notice of claim not mailing his decision, the mayor's office not giving him a hearing, and the mayor's office not doing discovery. [00:10:41] Speaker 04: All of that is with regard to that notice of claim issue that is sort of a second issue in his complaint that he's never briefed before this court and thus has been forfeited. [00:10:52] Speaker 04: In terms of paragraph 6 of the complaint where he does set forth a 6th and 14th amendment count or allegation, they're very similar to the 14th amendment complaint that is in the Superior Court. [00:11:07] Speaker 04: And I think that the District Court was being fair when it read his complaint where he summarizes his counts in the Superior Court and then reiterates [00:11:17] Speaker 04: very similar claims to what's in the Superior Court as being nothing more than just a repeat of his Superior Court complaint now in federal court. [00:11:26] Speaker 04: And for that reason, race judicata and the subject matter jurisdiction ruling that underpins the Superior Court finding or ruling would equally apply here and in federal court. [00:11:42] Speaker 02: Can I back up again? [00:11:44] Speaker 02: I'm looking at my notes here. [00:11:45] Speaker 02: Did the Superior Court [00:11:48] Speaker 02: actually say that the exclusive jurisdiction was with the DC Court of Appeals. [00:11:57] Speaker 02: I know the DC Court of Appeals said that, but did the Superior Court, I thought they simply said that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction. [00:12:05] Speaker 04: Sure, so the Superior Court's order. [00:12:07] Speaker 02: And that would make a difference, wouldn't it? [00:12:10] Speaker 02: Because you're talking about the preclusive effect of the Superior Court's decision. [00:12:15] Speaker 04: That's right, and so the Superior Court's order [00:12:20] Speaker 04: begins with a reference to the arguments that are made in the motion to dismiss, sort of incorporating those arguments. [00:12:27] Speaker 04: The motion to dismiss on subject matter jurisdiction is entirely an argument on the court of appeals, the DC court of appeals having exclusive jurisdiction. [00:12:36] Speaker 04: And so when the DC. [00:12:38] Speaker 02: So to get to where you're going with characterizing what took place in front of DC Superior Court, you have to incorporate by reference [00:12:47] Speaker 02: the arguments on the breach, right? [00:12:49] Speaker 02: Because the language that the DC Superior Court itself used in its order didn't say that. [00:12:56] Speaker 04: The July 2017 order says, as discussed in defendant's motion to dismiss and supporting memoranda, plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed for many reasons. [00:13:05] Speaker 04: Specifically, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this act. [00:13:09] Speaker 02: This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this act. [00:13:11] Speaker 02: That's right. [00:13:12] Speaker 02: jurisdiction is overly on the Court of Appeals, right? [00:13:15] Speaker 04: That's right. [00:13:16] Speaker 04: However, I will say that to the extent that we then need to rely on the DC Court of Appeals opinion, which does expressly address that, that's also fine. [00:13:25] Speaker 04: There are cases, and we cited it in our brief, I believe on page 16, that it doesn't really matter in terms of the fact that [00:13:34] Speaker 04: the complaint may have been filed before the DC Court of Appeals ruled, it's kind of who gets to the decision first. [00:13:42] Speaker 04: And certainly that, the DC Court of Appeals has ruled, it is final, the mandate has been issued. [00:13:49] Speaker 04: And so I don't think there would be any harm in relying on the DC Court of Appeals decision in this context either. [00:14:02] Speaker 04: There are no further questions. [00:14:05] Speaker 00: All right. [00:14:06] Speaker 00: OK. [00:14:06] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:14:06] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:14:09] Speaker 00: Does Miss Boyce have it done? [00:14:10] Speaker 00: No. [00:14:12] Speaker 00: All right. [00:14:12] Speaker 00: You want to take a minute? [00:14:19] Speaker 03: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:14:20] Speaker 03: I would agree with Judge Griffith's assessment of the Superior Court's judgment, and that is that the jurisdictional holding was limited to the narrow question of whether that court, in fact, had subject matter jurisdiction. [00:14:32] Speaker 03: The same is true of the DC Court. [00:14:33] Speaker 02: What about the incorporating by reference the briefing that had taken place below? [00:14:37] Speaker 03: Your Honor, I don't think it would be appropriate to look through to the briefing, but even if the court were to look through to the briefing and hold that the Superior Court [00:14:46] Speaker 03: The jurisdictional holding of the Superior Court was more expansive, as appellees have urged. [00:14:50] Speaker 03: That would not change the fact that Mr. Jackson is not raising the same claims. [00:14:54] Speaker 02: In fact, it's not clear... Let me back up. [00:14:56] Speaker 02: Why not look through the briefing? [00:14:57] Speaker 02: Why wouldn't that be appropriate to do? [00:15:00] Speaker 03: Your Honor, I'm not familiar with any case law that would say that the approach to interpreting a jurisdictional holding is to go back to what the parties argued and to look at it. [00:15:09] Speaker 03: But even if the court were to conclude that that's the proper course, there would still be the second problem with the res judicata argument, which is that Mr. Jackson is not raising the same claims in this complaint. [00:15:19] Speaker 03: Indeed, he would not have had standing to even raise these claims. [00:15:21] Speaker 02: What about the notion that whatever claims he's raising, [00:15:25] Speaker 02: The place to bring that is before the Court of Appeals, right? [00:15:28] Speaker 02: They have exclusive jurisdiction over these sorts of bar admissions. [00:15:32] Speaker 03: Only if Mr. Jackson is bringing a narrow challenge to the bar admissions decision. [00:15:37] Speaker 03: Feldman points the way on that, the Supreme Court's decision in Feldman, and it draws a clear line between cases that challenge an individual bar admission decision and cases that bring broader constitutional challenges to bar admission rules. [00:15:49] Speaker 03: In his federal complaint, [00:15:50] Speaker 03: Mr. Jackson is bringing the latter kind of claim, and in a superior court, he brought the former. [00:15:54] Speaker 03: And again, he would not again have standing to bring a broader constitutional challenge at the time that he brought his superior court complaint. [00:16:01] Speaker 03: For that reason, the district court should be dismissed, and the case should be remanded for assessment of the merits of the claims. [00:16:06] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:16:07] Speaker 00: All right. [00:16:07] Speaker 00: Ms. [00:16:07] Speaker 00: Boyd, you were appointed by the court as amicus, and we thank you for an outstanding job. [00:16:12] Speaker 00: Thank you.