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The United States Department of Appeals and the District of Columbia Circuit are in monitor.

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Draw here and give their attention for the 40s now seen.

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God save the United States in this honorable moment.

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PTA, please.

[00:00:29] Speaker 01:
Case number 12-3042 at out, United States of America versus Haji Bagchow, also known as Haji Bagchagul, also known as Haji Bagchagul Appellant.

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Ms.

[00:00:43] Speaker 01:
Rowland for the Appellant, Mr. Parker for the Appellate.

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Good morning.

[00:00:50] Speaker 06:
Good morning.

[00:00:51] Speaker 06:
May it please the court, Sandra Rowland on behalf of Haji Bagchow.

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Turning first to the jury selection and service act issue, the district court didn't just deny continuance.

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It foreclosed any further inspections, inspection of the jury records on the merits.

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The court discussed the law and the defendant's burden

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legal burden in a fair cross-section challenge at length, and then ruled that the defendant hadn't met his burden of showing a fair cross-section violation.

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And so further inspection of the records was not justified.

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Any attorney, every attorney, would think that a ruling that the defendant hadn't met his burden of showing a violation and so further discovery was not justified meant that no one representing the defendant could seek further discovery.

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No attorney would think, as the government suggests, that a lawyer could simply send a different attorney to the jury office to get the discovery

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where the court had discussed the merits of the case, the merits of the issue, had ruled that he hadn't shown a fair cross-section violation, and discovery wasn't justified.

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Why couldn't you have just clarified?

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Why wouldn't the obvious thing to do here for an attorney be to clarify with the court and say, look, I filed a motion for a continuance?

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Is that what you're ruling on?

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access to these jury's records isn't a form of discovery, or do you mean to be ruling on this issue for which there is no motion before you?

[00:02:28] Speaker 06:
I'm going to try to answer the court's question, but I'm actually finding it really hard to hear you.

[00:02:35] Speaker 03:
That's mutual, actually.

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I can't hear you either very well.

[00:02:38] Speaker 06:
Oh, you can't hear me?

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Not well at all.

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Let me try.

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Is this better?

[00:02:43] Speaker 06:
That's better.

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Thank you.

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My question is why wouldn't the obvious thing for an attorney to do in that situation be to ask the district court for clarification because there seemed to be a lot of confusion.

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There was a motion for continuance only before the court.

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And then suddenly there's this discussion of merits on which there is no motion before you and for which discovery is not needed.

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So why wouldn't that be the proper course in this case?

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The defense attorney was asking to learn more, because there were several issues about which the witness could not testify.

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She didn't have the information, but she said it could be found in the jury office.

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After the court went through an entire analysis of fair cross-section claims and determined that this

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defendant hadn't made out a claim.

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And therefore, there was no point in going to the jury office.

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There wasn't any confusion.

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There's only confusion on appeal, really.

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I mean, at the moment, there was no confusion.

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The judge said, you made a fair cross-section violation claim.

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I deny it for the following reasons.

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You haven't met your burden.

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And therefore, there's no inspection.

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I don't think there's any importance, any significance to the word discovery in the way we, I don't think anyone was thinking of it as discovery as we think with Rule 16.

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It was just she wanted to learn more.

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She told the judge exactly what she wanted to learn, why she wanted to go to the jury office to learn that.

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She called it, I don't actually know if she called it discovery.

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The court called it discovery, but it meant inspect the jury records.

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So the defendant moved for a continuance, and the continuance was denied.

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Now, that's what we have in front of us.

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Now, I don't see you're making an argument that the denial of the continuance was on an arbitrary or erroneous ground.

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What you're arguing is that, as I understand it, that you had an absolute right to inspect the jury records.

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And you did indeed have such a right.

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And you had the right after the continuance was denied.

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The defense counsel used the word continuance.

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But she explained.

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Well, that's what was an issue, trying to get this trial going.

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The judge said, well, I'll give you a day.

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We'll get Miss Larry in here right away.

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It was all about timing.

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The defense counsel just didn't say, I want to continue.

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His defense counsel said, I want to inspect the records further.

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I need more information than the jury.

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What the counsel needed was a continuance.

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He didn't need anything in order to get that information or just go ahead while the trial's in progress.

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If not for this ruling, the defendant's representatives could have gone to the jury office to get that information, although I did need a court order for that.

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The ruling didn't stop you from doing that?

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Pardon me?

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The ruling didn't prohibit you from going to the jury records?

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I think it absolutely did, and it still does.

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We have a court order saying,

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You need to show a fair cross-section violation, and you didn't do it.

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You need to show that, she said, if you want a continuance, which you're not getting.

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But whatever that court order says, if you went to the jury office, you'd see the records you wanted, wouldn't you?

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Well, actually, it's my understanding you wouldn't without a court order.

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You can't just walk in and see them.

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You have to have a court order to do that.

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And this judge had already said no.

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How do we know that?

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How do we know what?

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That you need a court order.

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One of the questions I had in my mind was, while there's an absolute right, what does that mean?

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In other words, if the defendant walks into the jury office today, does he get to see the records?

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There's nothing in the record.

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Let's assume that the district court had not ruled.

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Is there any rule or regulation

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that says that the defendant must have a court order in order to look at the jury records?

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There is no rule that I'm aware of or regulation.

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There's nothing in the record about what would happen.

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I can tell you from my own experience.

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I mean, there's a sign on the door that says, no attorneys allowed.

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And when you go in and say, I'd like to ask some questions about the Jury Selection and Service Act, you would be told, as I was.

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But you're an attorney.

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You're not the defendant.

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The question is, what would happen if the defendant went in to look?

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If the defendant was not incarcerated and went in and asked, I don't know the answer to that.

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There's nothing in the record.

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And so far as you know, an attorney could not simply walk in and inspect?

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No.

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I think an attorney can make an appointment with the jury administrator.

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Right.

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Is my understanding that to actually inspect the jury records, you need a court order, but there's nothing in the record about that?

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And I'm not 100% positive about that.

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So let me just ask.

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Counsel was appointed to represent the defendant?

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Yes.

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Was he sole counsel?

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No.

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It was co-counsel.

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There was co-counsel.

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Yes.

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So the district court made a definitive record

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of her ruling, saying there would be no more discovery.

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Did that mean in your view that the defendant couldn't go to the jury office or the attorney could not make an appointment?

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Yes, that meant that now, and that then, and it means it now.

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There was a court order saying the defendant needed to show a fair cross-section violation.

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He didn't meet that legal burden.

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And therefore, it's a different issue.

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I agree.

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The statute is not as clear as it might be, because it almost assumes that you have to have the information

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in order to file the motion.

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So here, the defense was trying to get the information.

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And if the trial proceeded, counsel couldn't be in two places at once.

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And arguably, the only option he had at that point was to seek a continuance rather than waste everybody's time by going to trial and then a problem arising.

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with the jury, but the district court did allow the jury supervisor to testify.

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She did, and the attorney pointed out very specifically things that the jury administrator was not able to testify about because she didn't have those records before her.

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So from your reading of the cases, principally the appellate cases,

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How has this proceeded under this statute?

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In other words, a defendant is before the trial judge and making an objection, and then everything stops while the defendant, or maybe his attorney, goes to the jury office to look at the records?

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That is one way it could proceed in a situation like this, where the defense attorneys were from the Federal Public Defender Office, an institution.

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They could perhaps get another attorney to go look at the jury records.

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But it's a problem in the statute.

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Obviously, you can't proceed without getting the information.

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You can't even make your objection until

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the jury panel walks in, you can't see any information until the jury walks in.

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And then, of course, courts, to address your point, don't want to continue.

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But I was wondering whether your research in the cases had indicated what had happened in fact.

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In other words, the trial can't proceed.

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I mean, when I've been reading the cases, I've been looking for something else.

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And I just wondered whether your research had made it clear that the statute contemplates that the trial stops because you're not going to know who's been selected for the jury until the first day of trial starts.

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Maybe.

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I think that the statute contemplates the trial stopping so that you can do the analysis.

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Well, the trial hadn't started.

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Voydier had begun, but no jury was impaneled.

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So I think the statute contemplates not impaneling a jury until the jury records have been inspected.

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So yes.

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So just one other question.

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If your counsel representing a defendant and a trial is set for December 1, do you have access to the list of the

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who will be called that day and when do you get that?

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The court discussed that issue in United States versus DeFries and in our jurisdiction and with our jury plan, defense counsel doesn't or the defendant doesn't have access to those records until

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the potential jurors, the veneer men, come into the courtroom.

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So there's no space built in there.

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You can't... I know from having been called as a juror myself that the defense counsel is standing there with a list of all the jurors who are sitting in the room who are potentially to be the jurors sitting on

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They don't get that list until that first day of trial when the potential jurors are waiting in the wings.

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Do you know if that same practice is followed in other jurisdictions, or is that just what our courts do?

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Does the statutory scheme work better in other jurisdictions?

[00:13:44] Speaker 06:
I don't know.

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That part is not in the statute.

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It's in the district court's jury plan for our district court.

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So I don't know how it works in other jurisdictions.

[00:13:59] Speaker 03:
Ms.

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Rowland, am I correct in thinking that

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The defendant was represented in the district court by your office, the Federal Public Defender Office, by two lawyers there.

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So the rest of your staff, somebody on your staff could have gone to, if you had whatever you need to get in, could have gone to the jury records.

[00:14:18] Speaker 06:
I worked for an institution.

[00:14:19] Speaker 06:
Yes, we have other lawyers who could potentially do that in this case.

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There was an order preventing us from doing that.

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And certainly in other cases, with the CJA panel, they wouldn't have that resource.

[00:14:30] Speaker 03:
Did you say the order was preventing it, or just didn't have the order that you needed to allow it?

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Both.

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We do not interpret this as simply an order for denying a continuance, but an order saying you haven't met your burden, and therefore you cannot proceed.

[00:14:49] Speaker 06:
There will be no further inspection of the jury records because you haven't made your burden, which is exactly what the district court

[00:14:57] Speaker 06:
said in Williamson, which this court recently decided, that the analysis that the district court applied in Williamson and the analysis here are almost exactly the same.

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They track each other exactly.

[00:15:12] Speaker 03:
Ordinarily, when you move for a continuance, quite apart from this situation, you have to make some showing, do you not?

[00:15:20] Speaker 06:
Certainly, if you move from continuance, you need to make a showing of why you can't proceed.

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Some sort of good cause or what have you.

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Pardon me?

[00:15:29] Speaker 03:
Some good cause or something of that nature.

[00:15:31] Speaker 06:
Yes.

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Yes.

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And here, the cause was...

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We haven't been able to get all the inspected records as we need to.

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And so we need to inspect the record, be able to go to the jury office, and get the information that the administrator wasn't able to provide.

[00:15:52] Speaker 04:
I'd also note that the government's representation at oral argument before the district court, that it would take months or years to sort through the information you wanted to see.

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Do you agree with that time assessment?

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I have never done this, so I don't know.

[00:16:10] Speaker 06:
The things that counsel asked to see were very specific.

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She wanted to see the records of the 147 people who asked to be excused.

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The administrator also couldn't say what quadrant the undeliverables and unresponsive lived in.

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She couldn't say what

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quadrant, the 362 people who didn't respond to the summons lived in.

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She didn't know the race of the people who were excused.

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She didn't know the race of the 485 people who returned the summons.

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And she didn't know the race of the 12 jurors who had been sent home.

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But the administrator testified that all of that was available in the

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jury office, and I don't think it would have taken months or even weeks or even more than a day or two to find that information.

[00:17:04] Speaker 05:
So what's your understanding then?

[00:17:06] Speaker 05:
Suppose defense counsel had that information.

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Then defense counsel could do what the act allows for, could analyze that information, and if she thought that it showed a fair cross-section violation, then file that motion.

[00:17:24] Speaker 05:
But she never got to that point.

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As to this client's jury, or more broadly,

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Well, she would have to show a systemic problem.

[00:17:36] Speaker 06:
Yes.

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Yes.

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She would have to show that this wasn't just a fluke.

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And that's why she wanted to look at those records to see.

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So Judge Millett's question goes to the question of, I'm implying something she didn't say, but that it's not simply getting the race and where people live as to your client's jury.

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pool, but it's investigating whether there's a systemic problem.

[00:18:11] Speaker 06:
That would take time.

[00:18:12] Speaker 06:
It was counsel's view that by looking at that information,

[00:18:17] Speaker 06:
we could make inferences about systemic violations.

[00:18:21] Speaker 05:
What I'm getting at is the judge heard testimony from the jury supervisor as to what their procedure was.

[00:18:29] Speaker 05:
And suppose it turned out that everybody was from Northwest, but that everyone from Northeast had a valid excuse.

[00:18:40] Speaker 05:
Then where do you end up?

[00:18:44] Speaker 06:
Well, if the excuses were valid, then that's not a fair cross-section violation.

[00:18:51] Speaker 06:
But if you found out that all 1,100 of the 1,200 summances were sent to people in Northwest, you could infer that there's a problem with the computer program.

[00:19:06] Speaker 06:
You can infer that there's a problem in the implementation of the act.

[00:19:09] Speaker 05:
I understand there are a couple of cases where there was a computer glitch.

[00:19:14] Speaker 05:
All right.

[00:19:16] Speaker 05:
But that's not what these questions that you were indicating counsel had were focusing on.

[00:19:25] Speaker 06:
No.

[00:19:26] Speaker 06:
But if she had discovered, perhaps, that all of the 12 jurors who sent home had been African-American, or that

[00:19:38] Speaker 06:
Very few summonses were sent to any quadrant other than Northwest.

[00:19:45] Speaker 06:
Even without hiring an expert to come look at the computer code, she could make inferences about a fair cross-section violation.

[00:19:54] Speaker 06:
And frankly, I think if that had been the case, the court would want her to then go hire a computer expert to find out

[00:20:02] Speaker 06:
you know, why summonses aren't sent to other quadrants.

[00:20:07] Speaker 05:
So, counsel is asking for a continuance of potentially weeks.

[00:20:12] Speaker 06:
No, no, she was asking for a continuance.

[00:20:15] Speaker 06:
to find out the answers to those questions.

[00:20:18] Speaker 06:
And depending on the answers to those questions, she could have potentially, we don't know what the answers would have been, but she could have potentially been able to make inferences about a fair cross-section violation.

[00:20:35] Speaker 05:
All right, we've gone way over.

[00:20:38] Speaker 04:
Well, I just had one other question, and that was you asked for a remand.

[00:20:44] Speaker 04:
Do we know if these records still exist, or would that even be part of the remand?

[00:20:50] Speaker 06:
There's nothing in the record about that, but I know that most of the records that I would be interested in on a remand do still exist.

[00:21:00] Speaker 04:
And then, just to understand the theory again, is the defense counsel would go and would take a day or two to answer these questions that she had.

[00:21:08] Speaker 04:
And either the answer would be, there's no there there, and the trial would go forward, or there would be something there that would look like the type of problem that could well be a recurring problem, and then the court would address it at that stage.

[00:21:23] Speaker 06:
Yes.

[00:21:24] Speaker 06:
And as I've said repeatedly, we don't think this was simply a ruling on a motion for a continuance.

[00:21:33] Speaker 06:
But what else is there?

[00:21:35] Speaker 05:
All right.

[00:21:35] Speaker 05:
So I assume you are preserving your other two issues as well?

[00:21:41] Speaker 05:
Yes.

[00:21:42] Speaker 05:
All right.

[00:21:42] Speaker 05:
Why don't we hear from the government?

[00:21:44] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[00:21:50] Speaker 05:
Tell us how you think this statute works.

[00:21:53] Speaker 00:
There's no question that the defendant sought a continuance, and the statute makes very clear that in order to obtain a stay of the proceedings, a defendant has to show an actual substantial violation of the act.

[00:22:12] Speaker 00:
The reason for that

[00:22:13] Speaker 00:
is because Congress recognized that these sorts of claims, by their nature, would arise at the very outset of a trial when voir dire is underway.

[00:22:22] Speaker 00:
And it would not make much sense.

[00:22:24] Speaker 04:
This isn't making any sense to me.

[00:22:26] Speaker 04:
They don't have the information needed to even

[00:22:30] Speaker 04:
identify whether they have an issue under this statute, let alone to look at the records to research emotion if they think they need something.

[00:22:40] Speaker 04:
They don't even have it until the moment the trial begins.

[00:22:43] Speaker 04:
And so to say at that very moment, that first day, they have to, just by looking across the room at the jury, also have a substantial basis for thinking of violation

[00:22:55] Speaker 04:
is to empty the statute of any operation.

[00:22:58] Speaker 04:
How are they supposed to have that substantial basis the first day?

[00:23:01] Speaker 00:
They don't.

[00:23:03] Speaker 00:
That's the point.

[00:23:04] Speaker 04:
How are they supposed to have it?

[00:23:06] Speaker 04:
They looked and they saw an unusual disproportionality in the jury pool.

[00:23:11] Speaker 04:
They can't immediately decide why or how that was going to happen.

[00:23:17] Speaker 04:
They got the juror person from the office to come in and testify, but she left as many unanswered questions as the answered ones.

[00:23:26] Speaker 04:
So what were they supposed to do?

[00:23:28] Speaker 04:
Imagine hypothetically that there was actually some real computer problem.

[00:23:32] Speaker 04:
This was one of those computer glitch or programming problem situations.

[00:23:37] Speaker 04:
Imagine that's what happened here.

[00:23:38] Speaker 04:
How would the process have worked?

[00:23:41] Speaker 00:
Well, the statute specifically addresses this in section 1867.

[00:23:44] Speaker 00:
And what it says is that defendants have an absolute and unqualified right to see the records in order to determine whether they can make this motion.

[00:23:53] Speaker 00:
But what they can't do is delay their proceedings.

[00:23:56] Speaker 00:
At least they don't have an entitlement to delay their proceedings while they are doing that.

[00:24:01] Speaker 00:
And that is because if the rule were otherwise, every defendant, even if there was no indication of a problem with the jury,

[00:24:09] Speaker 00:
would have already made continuance that they could invoke simply by saying, I'd like to go and see the record.

[00:24:14] Speaker 04:
Well, first of all, they're going to have to have something by looking at the jury pool, right?

[00:24:19] Speaker 00:
In order to actually eventually demonstrate a problem, yes.

[00:24:24] Speaker 00:
But there is no requirement in the statute that... What is your understanding?

[00:24:29] Speaker 05:
In other words, the defendant would say to the district court judge, I would like a continuance to go look at the records.

[00:24:37] Speaker 05:
The judge says denied.

[00:24:39] Speaker 05:
The trial proceeds.

[00:24:43] Speaker 05:
Two weeks into the trial, defense counsel comes back, files a motion with the judge saying there's a problem with the jury pool?

[00:24:52] Speaker 05:
Or is it simply an issue for appeal?

[00:24:56] Speaker 00:
No.

[00:24:56] Speaker 00:
The statute would give them seven days from the time that they discover the grounds to potentially make the motion.

[00:25:05] Speaker 00:
They would have those seven days in which to conduct their investigation.

[00:25:08] Speaker 00:
And if the trial was already underway, what the statute says is, at that point,

[00:25:12] Speaker 00:
They can file a motion.

[00:25:13] Speaker 00:
And if the judge finds that there has been a substantial violation of the act, the remedy is to stop the proceedings and reconstitute the jury.

[00:25:22] Speaker 05:
So why wouldn't that seven-day period apply here?

[00:25:27] Speaker 05:
I mean, the trial has started in the sense that there is a judge who is ready to proceed to pick the jury.

[00:25:37] Speaker 00:
Correct, yes.

[00:25:39] Speaker 00:
And it would.

[00:25:40] Speaker 00:
It would.

[00:25:40] Speaker 00:
I think the only debate here is whether the district court had to stop the proceedings while the investigation was proceeding.

[00:25:49] Speaker 05:
But this is what I'm getting at.

[00:25:50] Speaker 05:
The statute says if the trial was ongoing and mid-trial, this issue is raised, you get seven days.

[00:26:02] Speaker 00:
No.

[00:26:03] Speaker 05:
So the seven days means the trial continues and counsel sends out an investigator to do the investigation?

[00:26:11] Speaker 00:
I think that's probably correct, but it doesn't have to be while the trial is proceeding.

[00:26:16] Speaker 05:
I know, but I'm trying to understand what this seven days was intended to do.

[00:26:20] Speaker 05:
I mean, my understanding here is this experienced trial judge understood that the defendant had raised an issue.

[00:26:32] Speaker 05:
So she didn't just proceed willy-nilly.

[00:26:38] Speaker 05:
She had the jury supervisor person testify as to how juries are chosen.

[00:26:45] Speaker 00:
Correct.

[00:26:46] Speaker 05:
And not hearing anything else, she said, no further discovery.

[00:26:54] Speaker 05:
And so the problem we're having, as our questions to Appellants Council made clear,

[00:27:01] Speaker 05:
is, if you have a right to this, is the statute, did Congress contemplate this was a mid-trial matter?

[00:27:11] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:27:11] Speaker 00:
Well, it contemplates that these issues will arise often, as in this very case, as soon as the defendant sees the jury pool.

[00:27:21] Speaker 05:
But Judge Millett's whole point, as I understood it, was you can't make this motion

[00:27:28] Speaker 05:
and have a chance of succeeding unless you have the data.

[00:27:33] Speaker 00:
That's correct.

[00:27:34] Speaker 00:
That's correct.

[00:27:34] Speaker 05:
But necessarily, you have to have an investigator who can do this while the trial is proceeding?

[00:27:39] Speaker 00:
Well, you have to be able to, if you want to conduct an investigation and you want to go to the jury office and see the records in an effort to determine whether there is, in fact, a substantial violation of the act, the statute gives you an unqualified right to do that.

[00:27:55] Speaker 00:
That was the Supreme Court's ruling in test.

[00:27:57] Speaker 00:
But what it doesn't give you.

[00:27:58] Speaker 05:
We're with you on that.

[00:28:00] Speaker 05:
Right.

[00:28:01] Speaker 05:
the practicality of how this statute is supposed to work.

[00:28:08] Speaker 00:
Yes.

[00:28:09] Speaker 00:
How I think it is supposed to work is that the defendant will review the records, but that doesn't mean that he or she is relieved from the burden of having to also proceed with trial.

[00:28:22] Speaker 00:
These are two things that Congress envisioned would happen in tandem.

[00:28:26] Speaker 00:
And the reason that it envisioned they would happen in tandem is, were it otherwise, the result would be basically

[00:28:32] Speaker 00:
a continuance or the opportunity for a continuance in basically every case.

[00:28:37] Speaker 00:
And I think that that is why the district court here engaged in the discussion of whether there was a showing of any violation of the act, because that's what the statute says in getting a state of the procedure.

[00:28:49] Speaker 04:
Do you think that defense counsel, particularly public defenders and CJA attorneys,

[00:28:55] Speaker 04:
Have the resources to be doing this type of research at the same time a trial is ongoing?

[00:29:01] Speaker 04:
Congress would have thought that there's public defenders sitting around, twiddling their thumbs, ready to go do this research for their colleague during a trial, or that during trial they're supposed to be spending their time doing this?

[00:29:12] Speaker 00:
Well, I don't.

[00:29:13] Speaker 04:
I wouldn't presume to suggest what the- Since your theory presumes that they're supposed to do it while the trial goes on, doesn't it?

[00:29:20] Speaker 00:
Well, I think that that may be true.

[00:29:22] Speaker 00:
At the very least, while the jury is being selected.

[00:29:26] Speaker 00:
And that, I think, is simply an inescapable result of Congress's scheme.

[00:29:31] Speaker 04:
It's not an escape.

[00:29:33] Speaker 04:
It's an inescapable result of your theory.

[00:29:35] Speaker 04:
What I'm trying to figure out is the problem with administrability here

[00:29:40] Speaker 04:
the way the jury plan operates in our court?

[00:29:44] Speaker 04:
Or do all courts have this same problem?

[00:29:46] Speaker 04:
Surely someone has figured out how to crack this nut and get this to work, the statute to work the way it's meant to, and not have defense attorneys trying to conduct a trial and examine records like this simultaneously.

[00:29:59] Speaker 00:
I honestly don't know, Judge Millett, how it is handled in other districts.

[00:30:03] Speaker 00:
I do know that in this district, I believe that Miss Rowland is correct.

[00:30:07] Speaker 00:
The defense counsel would not see or prosecutor would not see the jury pool until the first day.

[00:30:14] Speaker 04:
But I'm just thinking the jury office probably isn't open.

[00:30:18] Speaker 04:
It's open probably about the same hours as the court.

[00:30:21] Speaker 04:
So I'm not even sure when this poor attorney who's in trial all day is supposed to go look at these records.

[00:30:25] Speaker 00:
Well, one thing that I want to make very clear is there is a difference between what a defendant is entitled to under the statute and what a district court might choose to permit.

[00:30:36] Speaker 00:
And here, for example, the district court did agree to a stay of the proceedings so that the jury commissioner could come in and testify.

[00:30:44] Speaker 04:
I understand, but that raises more questions than answers, right?

[00:30:47] Speaker 04:
And so the problem is, how exactly was a defense attorney, as Judge Rogers said, supposed to be in two places at one time, in the courtroom during the day and in the voting office during the day?

[00:30:59] Speaker 00:
There may be some harshness to this rule, but I think that's the answer.

[00:31:03] Speaker 04:
Some harshness.

[00:31:04] Speaker 04:
It can't work.

[00:31:05] Speaker 00:
No, I disagree with that, Judge.

[00:31:07] Speaker 00:
Tell me how it was supposed to work.

[00:31:09] Speaker 00:
I think that what would have happened here, if the defendant really believed that this was worth pursuing, would be that they would proceed with voir dire, but the co-counsel or an investigator or someone else could go to the jury office and see the records.

[00:31:25] Speaker 00:
That is the type of thing that happens every day.

[00:31:28] Speaker 04:
They have extra personnel available.

[00:31:29] Speaker 04:
Is it your experience in the public defender's office has extra people?

[00:31:33] Speaker 04:
It's not overloaded?

[00:31:35] Speaker 00:
Well, I would not presume to judge the resources.

[00:31:39] Speaker 04:
You could deal with them every day.

[00:31:40] Speaker 00:
But every day in trial courts, prosecutors and defense lawyers have to make judgments about what they are going to devote their resources to.

[00:31:50] Speaker 00:
And that is something that I think this statute contemplates.

[00:31:54] Speaker 04:
So then it sounds like your answer is that they have to make a choice between devoting themselves to the defense of their client in the courtroom and exercising this unqualified right that the statute gives them.

[00:32:08] Speaker 04:
And the answer is always going to be

[00:32:11] Speaker 04:
We have to give up on that right to investigate the jury records, because we've got to deal with the trial that's happening right in front of us.

[00:32:18] Speaker 04:
Unless we have extra resources.

[00:32:20] Speaker 00:
I don't think that will always be the right result.

[00:32:24] Speaker 00:
But I also think that... Always?

[00:32:25] Speaker 04:
Well, how often do you think they'll be able to do these things simultaneously?

[00:32:29] Speaker 00:
I don't know.

[00:32:30] Speaker 00:
I think it would depend very much on the facts of each case and the circumstances.

[00:32:34] Speaker 04:
Is this right supposed to depend on the amount of resources the defendant has?

[00:32:39] Speaker 00:
I'm sorry, I didn't.

[00:32:39] Speaker 04:
Is this right supposed to depend on the amount of resources the defendant has?

[00:32:42] Speaker 00:
Of course not.

[00:32:43] Speaker 00:
Of course not.

[00:32:44] Speaker 00:
And we would never suggest that.

[00:32:46] Speaker 00:
The only point here is

[00:32:49] Speaker 00:
whether there is an entitlement to stop the proceedings while this investigation takes place, or whether a district court could determine, as the court did here, that a continuance was not warranted.

[00:33:01] Speaker 04:
Because it's not just- The problem here is the district court didn't say, I deny a continuance.

[00:33:08] Speaker 04:
It didn't.

[00:33:09] Speaker 04:
I know that was the motion that was asked for.

[00:33:12] Speaker 04:
But what the government counsel argued was a merits issue about the jury right to the court.

[00:33:19] Speaker 04:
And the court ruled exclusively on the merits of their showing as to a fair cross-section of the community and ruled on their inability to have discovery into those records and that they hadn't met their burden.

[00:33:35] Speaker 04:
If the district court had made a ruling in terms of a continuance decision, I would understand that point.

[00:33:42] Speaker 04:
What happened here is you had a motion for a continuance, and then suddenly the government's arguing a merits issue, and the district court's ruling on a merits issue.

[00:33:50] Speaker 04:
We never got to sort these things out about how the district court envisioned letting the trial go forward, but them still exercising their rights.

[00:33:58] Speaker 00:
Well, I think there are two responses to that, Judge Millett.

[00:34:01] Speaker 00:
If I may, I'd just like to explain both of them.

[00:34:03] Speaker 00:
The first is the statute says that in order to obtain a stay of the proceedings, you do have to show, at least to be entitled to one, you have to show a substantial violation of the act.

[00:34:14] Speaker 00:
And so that is why there was all of this discussion about that.

[00:34:17] Speaker 00:
And that is why the district court considered these issues.

[00:34:20] Speaker 00:
The other point is, in determining near the end of the court's ruling, which again was an oral extemporaneous ruling on an oral motion, so it was not a written ruling, the court did say, I cannot continue to provide discovery, there's been an insufficient showing for discovery.

[00:34:38] Speaker 00:
But we think that those references have to be understood in the context of the motion that was pending before the court.

[00:34:44] Speaker 00:
And that was very much a motion for a continuance.

[00:34:46] Speaker 00:
And so I think the only reasonable way to understand that is that the court was saying, I'm not going to continue to provide you the kind of discovery that I just provided you, which was stopping the trial so that you can, in this case, provide the testimony of the jury commissioner.

[00:35:03] Speaker 00:
But it doesn't mean that, as my friend has suggested, that the defendant was precluded from attempting to exercise his unqualified right.

[00:35:14] Speaker 00:
And I don't think that we should lightly presume that a district court judge would reach out and override that right.

[00:35:22] Speaker 00:
The other point I- Oh, I'm sorry.

[00:35:23] Speaker 00:
Is this your second point?

[00:35:24] Speaker 00:
Go ahead.

[00:35:25] Speaker 04:
I don't want to interrupt.

[00:35:25] Speaker 00:
No, not at all.

[00:35:26] Speaker 04:
OK, so the statute says

[00:35:29] Speaker 04:
that a motion raising a question, a substantial question, the substantial question that you want the defendant to have, has to be made within seven days of either voir dire starting, or when they could or reasonably could have discovered the violation, both of which are the same day.

[00:35:49] Speaker 04:
But under the statute, it says whichever is earlier, not later.

[00:35:54] Speaker 04:
And so under the theory here that they're supposed to go investigate while the trial goes forward, that doesn't work either.

[00:36:01] Speaker 04:
Because if it takes them more than seven days from the start of Wadheer to discover the violation, they can't raise it under the statute.

[00:36:09] Speaker 04:
Because the earlier deadline is when it starts the clock for the seven days.

[00:36:15] Speaker 04:
So they could, if they had discovered, if they had gone on as a district court envisioned, and it took them eight days to discover,

[00:36:22] Speaker 04:
the problem with the computer.

[00:36:24] Speaker 04:
They couldn't raise it under the statute, could they?

[00:36:28] Speaker 00:
As a statutory matter, no.

[00:36:30] Speaker 00:
I mean, the government obviously would have to invoke that time bar.

[00:36:33] Speaker 00:
We are not invoking it here.

[00:36:34] Speaker 00:
The point that I would simply... I'm talking to you because it doesn't apply here.

[00:36:38] Speaker 00:
Well, it would, because there was some question about whether... We're trying to figure out how the statute works.

[00:36:45] Speaker 04:
And so the statute envisions a frontloading, a very strict frontloading of this process, seven days, whichever is earlier.

[00:36:52] Speaker 04:
And here, it appears that the voir dire is when you first have a chance of knowing anything at all.

[00:36:59] Speaker 04:
So that's going to start the clock every single time.

[00:37:01] Speaker 00:
Well, I think that's correct as a usual matter, Judge Millett.

[00:37:06] Speaker 00:
I would just point this court to the court's prior decision in DeFries.

[00:37:10] Speaker 00:
In that case, it discussed the legislative history of this statute and explained that Congress wanted these sorts of issues to be resolved very quickly because they would be arising right at the beginning of trials.

[00:37:23] Speaker 00:
And it envisioned that there would be very strict time limits placed on defendants who wanted to raise these kinds of challenges.

[00:37:29] Speaker 00:
So I do think that that is inherent in the statutory scheme.

[00:37:34] Speaker 00:
I did want to just quickly respond to a couple of other points.

[00:37:39] Speaker 00:
Judge Rogers, you had asked whether these records could have been obtained later, and I think the question is yes.

[00:37:46] Speaker 00:
The statute provides that these records do become publicly available after the master jury wheel is refilled.

[00:37:54] Speaker 00:
It is refilled every four years.

[00:37:56] Speaker 00:
trial occurred six years ago.

[00:37:58] Speaker 00:
So obviously there have been some period of time in which they've been publicly available and I don't think there would be any impediment at all to seeing those records.

[00:38:07] Speaker 00:
And Judge Millett, you had also said that whether this investigation might take months or years.

[00:38:13] Speaker 00:
I just wanted to clarify something.

[00:38:14] Speaker 00:
What the government had said was that it appeared that

[00:38:16] Speaker 00:
an analysis of months or years worth of data would be required, but we weren't suggesting that it would take years to actually conduct this investigation.

[00:38:25] Speaker 03:
I just think... Parker, before I lose the opportunity, does the defendant need a court order in order to get these jury records?

[00:38:38] Speaker 00:
No.

[00:38:39] Speaker 00:
There's nothing in the statute that would suggest that.

[00:38:41] Speaker 00:
There's nothing.

[00:38:41] Speaker 03:
Jury records office in this jurisdiction deny access without a court order?

[00:38:47] Speaker 00:
I don't know if, as a practical matter, that has occurred.

[00:38:50] Speaker 00:
It certainly is not in the jury plan.

[00:38:52] Speaker 00:
It's not in the statute.

[00:38:53] Speaker 00:
It's not consistent with the court's decision and test.

[00:38:57] Speaker 00:
And it certainly is not in the record.

[00:38:59] Speaker 00:
I also think that we can, at the very least, presume that

[00:39:03] Speaker 00:
the jury commissioner and the district court, for that matter, would resolve these issues in a regular manner that is consistent with the statute.

[00:39:11] Speaker 00:
And if a defendant presents himself or the defendant's representative presents himself or herself at the jury office, and the jury commissioner knows that this individual is a litigant in the case, the records that they are asking for are within the scope of what they are entitled to, and it's within normal business hours, the jury commissioner would have no discretion to refuse to provide those records.

[00:39:34] Speaker 03:
but we don't know what the actual practice is.

[00:39:36] Speaker 00:
I do know that there have been cases where defendants, for example, have gone to the jury office and asked for the records, and they've been denied.

[00:39:51] Speaker 00:
Not this jury office, necessarily, but jury offices in other courts.

[00:39:56] Speaker 00:
Alden in the Eighth Circuit, which is cited in our brief, is an example of that.

[00:40:00] Speaker 00:
There are reasons that that might occur.

[00:40:06] Speaker 03:
a very brief summary of your understanding of the statute then, that if the defendant sees on the day of the jury selection

[00:40:23] Speaker 03:
what appears to be an imbalance or some disproportion in the pool.

[00:40:31] Speaker 03:
And so seeks a continuance from the court.

[00:40:37] Speaker 03:
The court should grant that if it is sufficiently manifest, sufficiently likely that there might be something wrong.

[00:40:45] Speaker 03:
But has the discretion to say no doesn't look it's not obvious to me that there's a problem You can we're going to go forward with the trial you can you can go to the jury records office in the meantime I Think that that is that would be an appropriate Appropriate result under the statute yes If there are no further questions well there are two other issues you stand on your brief on those and

[00:41:10] Speaker 00:
Sure.

[00:41:11] Speaker 03:
I would be happy to answer any questions.

[00:41:13] Speaker 03:
Tell us one link between that AK-47 and the defendant.

[00:41:18] Speaker 03:
Just one.

[00:41:19] Speaker 00:
Well, I actually think there are a number of links.

[00:41:21] Speaker 03:
Who's your best?

[00:41:23] Speaker 00:
Well, I think the fact that the compound where it was found was the compound where the defendant lived, was running his

[00:41:30] Speaker 00:
massive heroin trafficking operation, which at one point was responsible for 20 percent of the world's supply of heroin.

[00:41:36] Speaker 03:
Wait a minute.

[00:41:37] Speaker 03:
He lived there, but he didn't live there alone.

[00:41:39] Speaker 03:
That's correct, but we... Problem.

[00:41:42] Speaker 00:
Well, we do know, though, that there are a number of circumstances that suggest that he was not only fully in control of the compound.

[00:41:53] Speaker 00:
I mean, it was his compound, and he was the drug kingpin of this organization.

[00:41:58] Speaker 00:
We also know that he employed people there.

[00:42:01] Speaker 03:
His story as a son-in-law was farming the land, right?

[00:42:05] Speaker 00:
That is not the only evidence of individuals working there, but I would note there is one point I'd just like to make about that particular one.

[00:42:14] Speaker 00:
The thing that is not noted in the reply brief is that what was being farmed on that land was opium poppies for many years.

[00:42:21] Speaker 03:
So he might have good reason to carry a gun when he's out there in the fields, right?

[00:42:25] Speaker 00:
Well, he could, and I think that would be very much connected with his drug trafficking operation.

[00:42:31] Speaker 03:
He didn't argue a co-conspirator theory.

[00:42:33] Speaker 00:
We actually did argue the co-conspirator theory.

[00:42:35] Speaker 03:
Your brief here?

[00:42:37] Speaker 00:
We argued it in our brief here, and we also argued it in our sentencing memorandum below.

[00:42:43] Speaker 00:
The district court did not address that because it found that there was sufficient evidence here for constructive possession.

[00:42:49] Speaker 03:
So what do you suggest we do with that?

[00:42:53] Speaker 03:
If the current basis for the district court's decision on the AK-47 is insufficient, what should be done?

[00:43:03] Speaker 00:
Well, I think that there would be other grounds on which the court can affirm.

[00:43:06] Speaker 00:
What do we do?

[00:43:07] Speaker 00:
I think it's well established that the court can affirm on any ground that's presented in the record here.

[00:43:11] Speaker 03:
Make our own decision about that?

[00:43:13] Speaker 03:
I'm sorry?

[00:43:14] Speaker 03:
Make our own decision about the link between the gun and the co-conspirator?

[00:43:18] Speaker 00:
Well, I think that the case law would clearly support the ability of the court to affirm on any ground that's been presented to it, even if it's not the precise ground.

[00:43:27] Speaker 04:
Any ground preserved in the record, which would require the necessary factual findings.

[00:43:32] Speaker 00:
Yes, and we preserve this.

[00:43:33] Speaker 00:
This is at Page's... But wait a minute.

[00:43:38] Speaker 03:
That's on any legal ground.

[00:43:40] Speaker 03:
This is a factual question, isn't it?

[00:43:41] Speaker 03:
There's no finding under the co-conspirator theory.

[00:43:46] Speaker 00:
I think that's right, though I would note that there is undisputed evidence that I think would support it.

[00:43:53] Speaker 00:
For example, an AK-47 was also found in the compound of Farman Shah, who was the defendant's chemist and the keeper of his ledgers.

[00:44:01] Speaker 00:
We know that there were other individuals who worked at the compound.

[00:44:04] Speaker 00:
It was not just the young man who assisted Fareed during the drug transaction that occurred.

[00:44:11] Speaker 00:
Baggio was also caught on tape.

[00:44:15] Speaker 00:
a taped telephone conversation stating that he had a man whose job it was to basically go to the heroin lab and bring heroin back to the compound so it could be sold.

[00:44:25] Speaker 00:
There were his sons who were, or sons-in-law who were apparently engaged for some time in the cultivation of opium poppies, although Baggio then later contended that they were growing wheat.

[00:44:35] Speaker 05:
I just think that the- What's your strongest case for the proposition that in a drug factory compound,

[00:44:43] Speaker 05:
the normal principles of constructive possession do not apply?

[00:44:48] Speaker 00:
Well, I think that they do.

[00:44:49] Speaker 00:
I want to be clear.

[00:44:51] Speaker 00:
We don't think that the concept of constructive possession changes.

[00:44:55] Speaker 00:
It's just the type and quantity of proof necessary to prove it changes based on whether it's a sentencing context or a trial context.

[00:45:03] Speaker 05:
Well, some DEA agent sees a gun come out of a compound.

[00:45:08] Speaker 05:
That's enough.

[00:45:09] Speaker 05:
I think that when you link it up with all of the other evidence that the district court had before it, and this includes... The premise of my question is that if you apply the normal, the regular principles underlying constructive possession, it's not shown here.

[00:45:33] Speaker 05:
And you push back by saying it is shown here because it's a compound

[00:45:39] Speaker 05:
manufacturing illegal drugs and drugs and guns go together.

[00:45:45] Speaker 00:
Well, again, I think I just want to be clear at the outset.

[00:45:50] Speaker 00:
We're not saying that the normal requirements for constructive possession aren't met.

[00:45:58] Speaker 00:
It's simply that in this court's cases discussing constructive possession, those have been cases involving an element of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

[00:46:05] Speaker 03:
We just don't think that that type of proof is needed.

[00:46:08] Speaker 03:
You mentioned in your brief, you identified a couple of the cases that

[00:46:12] Speaker 03:
the defendant had cited, which were in fact Merritt's conviction cases.

[00:46:18] Speaker 03:
But not all of them.

[00:46:20] Speaker 03:
There were cases that she cited, I believe, that turned on the preponderance standard.

[00:46:28] Speaker 00:
There are two cases from the Ninth Circuit.

[00:46:30] Speaker 00:
That's correct.

[00:46:31] Speaker 00:
Now, I think both of those cases are distinguishable.

[00:46:35] Speaker 00:
One involved the question of when the defendant was found or a gun was found in the defendant's apartment.

[00:46:44] Speaker 00:
But none of his other cohabitants

[00:46:48] Speaker 00:
appeared to be connected with the drug trafficking crime.

[00:46:52] Speaker 00:
Here, that fact wasn't true.

[00:46:55] Speaker 00:
The other one involved a case where... Wait a minute.

[00:46:58] Speaker 03:
Have you connected the Sons-in-law to the drug trafficking?

[00:47:02] Speaker 00:
Well, I don't think that this turns on the Sons-in-law.

[00:47:04] Speaker 03:
I would note that... He's the only other one that actually lives there, right?

[00:47:07] Speaker 00:
No, the sons-in-law were apparently involved in farming, but they were growing opium poppies, which are the precursor to heroin.

[00:47:15] Speaker 00:
There was a young man who was there who, when Fareed arrived to conduct the drug transaction, he was on the phone.

[00:47:24] Speaker 00:
The young man was on the phone with Haji Bagcho, taking orders from him.

[00:47:27] Speaker 00:
in providing the heroin to Fareed.

[00:47:31] Speaker 00:
Haji Bagcho was recorded telling Fareed that he had a man who would go and pick up the heroin at a drug lab and then bring it back to the compound.

[00:47:41] Speaker 04:
Not the sole owner of this property, correct?

[00:47:44] Speaker 00:
The district court found that he was based on the evidence in the record.

[00:47:48] Speaker 04:
The district court pointed to the paragraph 91 of the pre-sentencing memorandum, which is quite explicit that he was he with his family owned this property together.

[00:47:59] Speaker 00:
Bagchow had said that, but I believe that the district court was also... Evidence was that he was the sole owner.

[00:48:06] Speaker 00:
I think if you look at pages 297 to 298 of this supplemental appendix, the district court there is saying that it had concluded that Bagchow owned this compound.

[00:48:22] Speaker 00:
I know that in the... You've got to know which appendix you're in.

[00:48:24] Speaker 04:
What are you quoting from?

[00:48:25] Speaker 04:
Tell me, is this the sentencing hearing?

[00:48:27] Speaker 00:
Yes, this is the sentencing hearing.

[00:48:28] Speaker 04:
We've got too many appendices in this case.

[00:48:34] Speaker 04:
This is the sentencing decision, or the resentencing decision?

[00:48:37] Speaker 00:
Yes, this is the resentencing hearing.

[00:48:41] Speaker 00:
And on pages 297 to 298, the court says, given the defendant's own statements about his property, the court finds that the enhancement is appropriate.

[00:48:53] Speaker 04:
Right, all he says is the defendant's own statements about his property.

[00:48:56] Speaker 04:
What statements?

[00:48:57] Speaker 04:
Well, I think that's a conclusion.

[00:48:58] Speaker 04:
That's not a fact.

[00:48:59] Speaker 04:
What evidence in the record is supportive that he was soulless?

[00:49:02] Speaker 04:
She points to paragraph 91, which says, he's the co-owner along with his extended family.

[00:49:08] Speaker 04:
And by the way, there's a guest house on this property.

[00:49:11] Speaker 00:
Well, that's true.

[00:49:12] Speaker 00:
But I think that you also have to remember the fact that Bagchow had, Bagchow's residence was here.

[00:49:17] Speaker 00:
It was by far the largest house on the compound.

[00:49:24] Speaker 00:
Bagchow used it.

[00:49:25] Speaker 00:
extensively for purposes of running his heroin trafficking operation.

[00:49:29] Speaker 00:
His family members who were there, by his own admission, worked for him.

[00:49:32] Speaker 04:
Do we know where this gun came from in the compound?

[00:49:35] Speaker 00:
I'm sorry.

[00:49:35] Speaker 04:
Do we know where this gun came from?

[00:49:37] Speaker 04:
Did it come out of the guest house or out of his house?

[00:49:39] Speaker 00:
No, no.

[00:49:40] Speaker 00:
Candidly, we don't have evidence precisely where this gun was found.

[00:49:44] Speaker 00:
All we are saying is that the court's review here, which is only to ask whether it was clearly erroneous for the court to conclude that it was more likely than not that Baggio had some control over this gun, and that it was not clearly improbable that it was connected to his drug trafficking offense, which is the standard under the guidelines, that that is met by the evidence in this case.

[00:50:05] Speaker 00:
That is obviously a very different standard than would be applied in other cases involving elements of the offense.

[00:50:11] Speaker 05:
And that's the standard under what?

[00:50:13] Speaker 05:
Did you say I didn't hear what you said?

[00:50:15] Speaker 00:
Under the sentencing guidelines.

[00:50:17] Speaker 00:
Fine.

[00:50:17] Speaker 00:
That would be the standard to be applied.

[00:50:20] Speaker 05:
All right.

[00:50:20] Speaker 05:
Anything further?

[00:50:21] Speaker 00:
No.

[00:50:21] Speaker 00:
We would ask that the court affirm.

[00:50:23] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[00:50:24] Speaker 05:
All right.

[00:50:24] Speaker 05:
Counsel for a pillow.

[00:50:26] Speaker 05:
Give you a couple of minutes.

[00:50:28] Speaker 06:
Thank you.

[00:50:30] Speaker 06:
There's absolutely no evidence that all of the occupants of the compound were co-conspirators.

[00:50:37] Speaker 06:
And the evidence regarding his son-in-law was a statement made in 2009 that my son-in-law by the name of Mohammed Gul and Naga Gul look after my lands and my house located in Marco.

[00:50:49] Speaker 06:
They've grown wheat there now.

[00:50:51] Speaker 06:
In the past, my farmers have grown opium there.

[00:50:54] Speaker 06:
And at a time... What are you reading?

[00:50:56] Speaker 06:
I'm sorry.

[00:50:57] Speaker 06:
I'm reading paragraph 91 of the final PSR.

[00:51:02] Speaker 06:
In the past, they've grown opium there at the time when poppy cultivation was a trend in this area.

[00:51:09] Speaker 06:
But there's no evidence about when they grew poppy, when they stopped growing poppy, when they grew poppy.

[00:51:16] Speaker 06:
started growing wheat.

[00:51:19] Speaker 06:
It's also undisputed that Hygie Bag Joe has two wives and 16 children and I think maybe eight siblings who co-own the property.

[00:51:30] Speaker 04:
Does anything in the record show how many people were living there at the time of the search?

[00:51:36] Speaker 06:
No, the agent didn't testify about who was at the present at the time of the search, except to say that Haji Bagcha was not present.

[00:51:47] Speaker 06:
At the two subsequent searches, there were many people present, men and women and children.

[00:51:56] Speaker 06:
And there was testimony about that.

[00:52:00] Speaker 06:
The government's arguments about co-conspirator liability had to do with the gun found at Farman Shah's house.

[00:52:09] Speaker 06:
And the district court made no factual findings about that.

[00:52:12] Speaker 06:
We don't know why.

[00:52:14] Speaker 06:
She didn't make a ruling on that.

[00:52:16] Speaker 06:
The government argues that she didn't make a ruling in light of her ruling about the AK-47 at Bagchow's compound.

[00:52:23] Speaker 06:
But she didn't say that.

[00:52:25] Speaker 06:
She simply didn't make a ruling.

[00:52:26] Speaker 06:
Perhaps it was because she found the evidence insufficient, perhaps for some other reason.

[00:52:31] Speaker 04:
But there are no facts... Will government make an argument at sentencing about co-conspirator responsibility or co-conspirator count?

[00:52:41] Speaker 04:
for enhancement, sorry, for this AK-47?

[00:52:44] Speaker 06:
No.

[00:52:47] Speaker 06:
That's my understanding of the record.

[00:52:49] Speaker 06:
There was no argument about that.

[00:52:51] Speaker 06:
And there certainly were plenty of non-co-conspirators who occupied the residence.

[00:52:58] Speaker 06:
In any event, this court cannot affirm on any ground on which, if that ground is one where the district court has not made factual findings, we ask the court to remand the case to allow the defendant to inspect the jury records

[00:53:16] Speaker 06:
and for re-sentencing without the two-point enhancement.

[00:53:22] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[00:53:22] Speaker 02:
We'll take the case under advisement.