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Case number 19-5310, Margaret B. Cuoca, appellant versus Internal Revenue Service.

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Ms.

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Rosenbaum for the appellant, Ms.

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Lyon for the appellee.

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May it please the court, Edina Rosenbaum on behalf of plaintiff appellant, Margaret Cuoca.

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Margaret Cuoca is a law professor whose scholarly research focuses on government transparency and federal agencies administration of the Freedom of Information Act.

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As part of her research, she filed a FOIA request with the IRS seeking copies of their FOIA logs, including the names of third party FOIA requesters and the organizational affiliations of FOIA requesters.

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which the IRS withheld.

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On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court rejected all of the IRS's arguments for its blanket withholding of these records, saying that the agency's reasoning suffered from logical problems.

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The court required the agency to release the records subject only to limited redactions that the agency had to specifically justify.

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And the IRS subsequently released the vast majority of the records

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which was thousands of names and organizational affiliations.

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Nonetheless, when Professor Cuoca moved for an award of attorney's fees, the district court denied her motion, concluding that although she was eligible for fees, she was not entitled to fees under the four-factor test that this court uses to determine entitlement.

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In so concluding, the district court abused its discretion in two ways.

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First, it abused its discretion in weighing against Professor Cuoca the second and third entitlement factors, which look at the requester's commercial interest in the records and the nature of the plaintiff's interest in the records.

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And second, it abused its discretion in weighing against her the fourth entitlement factor, which looks at the reasonableness of the agency's initial withholding.

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On the second and third factors,

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I wasn't sure where the district court was landing.

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Can you help me understand?

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It certainly didn't seem helpful to Ms.

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Cuoca.

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Is it the nature of interest is both professional and pecuniary?

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You're reading that as a resolution of both those prongs against Ms.

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Cuoca.

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Yes, I think the only way to read this sentence is that it weighed both of the prongs against her.

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It addresses both of the prongs, and the prongs often are considered together.

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It addresses both of them in one sentence, that it begins with a but.

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in talking about the first factor says that she has met that first factor or indicates that first factor weighs in her favor.

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And then it says, but to introduce the other two factors.

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So I think the only way to read the sentence is that it has weighed both the second and third factors against her.

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And that quoted language from Cotton, I guess she called her Hayman, was language resolving a prong against.

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No, that language from Cotton, Cotton didn't actually turn on the second and third.

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That's just sort of the language of the standard.

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OK.

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So it's quoting the standard in doing that.

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On the second and third.

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Let me ask you about the fourth factor.

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So given that this is a judge who granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, in other words,

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On the underlying case, she ruled for the plaintiffs, yet she concluded that the IRS's defense was not unreasonable.

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So given that, and given what we've called our double dose of deference here, how do we conclude that she abused her discretion in reaching that conclusion?

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I think the court abused its discretion by looking at the wrong factors, in particular in saying that the IRS had a reasonable basis ex ante in withholding the records.

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The court stated that its primary motivation was to ensure that it was not disclosing confidential tax return information.

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But the question for the fourth entitlement factor

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isn't about the agency's subjective motivation, whether it had good faith to withhold the records.

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It's about whether it had a reasonable basis in law for withholding the records.

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And when the court addressed the legal basis for withholding the records in its summary judgment decision, it found that the agency's reasoning suffered from logical conclusion, logical problems that the agency's conclusions did not follow from its premises.

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You just broke up.

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Could you just say that sentence once again?

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Sure.

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The last word I heard was logical.

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Sorry about that.

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So the agency... That's not your fault.

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Yeah.

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In its summary judgment decision, the court concluded that the agency's reasoning suffered from logical problems, that its conclusions did not follow from its premises.

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But not with saying that she concluded that the agency's position in the underlying litigation was not unreasonable.

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Right, but in doing that, she looked at the wrong considerations, particularly at the motivation, the subjective motivation.

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But she went on to say that the position was substantively reasonable.

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She didn't rest only on good motive.

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Well, the other thing that the court pointed to in saying that it was reasonable was that the redactions showed that there had been some legitimate cause for concern.

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But looking at the redactions also involves examining the wrong factor, because the question isn't whether there was a

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reasonable basis for withholding the records that the agency ultimately withheld.

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And Professor Cuoca did not object to those redactions.

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She did not challenge those redactions when the agency made them.

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The question is whether the agency had a reasonable basis in law to withhold all of the records that it withheld at the beginning, including all of the ones that it eventually released in the case.

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So we think that in determining that the agency had a reasonable basis as an ex ante, that the court was examining the wrong considerations and not looking at whether the agency had a reasonable basis in law for withholding all of the records that it originally withheld.

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And what it did is the ex ante point in time that we're talking about is the initial decision for blanket withholding?

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Yes.

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So the question is whether it had a reasonable basis to withhold.

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At that time, to do a blanket withholding.

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To do a blanket withholding at the beginning of the case.

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To not determine whether it could segregate portions out.

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Right, whether it had a reasonable basis for not complying with its obligations to segregate out the non-exempt records.

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And as to that, its reasons were new document, which the district court flatly rejected.

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Yes.

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And administrative burden, which the district court flatly rejected.

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Yes.

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So that's what we're comparing, looking at right now is a blank, the justification, whether the blanket withholding on those two grounds was reasonable.

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Whether there was a reasonable basis for the blanket withholding overall, yes.

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Those two grounds and then the concern.

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The concern was we might disclose, there might be something in here that will, some things in here that will disclose stuff covered by 6103.

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And we're not gonna look any further because new record administrative burden.

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Well, the agency overall did not engage in any segregation.

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It was not willing to segregate.

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Because of the administrative burden and new document arguments.

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Yes.

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I would like to briefly touch on the second and third entitlement factors as well.

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The court abused its discretion with regards to those factors by failing to apply this court's decision in Davey and ignoring Professor Cuoca's scholarly interest in the records.

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In Davey, this court made clear that scholars were precisely the type of requesters that the FOIA's attorney's fee provision is for and that

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Generally, the second and third factors should weigh in favor of scholars, of people with a scholarly interest in the records, unless they have a purely commercial interest or their request is frivolous.

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Here, Professor Cuoca's interest was

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Clearly, scholarly, she sought this information to use in her forthcoming book and in other scholarly works.

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Her interests were not purely commercial or frivolous, and those two factors should have weighed in her favor.

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She is the paradigmatic scholar seeking information for public information purposes.

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There's a third possibility on factors two and three.

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could be resolved in the requester's favor, they could be resolved in the government's favor, or they just might not cut one way or the other.

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And you cite Davey, which is a very good case for you, no doubt about it.

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But post Davey, we have McKinley, which says that when you have a requester with both motives, the commercial and the scholarly,

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It's not an abuse of discretion to conclude that that factor falls in the middle category.

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It doesn't cut one way or the other, right?

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So why shouldn't we understand the district court basically to have been acting consistently with McKinley rather than inconsistently with Davey?

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I think the only way to read what the district court did was to weigh those two factors actually against Professor Cuoca.

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Factor one, she resolved in your favor.

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And then there's the but.

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There's the but and the only thing- The but means she's not resolving factors two and three in your favor.

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Where do you get that she's resolved, she's counting them against you

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which would be a Davey error as opposed to just saying, I'm not counting them one way or the other, which would be fine under McKinley.

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I think that the but does indicate that, that it's saying something opposing, and then the fourth factor is introduced with more over.

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So I think that the structure of the decision makes clear that she's weighing the first factor in favor of Professor Koka, and then the last three factors against Professor Koka.

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I think also looking at what the court took into account on the second factor too.

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Just back up there too, McKinley, the requester was,

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someone in business for himself as a regulatory policy expert, not an academic, with no real history of academic publications.

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So do you read McKinley as changing?

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Davey, to say that when you're an academic and you're also publishing a book, it's a draw on two and three?

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I hadn't read McKinley that way.

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I don't think academic.

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I don't think that McKinley changes the, um, that overrides Davy in that way.

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And I think on academic and we talked a lot about academics because otherwise I don't know why a newspaper, a newspaper reporter was writing a book say about bringing down Harvey Weinstein.

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or Jeffrey Epstein or something, because that was federal government, did a FOIA request for that.

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And I think here there's just no basis for finding that Professor Cuoca's commercial interests outweigh her scholarly interests.

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And the district court, again, did not take her scholarly interests into account at all.

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It only talks about her commercial interests, her pecuniary interests, her professional interests.

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There's no recognition that she was seeking this information for public informational purposes.

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which is the way in which scholars seek information.

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So it ignored her scholarly interests overall.

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And there is no basis here for finding that her commercial interests, and the only possible thing that the court could have been referring to in talking about her commercial interests is the fact that she earns her living as a scholar and is publishing an academic book about FOIA.

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But in Davy, this court recognized- Do books like that make much money?

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I would not expect that book to make a lot of money for your client.

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Under your theory though, does that really make any difference?

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I don't think it makes a difference how much money the book will make.

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I think at the extremes there could be if someone, if it becomes clear someone is really publishing a book solely for private

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private, pecuniary.

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But I was asking a question about her, a scholar, a university-based scholar.

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Does it make a difference?

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Are scholars who write books like this

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treated differently from scholars who write Econ 101 that's used by every freshman in the United States?

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I don't think it makes a difference.

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I think if the purpose of the book is scholarly and it's being written for an academic purpose to be increasing the public knowledge, then the amount of money that the professor is making doesn't make a difference.

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That's just how.

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OK.

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Okay, great.

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Thank you.

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Unless either of my colleagues have any questions, you're out of time.

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Thank you.

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Anything else?

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No.

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Okay, we'll hear from the government.

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Thank you, Your Honor, and may it please the Court.

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My name is Kathleen Lyon and I represent the IRS.

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The district court here properly exercised its broad discretion in denying Professor Cuoca's request for attorney's fees because first and foremost, the IRS had a reasonable or at least a clerable basis in law for withholding the documents principally to ensure compliance.

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What supports your statement in your brief that that's the most important factor?

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in our brief, well, because the- Yeah, don't you say that this, don't you say the fourth factor is the most important?

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Yeah, we say it's the most important here, we think, because the, because we think that- Oh, you mean here?

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Yes, yes.

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We're not saying that the fourth factor is elevated above the fourth factor.

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Then why is it the most, oh.

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I'm sorry, you're breaking up here.

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Oh, so you think it's just the most important, you think it's just the most important in this case?

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Correct, correct.

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And why is that?

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Because we think that that factor standing alone would be sufficient to affirm in this case.

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For example, under Morley 3, this court found that even though factors 1 through 3 weighed in favor of the FOIA requester, the plaintiff in that case, that factor 4 was enough in that case because it weighed strongly enough.

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to support affirming the court's denial of the award of fees.

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And we think this is a similar situation, that even if the first three factors weighed in Professor Cuoco's favor, that the district court's finding that, or determination that, yes.

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Here's my question about this factor.

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So you devote,

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several pages in your brief to the proposition that the service was motivated to protect confidential return information.

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And of course, that's true.

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I mean, no one would disagree with that.

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But the question we have to ask is, why was it reasonable to think that this particular FOIA request, this one,

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would result in the release of return information.

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That's the question.

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And I didn't see anywhere in your brief where you responded to that.

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Well, I think what we- The district board in her sentry judgment motion said that basically the IRS's position on that issue didn't make any sense.

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Well, the district court found that there were logical problems with that argument.

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However, the district court is very familiar with its own opinion, and it found even despite that, that the district court- Yeah, I know that, but we still have to review it.

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We have to review it.

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I asked counsel for that same question.

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You're right, it is significant that this is

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the same district judge who granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, but we still have to ask whether it was an abuse of discretion.

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And my question to you is that I didn't see in your brief anywhere where you explained that why it was all reasonable to think that this particular FOIA request would result in the release of return information.

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That's what I don't see.

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Well, it seems to me just, you know, good.

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Okay.

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Well, at our brief pages 28 and 29, I believe, we set out that the question that was posed by this FOIA request was a novel legal question about which there wasn't any specific guidance.

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There wasn't any precedent.

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There wasn't any, you know, specific exclusion in 6103 that would answer the question of whether

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third party FOIA requesters and the organizational affiliations of FOIA requesters would, when combined with the subject matter of the FOIA request, result in an indirect disclosure of return information.

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And so it was a novel question that arose in a familiar framework of 6103.

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And of course, 6103 has these extremely broad definitions of return, return information and disclosure.

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And it's established that when information is aggregated with other information, if that poses a great risk of disclosure of return information, that also is prohibited.

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Now, the FOIA law... What about this FOIA request?

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I mean, they rejected it.

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They didn't offer any to turn over some of it with redactions as a blanket rejection.

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And the question is, why was it reasonable

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for the IRS to think that this request would result in the disclosure of return information.

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I was at it all reasonable, given everything the district court said.

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Well, if I could step back for a moment and perhaps give a big picture look here.

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Now, of course, the FOIA log itself is not 6103.

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It wouldn't be a public FOIA log if it were.

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But the vast majority of FOIA requests that come to the IRS are asking for return information for very common sense reasons, because people generally don't ask the IRS for documents that don't exist or for documents that don't exist.

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I'm sorry.

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When you say the vast majority, the road declaration said you get many requests for that, and you get, quote, many.

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quote, requests for non-returned information.

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Are you disagreeing with that declaration now when you say the vast majority seek tax information?

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Well, I don't think it's incorrect to say that there are many requests that are for non-returned information.

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But those can be split between first and second.

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It's hard to say the vast majority when there's many for non-returned information.

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And this one included a request for non-returned information, as well as your concern about return information.

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Well, it asked for the names of organizational affiliations.

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It didn't necessarily, including those FOIA requests that were for non-tax information.

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Well, correct, correct.

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But the problem for the IRS is that looking at when Professor Cuoco's request comes in,

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Suddenly, she wants to associate names with everything on the FOIA log.

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And the automated system, of course, can produce a list of names of the requesters and their organizational affiliations.

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But the IRS can't release that list without risking violating 6103 because there's no way to distinguish.

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Well, why hang on?

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I'm sorry.

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That's our question.

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Why?

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You keep saying that, but why?

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Well,

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Because the automated system has no way of distinguishing between what's the first party request, what's the third party request, what's a tax, what's a request for tax information or tax return information, what's a request for non return information and

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And so we think that, given the broad definitions in 6103, the IRS has to make a judgment call about the risk of 6103 violations.

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And this was a very novel and complex request.

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And so the IRS's concern there was reasonable, or at least a colorable basis in law.

[00:22:08] Speaker 03:
The fact is that- Sorry, I just want to be crystal clear here.

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Yes.

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Rose declaration said you get many requests for non return information.

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And this was just for a year 2015 so

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There's no reason to think 2015 would have been different than other years.

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It would have included many FOIA requests for tax return information and many for non-return tax information.

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And then Rose declaration specifically said, yes, closing the requester names and organizational affiliation with respect to those requests for non-tax records would not reveal tax information under 6103.

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And 6103 itself,

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You got to read the whole thing says that its protection does not include data in a form which cannot be associated with or otherwise identified directly or indirectly a particular taxpayer do exactly what your declarant.

[00:23:00] Speaker 03:
Mr. Rose said we would have had many of those in Correct.

[00:23:06] Speaker 03:
You don't disagree with your own declarant, right?

[00:23:08] Speaker 02:
No.

[00:23:09] Speaker 02:
No, Your Honor.

[00:23:09] Speaker 02:
What I'm saying is that, you know, all of that can be true, but the IRS had a lot in there that wasn't protected by 61.

[00:23:19] Speaker 03:
You thought there might be some that if things got pieced together, are you worried?

[00:23:24] Speaker 03:
I guess there were, there were some, and that's conscientious.

[00:23:26] Speaker 03:
You're worried that there were a lot that there were, that this was all going to be a problem.

[00:23:31] Speaker 03:
But you didn't know.

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You didn't know.

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Right.

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Take any inquiry.

[00:23:35] Speaker 02:
Well, it couldn't, we couldn't, the IRS couldn't tell based on the... It couldn't tell without looking.

[00:23:41] Speaker 03:
That's what Mr. Rowe said.

[00:23:44] Speaker 02:
Correct.

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They couldn't, and we also argued, of course, the unreasonable burden.

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Right.

[00:23:48] Speaker 03:
And the district court just flatly rejected that as not a reasonable argument.

[00:23:52] Speaker 02:
Well, it did that based in part on public citizen, in which case... I'm not asking what cases they cited.

[00:23:58] Speaker 03:
The district court just found no merit to that argument at all.

[00:24:02] Speaker 02:
Well, correct, but I didn't find that that was, you know, the district court here didn't find that it was, that would have been an unreasonable basis for our argument.

[00:24:11] Speaker 02:
It just said that the IRS was wrong.

[00:24:13] Speaker 02:
And, you know, there are distinctions between public citizen and our case here, specifically that the reason that the- The case about you had a concern that there might be some

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in there.

[00:24:27] Speaker 03:
I didn't see any declaration that said you were concerned that lots and lots would be in there, but you were concerned that there would be some in there, and 6103 is correct, important statute.

[00:24:39] Speaker 03:
And then, as I read the process, what happened is then what the government said is, and we're not going to look and check to see, because it would be too much work.

[00:24:49] Speaker 03:
Because the documents, all the documents, would just be too much work to look.

[00:24:55] Speaker 03:
That was the position.

[00:24:57] Speaker 02:
Yes, that it would be an unreasonable burden.

[00:24:59] Speaker 03:
So it wasn't that we know there or that we think there's lots.

[00:25:01] Speaker 03:
There's no declarant I saw that said we think there's lots in there that are protected by 6103.

[00:25:05] Speaker 03:
I didn't see that quantification.

[00:25:07] Speaker 03:
If I'm erroneous, please tell me.

[00:25:09] Speaker 03:
It's just that it could be one, could be 200.

[00:25:14] Speaker 03:
We have no idea.

[00:25:16] Speaker 03:
Correct.

[00:25:16] Speaker 03:
We know there's a chunk in there that don't release tax return information.

[00:25:22] Speaker 03:
There's some that may not, yes.

[00:25:23] Speaker 03:
We know many.

[00:25:25] Speaker 03:
will not include tax return information, according to Mr. Rowe's words.

[00:25:30] Speaker 03:
But we're not looking.

[00:25:31] Speaker 03:
And so isn't that what we were deciding, whether the district court was correct to decide that position was colorable under FOIA?

[00:25:39] Speaker 02:
Well, I think the colorable bar is a fairly low bar.

[00:25:43] Speaker 02:
And considering- We're not going to bother looking?

[00:25:48] Speaker 02:
No.

[00:25:49] Speaker 02:
No, Your Honor.

[00:25:50] Speaker 02:
We made a reasonable- Exactly what Mr. Rowe said.

[00:25:53] Speaker 03:
We're not going to look.

[00:25:54] Speaker 03:
It would be too much.

[00:25:55] Speaker 03:
work.

[00:25:56] Speaker 03:
Correct and it is it is perfectly legitimate after summary judgment and it turns out it didn't.

[00:26:03] Speaker 02:
Correct it turns out it didn't but the reasonableness factor is is determined you know earlier in that process at the time the IRS is making the decision and in light of the fact that there's something when Mr. Rowe described why it would take a lot of work that he was wrong about because he just said how many documents and how many hours

[00:26:23] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:26:23] Speaker 02:
And our other declarant, Corinna Smith, also laid out the number of hours and why it would take that long.

[00:26:30] Speaker 03:
Were they just wrong about that?

[00:26:33] Speaker 03:
It looks like it took a decent amount of time.

[00:26:35] Speaker 03:
It took

[00:26:36] Speaker 03:
I don't know, eight or nine, 10 months, something like that.

[00:26:39] Speaker 02:
Yeah, well, there was also the government shutdown in there that was the five-week shutdown.

[00:26:43] Speaker 02:
And so it did take a good deal of time to do it.

[00:26:47] Speaker 02:
And Corinna Smith, I think, in particular, in her declaration, laid out why that was going to be the case, because of the way this is.

[00:26:55] Speaker 03:
I'm just saying that there's no gap.

[00:26:56] Speaker 03:
You said it turned out it didn't take that much time, but there wasn't anything.

[00:26:59] Speaker 03:
We have to assess it at the time the government made its decision to do a blanket withholding.

[00:27:04] Speaker 03:
Correct, correct.

[00:27:05] Speaker 03:
And then I guess And the rationale given was one that the district court flatly rejected just said that's not how FOIA works.

[00:27:13] Speaker 03:
So that is not how FOIA works.

[00:27:15] Speaker 03:
You have the documents and you have to check them.

[00:27:18] Speaker 02:
Well, it said that the volume of the documents was not enough to No, but it also said your reasonable burden goes to search not

[00:27:26] Speaker 03:
organizing the documents when you have them?

[00:27:29] Speaker 02:
Well, as we've cited, I think it's solar sources and American Federation of Government Employees, which both stand for the proposition that, you know, where the search is, you know,

[00:27:41] Speaker 02:
The unreasonable burden question goes to search and review.

[00:27:46] Speaker 02:
And I think under solar sources, that case said that where this is going to be significantly unwieldy as it was with our FOIA system.

[00:27:54] Speaker 03:
And the district court rejected both.

[00:27:56] Speaker 03:
First of all, the cases you cited involved search.

[00:28:00] Speaker 03:
And that your sense of unwieldy was off base for FOIA purposes.

[00:28:06] Speaker 03:
I mean, it takes a lot bigger numbers and a lot more hours

[00:28:10] Speaker 03:
under FOIA, you weren't in the neighborhood.

[00:28:14] Speaker 02:
Well, the district court didn't pass on the number of hours.

[00:28:16] Speaker 02:
It passed on the volume.

[00:28:18] Speaker 02:
And it also, again, the case that it was relying on, public citizen, went to the lack of sufficiency of an explanation in the affidavits.

[00:28:31] Speaker 03:
Do you have any case for the district court or one now that says the amount of documents and hours

[00:28:39] Speaker 03:
All that was at issue here or something in that range at issue here.

[00:28:45] Speaker 03:
Post search, search is done, not talking about a reasonable search.

[00:28:47] Speaker 03:
That just going through this many documents and what would take this many hours is too much of an obligation for an agency to have to execute under FOIA.

[00:28:59] Speaker 03:
Do you have any cases of that?

[00:29:01] Speaker 02:
I don't have one specifically, no.

[00:29:02] Speaker 02:
No, Your Honor.

[00:29:03] Speaker 03:
I didn't have any cases.

[00:29:03] Speaker 02:
We don't think any.

[00:29:06] Speaker 03:
Did you have anything closed?

[00:29:08] Speaker 02:
I don't think so.

[00:29:09] Speaker 03:
Do you have any legal authority on your assertion?

[00:29:13] Speaker 02:
Well, not specifically, no.

[00:29:14] Speaker 02:
I don't think so.

[00:29:16] Speaker 02:
OK.

[00:29:17] Speaker 02:
So my time is up.

[00:29:18] Speaker 02:
Does the court have any further questions?

[00:29:21] Speaker 03:
I had one more.

[00:29:22] Speaker 03:
You also undergo FOIA Exemption 6?

[00:29:25] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:29:26] Speaker 03:
I don't know if you've abandoned that or not.

[00:29:29] Speaker 02:
Well, we didn't, you know, we didn't appeal the order.

[00:29:33] Speaker 02:
So we're not, you know, disputing.

[00:29:35] Speaker 02:
I mean, as to reasonableness.

[00:29:37] Speaker 02:
As to reasonableness.

[00:29:38] Speaker 02:
Well, I mean, we noted it briefly in the, in the, in the brief.

[00:29:41] Speaker 02:
I mean, the fact is on reasonableness, the court was looking to 6103, primarily, it wasn't looking to exemption six.

[00:29:47] Speaker 02:
And so we didn't think that needed that much addressing because the district court only needs one basis to find a reasonable basis.

[00:29:53] Speaker 02:
And, but we, as we said in our brief, we think under exemption six, you know, the rationale is essentially the same because the court found- If under exemption six, you have to show that there would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.

[00:30:08] Speaker 03:
And your affidavits again at the relevant time here, invoking blanket exemption and said, maybe, may, may, and may, which is not

[00:30:20] Speaker 03:
the standard for exemption six, I might work under seven C's privacy protection, but not exemption six, which requires wood.

[00:30:28] Speaker 03:
Correct.

[00:30:29] Speaker 03:
So then it's not the same.

[00:30:30] Speaker 03:
So I don't know how you can just say if it's 6103.

[00:30:33] Speaker 03:
If we have a 6103 concern, that also satisfies Exemption 6, given that Exemption 6 has a very strict standard.

[00:30:39] Speaker 03:
No, no.

[00:30:40] Speaker 03:
It would violate.

[00:30:41] Speaker 03:
It would fringe.

[00:30:42] Speaker 02:
I'm sorry.

[00:30:43] Speaker 02:
Just to be clear, we're saying that the district court's opinion found that for much the same reasons that our arguments under 6103 were not persuasive.

[00:30:53] Speaker 02:
they were for the same reasons, not persuasive.

[00:30:56] Speaker 03:
But that would be legal error then, plain legal error, which is always an abuse of discretion, because exemption six requires your finding that there would be a privacy intrusion, not that there may or might be a privacy.

[00:31:10] Speaker 02:
I guess I'm perhaps confused by your question.

[00:31:13] Speaker 02:
I mean, the district court found against us on that, and we didn't appeal.

[00:31:16] Speaker 03:
So I'm talking about, again, on the reasonableness of your legal position.

[00:31:22] Speaker 02:
Well, I don't think that we needed to particularly defend on those grounds.

[00:31:26] Speaker 02:
I mean, the district court found that there was reasonableness under 6103.

[00:31:28] Speaker 02:
I'm sorry.

[00:31:29] Speaker 03:
I thought you said your brief had raised it again.

[00:31:31] Speaker 03:
Well, we just understood.

[00:31:35] Speaker 02:
Well, correct.

[00:31:35] Speaker 02:
In a section where we address that very briefly in our brief, followed by addressing the unreasonable burden standard, we said that the district court had sufficient grounds under 6103.

[00:31:47] Speaker 02:
And therefore, you only need one reasonable basis.

[00:31:50] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:31:52] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:31:54] Speaker 04:
Yeah, thank you.

[00:31:55] Speaker 04:
Ms.

[00:31:55] Speaker 04:
Rosenbaum, you are at a time, but you can have two minutes.

[00:32:01] Speaker 01:
Uh-oh.

[00:32:02] Speaker 01:
Sorry for that delay.

[00:32:04] Speaker 01:
Because all of the four factors here weigh in favor of Professor Cuoca, we think this court should hold that she is both eligible for and entitled to fees and remand to the district court to award her the fees that she requested.

[00:32:19] Speaker 01:
And unless there are any further questions.

[00:32:23] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:32:25] Speaker 04:
Any further questions?

[00:32:27] Speaker 04:
No?

[00:32:27] Speaker 04:
OK.

[00:32:27] Speaker 04:
Well, thank you very much.

[00:32:28] Speaker 04:
The case is submitted.