[00:00:00] Speaker 05:
Face number 20-7083, Constance AP Barrett and Dolores Barrett, at balance, versus Alden Management.

[00:00:08] Speaker 05:
Mr. Shelley, amicus curiae, Ms.

[00:00:10] Speaker 05:
Barrett, are they at balance?

[00:00:12] Speaker 05:
Ms.

[00:00:12] Speaker 05:
Alexander, are they at believe?

[00:00:15] Speaker 08:
All right, Mr. Shelley, we'll hear from you first.

[00:00:18] Speaker 00:
Good morning, and may it please the court.

[00:00:20] Speaker 00:
I'm Anthony Shelley, the amicus.

[00:00:22] Speaker 00:
District court has generously established a mediation program free to all civil litigants for cases before that court.

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
The district court in turn has established the ground rules for its mediation program, one of which is that the program generally is available only to parties with counsel.

[00:00:39] Speaker 00:
And the second is that no agreement in a mediation is binding unless signed by all the parties and their counsel.

[00:00:46] Speaker 00:
Barrett's here were pro se below, but Judge Kelly appointed counsel for them so that they could participate in the mediation program.

[00:00:52] Speaker 00:
Importantly, on the day of the mediation, the parties entered an agreement to govern the mediation.

[00:00:58] Speaker 00:
This agreement was signed by all parties and all council, and it appears at the supplemental appendix at pages 112 and 113.

[00:01:06] Speaker 00:
This mediation agreement itself expressly stated, following the local rules, that no settlement agreement reached in mediation would be binding unless signed by the parties

[00:01:16] Speaker 00:
and their council, and to this agreement, the mediation council did sign.

[00:01:20] Speaker 00:
So it's not just the local rules that required council signatures on a settlement, but also the very contract setting up the mediation in the first place.

[00:01:29] Speaker 00:
The mediation occurred, and of course, the Barrett's council did not sign the settlement document.

[00:01:34] Speaker 00:
In the migas's view, plain and simple, whether under the contract signed by the parties on the morning of the mediation or under the district court's local rules, the lack of a council signature

[00:01:44] Speaker 00:
for the appellants means that the settlement agreement is not binding.

[00:01:49] Speaker 00:
The court asked me as amicus to address the application of the district courts local rule 84.7 F, which is the Council signature requirement.

[00:01:59] Speaker 00:
To address that with respect to this case in my brief I explained that the rule.

[00:02:04] Speaker 00:
applies and requires reversal of Judge Lambert's order enforcing the settlement agreement.

[00:02:09] Speaker 00:
But as I just noted, even going before getting to the local rule, the court can find that the party's contract setting up the mediation for closed enforcement of the settlement agreement in the first instance, since it contained a requirement that all counsel sign and they did not sign.

[00:02:25] Speaker 00:
But getting to the local rule, it's plain wording for closes enforcement of the settlement here.

[00:02:31] Speaker 00:
Rule 84.7f, without any conditions or qualifiers, says that council must sign the settlement agreement for it to be binding.

[00:02:41] Speaker 00:
Judge Lamberth, respectfully, did linguistic gymnastics, really, in trying to find the rule followed or at least inapplicable.

[00:02:48] Speaker 00:
God bless you, Your Honor.

[00:02:50] Speaker 00:
And in the end, rested basically on a proposition

[00:02:54] Speaker 00:
that council means council who's made an appearance for the whole case, not council just appointed for the mediation.

[00:03:00] Speaker 00:
And there's really nothing in the word council itself that suggests that, and there's nothing anywhere in the local rule 84.7 or the rules surrounding it involving mediation to suggest Judge Lambert's gloss on this.

[00:03:12] Speaker 00:
In fact, if you look throughout rule 84.7, council shows up many times and it has to mean mediation council.

[00:03:19] Speaker 00:
For instance, in 84.7C,

[00:03:23] Speaker 00:
The rule says that there can be separate meetings for parties and separate meetings for council.

[00:03:27] Speaker 00:
It has to include mediation council, because that's the only council there.

[00:03:31] Speaker 00:
Rule 84.7D says council must notify the court of a settlement by filing a dismissal stipulation.

[00:03:38] Speaker 00:
That has to mean mediation council.

[00:03:41] Speaker 00:
Rule 84.8A says that council and parties must attend the mediation sessions.

[00:03:46] Speaker 00:
That has to mean mediation council.

[00:03:48] Speaker 00:
And most important,

[00:03:49] Speaker 00:
84.4C says that the parties must be represented by council for purposes of mediation for it even to start.

[00:03:58] Speaker 00:
And that clearly must mean mediation council.

[00:04:01] Speaker 00:
But somehow the word council takes on a different gloss in the part that says council must sign the mediation agreement.

[00:04:09] Speaker 00:
Judge Lamberth pointed, the only thing he really pointed to was his confidence.

[00:04:13] Speaker 00:
He used the word confidence that this reading, his reading was right, but

[00:04:18] Speaker 00:
And respectfully again, the plain wording doesn't support that nor does the purpose the purpose is to assist the litigant, the actual litigant and understanding the mediation and not signing and not being bound by it, unless that was fully in their best interest in the council's view.

[00:04:36] Speaker 00:
Without without the council side in a way, Judge Lambert set up a situation where a party that's represented would have more protection than a pro se party because their counsel would have to sign, as opposed to in the pro se situation they'd be left on their own, even though they had counsel.

[00:04:52] Speaker 00:
So on the plain wording of the rule, as well as its purpose, it simply doesn't support the reading that Judge Lamberth adopted in this case.

[00:05:05] Speaker 00:
And for the reasons we've stated in our brief, we think that the Judge Lamberth's order should be reversed and the case should be remanded back to Judge Kelly for further proceedings on the merits.

[00:05:15] Speaker 08:
You have any suggestion as between the local rule theory and the contract theory, is there any reason we should

[00:05:22] Speaker 08:
prefer one over the other?

[00:05:25] Speaker 00:
Well, only as a matter of judicial restraint in a way, in the sense that you could limit your decision to this case alone if you go with the contract that the party signed at the beginning of the day on the mediation as opposed to making a hard and fast rule for all of the lower courts to follow.

[00:05:47] Speaker 00:
But honestly,

[00:05:48] Speaker 00:
the lower courts probably could use some guidance on this.

[00:05:54] Speaker 00:
And in that respect, a bright line reading of this, the rule is a bright line construction is what's appropriate.

[00:06:00] Speaker 00:
It's an easy rule to follow.

[00:06:02] Speaker 00:
It's easy for people to sign.

[00:06:04] Speaker 00:
And it's an objective indication when there's no signature that it's not binding.

[00:06:09] Speaker 00:
But if the court wanted to limit its ruling to simply this case alone, then you could decide it on the contract theory.

[00:06:18] Speaker 08:
Okay, Judge Ginsburg, any questions?

[00:06:21] Speaker 06:
No, not at all.

[00:06:22] Speaker 06:
Thank you.

[00:06:23] Speaker 08:
Judge Walker, I hope you're still here.

[00:06:25] Speaker 08:
I don't see you.

[00:06:29] Speaker 08:
Did we lose Judge Walker?

[00:06:33] Speaker 05:
Judge Walker has dropped from this meeting.

[00:06:35] Speaker 05:
We're trying to get him back on.

[00:06:37] Speaker 08:
Okay, we will pause.

[00:06:42] Speaker 08:
I hope for just a minute or two while that happens.

[00:07:13] Speaker 07:
I apologize very much, my internet went out.

[00:07:16] Speaker 08:
No problem, I think we lost you.

[00:07:19] Speaker 08:
I think we lost you pretty much at the end of Mr. Shelley's presentation.

[00:07:27] Speaker 08:
We're getting some feedback.

[00:07:29] Speaker 08:
That's right, Judge Katzis.

[00:07:31] Speaker 08:
Do you have any questions?

[00:07:33] Speaker 08:
I don't, and I again apologize to all for the inconvenience.

[00:07:36] Speaker 08:
No problem.

[00:07:37] Speaker 08:
Is it Barrett?

[00:07:43] Speaker 08:
Go ahead and unmute yourself.

[00:07:45] Speaker 08:
Ms.

[00:07:46] Speaker 08:
Barrett, did I say your name right?

[00:07:48] Speaker 01:
Yes, my name is Dolores Barrett.

[00:07:51] Speaker 08:
Okay, your amicus has made some strong arguments on your behalf, but we welcome anything further that you would like to present to us.

[00:08:02] Speaker 08:
Go ahead, please.

[00:08:03] Speaker 01:
Good morning, Your Honor.

[00:08:05] Speaker 01:
My husband and I, Constante Barrett, are the appellants and we are pro se.

[00:08:11] Speaker 01:
Local CB rule 84.7 parenthesis app provides that for immediate settlement agreement to be enforceable and binding, it must be signed by the parties, that is the plaintiffs and the dependent and the respective lawyers.

[00:08:34] Speaker 01:
The Mediated Settlement Agreement that was signed on November 13, 2019 was not enforceable and not valid because it was not signed by the dependent, Aldan Management, who was represented by the insurance broker during that mediation.

[00:09:02] Speaker 01:
The councils for the barrows, the appellants, the court-appointed councils did not also sign in that mediation settlement agreement.

[00:09:21] Speaker 01:
The memorandum order of Judge Lambert,

[00:09:28] Speaker 01:
dispute resolution compliance judge dated February 6 2020 denying our request for revocation of the demigiated settlement agreement and granting the the motion of the

[00:09:51] Speaker 01:
appeal the Aldan management in force the magician settlement as well as Judge Lambert's decision or judgment dated August 12 2020 are not inconsistent with local civil rule 84.7 parenthesis F because

[00:10:20] Speaker 01:
he imposed the medicated settlement and yet it is wrong because it was not, the medicated settlement was not signed by all parties in their respective council.

[00:10:34] Speaker 01:
In fact, in the rulings of Judge Lambert in Hall versus George Washington University and in Davis versus

[00:10:50] Speaker 02:
National Council of Negro Women, Incorporated.

[00:11:08] Speaker 07:
Inspiro, we have lost you for the moment.

[00:11:14] Speaker 07:
Can you hear us?

[00:11:28] Speaker 02:
Ms.

[00:11:36] Speaker 07:
Burrow?

[00:11:39] Speaker 05:
Judge, we have lost the connection with Ms.

[00:11:40] Speaker 08:
Burrow.

[00:11:44] Speaker 05:
Would you like me to call her?

[00:11:45] Speaker 08:
I would recommend and you want to try to just get her by telephone.

[00:11:48] Speaker 05:
I will call her right now.

[00:12:02] Speaker 05:
Ms.

[00:12:02] Speaker 05:
Barrett's connection is back on.

[00:12:04] Speaker 08:
Okay.

[00:12:07] Speaker 08:
Ms.

[00:12:07] Speaker 08:
Barrett, can you hear me?

[00:12:09] Speaker 01:
Yes, your honor.

[00:12:11] Speaker 08:
You cut out, so glad to have you back.

[00:12:15] Speaker 08:
You have about a minute left.

[00:12:17] Speaker 01:
And additionally, the mediated settlement agreement was not signed by the court appointed lawyers for us, the appellants, I think.

[00:12:29] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:12:32] Speaker 08:
Thank you very much to my colleagues have any questions.

[00:12:36] Speaker 06:
That was clear.

[00:12:37] Speaker 06:
Thank you.

[00:12:38] Speaker 08:
Thank you for your presentation.

[00:12:40] Speaker 08:
Miss Alexander will hear from you.

[00:12:46] Speaker 04:
Good morning and may it please the court.

[00:12:49] Speaker 04:
The compliance judge did not abuse his discretion and finding the existence of an enforceable settlement agreement between the parties and thereby denying appellants motion to revoke the settlement agreement.

[00:13:02] Speaker 04:
This is because there indeed was an enforceable agreement under both common law contract principles, as well as under the local rule.

[00:13:12] Speaker 04:
The parties reached an agreement to settle the case after five long hours of mediation.

[00:13:19] Speaker 04:
all parties and their counsel were present.

[00:13:22] Speaker 04:
Indeed, the appellants were represented by three attorneys from the Georgetown University Law Center who were appointed to appellants for the mediation.

[00:13:33] Speaker 04:
And the material terms of that settlement were reduced to writing and that writing was signed by both appellants and myself as counsel for the appellee with the understanding that a more formal release would be executed at a later time.

[00:13:48] Speaker 04:
Five days following that mediation the appellants filed the motion to revoke revoke and it's significant that the appellants filed this motion, pro se, and not under the signature of their counsel who was appointed to represent them at that time.

[00:14:08] Speaker 04:
referred to the compliance judge who held a hearing with all counsel parties, the mediator and the director of the circuit executive mediation program to discuss the appellants change of heart.

[00:14:23] Speaker 04:
And then the court, after that hearing, decided that the appellant's counsel had participated in the settlement negotiations and that the appellant's counsel had satisfactorily confirmed to the court that they did not object to the ultimate agreement.

[00:14:38] Speaker 04:
The fact that the court was satisfied that appellant's counsel had no objection to the agreement has the same effect as if the agreement had been signed by counsel for purposes of local rule 84.7f.

[00:14:51] Speaker 04:
It was clear to the court that council.

[00:14:55] Speaker 08:
The rule is clear as can be that the agreement is not binding, unless it's signed by council.

[00:15:04] Speaker 04:
Well, there's, there are two ways to interpret local rule 84.7 one would be.

[00:15:13] Speaker 04:
which would render it invalid under the Rules Enabling Act because the Rules Enabling Act is limited to regulating only procedure.

[00:15:26] Speaker 04:
to conclude that there was an enforceable agreement would allow the court to exceed its authority in drafting local rule, the rule in the first place.

[00:15:42] Speaker 08:
That's not exactly right though.

[00:15:45] Speaker 08:
You need to, Rules Enabling Act says that a court rule under 2071 is invalid to the extent

[00:15:55] Speaker 08:
It's inconsistent with a federal statute, or in this case, a federal rule of civil procedure, which is a rule of practice or procedure prescribed under 2072.

[00:16:06] Speaker 08:
So what's the federal rule of civil procedure with which this court rule is inconsistent?

[00:16:15] Speaker 04:
Well, it's that this rule is inconsistent with a substantive right the rules and that abling act is author has authorizes district courts to craft local rules to implement or fill in the gaps between national rules of practice and procedure.

[00:16:33] Speaker 04:
the local rules must be limited to regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law.

[00:16:43] Speaker 04:
So if the rule regulates the manner and the means by which the litigants' rights are enforced, then the rule is valid.

[00:16:54] Speaker 04:
If it alters the rules of decision by which the court will adjudicate those rights, it is not valid.

[00:17:01] Speaker 04:
And here,

[00:17:04] Speaker 04:
The local rule extends beyond being procedural in nature.

[00:17:09] Speaker 04:
If it's interpreted as taking away a substantive right that substantive right being the liberty to enter into a contract and the liberty to enforce the contract.

[00:17:22] Speaker 04:
The other way, and we submit this is the proper interpretation of local rule 84.7f, that is, would be valid under the Rules Enabling Act and would be consistent with the substantive law of contracts, is that the rule simply provides a single method for creating an enforceable agreement.

[00:17:47] Speaker 04:
And that is how Colorado has viewed a similar local rule.

[00:17:51] Speaker 04:
Unfortunately, there's no case directly on point in this jurisdiction and therefore I urge this court to look to a California case not as authority, but for guidance on the issue and yakel versus Andrews, which is 195 specific third 1101.

[00:18:13] Speaker 04:
The Colorado has a statutory requirement found in Section 308 of their Dispute Resolution Act, which requires settlement agreements to be reduced to writing and approved by the parties and their attorneys.

[00:18:30] Speaker 04:
So the Colorado statute is very similar to the local rule at issue here.

[00:18:35] Speaker 04:
And in Yackel, the US District Court for the District of Colorado held that the statute does not abrogate

[00:18:43] Speaker 04:
the common law of contracts in the context of mediation proceedings.

[00:18:48] Speaker 04:
The Colorado statute does not mandate a single method that must be followed for the formation of a binding agreement and mediations.

[00:18:57] Speaker 04:
It simply provides one method.

[00:19:01] Speaker 04:
There the court construed common law contract principles alongside the Dispute Resolution Act and held that provisions of the act outline a process by which

[00:19:11] Speaker 04:
parties can turn an agreement reached during mediation into an enforceable court order.

[00:19:17] Speaker 04:
The local rule merely provides a method, not the only method for turning a mediated settlement agreement into an enforceable order of court.

[00:19:28] Speaker 06:
I understand what you're saying.

[00:19:29] Speaker 06:
Everything you're saying goes to the local rule.

[00:19:33] Speaker 06:
Why isn't the pre-settlement contract requiring council mimicking the local rule, but separate from it, why is that not valid?

[00:19:46] Speaker 04:
Well, subsequent to entering into that agreement to proceed with the mediation, the parties engaged in discussions for five hours and agreed to terms that

[00:20:02] Speaker 04:
altered that agreement because they well they settled the case, they settled the case, they.

[00:20:07] Speaker 06:
They didn't complete the process because they didn't sign the agreement.

[00:20:13] Speaker 04:
Well, and that that's correct, your honor.

[00:20:16] Speaker 04:
And that's why any disputes involved in

[00:20:21] Speaker 04:
arising out of the mediation process, then get deferred to the compliance judge and the hearing was held, all the parties were present, all the attorneys were present, the mediator was present.

[00:20:35] Speaker 04:
And the compliance judge in honoring the policy preference for maintaining the confidentiality of mediation had this closed

[00:20:51] Speaker 04:
hearing and came away satisfied that the parties did indeed reach an enforceable agreement.

[00:21:01] Speaker 04:
And that was evidenced further by the fact that the attorneys

[00:21:08] Speaker 04:
didn't file the motion to revoke the appellants filed the motion pro se their counsel never filed any objection to the agreement that was entered into.

[00:21:24] Speaker 04:
In fact, they withdrew.

[00:21:29] Speaker 06:
their counsel, or let's maybe even hypothetically let's say counsel for the pro se plaintiffs loses interest or has something more important to do.

[00:21:42] Speaker 06:
And so when the parties seem to have agreed on everything and reduced it to writing, he basically just leaves.

[00:21:51] Speaker 06:
He leaves them on their own.

[00:21:53] Speaker 06:
And then somewhat embarrassed by that, says later when asked by the compliance judge, did he have any objection to it, says no.

[00:22:04] Speaker 06:
Never said why he didn't sign it, did he?

[00:22:08] Speaker 04:
So, that's correct there's nothing on the record that says why council didn't sign the agreement.

[00:22:14] Speaker 04:
There's nothing that indicates that there was any further discussion about having counsel, sign that agreement.

[00:22:23] Speaker 04:
We know that the compliance judge came away from that hearing, satisfied that the attorneys had no objection.

[00:22:31] Speaker 04:
And the appellants themselves have never indicated that their attorneys did in fact object to the

[00:22:40] Speaker 06:
The attorney asked that question by the compliance judge, whether you object to the settlement that you didn't sign, is hardly in a position freely to say, yes, I object.

[00:22:54] Speaker 06:
I don't think it's a good agreement.

[00:22:55] Speaker 06:
And that's why I didn't sign it, because it was negligent not to sign it.

[00:23:01] Speaker 04:
Well, ordinarily under, absent the circuit executive mediation program, a settlement agreement can be entered into between the parties without their attorneys signing off on the agreement.

[00:23:15] Speaker 06:
The purpose of- I have Sarah who maybe for good reason said, we're not confident what we're doing when we sign the agreement.

[00:23:25] Speaker 06:
We really need it to be countersigned by our council.

[00:23:33] Speaker 04:
Council had the opportunity to raise any objection and to advocate on behalf of their clients and to join in and in fact to file their motion to revoke the settlement agreement after the appellants had a change of heart.

[00:23:51] Speaker 04:
They did not.

[00:23:53] Speaker 04:
The appellants filed that pro se and then the attorneys withdrew their representation afterwards.

[00:24:03] Speaker 04:
Because of all these facts, the fact that the attorneys didn't file the motion, what the compliance judge heard at the hearing, there's a reasonable basis for the compliance judge to come away and draw the conclusion that the attorneys did not object at the time that the agreement was entered into, to the agreement itself.

[00:24:32] Speaker 04:
This is a absent this local rule there's no question that this is a binding agreement all the material terms are written the parties.

[00:24:44] Speaker 06:
Local rule on does the agreement.

[00:24:50] Speaker 04:
Well, your honor, I submit that.

[00:24:54] Speaker 04:
In the event that the local rule is interpreted as taking away a substantive right, it's not a valid rule.

[00:25:03] Speaker 04:
Alternatively, the local rule can be viewed as

[00:25:07] Speaker 04:
providing one procedural mechanism for creating a enforceable settlement contract, but it doesn't take away.

[00:25:17] Speaker 06:
As you said before, but not the only method, right?

[00:25:20] Speaker 06:
Correct.

[00:25:21] Speaker 06:
What is the other method other than what happened to just a common law agreement, which is not valid?

[00:25:27] Speaker 04:
Well, it

[00:25:29] Speaker 04:
You can enter into an agreement absent the if you weren't going through the circuit mediation program you could enter into an agreement without having the attorneys sign the agreement and the the reason for the the rule, the local rule.

[00:25:47] Speaker 04:
is to discourage oral agreements.

[00:25:50] Speaker 04:
And the reason for that is that the courts want to maintain confidentiality in the mediation process.

[00:25:58] Speaker 04:
And that's why 84.7 was added to the local rules in the first place.

[00:26:03] Speaker 04:
And you can find this preference for maintaining the confidentiality of a settlement agreement throughout the local rules.

[00:26:12] Speaker 04:
And that's one of the reasons why

[00:26:16] Speaker 04:
the dispute was then deferred to the compliance judges to keep the discussions in the mediation process from flowing to the adjudicating judge.

[00:26:28] Speaker 04:
So it's that process that that then satisfies the judge that there's an enforceable agreement in place absent.

[00:26:41] Speaker 04:
Um,

[00:26:42] Speaker 04:
what's provided for in the local rule 84.7, absent the signatures of council.

[00:26:49] Speaker 06:
I have your point, thank you.

[00:26:53] Speaker 04:
Judge Walker, anything?

[00:26:56] Speaker 08:
One last question for you, Ms.

[00:26:59] Speaker 08:
Alexander, quickly.

[00:27:00] Speaker 08:
We've handled this entire appeal under seal.

[00:27:07] Speaker 08:
Strikes me that a lot of the legal issues we're talking about can,

[00:27:12] Speaker 08:
we can appropriately share with the public and should.

[00:27:16] Speaker 08:
Would you have any objection to unsealing?

[00:27:21] Speaker 04:
I do not.

[00:27:22] Speaker 08:
Okay, thank you.

[00:27:24] Speaker 08:
All right.

[00:27:26] Speaker 08:
Ms.

[00:27:26] Speaker 08:
Barrett, you have a minute for rebuttal.

[00:27:31] Speaker 08:
Before you begin, let me just ask you the same question.

[00:27:34] Speaker 08:
Would you have any objection to us making these proceedings public?

[00:27:42] Speaker 01:
No, no, no, your honor.

[00:27:44] Speaker 01:
I want everything to be public.

[00:27:46] Speaker 08:
OK, thank you.

[00:27:47] Speaker 08:
You have a minute.

[00:27:50] Speaker 01:
This is in connection with the mediated settlement agreement.

[00:27:55] Speaker 01:
And according to Judge Lambert, on May 17, 2001, the court amended local civil procedure by adding local civil rule 84.7 parenthesis F.

[00:28:13] Speaker 01:
in order for an immediate settlement agreement to be impossible.

[00:28:18] Speaker 01:
So the LCVR 84.7 parenthesis F was not

[00:28:27] Speaker 01:
was not complied with in this mediated settlement agreement.

[00:28:32] Speaker 01:
Therefore, the mediated settlement agreement that was dated November 13, 2019 is not enforceable and not binding because it is not in accordance with 84.7 parentheses F. Thank you.

[00:28:49] Speaker 08:
Thank you very much.

[00:28:51] Speaker 08:
Mr Shelley I know this is beyond the scope of your assignment but do you have any thoughts on whether we should do anything other than just unseal the entire appeal.

[00:29:05] Speaker 08:
I know the district court has a confidentiality provision but.

[00:29:10] Speaker 08:
We don't like secret proceedings and frankly, nothing that we've talked about strikes me as anything that should remain secret.

[00:29:21] Speaker 00:
I certainly have no personal objection myself and I don't see anything in the, as long as the parties don't object, it seems as though the court could go through and make the matter public.

[00:29:31] Speaker 08:
Okay, thank you.

[00:29:34] Speaker 08:
My colleagues have any questions for the amicus?

[00:29:38] Speaker 08:
No, thanks.

[00:29:38] Speaker 06:
No, thank you.

[00:29:40] Speaker 08:
Okay, Mr Shelly, you were appointed by the court as an amicus to help us work through the issues in the case, and you have ably discharged your responsibilities for which we are grateful.

[00:29:54] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honor.