[00:00:00] Speaker 00:
Case number 20-7036, Gary Anthony Abelant versus International Association of Machinists and Airspace Workers, District Lodge 1 and IAM National Pension Fund.

[00:00:13] Speaker 00:
Mr. Fay for the Abelant, Mr. Siegel for the Appellees.

[00:00:26] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Council.

[00:00:29] Speaker 00:
Please proceed.

[00:00:31] Speaker 03:
Good morning, Your Honors, and may it please the Court.

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My name is Raymond Fay, and I represent the Appellant, Gary Anthony.

[00:00:40] Speaker 03:
The decision of the IAM Fund Appeals Committee to deprive Mr. Anthony of his participation rights and benefits was not reasonable by any measure in three principal ways.

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The first was the referral to the employer.

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When the plans of the appeals committee said district lodge one unilaterally determines who is to be covered for the purposes of this pension contributions.

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That's at the appendix page 433.

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Plan documents governed, but there's nothing in the plan that authorizes this.

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The relevant plan related documents are the participation agreements.

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And those are bilateral agreements

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uh, in paragraph nine, they make clear that the trustees, not the employer has the full discretion and authority to adopt the participation rules.

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The district court concluded that the committee was merely requesting information that doesn't square with the unilaterally determines decision adopted by the plan.

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In fact, the first question put to the union was

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What job classifications did district lodge one intend to contribute?

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Spendix page 361.

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That's an ultimate issue, not an informational request.

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The second reason that the decision was unreasonable was that the committee did not decide the matter on the basis of unambiguous language of the participation agreements.

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Any discretionary authority of the plan to interpret its own documents is limited to interpreting ambiguous plan terms.

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Mr. Fay, can I get in the trust?

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Sure.

[00:02:36] Speaker 05:
In paragraph two of the participation agreement, it has this phrase, which as I understand,

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the lower court's decision is the key phrase that turns what would otherwise be an unambiguous word, employees, or an unambiguous phrase, all its employees, into an ambiguous phrase.

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And the phrase in paragraph two is all employees in all job classifications covered by this agreement.

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Okay, in all job classifications.

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What is a reasonable person

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supposed to make of those four words in all job classifications?

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What is a reasonable person supposed to think is the work that those four words are doing?

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In a nutshell, all work except those classifications covered by the collective bargaining agreement.

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So in all job classifications means, in all job classifications covered by this agreement means,

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not covered by collective bargaining agreements.

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Just another way to say not covered by collective bargaining agreements.

[00:03:54] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor.

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It said that in the previous paragraph, and you have to read the things together.

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The district court paid lip service to that, but she did not implement.

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So when you read the agreement as a whole,

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the first two paragraphs, we can see that that's exactly what the, there's no other way to read it because it covers participation and coverage for all employees as said in the first paragraph.

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And in the second paragraph, it refers to all job classifications covered, which has explained in the, I'm sorry, in the second paragraph, it says that the words you pointed to.

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And as the first paragraph explains, it's all the classifications covered, excuse me, that are not covered by a CVH.

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Mr. Fay, I think I only have one other question from me to you.

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What law do you think governs?

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What state law or is it Washington DC common law governs our interpretation of this?

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Or is it some kind of ERISA-based narrow federal common law that's an exception to the general rule that there's no general federal common law?

[00:05:02] Speaker 04:
Well, there is, there are narrow exceptions to that, but I don't think it applies in this context because and because the basic, the more fundamental statutory rules are going to govern.

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the way in which the plan's interpreted, that the discretion.

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Let's just say, Mr. Fay, let's just imagine that there's a statute of limitations issue on this dispute.

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There isn't, but let's just say that there is.

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Would we look to DC, Washington DC, local law for that statute of limitations question?

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Would we look to Pennsylvania state law?

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I believe we'd look to the federal jurisprudence that interprets the statutes of limitations within the original statute.

[00:05:44] Speaker 05:
So that does sound like some kind of narrow carve out a federal common law as opposed to the rule there's no general federal common law.

[00:05:53] Speaker 04:
What I'm trying to say to blend the two together is that ERISA already has a structure, and that's interpreted by the federal courts typically.

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And whether it's a statute of limitations, which is contained, there are statutes of limitations contained within ERISA, or the principles concerning the interpretation of land documents.

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Those are, it's kind of a web of all these obligations.

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That's why the plan committee is the delegated fiduciary.

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And that's why the matter should not have gone beyond that.

[00:06:27] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:06:27] Speaker 02:
And what is your best citation for that?

[00:06:35] Speaker 04:
Well, as we explained in our brief, if you look at the appeals committee charter, which is it,

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pages 850 and 851 of the appendix.

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You'll see that the trustees could delegate, and there are other provisions we cited in our brief, and delegate certain fiduciary functions, which it did.

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It delegated to the appeals committee the right to decide all of these participant appeals.

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Didn't go beyond that.

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There's nothing in the charter which allows it to refer matters out

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to a non-fiduciary in here, the employer, and there is nothing in the plan that says that we're gonna have an exception, and the union employer will decide participation rights in this instance.

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Anything further?

[00:07:29] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor.

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I just touched on it, but the third, beyond the ambiguity issue,

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The third element is the sub-delegation and that I've just described.

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The sub-delegation to the non-debutiary, namely the employer.

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A very brief word about the motion to alter or amend the judgment.

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As set forth in our brief, the appeal can be decided in Anthony's favor without reference to the motion.

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But the motion has merit because the misrepresentation about Powell's status and Powell's status changed the course of the case and was a key element in the district court's decision as seen on page 58.

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And the only other thing I'd say about it right now is that the court and the defendants focused on the new evidence prong of rule 59 when clearly the Manifest Injustice standard was the overriding concern.

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And similarly, under Rule 63, misconduct was shown by clearing convincing evidence.

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And my opponents, instead of addressing the wrongful result, which was within their clear knowledge, they erected the technical barriers to it.

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But for example, the non-hearsay aspect of Rule 801, they said, for example, well, Powell went to a different lawyer.

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The disclosure statement of District Lodge 1, in its brief in this case, confirms that it's simply a different arm of the same reporter.

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Powell went upstairs to the organizer.

[00:09:17] Speaker 02:
Okay, I don't know if you could do anything to be clearer, but you're really breaking up.

[00:09:21] Speaker 02:
I don't know if a more consistent closer to the microphone is very difficult to hear you.

[00:09:27] Speaker 04:
Okay, I am sorry about that and ask if I speak slower.

[00:09:31] Speaker 04:
Is that better?

[00:09:32] Speaker 02:
A little bit.

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Let me ask you, you were just addressing the motion to amend?

[00:09:39] Speaker 04:
Yes, I was.

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Your suggestion is that presumption of regularity in the administration of a fund in the context of ERISA somehow affects the rules and the burdens here.

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Do you have any authority for that?

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Any cases?

[00:10:03] Speaker 04:
No, I don't have specific specific cases, just the overall structure of a recent in the way it's supposed to work.

[00:10:14] Speaker 04:
Okay.

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And I'll reserve if I might, if there are any other questions.

[00:10:18] Speaker 00:
Thank you.

[00:10:21] Speaker 00:
All right.

[00:10:21] Speaker 00:
We'll hear from council.

[00:10:26] Speaker 01:
I'm sorry, your honor for interrupting.

[00:10:29] Speaker 01:
Good morning, your honors, and may it please the court.

[00:10:32] Speaker 01:
My name is Richard Siegel of Slevin and Hart PC.

[00:10:35] Speaker 01:
I represent the IAM National Pension Fund, and will be speaking on behalf of both appellees.

[00:10:41] Speaker 05:
Mr. Siegel, can I ask you to start where Mr. Fay left off before you get into the more merits type things?

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He was talking about the question of Powell and whether he got paid or not, or whether he qualifies for coverage or not.

[00:10:58] Speaker 05:
J.A.

[00:10:59] Speaker 05:
377 or thereabouts refers to something from the record, AR 262, where you have represented, this is an email from, a letter from Tony Armadillo of the union to Mr. Tierney of the fund.

[00:11:18] Speaker 05:
And here's what it says, brother Powell does not presently nor has he ever had contributions made on his behalf

[00:11:25] Speaker 05:
to the district lodge by the district lodge to the fund, nor is he entitled to as the district lodge organizer.

[00:11:33] Speaker 05:
I just have a simple question.

[00:11:35] Speaker 05:
It's from AR 262, a letter from Tony Armadillo.

[00:11:44] Speaker 05:
Let's see if I can find it in the JA.

[00:11:55] Speaker 05:
I think it starts at J.A.

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377, and there's a letter from Armadillo to Tierney.

[00:12:07] Speaker 05:
My question, Mr. Siegel, is that statement correct?

[00:12:13] Speaker 05:
You submitted it.

[00:12:14] Speaker 05:
Is it correct?

[00:12:16] Speaker 01:
Your Honor, I apologize.

[00:12:17] Speaker 01:
In the interest of finding the page, could you direct me to the statement that you were referring to on the page?

[00:12:22] Speaker 01:
Apologies.

[00:12:22] Speaker 05:
Yes.

[00:12:23] Speaker 05:
Let me...

[00:12:25] Speaker 05:
I'm sorry, I should have known the exact JA page, not just the exact AR page, but I can read it to you.

[00:12:30] Speaker 05:
It's only one sentence.

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Brother Powell does not presently nor has he ever had contributions made on his behalf by the district lodge to the fund, nor is he entitled to as the district lodge organizer.

[00:12:44] Speaker 05:
It's basically just saying Brother Powell is not entitled to coverage by the fund.

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And I'm just wondering if

[00:12:54] Speaker 02:
All right, it's on page A381.

[00:12:58] Speaker 05:
Thank you.

[00:12:58] Speaker 05:
Thank you very much, Jessica.

[00:13:00] Speaker 05:
I apologize for not having that, having the page.

[00:13:04] Speaker 02:
Just like four lines from the top.

[00:13:08] Speaker 01:
And so your question is, does Mr. Powell actually receive benefits from the fund?

[00:13:13] Speaker 05:
That is basically the substance of my question.

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I'm really asking about something from the record.

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Is that statement in the record correct?

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The statement says Brother Powell is not covered by the fund.

[00:13:25] Speaker 05:
Is that statement correct?

[00:13:27] Speaker 01:
To my information, yes.

[00:13:29] Speaker 01:
There is certainly and what is

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for the purposes of this court's review, there is nothing in the administrative record to contradict that statement.

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No evidence that this court's review is to evaluate the committee's decision based upon the information and evidence that was presented to it.

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There was no information or evidence presented to it to contradict that statement regarding Mr. Powell and

[00:13:57] Speaker 05:
Mr. Siegel, I think it's a little, I think, odd, or maybe maybe I shouldn't think it's odd, but your, your lodge only has, I think, three or four or five employees.

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And you're, you're the, you're the counsel for the lodge.

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And you submitted a statement saying pal is not covered.

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And now you're not sure whether he's covered.

[00:14:19] Speaker 01:
To clarify, Mr. To clarify, your honor, I'm sorry.

[00:14:22] Speaker 01:
Uh, I represented the fun, not I am sorry.

[00:14:27] Speaker 05:
I apologize.

[00:14:28] Speaker 01:
I am speaking on behalf of both, but to the, to the, the limited information that I have is no, that is, that is that that was a correct, a factually correct statement regarding Mr. Powell, but more directly

[00:14:44] Speaker 01:
no contradictory evidence was presented to the committee.

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And this court can only review what was presented to the committee.

[00:14:53] Speaker 02:
Right, which is a slightly different issue.

[00:14:55] Speaker 01:
Yes.

[00:14:56] Speaker 05:
And then I also wonder if you could answer the question I asked Mr. Fay about what law do you think of, what kind of common law do you think applies to our interpretation of this contract?

[00:15:08] Speaker 05:
Do you think it's DC local common law or something else?

[00:15:13] Speaker 01:
I think it's actually somewhat of a mix.

[00:15:16] Speaker 01:
There is a common law in ERISA.

[00:15:20] Speaker 01:
There is a developed federal common law in ERISA cases.

[00:15:24] Speaker 01:
For example, the entire premise that this court reviews the committee's decision as a matter of discretion isn't found in the ERISA statute.

[00:15:33] Speaker 01:
It is a judicially created doctrine.

[00:15:35] Speaker 01:
At the same time,

[00:15:39] Speaker 01:
You asked the question regarding the statute of limitations and the general accepted rule of law under the federal common law of ERISA is that in cases like this, you adopt the most analogous state law.

[00:15:54] Speaker 01:
So for example, the statute of limitations that would be applicable in this case would be the District of Columbia statute of limitations for breach of contract actions by analogy.

[00:16:06] Speaker 05:
And that would apply to our interpretation of the participation agreement.

[00:16:11] Speaker 01:
I believe that is correct.

[00:16:12] Speaker 01:
Subject to the caveat that, of course, you review the committee's decisions with deference to the committee.

[00:16:20] Speaker 01:
So that is the ERISA layer that I would put on top of the state law layer, which is that you might start with the fundamental of DC, but you must also defer to the committee's decision so long as it is reasonable.

[00:16:35] Speaker 02:
Mr. Siegel, just stepping back a moment and stepping back from the issue a little bit, you and Judge Walker were discussing whether this representation about Powell was correct, is correct, whether there's any in the record showing otherwise.

[00:16:53] Speaker 02:
I have a more fundamental question, which is if it were wrong and if Anthony had presented evidence

[00:17:03] Speaker 02:
at the time the record was open, that Powell actually was receiving benefits in some period of time when he was in the job that Anthony had held, that wouldn't undermine the union or the funds position, would it?

[00:17:22] Speaker 01:
I don't think, I think the committee could have still reached the decision that it reached.

[00:17:26] Speaker 01:
It would have had to have made a decision based upon competing evidence rather than the unilateral evidence that was actually presented.

[00:17:36] Speaker 02:
Is it competing evidence?

[00:17:37] Speaker 02:
Because as I understand the Lodge's interpretation, it's interpreting the second clause as

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you know, applying to job classifications for which contributions are required by a written agreement.

[00:18:00] Speaker 02:
And if the lodge entered a written agreement to cover organizers that it hadn't previously covered, there's nothing that would prohibit that.

[00:18:13] Speaker 02:
But the question for Anthony is, is there something that required it?

[00:18:18] Speaker 02:
And so I guess I'm just, and Mr. Fay can address this also in his rebuttal, I'm just, I mean, dishonesty is dishonesty and that's something of concern, but I'm trying to understand apart from any question, you know, what is the theory of relevance or not of this statement and whether my appreciation of its relevance or not is correct.

[00:18:45] Speaker 01:
I believe I believe I understand your question, your honor so my answer would be, or my answer is that in so far as the fact that I'm sorry, the allegation because it's not a fact the allegation that Mr Powell.

[00:19:01] Speaker 01:
receives benefits from the fund to the extent that could weigh on whether organizers were to be covered by the participation agreements as they existed during the time of Mr. Anthony's employment, that I suppose could be competing evidence.

[00:19:16] Speaker 01:
But I certainly agree as I understood your question to be that there would be nothing to preclude the district lodge after Mr. Anthony left the district lodges employment to sign a new participation agreement

[00:19:29] Speaker 01:
on behalf of organizers that would cover Mr. Powell.

[00:19:33] Speaker 01:
Of course, because Mr. Anthony did not present or raise any issues to the committee, disagreeing with what the committee was told regarding Mr. Powell, there was no basis for the committee to...

[00:19:47] Speaker 01:
conduct further investigation into that.

[00:19:50] Speaker 01:
And of course, it didn't even come up during the course of the district court litigation.

[00:19:55] Speaker 01:
But instead, it only came up during the post-judgment motion.

[00:20:03] Speaker 01:
And referring back to an issue that Judge Walker raised during Mr. Fay's presentation,

[00:20:12] Speaker 01:
Looking to the participation agreement itself, it's in the append, an example A411 is, as an example, Mr. Fay gave the answer that all job classifications means essentially all employees, that it is indistinguishable.

[00:20:33] Speaker 01:
I apologize, I realize I'm out of time.

[00:20:34] Speaker 01:
May I finish this point?

[00:20:37] Speaker 01:
Yes, please.

[00:20:39] Speaker 01:
If you read paragraph two of these participation agreements and then do what Mr. Anthony, I'm sorry, Mr. Anthony through his counsel suggests and interpret all job classifications to in fact mean all employees, then the effect of that would be to read the words regarding job classifications out of the participation agreement.

[00:21:00] Speaker 01:
It would have, if you read the words,

[00:21:03] Speaker 01:
In all job classifications covered by this agreement out of paragraph two, paragraph two would have the exact same meaning according to Mr. Fay in that it would read that the lodge shall contribute to the fund for each hour day or portion thereof for which all employees are entitled to receive pay as follows.

[00:21:23] Speaker 01:
It would have the same meaning without job classifications.

[00:21:26] Speaker 01:
And so in that context, the district court correctly found there to be an ambiguity.

[00:21:30] Speaker 01:
I understand.

[00:21:31] Speaker 01:
What do you think?

[00:21:32] Speaker 01:
I'm happy to answer questions.

[00:21:36] Speaker 02:
That's fine.

[00:21:36] Speaker 02:
Yes, Judge Walker?

[00:21:37] Speaker 05:
No, I'm good.

[00:21:38] Speaker 05:
I'm good.

[00:21:39] Speaker 02:
You sure?

[00:21:39] Speaker 05:
Thank you, though.

[00:21:40] Speaker 02:
I am.

[00:21:41] Speaker 02:
All right.

[00:21:42] Speaker 02:
Judge Pillard, anything?

[00:21:43] Speaker 02:
No, thank you.

[00:21:44] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:21:45] Speaker 02:
All right.

[00:21:46] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:21:46] Speaker 02:
All right.

[00:21:50] Speaker 00:
So Council for Appellant, give you a couple of minutes.

[00:21:55] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:21:55] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:21:58] Speaker 03:
Executive Director Tierney explained it very well before this matter was referred.

[00:22:04] Speaker 03:
In appendix 271, he said that the participation agreements do not define any specific job classifications, nor eliminate jobs from coverage.

[00:22:16] Speaker 03:
That is why the executive director felt that the term all employees meant.

[00:22:21] Speaker 03:
all job classifications.

[00:22:23] Speaker 03:
Granted, it was the custom to enter a new participation agreement if the rate changed, or this very tiny universe of employees not in collective bargaining agreements expanded.

[00:22:36] Speaker 03:
But it was undisputed that they were all the same.

[00:22:39] Speaker 03:
The participation agreements were identical all along.

[00:22:44] Speaker 03:
The agnosticism that was expressed by the fund to say, I believe it was said in the brief, the fund has absolutely no reason to believe that Anthony's allegations regarding Powell are in any way accurate.

[00:22:59] Speaker 03:
Well, that's not true.

[00:23:00] Speaker 03:
It's the plan.

[00:23:02] Speaker 03:
The plan knows who the participants are.

[00:23:04] Speaker 03:
You just look at the roster and they'll know if Powell was on or is on the roster or not.

[00:23:10] Speaker 03:
They talk about all these ways of gathering their

[00:23:13] Speaker 03:
employees and keeping track of a very simple matter.

[00:23:17] Speaker 03:
So, you know, everybody's got a right to argue the technical matters, but I think the truth is going to govern here because we're looking for federal rights that would inure to Mr. Anthony and others.

[00:23:32] Speaker 03:
And if there weren't to be exceptions made, it should have been made for him.

[00:23:37] Speaker 02:
Let me ask you the same question, Mr. Fay, that I had asked Mr. Siegel, because it really is better directed at you.

[00:23:44] Speaker 02:
And I understand the consternation about a statement being made in the record that you learned or Mr. Anthony had reason to think was made in error and perhaps knowingly in error.

[00:24:01] Speaker 02:
It's a serious issue.

[00:24:06] Speaker 02:
But imagine that Anthony had made the phone call and the information had come in

[00:24:12] Speaker 02:
when the record going to the committee and or to the district court was still open.

[00:24:23] Speaker 02:
Am I wrong that the committee could still have interpreted the plan

[00:24:35] Speaker 02:
and its reference to employment and a job classification for which employer contributions are required to this plan by a written agreement between the trustees and a contributing lodge could still have been

[00:24:50] Speaker 02:
met in both Anthony's case and in Powell's case because what happened by hypothesis between Anthony's case and Powell's case is that a new written agreement was entered, including the organizer job classification in

[00:25:09] Speaker 02:
in the category for which employer contributions are required.

[00:25:12] Speaker 02:
In other words, it was a decision made to confer this benefit on an employee in a category that had not previously received the benefit.

[00:25:22] Speaker 02:
What am I missing?

[00:25:23] Speaker 04:
Yeah.

[00:25:23] Speaker 04:
Again, Your Honor, the job classifications aren't specified in the participation agreements.

[00:25:29] Speaker 04:
They're only handful of them.

[00:25:30] Speaker 04:
They're only handful of employees that were not in collective bargaining agreement and employed by District Lodge 1.

[00:25:37] Speaker 04:
In each case, if the rates change, they issue the new participation agreement.

[00:25:43] Speaker 04:
But the words of those first two paragraphs stay the same.

[00:25:48] Speaker 00:
Mr. Fay, we're having trouble hearing you.

[00:25:51] Speaker 04:
I apologize.

[00:25:52] Speaker 04:
That's all right.

[00:25:53] Speaker 04:
I'm trying to get, maybe I get closer, and then my head gets too big on the screen.

[00:25:58] Speaker 00:
Yes, if you would repeat your last sentence.

[00:26:04] Speaker 04:
I'm sorry, Your Honor.

[00:26:05] Speaker 04:
The last sentence was that in the course of all these dealings, when a new person came in, the participation agreement read identical.

[00:26:16] Speaker 04:
The job classification was not specified in any of the participation agreements.

[00:26:21] Speaker 02:
Right, but there has to be some mechanism by which the lodge tells the fund.

[00:26:26] Speaker 02:
These are the employees that we

[00:26:29] Speaker 02:
are gonna be regularly contributing toward whose pensions we're gonna be regularly contributing.

[00:26:33] Speaker 02:
And my understanding from this record is that they actually entered into a separate participation agreement for each employee.

[00:26:39] Speaker 02:
So they could add on a third one, they have the secretary, they have the blanking on the name, but the business agent.

[00:26:47] Speaker 04:
Business representative, yes.

[00:26:49] Speaker 02:
Business representative, and then they could say, okay, we're gonna do a third one of these for the organizer.

[00:26:56] Speaker 02:
that would make clear who they're covering and who they're not.

[00:27:00] Speaker 04:
Well, that would make clear who they said they were desiring to cover.

[00:27:04] Speaker 04:
But if the participation agreements, which in this case are the governing plan-related documents, if those specify all employees of all job classifications are to get these benefits, then that's the end of the matter.

[00:27:17] Speaker 04:
And that's why I pointed to what

[00:27:19] Speaker 04:
Mr. Tierney said, because he said, well, it doesn't specify define the job classification, but it doesn't eliminate them either.

[00:27:27] Speaker 04:
And that's why we end up back when you read the agreements as a whole, it comes back to all employees.

[00:27:36] Speaker 00:
All right.

[00:27:38] Speaker 00:
Anything further?

[00:27:39] Speaker 04:
I have nothing further.

[00:27:40] Speaker 04:
Thank you very much.

[00:27:41] Speaker 00:
Thank you very much.

[00:27:42] Speaker 00:
We'll take the case under advisement.