[00:00:00] Speaker 05: Takes number 22-1792. [00:00:02] Speaker 05: Ian Scott-Anderman and David Sepley at Appellants versus Robert Martinez et al. [00:00:09] Speaker 05: Mr. Gegan for the Appellants, Mr. Hudson-Platt for the Appellees. [00:00:14] Speaker 03: Good morning. [00:00:15] Speaker 03: Good morning to Council as well. [00:00:19] Speaker 03: I'm Thomas Gagan and I am Council for the Appellants and I'd like to reserve three minutes of my time. [00:00:27] Speaker 03: On two major grounds. [00:00:30] Speaker 03: The trusteeship of District Lodge 142 is illegal and even void of initial, of no effect to quote the leading law of the circuit. [00:00:45] Speaker 03: And under the law of the circuit, the elected leadership should be reinstated, should go back to the status quo before this void trusteeship was put in place. [00:00:56] Speaker 02: Let me just clarify a couple of things. [00:00:58] Speaker 02: The trusteeship, though, did not [00:01:01] Speaker 02: the elected leadership that happened prior to the trusteeship, right? [00:01:09] Speaker 03: The formal trusteeship did not. [00:01:12] Speaker 03: But trusteeship has a functional definition under 402H. [00:01:17] Speaker 03: It is any method of control or supervision. [00:01:20] Speaker 03: It's important to keep in mind that when the LMRDA was passed in 1959, parent unions had all sorts of names [00:01:28] Speaker 03: for things that were trusteeships but were not formally called trusteeships. [00:01:33] Speaker 03: The removal of the plaintiffs without any notice as to the specifics was on January 25th, and the trusteeship notice was on January 26th. [00:01:47] Speaker 03: They were twin. [00:01:49] Speaker 03: And the removal of the elected leadership, the elected leadership of a district line of 20,000 members, their elected leadership, summarily, [00:01:58] Speaker 03: without any hearing by one person, defendants or bounties, not even by the entire IAM, just by her, is certainly a method of control or supervision and a trusteeship. [00:02:11] Speaker 03: And I will use those terms, I will use the broader term of trusteeship. [00:02:17] Speaker 02: Why is there a Title I of the Act then? [00:02:25] Speaker 02: I mean, I don't understand. [00:02:27] Speaker 03: Well, Title III is, as various courts have pointed out, including the Sixth Circuit, we cited Thompson, it's for the district lodge itself. [00:02:39] Speaker 03: It is a claim of the district lodge on behalf of the entire membership. [00:02:43] Speaker 03: The Title I is an individual claim of the officers to prevent the removal for speech. [00:02:51] Speaker 03: However, [00:02:53] Speaker 03: The Supreme Court in Lynn qualified that individual nature. [00:02:58] Speaker 03: In Lynn versus sheet metal workers or sheet metal workers versus Lynn, the Supreme Court said, oh no, this is not just an individual claim. [00:03:08] Speaker 03: If the elected officers are being removed because of their speech, the members who elected them or who represented by them are also chilled with respect to their speech. [00:03:21] Speaker 03: So even the Title I claim has a dimension that is collected in the Supreme Court's understanding of Lin versus, in the Supreme Court's statement as the rationale for Lin versus chief member of workers. [00:03:37] Speaker 03: And the Title I issue remains in this case. [00:03:41] Speaker 03: We have a separate Title I count, as this court is aware. [00:03:46] Speaker 03: And that removal for speech has a chilling effect. [00:03:49] Speaker 03: It is not that. [00:03:51] Speaker 03: We are seeking to lift the trusteeship under Title I. We did say that in the original complaint, but that was one of the prayers for relief. [00:04:00] Speaker 03: But we can see that Title I is not a remedy for lifting the trusteeship. [00:04:05] Speaker 03: But it is clear from Lynn that officers do not lose their elected positions [00:04:14] Speaker 03: because of speech and just because a trusteeship is in place. [00:04:18] Speaker 03: They retain them, and they retain all their rights. [00:04:21] Speaker 03: And in this case, there would never have been, Your Honor, there would never have been any trusteeship without the removal of the officers. [00:04:29] Speaker 03: This was payback. [00:04:31] Speaker 03: It was a revenge against Scott Anderman and subtly for challenging her for election and for calling her out for financial fraud. [00:04:40] Speaker 02: Let me turn to another issue. [00:04:43] Speaker 02: The statute. [00:04:44] Speaker 02: specifically says that the trusteeship can be authorized or ratified after a fair hearing. [00:04:57] Speaker 02: Do you agree with that? [00:04:58] Speaker 02: That's correct. [00:04:59] Speaker 02: As interpreted by this court in the minority. [00:05:02] Speaker 02: I'm asking you what the statute says. [00:05:04] Speaker 02: The statute says it can be authorized or ratified. [00:05:07] Speaker 02: That's true. [00:05:08] Speaker 02: So are you taking the position that if [00:05:14] Speaker 02: if a prestige ship is imposed without a hearing and without a valid finding or presence of an emergence. [00:05:31] Speaker 02: But then within a short time afterwards, there is a fair hearing. [00:05:38] Speaker 02: and the grounds, which is for the sake of this hypothetical, the grounds to justify a trusteeship are proven at that subsequent hearing. [00:05:54] Speaker 02: Are you saying that that can never cure or be the basis of the imposition of a trusteeship if there had been an invalid trusteeship imposed [00:06:08] Speaker 03: Yes, and that's why would that be given with that? [00:06:13] Speaker 03: Because is this circuit pointed out in the mine workers decision? [00:06:17] Speaker 03: It begs the question is whether there is a pair of hearing and post ratification. [00:06:21] Speaker 03: There was no emergency. [00:06:23] Speaker 03: And if I don't, I don't see any argument in your brief that this wasn't a fair here, but if yes, there is an argument that is not a fair hearing. [00:06:32] Speaker 03: We say first of all, the district lodge once it is sidelined, [00:06:36] Speaker 03: no longer is able to present a case. [00:06:38] Speaker 03: There was no district lodge to protest this trusteeship. [00:06:42] Speaker 02: And second, nobody showed up at the hearing. [00:06:46] Speaker 03: Oh no, people showed up, including the lead athlete of the case, Joe Tiberi. [00:06:51] Speaker 02: But your clients didn't show up. [00:06:53] Speaker 03: But they were removed on February, the trusteeship hearing was on February 16th. [00:06:59] Speaker 03: They were removed by Cervantes from, they were not just removed on January 25th, [00:07:06] Speaker 03: They were then banned on February 9th, a week before the post-trust issue. [00:07:11] Speaker 03: So they were prohibited from participating in the hearing? [00:07:14] Speaker 03: They were prohibited from representing the district in any capacity. [00:07:21] Speaker 03: You have no ability as a member anymore to represent the members. [00:07:26] Speaker 01: Is that a full-time position? [00:07:30] Speaker 01: It was a full-time position. [00:07:32] Speaker 01: Both of your clients, they were full-time. [00:07:35] Speaker 01: That's right. [00:07:36] Speaker 01: Secretary of Treasury and President. [00:07:38] Speaker 01: You know, I wonder, you keep mentioning mine workers. [00:07:41] Speaker 01: The statute itself does not require a hearing for a trusteeship to be imposed. [00:07:49] Speaker 01: It only says that if the hearing is, if there is a hearing and it's a fair hearing and it either, and it may be before or after, then there is an 18 month immunity. [00:08:02] Speaker 01: but the statute doesn't require a hearing. [00:08:04] Speaker 01: And in mine workers, there was no hearing, correct? [00:08:09] Speaker 01: So anything that mine workers said about what the situation should be if there had been a hearing after the trusteeship or before is totally dictated. [00:08:20] Speaker 01: And I don't see any case in our circuit that has ever adopted that proposition. [00:08:26] Speaker 01: Maybe a district court case, but I'm talking about in this circuit. [00:08:31] Speaker 03: Is there any? [00:08:32] Speaker 03: Well, Mineworkers is that case because Mineworkers says that if there is no, it questions the good faith [00:08:45] Speaker 03: of the parent union, if it doesn't provide for a hearing. [00:08:50] Speaker 03: And they gave specific guidance, but not just mine workers, but this circuit, again, in mail handlers, affirmed in 1989, the same rule. [00:09:01] Speaker 03: It was very specific guidance going forward. [00:09:03] Speaker 02: And the example here was a case where there was an emergency imposition of the trusteeship. [00:09:14] Speaker 02: Um, and then, um, without a hearing, but there was a declaration of an emergency, as I recall. [00:09:23] Speaker 02: And then, um, they noticed a hearing and the local tried to enjoin that hearing because they said that that hearing would interfere with elections or, you know, local union business. [00:09:39] Speaker 02: And that was denied. [00:09:42] Speaker 02: And then, [00:09:43] Speaker 02: The hearing took place and the trusteeship was imposed or ratified. [00:09:51] Speaker 02: And there was a proceeding by the national to enforce the trusteeship. [00:10:01] Speaker 02: And the court said, well, that's, you know, moot or not really right now because that's [00:10:09] Speaker 02: going on before the district court and the district court to act and then will act. [00:10:15] Speaker 02: That presumes then that that um, um, prestige ship had been enforced, right? [00:10:25] Speaker 02: Well, so if, if, if, if, if, um, if, if it couldn't be ratified, so to speak, by hearing after the fact, [00:10:36] Speaker 02: then there would have been no reason in mail handlers to say anything about a possible action on a motion to enforce that trusteeship. [00:10:51] Speaker 03: But the validity of that trusteeship hearing wasn't before the court of mail handlers. [00:10:57] Speaker 03: The mail handler was concerned with a second independent trusteeship. [00:11:01] Speaker 03: for a failure to hold an election. [00:11:04] Speaker 03: The first one was for financial fraud. [00:11:06] Speaker 03: And the court said that because of proceedings, actually, I think the magistrate judge became sick. [00:11:12] Speaker 03: Because of proceedings down below, this has moved, we've moved past it. [00:11:15] Speaker 03: And we're just focused on the second financial fraud, but trusteeship for not holding an election. [00:11:22] Speaker 03: And that trusteeship [00:11:24] Speaker 03: The court did apply the mine worker's rule and said that the district court couldn't enjoin the pre-trusteeship hearing, but after it was held, or the prior hearing, it could enjoin the imposition of the trusteeship. [00:11:37] Speaker 03: I would like to go back to Judge Randall's question as to whether or not there could be a fair hearing. [00:11:44] Speaker 03: In this case, it's a perfect example of what happened. [00:11:46] Speaker 03: First of all, there are no prior hearings. [00:11:49] Speaker 03: There are no prior hearings under the IAM Constitution ever. [00:11:53] Speaker 03: It's always shoot first and ask questions later. [00:11:55] Speaker 03: The district lodge has been sidelined. [00:11:58] Speaker 03: It has no institutional voice, which is the whole point of the statute, is to give the district lodge or the subordinate body a voice. [00:12:07] Speaker 03: They don't have a voice in a post-trustorship hearing. [00:12:10] Speaker 03: So it's problematic to have this statute [00:12:13] Speaker 03: that says, oh, the district law can protest and can present its case to the parent union when the district law has already been incinerated, more or less legally. [00:12:28] Speaker 01: Before you sit down, there's a question that's actually a preliminary question that I'd like to ask you a few questions about. [00:12:35] Speaker 01: It's the mootness argument. [00:12:38] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:12:38] Speaker 01: And your count, was it count six? [00:12:43] Speaker 01: Is the title one? [00:12:45] Speaker 01: It is the count six. [00:12:46] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:12:47] Speaker 01: And that's clearly that count is clearly not moved because you're seeking back pay. [00:12:53] Speaker 01: That's correct. [00:12:54] Speaker 01: Which is why I asked you if they had they were so so that count is not moved. [00:12:59] Speaker 01: But but we have to remember we're here on an appeal from a denial of preliminary injunction. [00:13:06] Speaker 01: And I'd like you to address the question, what kind of an injunction can be issued now since there's been so much water over the dam and there are new officers who have been elected? [00:13:21] Speaker 01: No, not yet. [00:13:22] Speaker 01: Well, they take office in January. [00:13:25] Speaker 01: There has been no election yet. [00:13:27] Speaker 01: Oh, I thought it was supposed to be on the 29th of November. [00:13:31] Speaker 03: To my knowledge, there has not been an election, but there is something in the record. [00:13:36] Speaker 01: But, um, and I, uh, well, there, there, there, the allegation here by, maybe I misread this, but I thought from the, uh, from the defendants was there, there was a new election scheduled for November 29th. [00:13:51] Speaker 03: Well, let me address the question as to the new election. [00:13:55] Speaker 03: Um, first of all, that election is void because the elected leadership has been barred from running it. [00:14:01] Speaker 03: But more important, if this trusteeship is void of initial, [00:14:06] Speaker 03: then this parent union, IAM, has no legal authority to conduct the election. [00:14:12] Speaker 03: And yes, of course, to go back to the status quo ante, to reinstate the elected leadership. [00:14:18] Speaker 03: And by the way, there was an election going on in January and February of earlier this year that was stopped by the parent union. [00:14:28] Speaker 03: And now there's a new election. [00:14:29] Speaker 01: If I understand your point that it is [00:14:33] Speaker 01: And I'd like the defendants to address this. [00:14:36] Speaker 01: The point is it's not moot because, forget about Camp 6 for the moment, it's not moot because they were barred from ever running again. [00:14:47] Speaker 01: So even if there was another election, [00:14:50] Speaker 01: An injunction, a preliminary injunction, would prevent the bar and you'd have to have a new election. [00:14:59] Speaker 01: That's your point? [00:15:01] Speaker 03: Or go back to the old election. [00:15:03] Speaker 03: There was an election going on and it stopped. [00:15:07] Speaker 03: And if we went back to the status quo, that election would just play out the way it had before. [00:15:12] Speaker 03: So, if it's void, it's void. [00:15:14] Speaker 03: They have no authority to conduct it. [00:15:16] Speaker 03: But more to the point, it's not just the Title I claim where there's a chilling effect on the members. [00:15:22] Speaker 03: If the members are having an election where the rule is you cannot put in place anybody who is going to challenge Cervantes for financial fraud or you will be trustee, [00:15:34] Speaker 03: they are not then able to have officers of their own choosing. [00:15:38] Speaker 03: There is a continuing irreparable effect, not just from the title one claim, but from the title three claim because there's an enduring structural effect from the title three. [00:15:49] Speaker 02: All right. [00:15:49] Speaker 02: Thanks. [00:15:50] Speaker 02: Let's suppose I, uh, for the sake of argument that [00:15:58] Speaker 02: We were defined that the initial imposition of trusteeship was void ab initio because there was no declaration of an emergency or emergency basis for doing so without a hearing. [00:16:15] Speaker 02: But we found that eventually there was a hearing and those grounds satisfy and justify [00:16:26] Speaker 02: the imposition of the trusteeship on March 17th. [00:16:35] Speaker 02: And so there was a void trusteeship from January 26th to March 17th, but then it was not void after that. [00:16:49] Speaker 02: What grounds would there be for [00:16:58] Speaker 02: what injuries resulted from that period of weakness and that would justify the imposition of preliminary. [00:17:08] Speaker 03: But judge, it's not just a limited period where it's void and suddenly it becomes unvoided. [00:17:12] Speaker 03: It's void from the assumption. [00:17:14] Speaker 03: So what the relief in this case would be to reinstate and go back to have a prior hearing again with the courts. [00:17:24] Speaker 02: Let me ask it this way. [00:17:26] Speaker 02: Suppose a district court judge gets a motion for a preliminary injunction, complaint, motion for a preliminary injunction with a bunch of declarations attached and a proposed order and without even hearing from the defendants, signs the order and says, [00:17:44] Speaker 02: Enjoying a that's you know, that's unfair. [00:17:51] Speaker 02: We want to file our pleadings. [00:17:52] Speaker 02: We want to have a hearing and the judge gets all the pleadings as a hearing. [00:17:59] Speaker 02: And then signs the same order and says, um, you know, I found a basis for entering the injunction and I'm entering it in signs. [00:18:12] Speaker 02: and it comes up to us on appeal. [00:18:16] Speaker 02: And we find that what the judge initially did was an error, but what the judge did after the hearing was not supposed to vacate the second injunction. [00:18:29] Speaker 03: Well, as I understand the question, what should have happened in that case is that the parent union can just restore the cesspool ante. [00:18:40] Speaker 03: They can have another prior hearing. [00:18:41] Speaker 03: That's not barred. [00:18:43] Speaker 03: But they have to go back through the trusteeship procedure. [00:18:46] Speaker 03: And there's one other thing that I wanted to get in before I sat down. [00:18:50] Speaker 02: You're not answering my hypothetical. [00:18:52] Speaker 02: My hypothetical is that if the district court [00:18:56] Speaker 02: enters an erroneous order that then follows the correct procedure and later enters a proper order. [00:19:04] Speaker 02: We're supposed to vacate the second order because the first one was erroneous. [00:19:09] Speaker 02: Are you enjoying the trusteeship? [00:19:13] Speaker 02: For anything, it doesn't even have to be a trusteeship to be an injunction over anything. [00:19:19] Speaker 02: I'm just asking about what a court is supposed to do or how it works if a body [00:19:26] Speaker 02: takes a void action, a legal action subsequent that has the same result. [00:19:35] Speaker 03: What do we do generally in that circle? [00:19:38] Speaker 03: I think that that's taken up in the mail handler's case, where the district court said, you cannot enjoin this pre-prior hearing. [00:19:49] Speaker 03: You can't do that. [00:19:50] Speaker 03: But you have to let that go forward. [00:19:52] Speaker 03: That doesn't mean you lose the jurisdiction to bar the reimposition of the trusteeship. [00:19:56] Speaker 03: This situation is different because the lack of jurisdiction or the voidness results from not having this prior hearing, which is necessary except in an emergency to a fair hearing. [00:20:10] Speaker 03: I mean, the hypothetical that, well, what if it's a fair hearing later begs the question as to whether it can be with the district lodge removed when they didn't have to do it. [00:20:19] Speaker 03: They didn't have to do it. [00:20:20] Speaker 03: They could have had the prior hearing. [00:20:22] Speaker 03: And in this case, in particular, it's very important to stress [00:20:25] Speaker 03: that the trusteeship panel had no authority to block the original trusteeship or to say it was wrong, it could just talk about continuing it. [00:20:35] Speaker 03: And it had no authority, no authority to reinstate the elected leadership because of this slice and dice thing. [00:20:43] Speaker 03: Oh, well, we didn't remove them because of the trusteeship when in fact they did, does fit the functional definition of 402H. [00:20:50] Speaker 03: So the panel, this so-called post-trusteeship hearing, didn't ratify the removal of the officers. [00:20:57] Speaker 03: The post-trusteeship hearing said, hey, we don't have any authority to look at that, which was the whole point of the trusteeship. [00:21:05] Speaker 03: Why should the plaintiffs show up at a hearing where they can't be reinstated and they've just been fined $265,000 each a week before [00:21:16] Speaker 03: for and told never dare to try to represent the membership again. [00:21:21] Speaker 03: I mean, they were terrified, obviously. [00:21:24] Speaker 03: And there was no district lodge there to present a case. [00:21:30] Speaker 03: And that's why a post-trust issue- What has happened to the $270,000? [00:21:35] Speaker 01: Has that been paid? [00:21:38] Speaker 03: No, we're still appealing it. [00:21:41] Speaker 01: You're appealing that within the union? [00:21:43] Speaker 03: Within the union. [00:21:44] Speaker 03: And it's been upheld at this point. [00:21:46] Speaker 03: Um, so and the ban has been increased from five years to forever. [00:21:51] Speaker 03: They can never hold an office basically because of the phone bill. [00:21:57] Speaker 02: All right. [00:21:58] Speaker 02: Um, any questions, Judge Rogers? [00:22:04] Speaker 02: No. [00:22:05] Speaker 02: All right. [00:22:06] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:22:06] Speaker 02: We'll give you some time on rebuttal. [00:22:07] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:22:10] Speaker 02: All right, Mr Hudson plush. [00:22:16] Speaker 04: Good morning. [00:22:16] Speaker 04: May it please the court, Evan Hudson-Plush, Cohen Weiss, and Simon LLP for the appellee's defendants. [00:22:22] Speaker 04: This case involves an interlocutory appeal of the denial plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, a mandatory preliminary injunction, seeking to lift the testesia imposed by an international union, the International Association of Machinists, or IAM, also known as the Grand Lodge, over one of its subordinate bodies, District Lodge 142. [00:22:40] Speaker 04: It's a case involving internal union affairs. [00:22:43] Speaker 04: of a union trying to stop serious financial malpractice in a statute, the LMRDA, which presumes the trusteeship was validly imposed for a period of 18 months. [00:22:53] Speaker 04: Before the merits, however, I did want to address the jurisdiction of this court to hear this appeal in light of intervening events. [00:23:00] Speaker 04: And asking, or going directly to Judge Randolph's question, yes, elections have happened. [00:23:07] Speaker 04: On the 29th? [00:23:09] Speaker 04: On the 29th of November. [00:23:10] Speaker 04: Not only have they happened, [00:23:12] Speaker 04: But the results, the ballots have been counted. [00:23:14] Speaker 04: Members have been notified. [00:23:16] Speaker 04: The election has been certified. [00:23:18] Speaker 04: New officers are elected. [00:23:20] Speaker 01: They take office on January 3rd. [00:23:23] Speaker 04: They will be seated on January 3rd. [00:23:25] Speaker 00: Perhaps we ought to offer an affidavit of some type for the record in this case, because all we have is your brief citing something on a website. [00:23:40] Speaker 04: Thank you for that suggestion, Your Honor. [00:23:42] Speaker 04: The website is the website of the District Lodge, and those are the official results of the election. [00:23:46] Speaker 00: But that's not part of the record of this court. [00:23:55] Speaker 04: Because it goes to subject matter jurisdiction, the court can consider it. [00:24:00] Speaker 00: whether the affidavit. [00:24:03] Speaker 00: I mean, you're making representations here today that not only was the election schedule for November 29, but it occurred and blah, blah, blah. [00:24:14] Speaker 04: It was certified, I believe, two days ago or one day ago. [00:24:21] Speaker 00: An affidavit that effect in the record for this court [00:24:27] Speaker 04: Absolutely. [00:24:27] Speaker 04: We can, we can do that. [00:24:29] Speaker 01: Maybe you can just talk to council for the plaintiffs and get a stipulation. [00:24:34] Speaker 04: Sure. [00:24:34] Speaker 04: I will, I will gladly do that. [00:24:38] Speaker 00: Take the issue out of the case, in other words. [00:24:44] Speaker 04: And the fact that this election has occurred triggers another provision of the LMRDA, LMRDA Title IV. [00:24:51] Speaker 04: It was run, the election was run under Title IV as we noted in our brief. [00:24:54] Speaker 04: Under Title IV, there's a provision 29 USC 483, which says the exclusive remedy for challenging an election already conducted is through the Secretary of Labor. [00:25:06] Speaker 04: It means the challenge that election is to go to the Department of Labor. [00:25:10] Speaker 04: First, you file internal challenges within the union, then you go to the DOL. [00:25:13] Speaker 04: What is the site on that again? [00:25:16] Speaker 04: 29 USC 483. [00:25:18] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:25:18] Speaker 04: And it's been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Local 82 v. Crowley, which is 467. [00:25:24] Speaker 04: U.S. [00:25:24] Speaker 04: by the 26th. [00:25:26] Speaker 04: So Reed's statement is just no longer a relief that is available to plaintiffs for numerous reasons. [00:25:30] Speaker 04: Number one is Title IV. [00:25:32] Speaker 04: Number two is that, as counsel acknowledged, they were not removed pursuant to the trusteeship, but pursuant to the shortage, which is a financial procedure under Article VII, Section V. And while he could... Well, his argument is that it's really tomato, tomato, [00:25:49] Speaker 02: You may say that, but it was really the trusteeship that removed it. [00:25:54] Speaker 02: What's your response? [00:25:56] Speaker 04: Well, they were removed the day before, and I believe his argument is that that removal in and of itself was a trusteeship under the definition of a trusteeship under the LMRDA. [00:26:05] Speaker 04: And there is black letter law on that, that the disciplinary removal of officers is not a trusteeship. [00:26:12] Speaker 04: The lead case is Martyr versus laborers, 410, F2, 32 out of the Third Circuit. [00:26:17] Speaker 04: And so that was not a trusteeship. [00:26:19] Speaker 04: So they can no longer be insulated. [00:26:24] Speaker 00: Third Circuit. [00:26:27] Speaker 04: March here versus Laborers, 410. [00:26:30] Speaker 04: At second, 32. [00:26:31] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:26:37] Speaker 02: So what about the fact that the Constitution of the National Union seems to be in conflict [00:26:48] Speaker 02: or is arguably in conflict with at least our mine workers case that interprets the statutory requirement of a hearing prior to the imposition of a prestige. [00:27:12] Speaker 04: Two responses to that. [00:27:13] Speaker 04: First, I do believe that mine workers case is distinguishable in this front because the [00:27:17] Speaker 04: Constitution in that case had no trusteeship provision whatsoever. [00:27:21] Speaker 04: There was no provision whatsoever. [00:27:23] Speaker 04: And there was no hearing ever held there. [00:27:26] Speaker 04: That being said, the way to read this Constitution in conformity with that decision, even with that distinction, is that when the president believes that there, in the language of the Constitution, that it is necessary to oppose a trusteeship, it is necessary to oppose a trusteeship [00:27:45] Speaker 04: to correct financial malpractice, that constitutes the need for immediate actions, in the words of the mine worker's case, that you need to go in there, you need to put that trusteeship in before the hearing because there is financial malpractice going on. [00:27:59] Speaker 04: You would not want those you're accusing of financial malpractice to have access to the bank account. [00:28:03] Speaker 01: Was there evidence in the audit that documents, records were being destroyed? [00:28:11] Speaker 04: The evidence of the record disruption is that after [00:28:15] Speaker 04: It was to return her phone and it was a district lodge issue telephone. [00:28:24] Speaker 04: Rather than returning the phone as is, she wiped it clean such that they no longer had access to whatever. [00:28:31] Speaker 01: That's an additional reason isn't it? [00:28:35] Speaker 01: for immediate action? [00:28:37] Speaker 04: Yes. [00:28:37] Speaker 04: In our brief, we noted that that was one reason. [00:28:39] Speaker 04: Another reason was that four days or three days prior to imposition of the trusteeship, the auditors had interviewed the former bookkeeper, who was no longer there. [00:28:49] Speaker 04: And that bookkeeper informed the auditors for the very first time that President Suppley had directed her to put fraudulent numbers, fake numbers, onto W-2 forms, federal tax forms, which was highly disconcerting. [00:29:08] Speaker 02: So what if we believe that our precedent requires us to only validate the imposition of a trusteeship without a hearing if there was a declaration of emergency or if there was an emergency that justified it and we find that [00:29:37] Speaker 02: the district court shouldn't have found such an emergency because, um, the district court asked, um, the defendants below, uh, they were relying on such an emergency. [00:29:51] Speaker 02: They said no. [00:29:53] Speaker 04: Your honor, we, we did say no and we said no. [00:29:57] Speaker 04: The reason was to us, it was so clear under the laborers case that once the fair hearing is held that whether there was an emergency or not is irrelevant. [00:30:07] Speaker 04: We have not weighed, however, and there are cases on this, the ability to defend the district court's decision that there were, in fact, emergency circumstances. [00:30:16] Speaker 04: So though we believe your honors do not need to reach that question, because the laborer's case is clear, that issue. [00:30:23] Speaker 01: I am not certain about this, but I just want to ask you, in the other circuits, is there such a law that says that you [00:30:35] Speaker 01: Unless there is an emergency, you have to have a hearing before a trusteeship. [00:30:41] Speaker 04: In the second, third, fourth, and fifth circuit, the law is very clear that you do not need to have an emergency at the time you impose the hearing, so long as the constitution so allows, and a hearing is held reasonably promptly. [00:30:56] Speaker 01: Are there any circuits going the other way? [00:30:59] Speaker 04: I believe the Ninth Circuit, but I'm not sure. [00:31:03] Speaker 04: OK, thanks. [00:31:05] Speaker 04: And I just want to address the facts of laborers, because they are a little confusing, but directly on point, as understood. [00:31:17] Speaker 04: On June 20th there, the international union imposed an emergency supervision without a hearing. [00:31:28] Speaker 04: The word supervision there is synonymous with trusteeship purposes of Title III. [00:31:32] Speaker 04: Then on July 28th, then [00:31:34] Speaker 04: The local refused to allow the trusteeship to be imposed. [00:31:37] Speaker 04: So the international went to court to enforce the trusteeship. [00:31:41] Speaker 04: And the district court refused to enforce it because it said there was no emergency. [00:31:45] Speaker 04: That case then goes on to interlocutory appeal before the circuit. [00:31:50] Speaker 04: In the meantime, a hearing is held. [00:31:53] Speaker 04: And on August 2, the general executive board votes to continue the trusteeship. [00:31:58] Speaker 04: This court was then confronted with the question of whether [00:32:02] Speaker 04: It even needed to address the district court's July 28 decision refusing to enforce the trusteeship. [00:32:08] Speaker 04: And the court said, no, we don't need to do that. [00:32:11] Speaker 04: That's moot. [00:32:11] Speaker 04: That is no longer relevant. [00:32:13] Speaker 04: And the plaintiffs say, well, they're actually referring to a different trusteeship. [00:32:18] Speaker 04: And there was another trusteeship. [00:32:20] Speaker 04: And that other trusteeship was the reason for the mootness. [00:32:22] Speaker 04: But that's wrong. [00:32:23] Speaker 04: On page 1393 of that decision, the circuit very clearly indicates that the reason for the mootness was, quote, [00:32:30] Speaker 04: the supervision voted by the general executive board on August 2 after a hearing before a special final. [00:32:37] Speaker 04: So it is quite clear, in our view, that that renders a relevant decision. [00:32:42] Speaker 04: And the way to read that decision in conformity with mine workers to say, to the extent mine workers use the term void ab initio, that it was void ab initio from the time it was imposed until there is a fair here. [00:33:01] Speaker 04: And that, again, is clear because in mine workers there was no fair hearing and the local had disabilitated including a fair hearing from a member of the committee. [00:33:10] Speaker 02: Will they argue that there was no fair hearing here and couldn't have been a fair hearing? [00:33:16] Speaker 04: Well, there was a full day of hearings. [00:33:22] Speaker 04: There was 28 voluminous exhibits entered. [00:33:26] Speaker 04: There were [00:33:27] Speaker 04: before three uninvolved members, a trial committee of three uninvolved members, there was a stenographer, everyone was invited, the plaintiffs were sent letters telling them they could attend and that they would have the right to enter evidence, cross-examine witnesses, challenge the trusteeship, and they did not appear. [00:33:45] Speaker 02: Your friend on the other side says, well, they weren't allowed to speak on behalf of the unions, so how could they appear? [00:33:55] Speaker 02: That is wrong. [00:33:56] Speaker 04: They were permitted to appear and speak on behalf of District Law 142 for why the trusteeship was not imposed. [00:34:03] Speaker 04: They were no longer officers at that time. [00:34:05] Speaker 04: They were at that time, temporarily, it was not permanent yet, temporarily suspended, subject to an evidentiary hearing under the shortage proceeding, subject to an appeal under the shortage proceeding. [00:34:18] Speaker 04: But they absolutely could attend and challenge the trusteeship in that hearing. [00:34:30] Speaker 04: And just to briefly touch on the procedure under Article 6, the international president found that there was significant financial malpractice in why he imposed the trusteeship, which was then found to be valid by the trial committee. [00:34:51] Speaker 04: And I just wanted to quickly go over what some of that financial misconduct was. [00:34:55] Speaker 04: The plaintiff, the Secretary of Treasury, Scott Anderman, self-authorized [00:35:00] Speaker 04: payments directly into our own bank account without any documentation or approval. [00:35:07] Speaker 04: I've already mentioned the fraudulent W-2s. [00:35:10] Speaker 04: And third, there was $270,000 of plaintiff's supply in contemporaneous emails that are in the record acknowledged his grand lodge money, his international money. [00:35:23] Speaker 04: He moved out of the general account into a separate account, not properly disposed, [00:35:29] Speaker 04: that was labeled a building corporation. [00:35:31] Speaker 04: On top of that, the auditors found that the district lodged in spending $200,000 additional over the course of five years on phones and electronics, 196 devices for 18 members, 18 staff members, as well as $50,000 for overpayments and vacation pay and bonuses. [00:35:53] Speaker 01: Were the payments for the [00:35:56] Speaker 01: phones or electronic devices were they made to, for example, Apple or a carrier, Verizon or something? [00:36:07] Speaker 01: That's right. [00:36:11] Speaker 01: Before you run out of time, the plaintiffs say, as I understand it, that the case is not moved because as part of the trusteeship, [00:36:27] Speaker 01: that was imposed, they were barred from running for office. [00:36:33] Speaker 01: And so the fact that there's been new officers elected wouldn't matter because they were entitled to an injunction reinstating them. [00:36:46] Speaker 01: Can you respond to that? [00:36:49] Speaker 04: I have seen no case standing for that proposition, but I think the boilerplate lies once an election has occurred under Title IV of the LMRDA, the sole and exclusive means to challenge that election, to file a challenge, and then go to the DOL. [00:37:03] Speaker 04: So they could have, maybe should have, challenged that election internally. [00:37:08] Speaker 04: I don't know if they will or did. [00:37:10] Speaker 04: Internally, and then go to the DOL, the Secretary of Labor can then decide whether to overturn the election. [00:37:15] Speaker 04: But it is no longer within the province of this court. [00:37:19] Speaker 01: And the only relief that they could get on a preliminary injunction would be to, for an injunction would be to reinstate them as officers. [00:37:28] Speaker 01: And you say that would be in effect challenging the results of the election? [00:37:33] Speaker 04: Correct. [00:37:36] Speaker 04: Okay. [00:37:36] Speaker 04: And the other basis they saw that in their request for leave was to hold an election. [00:37:42] Speaker 04: But again, that elections happened. [00:37:45] Speaker 01: But they couldn't run. [00:37:47] Speaker 01: Sorry, but they couldn't run in the election. [00:37:49] Speaker 02: All right. [00:37:53] Speaker 02: Okay. [00:37:53] Speaker 02: All right. [00:37:54] Speaker 02: Judge Rogers. [00:37:55] Speaker 02: Any other questions? [00:37:56] Speaker 00: Oh, thank you. [00:38:00] Speaker 02: All right. [00:38:00] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:38:00] Speaker 02: Council. [00:38:03] Speaker 02: Um, for Gagan, um, we'll give you, uh, three minutes. [00:38:07] Speaker 03: No handlers did not from a post crustacean [00:38:13] Speaker 03: for failure to hold a prior hearing. [00:38:15] Speaker 03: What happened in that case was there was no trustee, an emergency supervision. [00:38:20] Speaker 03: And by the way, I focus on the word emergency. [00:38:24] Speaker 03: The claim of the laborers was this is an emergency. [00:38:28] Speaker 03: The district court said, no, it isn't. [00:38:30] Speaker 03: So it didn't go into effect. [00:38:33] Speaker 03: So there was no trusteeship ratified. [00:38:35] Speaker 03: Then they had a hearing. [00:38:37] Speaker 03: of our emergency supervision later that laid it out in more detail. [00:38:42] Speaker 03: There was a hearing. [00:38:43] Speaker 03: And the court said, look, this is moot at this point. [00:38:46] Speaker 03: And they focused on the second trusteeship. [00:38:50] Speaker 03: There was never a post-trusteeship hearing to ratify. [00:38:56] Speaker 03: And in this case, as I stated earlier, in this case, there can't be a fair hearing if [00:39:05] Speaker 03: In absence of an emergency, no reason not to hold a prior hearing, the current union gets rid of the district lodge that is supposed to make a protest, bans the plaintiffs, and fines them $265,000. [00:39:20] Speaker 01: Can you tell me what you're seeking a reversal of the denial of a preliminary injunction? [00:39:27] Speaker 01: And an entry of a preliminary injunction. [00:39:29] Speaker 01: Now, what kind of injunction are you seeking? [00:39:32] Speaker 01: What would the terms of the injunction be at this stage after the trust reships going to expire and that there's been a new election or new officers? [00:39:42] Speaker 01: What sort of injunction are you talking about? [00:39:44] Speaker 03: The status quo ante. [00:39:45] Speaker 03: Reinstate the plaintiffs as elected officers, allow the election that was going forward. [00:39:50] Speaker 03: And this was only, this wasn't a long time ago. [00:39:53] Speaker 01: But you have to address the defendant's argument. [00:39:57] Speaker 01: But to do that, the district court in its order would have to set aside the election that's occurred, and you can't do that without going through the Secretary of Labor. [00:40:08] Speaker 03: That's not true, because under this court's decisions, both mail handlers [00:40:15] Speaker 03: and Brennan versus mine workers, this court has broad equitable power to correct a violation of the trusteeship of Title III. [00:40:24] Speaker 03: The Secretary of Labor under Title IV doesn't even take cognizance of that. [00:40:29] Speaker 03: So that has to be read, that 483 provision that counsel quoted has to be read with the broad equitable authority that this court recognized in Brennan versus mine workers and in mill handlers. [00:40:44] Speaker 03: to undo the effects of the trusteeship. [00:40:46] Speaker 03: Congress was very concerned about these intrusions. [00:40:50] Speaker 03: And if the election hadn't been held, first of all, the election was held on an expedited basis to move this. [00:41:02] Speaker 03: It was speeding up after this appeal was filed. [00:41:05] Speaker 03: And the attempt here is to argue to the court that we're out, you can't touch us anymore, but there is a continuing irreparable, remember, the members have not been allowed to have offices of their own choosing in this election because of the trusteeship, because of the irreparable injury. [00:41:23] Speaker 03: The secretary can't address that. [00:41:27] Speaker 00: It set aside the election. [00:41:31] Speaker 00: Wouldn't you be able to get all of these remedies that you're asking the court now, the order? [00:41:38] Speaker 03: Okay, that's fine. [00:41:41] Speaker 03: The order is very simple. [00:41:43] Speaker 03: And that is A, the trusteeship that was imposed on January 26th and 26th. [00:41:48] Speaker 03: Answer my question. [00:41:55] Speaker 03: I'm not sure that I heard it properly. [00:41:57] Speaker 03: I think there was a little static and I apologize. [00:42:01] Speaker 00: If the Secretary of Labor sets aside the election, then are not the remedies you're speaking of available to you? [00:42:14] Speaker 03: No. [00:42:15] Speaker 03: Why not? [00:42:17] Speaker 03: Because, for one thing, if the Secretary does set aside the election, it has to have it do so under a Title IV provision. [00:42:29] Speaker 03: We have a Title III challenge to the authority of the IAM to conduct the election at all. [00:42:37] Speaker 03: And there is no... I understand that. [00:42:41] Speaker 00: And the secretary can take all that to account if you raise these issues. [00:42:48] Speaker 00: And suppose the secretary decides to set aside the election. [00:42:53] Speaker 03: The secretary might in its discretion do that or might not in its discretion. [00:42:59] Speaker 00: If the secretary sets aside the election, then are not the remedies you're talking about now available? [00:43:15] Speaker 03: No. [00:43:17] Speaker 00: Why not? [00:43:18] Speaker 03: Because as this court pointed out in mine workers, there is [00:43:23] Speaker 03: Even for a Title III violation, there is a remedy of damages. [00:43:28] Speaker 03: There is, for the District Lodge, for its losses as a result of the unlawful trusteeship, there is a chilling effect that, and there is a need in particular, Your Honor, for a ban on the re-imposition of a trusteeship. [00:43:44] Speaker 03: No, it is not moot, and you cannot get that relief under Title IV, and that's a central part of the case. [00:43:50] Speaker 00: I don't know if that would bother the secretary in setting aside the election. [00:44:02] Speaker 00: And then you can pursue these other matters if you say the secretary has no jurisdiction over the title theory argument. [00:44:10] Speaker 03: First of all, the secretary cannot set aside the election. [00:44:13] Speaker 03: only a district court can decide, set aside the election if the secretary brings a lawsuit. [00:44:19] Speaker 03: And second, we cannot get the relief that we're seeking here, which is barring the reimposition of the trusteeship, ending this reign of terror at the top of the IAM. [00:44:31] Speaker 03: Every time, every person who has been talking about this. [00:44:36] Speaker 03: I get your argument. [00:44:40] Speaker ?: Okay. [00:44:40] Speaker 03: In fact, this might be the best way to conclude it. [00:44:43] Speaker 03: Every person who has called out defendant Cervantes for financial embezzlement, which she has not denied, on a massive scale, has been systematically removed. [00:44:54] Speaker 03: Pantoja, admittedly, appointed officers. [00:44:57] Speaker 03: Joe Tiberi, gone. [00:44:59] Speaker 03: Ian Scott Anderman, gone. [00:45:01] Speaker 03: find $265,000 for daring to raise the embezzlement charge, subtly the same. [00:45:10] Speaker 03: That's what's going on. [00:45:11] Speaker 03: Systematic suppression of dissent, that's what Title III entitles us to have this court enforce the LMRDA and let members have officers of their own choosing, even if they call out their leadership for massive union corruption. [00:45:29] Speaker 02: Thank you, council. [00:45:30] Speaker 02: We have your argument and we will take the matter under advisement.