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Case number 21-71-16, Melvin Brown at Ballent vs. Sandra Hill at Elk.

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Mr. Rickman for the at-Ballent, Ms.

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Browder for the District Appellees, Ms.

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Eric Lalla for the Salmon Appellees.

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Good morning, Honors.

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May I please record George Rickman on behalf of Dr. Melvin Brown.

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This case originated because of wrongdoing

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uh, some for others, I, an organization of corporate, um, in the district of Columbia contract.

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Yeah.

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Mental health is alleged to complaint that, um, employees for other ID, um, a false false statements about Mr. Brown, certainly his conduct, along with illegally obtaining medical records.

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to facilitate his removal and involuntary commitment to CPAC and the District of Columbia, a step up within the mental health system of the District of Columbia.

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This form of doing resulted in egregious harm to Mr. Brown, forced medication, and continued detention within the mental health system.

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For all intents and purposes, the U.S.

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District

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found that some was not a state act of constitutional violations that resulted from these allegations.

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But this report's purpose in reaching its conclusion was based on custody.

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Custody is not a basis for defining public function within a state action.

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It was defined by state action.

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Referring to West versus Actions.

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Go along with some of your more substantive arguments.

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I mean, you realize the case has been pending since December 2013 and kind of the third dismissal from this court.

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So what's the best argument you would say that with respect to any equitable tolling or relation back?

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Well, looking at 15C, the landscape has changed since this court's opinion in Nassim Brindle-Paker, and Rindle-Sparansky versus Nassim, and Krupsky versus Krupsky.

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Two important factors occurred in Krupsky.

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Krupsky first altered the analysis from

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to requiring or considering what the defendant knew or should have known within the timeline.

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I see explicitly rejected that argument, but I consider the A, if you look at the A and B analysis, Rekrepsky says, well, if A was mistaken about B's role,

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But the argument was that he was looking for his medical records and then you know something prompted how he got them but there was such a delay even then in getting the medical records.

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And then you also sued SOM, but not necessarily identifying specifically in the complaint in what capacity, whether it was going to be official or individual as well.

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This has been a longstanding precedent.

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But you look at the progress of those

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in determining whether a particular capacity of a defendant.

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I think that if you look at the complaint itself, some misnamed as a particular defendant within the text of the particular counts within the complaint, the course of events that are alleged makes it clear that Gerlach and

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John Adams, the CEO of SOM, were suing their officials.

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OK.

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In fact, I think I put them up within the brief.

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And that's kind of the default anyway.

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If you don't sue them individually, specifically alleging certain actions against them, then they would default to official capacity.

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Yeah.

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Actually, it would probably be an easier case to prove

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against, uh, well, assuming that, that, uh, some was found to be a state actor, state act, uh, in the 1983, uh, as being persons.

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Um, but that being said, while some of the dumb raises, I certainly may be available.

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Uh, so it would probably be an easier case.

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But some, but that being said, I think we argued that Pembauer, that Pembauer would apply because they had actual knowledge of what was going on.

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And there may have been particular allegations that they did in some way participate in the wrong doing.

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So that itself would also.

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purposes of identifying some of this.

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But going back to your question about while this case offers John Doe defendants and Krupsky, apparently the defendants were known to the plaintiff.

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Does this put the circuit as to whether or not Krupsky altered the landscape to include John Doe defendants?

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Because, and arguably because, the raising of Kropsky lends itself to the understanding that the knowledge or the knowledge shifts to what the defendant knew he should have known.

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would state that the different content within you could consider John Doe Defender.

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And there are also particular interests, policy interests, that involve it.

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But there will be a particular network involving where one kind of student perhaps knew of the Defender would be able to avail themselves

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While the defendant did not know the name of the defendant, though it was still intended to sue that defendant, if they did know, would not be able to help themselves.

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And that particular inequity would be addressed by permitting John Doe, the defendant's name, to be included in 15C.

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I'll also add, regarding 15C, in the district's brief, they argued that there was no timing notice, but that was based on

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the actual filing of the complaint.

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Under 4M, actual summonses were not set out until sometime in 1-7-2015.

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Therefore, there would be an imperative for those that under the theory articulated singletary as to the sum dependence reverse within that 108.

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I'm going to make that point.

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And returning back to state action, the court's basic theory on state action that there was not traditional or exclusive function involving the providing of mental health services within the district.

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But it's been a longstanding and traditional

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mandate requirement of that addition by these particular.

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Um, it's the final statute, um, is defined, uh, by case law that I think pointed to the, uh, extent of me that was entered that can order the district provides other housing services.

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And in light of that, the mandatory requirements, um, the court did not address the first particular obligation.

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that were presented or provided the basis for state action.

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I tried to reserve five minutes for follow-up.

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Okay, thank you.

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Thank you.

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Good morning, may it please the court making broader on behalf of Dr. Amelia Villeroos, David Walker, and the District of Columbia, referred to collectively as the District of Pellies.

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Because it is undisputed that none of the District of Pellies were a party to this litigation before the end of the statute of limitations period.

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Mr. Brown must show his entitlement to equitable tolling or that rule 15 applies.

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He can do neither.

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First, as to equitable tolling, there's no diligence.

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The only thing Mr. Brown relies on in the record is his superior court suit, but he did not file that suit until June 2014, which was already outside the statute of limitations period.

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Also, he received the medical records from that suit within at most two months.

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So if he had actually diligently pursued that and filed that suit within the statute of limitations period, he would have gotten those records.

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Second, as to extraordinary circumstances, he's waived that by not raising it below or before this court.

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And there's also nothing in the record to support any extraordinary circumstances.

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Second, as to Rule 15, Rule 15 does not apply here in this court.

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I know that appellant relies on Kresge, but I don't think it's necessary to go into the mistake doctrine at all to solve this case.

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This court can resolve it on the first prong of Rule 15C, which says that the defendant had to have notice within the rule foreign period of the action, had to receive such notice.

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It's undisputed that no District Appellee received notice of this action before June 2015 when Mr. Walker was served.

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That's more than a year after the statute of limitations period ended.

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And even on the second prong, even if we set aside the mistake part of it, the defendant also had to know within the 4M period.

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that they would have been an attendant defendant here.

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And again, because the district did not receive such notice, none of the district appellees would have been on notice or would have been able to know within the four-hour period.

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If there are no questions, we would rest on our papers and ask that this court affirm the issue of court's dismissal of all of the district appellee.

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Good morning, and may it please the court.

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Kate Urklauer on behalf of Sum, Anne Chauvin, Belinda Seeley, Susan Bond, John Adams, and Richard Gurley, who I'll refer to as the Sum of Police.

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The court inquired as to the circumstance position on that dismissal of Sum as an entity was appropriate.

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And here we would request that the court affirm because it was appropriate to dismiss Sum because they were never named as a defendant for litigation.

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through the four amended complaints, there was never issue of a summons or service on some as a party, and therefore it was appropriate to dismiss some in its corporate capacity, as it was never named or served with process.

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On the issue of state action, the fact that some, which is a housing provider that provides services under contract with the Department of Behavioral Health,

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Provided housing to Mister Brown does not is not sufficient to establish that it was a state.

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The fact that district of Columbia provides housing to individuals receive mental health care is not is not sufficient to establish that any of these some employees were in fact state.

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All of the cases that are cited by Mr. Brown are distinguishable, because in those cases, not only was the state providing mental health services through its contractors, but in each of those cases, the plaintiff was in the custody and care specifically of the state.

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That fact is not present here, and therefore, there are no facts that are sufficient to establish that some was a state actor for the purposes of 1982.

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And do you contest then the felon's suggestion that this is a mandated service by the state?

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I do, Your Honor.

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I mean, there is a requirement, the Department of Mental Health provides services to people who are eligible and apply for such services, but there are many people in the District of Columbia who need and have mental health care, but they're not remanded to the custody of the District of Columbia.

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So that makes it distinguishable.

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Because although the Department of Mental Health is established to provide those services, it's not a requirement that everyone who is eligible go then into the custody of the district

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When was it established?

[00:14:43] Speaker 04:
I'm sorry?

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When was it established?

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I'm sorry, the Department of Behavioral Health.

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I'm sorry, I don't know the answer to that question.

[00:14:51] Speaker 01:
I think the standard here involves to a degree whether something has historically been a function solely of the state.

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That's correct.

[00:15:01] Speaker 01:
Which is not at all the case.

[00:15:03] Speaker 04:
That's correct.

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If there are no other questions, we're happy to rest on our paper.

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Thank you.

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Thank you.

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And we've allotted two minutes for rebuttal.

[00:15:21] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

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I'm going to have to bring the mic up so I can hear you, please.

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First to address Judge Ginsburg's concerns that

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This is not a store within the district.

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This is for housing.

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Dixon versus the Dixon incentive is more than 20 to 30 years old.

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This followed

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which required that the district will mandated that the district by housing services for particular classes.

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This is more analogous to West versus where the obligation was for particular class persons, that being prisoners within the system.

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Plus it was not the dispositive factor, but was dispositive as the application that was established.

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within a long-standing principle of the district, but in particular, the District of Columbia.

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It's been long since more than 20, 30 years.

[00:16:34] Speaker 01:
This is quite different from Wendell Baker's phone where the Supreme Court kind of looked at... Are there not other institutions that perform this function, non-public institutions?

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There are not.

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There are.

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But it's unlike a prison.

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Well, there's non-public prisons that provide functions, but there are private operating prisons that perform the same functions as state actions.

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There are state actions as well.

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So I don't think at that point that there are other non-public institutions that provide this service.

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In fact, some of them are non-public institutions, but they're providing within the mandates of the District of Columbia.

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And it's the obligation that establishes the state action.

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That's the premise of West versus Atkinson.

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And that is the premise that, well, that particularly was not addressed within HALC.

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HALC, in the footnote, specifically reserved on West versus Atkinson, whether or not, did not address the obligation theory of state action.

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I think that is very, within the district of, in the history of this system, is very defined, this obligation with the fine class of

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I think the consent decree recognized that there may be other mental health persons who would not be within the system because of sheer numbers, but that's still required mandate that a particular number of beds be provided within the mental health system.

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And to go further to back to address of roof 15 or the

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They claimed that there was 14 months, some period of time from the filing a complaint before or when Mr. Brown obtained the information for the lawsuit.

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This case was on a field day, so he could not have filed

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until the board set a time and order to file the second amendment.

[00:19:02] Speaker 02:
So that argument kind of takes the question.

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If you can't do it, then how could that happen?

[00:19:10] Speaker 02:
Or be held against it?

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And the 15C, I'd just like to restate the interest.

[00:19:20] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:19:23] Speaker 02:
The case is submitted.