[00:00:00] Speaker 03: Case number 23-7033, Henry Searcy Jr., a balance versus DeMaurice Fitzgerald Smith et al. [00:00:08] Speaker 03: Mr. Searcy for the balance, Ms. [00:00:10] Speaker 03: Lee, I mean, Mr. Kessler for the appellates. [00:00:14] Speaker 02: Good morning, Mr. Searcy. [00:00:16] Speaker 02: Good morning, good morning. [00:00:18] Speaker 02: Your honor, what would you do if you were contracted to take an exam, was told you failed only to discover that the scoring methodology was arbitrarily changed? [00:00:30] Speaker 02: And the remedy which you was to appeal in accordance with was in accordance with the voluntary labor arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association. [00:00:43] Speaker 02: You only discover by the American Arbitration Association that the voluntary labor arbitration rules no longer existed, never existed. [00:00:57] Speaker 02: This is why I'm here today. [00:00:59] Speaker 02: So I'm here to argue three points. [00:01:05] Speaker 02: I've been working with the courts for seven years on this, and hopefully I can get some resolution. [00:01:12] Speaker 02: I'm going to argue that Judge Walton did not consider my subsequent filings. [00:01:18] Speaker 02: I'm going to also argue that my state law claims are not preempted by Section 301. [00:01:25] Speaker 02: I'm going to also argue that the federal district court [00:01:30] Speaker 02: This court, not this one particularly, but the other court in this building, has subject matter jurisdiction over my state claim because of diversity and the amount in controversy. [00:01:43] Speaker 02: Therefore, as we speak right now, as I mentioned, the federal rules of procedure 11 allows for me and anybody else in this room to provide their own formal research. [00:01:59] Speaker 02: prior to submitting a pleading. [00:02:04] Speaker 02: In that process, you're going to find that details change and post pleadings change and legal theories change as well. [00:02:15] Speaker 01: Mr. Searcy. [00:02:15] Speaker 06: Yes, ma'am. [00:02:17] Speaker 06: If you could just explain to me [00:02:20] Speaker 06: why you've chosen to bring these claims in federal court. [00:02:23] Speaker 06: Because my understanding is that you're bringing state law claims. [00:02:27] Speaker 06: Yes. [00:02:28] Speaker 06: And you don't believe that they are preempted by federal law. [00:02:32] Speaker 06: Right. [00:02:33] Speaker 06: And so I'm just interested in your own words, why you want to maintain the suit in federal. [00:02:39] Speaker 02: Yeah, because of two things. [00:02:41] Speaker 02: One, because of diversity. [00:02:44] Speaker 02: And also to the court, the House of Diversity and the amount of controversy and the court will allow it. [00:02:49] Speaker 02: It's convenient for me. [00:02:51] Speaker 02: I'm a resident of Maryland. [00:02:53] Speaker 02: The NFLPA is a resident of DC. [00:02:57] Speaker 02: DeMarie Smith is a resident of Maryland and subsequent supplemental acts associated with the same [00:03:04] Speaker 02: incident, they can actually be allowed to be a part of the court case. [00:03:09] Speaker 02: So I figured this is kind of like my home field. [00:03:13] Speaker 02: So I want to be here. [00:03:15] Speaker 06: But not in local district of Columbia courts. [00:03:19] Speaker 02: No, no, no. [00:03:19] Speaker 02: Because it was two different actors. [00:03:22] Speaker 02: We got the complete diversity. [00:03:24] Speaker 02: Diversity is only complete if we're in two separate states. [00:03:27] Speaker 02: So I'm in Maryland, Bowie, Maryland. [00:03:31] Speaker 02: The NFLPA is DC. [00:03:33] Speaker 02: We got it. [00:03:34] Speaker 02: And now, now that we have complete, that we have, I'll have a tort claim that I'm filing. [00:03:40] Speaker 02: And then because of the tort claim, the amount of controversy is satisfied due to the, due to the fact that I, in good faith, identified in the complaint that is over $75,000. [00:03:53] Speaker 02: So I just want to play on my home field. [00:03:57] Speaker 02: Is that okay? [00:03:59] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:03:59] Speaker 07: I'm sorry, why is this your home field instead of the local court? [00:04:03] Speaker 02: I'm not local. [00:04:04] Speaker 02: I'm not from here. [00:04:06] Speaker 07: Oh, I see. [00:04:06] Speaker 02: So I'm not from DC. [00:04:08] Speaker 02: But I do want DC law to apply. [00:04:10] Speaker ?: I see. [00:04:10] Speaker 07: Oh, I see. [00:04:12] Speaker 02: Yes, ma'am. [00:04:12] Speaker 02: Because it's favorable for me. [00:04:14] Speaker 02: It's like playing in your home field again. [00:04:17] Speaker 02: I'm very knowledgeable of the things. [00:04:18] Speaker 02: So DC law is actually governed by Maryland law, too. [00:04:22] Speaker 02: So I shouldn't tell you that. [00:04:24] Speaker 02: So it's going to provide an opportunity for my case. [00:04:26] Speaker 07: So nevertheless, let me get you. [00:04:28] Speaker 07: they'll be biased against you in the local court because you're not from D.C.? [00:04:32] Speaker 02: The only person who's biased against me is Judge Walton so far. [00:04:35] Speaker 02: I think I'm acceptable anywhere now. [00:04:39] Speaker 02: And I think the facts and statements that I'm saying are just pretty plain, plain and simple. [00:04:45] Speaker 02: I just need someone just to listen to them and quit adding stuff to the process. [00:04:51] Speaker 02: So this is the second time I'm here, by the way. [00:04:53] Speaker 02: I don't know if you know. [00:04:56] Speaker 02: So I'm back. [00:04:58] Speaker 02: But I'm back because Judge Walton did not do what this court told him to do. [00:05:04] Speaker 02: He told him to review and provide a ruling on my state law claims. [00:05:10] Speaker 02: He did not. [00:05:11] Speaker 02: So that's why I'm here again, just to make sure that he does exactly what he's supposed to do. [00:05:17] Speaker 02: So whoever was in the panel last time didn't make him do it. [00:05:20] Speaker 02: But they told him to do it, but he didn't. [00:05:23] Speaker 02: So I'm hoping he can do it this time. [00:05:26] Speaker 02: Nevertheless, I didn't have any other questions. [00:05:31] Speaker 02: OK. [00:05:32] Speaker 02: So one of the things I have a challenge with is that the case law, Ms. [00:05:39] Speaker 02: Carty. [00:05:39] Speaker 02: Ms. [00:05:39] Speaker 02: Carty is a CVS pharmacy person. [00:05:41] Speaker 02: She was a pro se litigant. [00:05:45] Speaker 02: She, as a pro se litigant, this little lady, she actually submit subsequent filings complaining about her systemic internal acts of cause that caused her distress. [00:05:57] Speaker 02: The court considered her pleadings broadly, so broadly that Ms. [00:06:04] Speaker 02: Carter's complaint was identified as another claim was added as an intentional infliction of emotional distress. [00:06:14] Speaker 02: just because she caused her subsequent pleadings and because she was a pro se litigant. [00:06:20] Speaker 02: However, when it comes to me, I am a pro se litigant. [00:06:27] Speaker 02: I actually submitted legal theories and changed my legal figures just like Ms. [00:06:32] Speaker 02: Cardy. [00:06:33] Speaker 02: However, my legal theories were not considered. [00:06:37] Speaker 02: They were not considered at all. [00:06:39] Speaker 02: The record would show that my subsequent plea stated that the NFLPA and Demaree Smith were in violation of the DC Arbitration Act. [00:06:48] Speaker 02: The record would also show that I filed a federal civil procedure, Section 15A2, to require [00:07:02] Speaker 02: justice to be served, because the requirement does that. [00:07:07] Speaker 02: And because justice is so required, and the reason why it was required, because the NFLPA attorney and the Maurice Smith attorney admitted to breaching the contract between the appellate and the NFLPA. [00:07:30] Speaker 02: That was put in writing. [00:07:32] Speaker 02: The record would show, as according to the federal rules of evidence, that both the NFLPA and the Murray-Smith attorney, which is Angela Smithley of Western and Strong, stated in the subsequent filings that, and I quote, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact that the NFLPA breached [00:07:56] Speaker 02: the contract between Cersei and the NFLPA. [00:08:01] Speaker 02: The motion does not mention Smith, end quote. [00:08:05] Speaker 08: Do you want to reserve any time for rebuttal? [00:08:09] Speaker 02: I think one minute. [00:08:11] Speaker 08: Because you got two minutes left. [00:08:13] Speaker 02: Oh, Lord. [00:08:14] Speaker 02: OK. [00:08:14] Speaker 02: I don't get questions because of questions. [00:08:18] Speaker 02: OK. [00:08:20] Speaker 02: The pillar was not. [00:08:22] Speaker 02: So therefore, the record would show that the NFLP attorney Joe Briggs, affidavit, and the discovery response provided to me during the American Association appeal hearing, which was not an appeal hearing associated with the American Association. [00:08:42] Speaker 02: He provided an appeal hearing according to the voluntary. [00:08:47] Speaker 02: His people are the affidavit that admits [00:08:51] Speaker 02: that the NFL PA changed the scoring methodology. [00:08:56] Speaker 02: In that affidavit and in those responses, he identified that the Players Association did not ratify the contracts because he said that there were no ratified bylaws or meeting minutes approved to change the scoring methodology. [00:09:12] Speaker 02: He also said that the NFL paid, in that affidavit, it states that the NFL paid Prometric to change the scoring methodology [00:09:19] Speaker 02: on an NFLB contractor exam, and the appealant was not provided an appeal hearing. [00:09:26] Speaker 02: Therefore, another thing I'm going to say is that state law claims are not presented by Section 301. [00:09:35] Speaker 02: The reason why is because the Article 48 of the NFLCB contract does not consider any applicants [00:09:44] Speaker 02: I'm an applicant. [00:09:45] Speaker 02: I'm not a certified agent. [00:09:47] Speaker 02: Applicants are listed in the contract between prospective agents and the NFLPA, but only people that are privates to the NFL Collective Bargain Agreement are those that are not applicants, that are certified contractors. [00:10:07] Speaker 02: Section 2 of the NFLPA contract states this, and it also identifies the applicant. [00:10:15] Speaker 02: Therefore, a ruling should be done for me as an applicant, not a certified contractor. [00:10:21] Speaker ?: All right. [00:10:21] Speaker 08: Thank you. [00:10:22] Speaker 08: We have your argument will appear now from Ms. [00:10:25] Speaker 08: Lee for the appointed amicus curia. [00:10:33] Speaker 04: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:10:34] Speaker 04: Erica Hashimoto from the Georgetown Law Center is court-appointed amicus. [00:10:38] Speaker 04: With the court's permission, third-year law student Alexandra Lee from the Georgetown Law Center's Appellate Litigation Clinic will present argument on behalf of amicus. [00:10:48] Speaker 08: Thank you, Ms. [00:10:48] Speaker 08: Hashimoto, and welcome, Ms. [00:10:50] Speaker 08: Lee. [00:11:01] Speaker 05: The honors may please the court. [00:11:03] Speaker 05: When Congress enacted Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act that authorized federal courts to create uniform federal common law governing labor contracting, Congress made clear in the statutory tax that Section 301 implicates only those labor contracts between an employer and a union or between two unions. [00:11:26] Speaker 05: Consistent with the scope set out by Congress, the Supreme Court found two separate paths to preemption with one important limiting principle. [00:11:36] Speaker 05: That preemption applies only where the interpretation of a 301 labor contract becomes necessary. [00:11:44] Speaker 05: The union's position contradicts both the statutory definition set out by Congress and the limiting principle fashioned by the Supreme Court. [00:11:54] Speaker 05: I'll first explain why the regulations are neither a 301 labor contract by itself nor a part of the collective bargaining agreement between the NFL and the Players Association. [00:12:06] Speaker 05: And I'll move on to why this court must uphold the limiting principle and require an interpretation of a labor contract to find preemption. [00:12:16] Speaker 05: First, the text of Section 301 is crystal clear. [00:12:21] Speaker 05: A labor contract has to be one between an employer and a union or between two unions. [00:12:28] Speaker 05: The regulations is an agreement between the Players Association and Mr. Searcy, and it simply doesn't fit within the statutory definition set out by Congress. [00:12:39] Speaker 07: What about the black decision in the district court that seems to support what [00:12:45] Speaker 07: Judge Walton did here. [00:12:46] Speaker 05: Your honor, we're asking this court to overturn the black decision precisely because that decision [00:12:56] Speaker 05: overlooks the clear statutory language defining what a 301 labor contract is. [00:13:03] Speaker 05: So the regulations by itself is not a 301 labor contract. [00:13:08] Speaker 05: It is also not a part of the collective bargaining agreement because the NFL and the players associations agree that only the union will get to set the standards for selecting agents. [00:13:23] Speaker 05: and the NFL will have no part in it. [00:13:26] Speaker 05: And so consistent with that contractual design to place certification beyond the reach of the NFL, the CBA never mention the regulations by name and they also never expressly incorporate the regulations by reference. [00:13:46] Speaker 05: And because the regulations are not a labor contract, [00:13:52] Speaker 05: nor a part of the collective bargaining agreement, Section 301 preemption is only possible here if this court needs to interpret the collective bargaining agreement to resolve Mr. CSC's claims. [00:14:05] Speaker 05: But that one. [00:14:06] Speaker 06: Let me ask you a question. [00:14:07] Speaker 06: So it seems to me that there are two competing principles that here with respect to jurisdiction. [00:14:13] Speaker 06: One is that a plaintiff who wants to bring their claim in federal court has to establish that there is subject matter. [00:14:21] Speaker 06: jurisdiction. [00:14:23] Speaker 06: And so arguably, Mr. Searcy has failed to do so here because there's not complete diversity. [00:14:30] Speaker 06: And he's only bringing state law claims, not a federal law claim. [00:14:38] Speaker 06: So in that context, why should we be thinking about 301 preemption at all to establish jurisdiction? [00:14:47] Speaker 06: I mean, this isn't a removal case. [00:14:50] Speaker 06: It's not a case where originally the claims were brought in a state court or in the District of Columbia courts. [00:14:58] Speaker 05: Your Honor is exactly right that Section 301 preemption cannot serve as a basis for federal question jurisdiction. [00:15:08] Speaker 05: and because there's no other basis that would provide a federal subject matter jurisdiction that we're asking this court to reverse the district court's findings. [00:15:18] Speaker 06: My question is not necessarily about the merits of whether 301 preemption applies here, but rather whether we should be considering the 301 preemption question at all in this posture. [00:15:37] Speaker 05: Your honor, I'm not sure I understand your question, but our position is that if the union is concerned with its ability to select agents, [00:15:50] Speaker 05: You know, plaintiff could always raise these claims in state court. [00:15:54] Speaker 05: And Section 9A, preemption under the National Labor Relations Act is always available for the union to use as an affirmative defense. [00:16:03] Speaker 05: And so these claims are properly brought in, should proceed in state court. [00:16:10] Speaker 07: So aren't we considering preemption under 301 because this court remanded for the district court to decide that question? [00:16:20] Speaker 07: Yes, Your Honor. [00:16:21] Speaker 07: So just procedurally, this is a little different from a case where the court just starts looking at preemption based on what the plaintiff or the appellant argued. [00:16:34] Speaker 05: Isn't that right? [00:16:34] Speaker 05: Right. [00:16:35] Speaker 05: I think my recollection is that previously the district court [00:16:40] Speaker 05: dismissed this case under 12b6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead. [00:16:46] Speaker 05: And the issue on appeal is whether the district court has subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss the case under 12b6 to begin with. [00:16:56] Speaker 05: So it's a matter of whether this court dismiss under 12b6 or 12b1. [00:17:07] Speaker 05: Thank you. [00:17:08] Speaker 08: And the significance of that for Mr. Searcy would be if it's dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, it's dismissed without prejudice. [00:17:17] Speaker 08: Versus if it's dismissed on 12b6 grounds, it's dismissed with prejudice. [00:17:23] Speaker 05: Yes, Your Honor. [00:17:24] Speaker 05: And Mr. Searcy is free to bring his state law claims in the DC Superior Court. [00:17:31] Speaker 05: And that case would properly proceed in state court. [00:17:38] Speaker 05: There is also no preemption here because Mr. CSE's claims require this court to interpret only the agent regulations. [00:17:47] Speaker 05: So the Alice Charmer preemption test provides two paths to preemption. [00:17:53] Speaker 05: A plaintiff could either raise a claim that's substantially dependent upon the interpretation of a labor contract or inextricably intertwined with the interpretation of a labor contract. [00:18:06] Speaker 05: And so here, Mr. Searcy makes two broad factual allegations. [00:18:12] Speaker 05: His first allegation is that the union failed to amend the regulations to reflect the changes they made in the exam procedures. [00:18:24] Speaker 05: And for that allegation, this court has to turn to Section 1C of the regulations. [00:18:29] Speaker 05: His second allegation is that the union did not comply with the arbitration procedures, and so [00:18:36] Speaker 05: For that claim, this court has to look at Section 5 of the regulations. [00:18:40] Speaker 07: So the collective bargaining agreement, Article 48, Section 1, does have quite detailed discussions about the NFLPA's obligations about deleting an agent from its list with a lot of just very detailed circumstances that they have to consider. [00:19:03] Speaker 07: And it also says the NFLPA shall have sole and exclusive authority to determine the number of agents to be certified and the grounds for withdrawing or denying certification of an agent. [00:19:14] Speaker 07: So why is this not intertwined with that? [00:19:19] Speaker 05: Because first, Mr. Searcy's claims are sufficiently removed from whether the union indeed has the power to promulgate the regulations or to determine the grounds for certification. [00:19:35] Speaker 05: So his claims are essentially that when he applied for certification, the agreement is that the union would conduct the exam and the arbitration according to the regulations. [00:19:49] Speaker 05: but they failed to do so. [00:19:51] Speaker 05: So it's about the nitty-gritty of how the union went about certifying him and not about whether the union indeed has the power to conduct exams and to certify agents. [00:20:11] Speaker 05: I want to address the gravamen of the union's argument, which is that because sports unions operate differently in their collective bargaining agreement, then Section 301 preemption has to apply to protect the union's ability to select agents. [00:20:30] Speaker 05: That concern is certainly important, but that should not drive this court's Section 301 preemption analysis. [00:20:38] Speaker 05: The union's ability to delegate its exclusive bargaining power to certified agents flows directly from Section 9A of the National Labor Relations Act. [00:20:49] Speaker 05: And a Section 9A concern is properly addressed by Section 9A preemption, meaning that the union can raise Section 9A as an affirmative defense in state court to insulate itself from any state law claims. [00:21:05] Speaker 05: And I want to point out that a built in mechanism to ensure that the union gets to gets the say so of selecting agents is arbitration. [00:21:16] Speaker 05: So under the regulations disputes over certification has to submit to arbitration so arbitrators. [00:21:23] Speaker 05: not state or federal courts, or interpret the regulations in the first instance. [00:21:28] Speaker 08: All right, Miss Lee, your time has expired. [00:21:31] Speaker 08: If you want to just say a couple words to conclude, we'll give you some time on rebuttal. [00:21:37] Speaker 05: Yes, I can reserve the rest of my time. [00:21:40] Speaker 08: Thank you. [00:21:41] Speaker 05: Thank you. [00:21:42] Speaker 08: Right. [00:21:44] Speaker 08: We'll hear from Mr. Kessler on behalf of Apple Ease. [00:21:48] Speaker 00: Good morning, Your Honor. [00:21:52] Speaker 00: Let me start with Judge Penn's question. [00:21:57] Speaker 00: We agree, as your question only suggested, that the detailed obligations the union assumed in this CBA to have an agent regulation system, to apply certain rules in that system for both certification and denial of certification, [00:22:20] Speaker 00: makes the regulations sufficiently intertwined with the CBA that it fits right into the complete preemption of Section 301 as articulated in the statute. [00:22:36] Speaker 00: And that's not limited [00:22:38] Speaker 00: The issue is not just whether it's a CBA issue, but whether it is a labor contract involved. [00:22:44] Speaker 00: That's what retail clerks make clear. [00:22:46] Speaker 00: When you look at the policies of complete preemption, what are the policies that are there? [00:22:54] Speaker 00: Has Congress so regulated the area that we can't have individual state courts making these determinations because we need a uniform national regulation [00:23:07] Speaker 00: That applies directly to this type of agent regulation system, which was correctly pointed out, comes from section nine of the National Labor Relations Act. [00:23:19] Speaker 00: When you look at the combination of that statute, and you look at the Supreme Court's decision in H.A. [00:23:28] Speaker 00: Otis, which talks about that in entertainment and sports unions, [00:23:33] Speaker 00: When you have this delegation, the agents are themselves labor parties. [00:23:39] Speaker 00: Yes. [00:23:39] Speaker 06: If you could respond to the question that I asked Ms. [00:23:43] Speaker 06: Lee, why do we need to think about complete preemption in this context where the plaintiff arguably has not demonstrated subject matter jurisdiction? [00:23:57] Speaker 06: Maybe it has to go back to, or maybe those claims need to be brought in a state court [00:24:02] Speaker 00: So I'll answer both procedurally and substantively, if I may. [00:24:09] Speaker 00: Procedurally, the prior order of this court created this issue, I think. [00:24:16] Speaker 06: Well, it asked about this issue. [00:24:18] Speaker 06: That doesn't mean that that issue is one we have to decide. [00:24:22] Speaker 00: Okay. [00:24:23] Speaker 00: So then moving on to that sort of procedurally why we're here, but substantively, [00:24:29] Speaker 00: If this case were filed in state court or in DC local court, we would remove. [00:24:38] Speaker 00: And when we would remove, we would be back in the federal court. [00:24:44] Speaker 00: The issue would be here, maybe come up here again. [00:24:47] Speaker 00: And really in sympathy with Mr. Searcy, he's been doing this for seven years. [00:24:52] Speaker 00: He likes some resolution. [00:24:55] Speaker 00: I think now's the time to, [00:24:57] Speaker 00: get that resolution, whatever the court decides, rather than say, we're not gonna decide it, have it go back, he either files again in local court, we remove, then your honor would agree, because we're gonna argue complete preemption, so it does remove it, and we're back up in exactly the same spot. [00:25:16] Speaker 06: So- Can you point to cases where a court uses complete preemption to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance? [00:25:26] Speaker 00: Sure. [00:25:26] Speaker 00: Actually, not all the cases, but some of the cases we cited. [00:25:32] Speaker 00: So, for example, one was the Weinberg case in the Northern District of Texas involving these regulations. [00:25:41] Speaker 00: It was removed. [00:25:42] Speaker 00: to the Northern District of Texas. [00:25:43] Speaker 00: That was first filed in state court and complete. [00:25:46] Speaker 06: That's in the context of removal. [00:25:47] Speaker 06: I'm saying not when there's no removal, when the initial claims are brought in federal court, and then the federal court uses complete preemption as the basis for its subject matter. [00:25:57] Speaker 00: I don't know of a specific case, but the reason why it doesn't come up [00:26:02] Speaker 00: So the parties being sued in these cases are either the union or the employer, right? [00:26:08] Speaker 00: Those are the two labor parties or related labor parties. [00:26:13] Speaker 00: Those two, we don't agree about a lot of things, but the union and the employer always agree we should be in federal court because we need a national body of law to have consistently do this. [00:26:27] Speaker 00: Imagine if we had an agent regulation system [00:26:30] Speaker 00: and some agents did have to pass the test if they're in one state, and some agents when another state didn't have to pass the test, how could we delegate our labor authority under that? [00:26:43] Speaker 00: So we need this type of uniform system. [00:26:46] Speaker 00: That's why every district court that's looked at this, and so it was black, it was Weinberg, it was Poston, [00:26:54] Speaker 00: decision below when they look at it they go say yes one way or another whether it's under section 9 of the NLRA which I also believe by the way can be complete preemption I want to raise that point [00:27:07] Speaker 00: It was noted this court's decision in Exxon said there's only three identified by the Supreme Court. [00:27:14] Speaker 00: That's true. [00:27:16] Speaker 00: But the Supreme Court has not ruled that the National Labor Relations Act couldn't be added to that list. [00:27:24] Speaker 00: The way you would decide that issue is you look at the decision in Condon, which says there's preemption and what [00:27:32] Speaker 00: Condon says in the Supreme Court is that it's a total occupation by Congress to give total regulation over how unions control themselves and delegate their exclusive authority. [00:27:46] Speaker 00: So if you apply the principles of Condon and you apply the principles of H.A. [00:27:51] Speaker 00: Artis, which note this special relationship in the labor parties, you come to the same complete preemption result. [00:27:59] Speaker 00: on this either section nine of the National Labor Relations Act or under section 301 of the LMRA for the reasons identified by Judge Pan. [00:28:11] Speaker 00: I think the way the court should look at that again is has Congress comprehensively regulated this issue of unions delegating to agents? [00:28:22] Speaker 00: No one disputes that. [00:28:23] Speaker 00: Amicus agrees with that. [00:28:26] Speaker 00: That is 100% clear. [00:28:28] Speaker 00: We couldn't anymore [00:28:29] Speaker 00: have our delegation of authority if we couldn't regulate the terms. [00:28:34] Speaker 00: For example, we have regulations about that they can't have criminal records, they can't commit fraud, they can't deceive the players. [00:28:43] Speaker 00: All of that has to be done on a national basis so we couldn't have this delegation of authority with respect to that. [00:28:50] Speaker 00: So when you look at it that way, when Congress is done, we at least believe that under either statute there's complete preemption [00:28:59] Speaker 00: and either one, we should be in this court and all of us should have some final resolution of this after seven years of doing this. [00:29:10] Speaker 00: So unless your honor says any questions for me, I don't usually stop with time left over, but I feel like I've made the points that I would like to make. [00:29:20] Speaker 08: Thank you. [00:29:23] Speaker 08: All right, Mr. Searcy, you were out of time, but we'll give you one minute for rebuttal. [00:29:28] Speaker 08: OK. [00:29:32] Speaker 02: In addressing some of the discussion that was had, the court, which means another reason why I should be here, because my claims are over a million dollars. [00:29:40] Speaker 02: And that's another thing. [00:29:41] Speaker 02: Also, US Constitution and Congress established two requirements to law for federal courts to hear cases in this court. [00:29:49] Speaker 02: And so those two requirements I've identified. [00:29:52] Speaker 02: The next thing is that the NFLPA regulation has a two-track. [00:29:59] Speaker 02: There's an applicant track, and there's an NFL agent track. [00:30:03] Speaker 02: The reason why you look at the collective bargaining reading, you see all those discussions about agent, agent, agent, agent, agent or contract advisor, that's Costco. [00:30:18] Speaker 02: I'm an applicant. [00:30:19] Speaker 02: I can't get in Costco, OK? [00:30:22] Speaker 02: I'm an applicant. [00:30:23] Speaker 02: So I had to sign a contract just to satisfy the contract. [00:30:27] Speaker 02: And that contract said, in Appendix A, I further agree that this application for certification, if one is issued to me along with the NFLPA regulations, shall constitute a contract between the NFLPA and myself. [00:30:44] Speaker 07: I'm an applicant. [00:30:46] Speaker 07: If this case were to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, that would be without prejudice. [00:30:53] Speaker 07: And that means you could bring it again in the DC Superior Court. [00:30:58] Speaker 07: And I just wanted to note, I was a judge on the DC Superior Court for 12 years, and I have every reason to believe that you would get a full and fair hearing in that court. [00:31:09] Speaker 07: They are accustomed to cases like this involving [00:31:14] Speaker 07: litigants who are from Maryland or from Virginia and have a case in DC. [00:31:19] Speaker 07: And they're very accustomed to dealing with pro se litigants such as yourself. [00:31:24] Speaker 07: And so I just wanted to note that you had said you brought your case here because you thought it was your home court. [00:31:31] Speaker 07: And I hope that you'll consider that if, I'm not saying it will, but if it were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, you could bring it again in superior court. [00:31:39] Speaker 07: And you would get the kind of law that [00:31:42] Speaker 07: want applied which is the DC law and they are very experienced applying that law. [00:31:47] Speaker 07: So I just wanted to note that for the record. [00:31:50] Speaker 08: Thank you. [00:31:55] Speaker 08: Your time was expired but we'll give you a minute for rebuttal. [00:32:02] Speaker 05: Your Honor, I have two points to clarify on rebuttal. [00:32:06] Speaker 05: So inextricably intertwined doesn't mean that the regulations and the collective bargaining agreement are inextricably intertwined. [00:32:15] Speaker 05: It means that the resolution of Mr. CSE's claims has to be inextricably intertwined with the interpretation of a labor contract. [00:32:24] Speaker 05: And that's the only way that there would be Section 301 preemption here. [00:32:29] Speaker 05: Second, the union explicitly kept the certification process out of the reach of the NFL, and in doing so, removing it from the purview of Section 301. [00:32:42] Speaker 05: And that is the process that the union bargained for and agreed to. [00:32:46] Speaker 05: And this court should not expand the scope of Section 301 preemption to accommodate what the union bargained for, but now decided that it doesn't like. [00:32:58] Speaker 05: If you honors don't have any more questions, I'll see my time. [00:33:01] Speaker 05: Thank you. [00:33:03] Speaker 08: Thank you, Miss Lee. [00:33:04] Speaker 08: You were appointed by the court to assist the appellant and assist the court as amicus curiae in this case in the court. [00:33:11] Speaker 08: Thanks you for your assistance. [00:33:15] Speaker 08: The cases have been.