[00:00:00] Speaker 00: Case number 24-7013. [00:00:01] Speaker 00: B-Stock Plevnik at balance versus Eugene R. Sullivan et al. [00:00:07] Speaker 00: Mr. Fine for the balance. [00:00:09] Speaker 00: Mr. Cady for the appellee, Eugene Sullivan. [00:00:11] Speaker 00: Mr. Genda for the appellee, United States. [00:00:15] Speaker 06: Good morning, counsel. [00:00:16] Speaker 06: Good morning. [00:00:17] Speaker 06: Thank you. [00:00:18] Speaker 05: Please proceed when you're ready. [00:00:19] Speaker 05: Thank you. [00:00:20] Speaker 05: Your honors, I'd like to at least correct, I think, two misunderstandings at the lower court with regard to the complaint. [00:00:28] Speaker 05: One, I think there was a misimpression that my client, Stock Plevnik, had signed a written engagement letter with a defendant, Mr. Sullivan, for $50,000. [00:00:39] Speaker 05: It's referenced in paragraph 14 of our complaint, and I think in the joint appendix, I mean, page 35, [00:00:47] Speaker 05: where I think the judge erroneously believed that engagement letter was with the defendant when it was not. [00:00:53] Speaker 05: There was never anything in writing between the [00:00:57] Speaker 05: Appellant here is Doug Plevnik and Mr. Sullivan. [00:01:00] Speaker 05: There was never an agreement as to whether he would get paid anything, but I just wanted to clear up that one point. [00:01:06] Speaker 05: The second one, there seems to be some belief below by the district court that the funds that were involved here in Africa belonged or owned by the United States. [00:01:15] Speaker 05: There isn't anything in the record in the complaint that supports that speculation. [00:01:20] Speaker 05: It's odd that the United States, if it believed it owned the funds, wouldn't have sent their ambassador to go retrieve them. [00:01:28] Speaker 05: or the embassy, which was alerted by Mr. Plevnik as to where the funds could be found in Ivory Coast. [00:01:35] Speaker 05: But those are two points I thought were important for the court to know about. [00:01:41] Speaker 05: With regard to Mr. Sullivan's, our claim of common law fraud against Mr. Sullivan, the district court decided that we had not adequately pled common law fraud because [00:01:54] Speaker 05: Mr. Sullivan had agreed to be Mr. Plefnik's lawyer, even though it was oral. [00:02:01] Speaker 05: He could serve pro bono. [00:02:03] Speaker 05: But I think it's standard law that if a person enters into a contract at the outset not intending to perform, that's a misrepresentation of state of mind, which can be a predicate of a common law fraud claim. [00:02:19] Speaker 05: And that's what we alleged in this case. [00:02:21] Speaker 05: I think it's replete. [00:02:22] Speaker 05: all the allegations which recite the betrayals of Mr. Sullivan, of Mr. Plevnik in retrieving the billions of dollars in the Ivory Coast. [00:02:33] Speaker 07: How do you get around Chiharis and Ludwig? [00:02:37] Speaker 07: I couldn't hear you, Your Honor. [00:02:38] Speaker 07: How do you get around the Chiharis case and the Ludwig and Robinson case? [00:02:43] Speaker 05: But we think that those are cases where a violation of the contractor intent came after the formation. [00:02:49] Speaker 05: It wasn't misrepresentation of state of mind. [00:02:52] Speaker 05: And Your Honor, we cite cases in our reply brief which show clearly this Court's conclusion that if at the time you make the contract, [00:03:00] Speaker 05: You do not intend to perform here, not intend to discharge duties of loyalty and honesty. [00:03:07] Speaker 05: That can be the foundation for a common law fraud claim. [00:03:10] Speaker 05: Of course, we have to prove it at trial. [00:03:12] Speaker 05: It's not something that can just be accepted as a presumption. [00:03:16] Speaker 05: I think in this case, the judge assumed that we had not alleged that that misrepresentation had occurred at the outset, but there's a fleeting reference, well, later on, down the contract road when Mr. Sullivan had performed some legal services for Mr. Plevenik, although we argue they were undertaken to induce Mr. Plevenik to reveal the whereabouts of the funds that Mr. Sullivan could lose. [00:03:43] Speaker 03: The amended complaint refers to a payment of $50,000. [00:03:49] Speaker 05: That was to Rudy Giuliani, Your Honor, not to Mr. Sullivan. [00:03:52] Speaker 05: I think if you look at paragraph 14 of the complaint is $50,000 to Rudy Giuliani, that agreement remained dormant and never actually became operative. [00:04:10] Speaker 05: So, [00:04:11] Speaker 05: We believe that the argument that's made that because there were some legal services performed, that automatically it disproved common law fraud. [00:04:22] Speaker 05: But let me suggest the following analogy, which is imperfect, but I think informative. [00:04:28] Speaker 05: Suppose you have a doctor. [00:04:30] Speaker 05: He's a heart surgeon, and he's paid by an enemy of a patient. [00:04:35] Speaker 05: I want you to amputate this patient's legs. [00:04:38] Speaker 06: You said he's paid by whom? [00:04:39] Speaker 06: What's the example? [00:04:40] Speaker 06: Excuse me? [00:04:41] Speaker 06: You said he's paid by whom? [00:04:42] Speaker 05: I just want to make sure I'm understanding the example. [00:04:45] Speaker 05: The doctor is paid by an enemy of the patient to represent that he's going to perform open heart surgery, but he really is going to amputate the legs. [00:04:58] Speaker 05: of the patient because he wants to get back to the patient. [00:05:01] Speaker 05: And so the doctor undertakes preliminary services, takes the vital signs that the patient advises on fluid and food intake, but then when the anesthesia is issued instead of doing the heart surgery, he amputates the legs. [00:05:16] Speaker 05: I think that's a clear case of common law fraud, even though it's true that the doctor did perform some medical services, taking the vital signs, [00:05:26] Speaker 05: suggesting what fluid and food intake would be appropriate. [00:05:30] Speaker 07: The problem is that the Ludwig case holds that you've got to show basically that the duties that are part and parcel of the fraud are divisible or different than the duties that were already within the scope of the contract. [00:05:52] Speaker 07: you don't have that in your example and I'm not sure how you have that in the facts alleged in your complaint. [00:06:02] Speaker 05: Well your honor I would just I would refer you your honor to this is Paige in our reply brief [00:06:14] Speaker 05: This is page four, these are citing cases of the DC Court of Appeals, which is the one that establishes the common law fraud elements because this is a DC cause of action. [00:06:28] Speaker 05: And you'll see on page four there, it is black letter law, a party who signs a contract intending non-performance as perpetrated common law fraud. [00:06:36] Speaker 05: And then there's a citation there. [00:06:38] Speaker 05: The question arises whether the breach of a contractual promise can ever be the subject of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation. [00:06:45] Speaker 05: We have held that it can. [00:06:46] Speaker 05: I'm quoting from that decision, Your Honor. [00:06:48] Speaker 05: a promise or contractual commitment may be actual fraud as misrepresentation if at the time of its making the promisor had no present intention of carrying it out. [00:06:59] Speaker 02: So let me ask where your strongest allegation is then, which I assume you will argue the district court should construe most favorably to your client because the amended complaint refers to various actions [00:07:16] Speaker 02: that appeared to be consistent with representation of your client's wish to repatriate these funds? [00:07:28] Speaker 05: Yes, Your Honor. [00:07:29] Speaker 05: It's a wonderful question. [00:07:30] Speaker 05: I think the answer is that as we have alleged, those services were done to induce confidence in my client that enabled him to reveal the whereabouts of the funds that [00:07:43] Speaker 05: resulted in the perpetrated and of the fraud. [00:07:45] Speaker 05: Without having that trust or confidence, my client, we allege, would never have revealed this information. [00:07:52] Speaker 05: So your honor, that's the response to your question. [00:07:55] Speaker 02: I don't understand then. [00:07:59] Speaker 02: Your client claimed that he had knowledge of funds coming from [00:08:12] Speaker 02: Libya that were in Africa and he wanted to bring them to the United States, correct? [00:08:23] Speaker 05: Yes, Your Honor. [00:08:24] Speaker 05: I think it was, they were an Ivory Coast, but they may have originated in Libya. [00:08:30] Speaker 02: And the allegation about putting $6 million in a local police station. [00:08:42] Speaker 02: The issue that the district court mentioned was the fact that the Department of Justice has responsibilities for recapturing funds abroad. [00:09:00] Speaker 02: And what is the allegation as to these funds that your client wanted to bring them back to the United States [00:09:12] Speaker 02: as his personal property? [00:09:18] Speaker 05: Are you finished, Your Honor? [00:09:20] Speaker 05: I don't want to interrupt. [00:09:21] Speaker 05: I think the allegation is, Your Honor, that my client was in possession of the funds. [00:09:26] Speaker 05: He had obtained two letters from the Department of Treasury's general counsel saying, this is how you can transfer, wire transfer the funds into the US Treasury. [00:09:36] Speaker 02: So did counsel, did you hear my question? [00:09:40] Speaker 05: Yes, I did. [00:09:42] Speaker 05: So let me continue with that. [00:09:44] Speaker 05: The idea was that he, in possession of the funds, would be responsible for sending those billions back to the United States Treasury per the guidance that was given by the Treasury Department's General Counsel. [00:09:56] Speaker 02: Remember the obligation- So what I'm trying to understand is, as I understand it, I could not transfer funds to the US Treasury [00:10:10] Speaker 02: unless they were funds to which I was legally entitled. [00:10:15] Speaker 02: And then I would just be making, as it were, a donation to the United States government. [00:10:23] Speaker 05: Correct. [00:10:24] Speaker 05: And what we're saying here, that's exactly what happened. [00:10:28] Speaker 05: The funds were in the possession of my client. [00:10:32] Speaker 05: He was transferring the funds to the US Treasury as a donation. [00:10:36] Speaker 05: Absolutely correct, Your Honor. [00:10:38] Speaker 02: Yeah, I don't get any of that from [00:10:41] Speaker 02: A complaint, but I understand you're saying construe it most favorably your client, it was totally unclear to me. [00:10:48] Speaker 02: As to. [00:10:53] Speaker 02: I mean, why would he. [00:10:56] Speaker 02: I'll cease my questions. [00:10:58] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:10:59] Speaker 05: No, if you're asking for the motivation, why would he make a donation like that? [00:11:02] Speaker 02: No, I'm not asking that. [00:11:03] Speaker 05: Okay. [00:11:04] Speaker 05: I apologize, Your Honor. [00:11:05] Speaker 05: I don't want to second guess you. [00:11:06] Speaker 06: I have one question for you before we will give you a little bit of time for rebuttal, which is, [00:11:13] Speaker 06: Let's just suppose conceptually, I'll assume for purposes of this question, that conceptually there's a route under which you could say, look, there was no intent to make good on the contract from the very outset. [00:11:26] Speaker 06: So it was a fraudulent enterprise from the get-go. [00:11:29] Speaker 06: And that's a way to get around what otherwise could be a impediment to your ability to proceed. [00:11:34] Speaker 06: But then in order to support that, the complaint can't just allege that there was never an intent. [00:11:41] Speaker 06: there's got to be something more than that that would allow, even at the dismissal stage, particularly given the particularity requirements associated with fraud claims, that would allow for concluding that there's something to the notion that there was no intent from the outset to make good on the representation. [00:12:00] Speaker 06: Where in the complaint is that? [00:12:02] Speaker 05: We allege that shortly after this enterprise collapsed, shipwrecked, and my client was imprisoned and came back. [00:12:11] Speaker 05: The judge had bought very, very fancy home and vehicles and that when the judge was asked to help when my client was in prison, he said, no, I'm sorry, I can't help you. [00:12:27] Speaker 05: That is, if you read the complaint carefully, it alleges clear actions by the judge. [00:12:34] Speaker 05: that betray what would ordinarily be expected at his duty if he intended to really serve my client, to try to help him repatriate the money. [00:12:45] Speaker 05: And he didn't do that. [00:12:46] Speaker 05: But if you read through the allegations and the complaint, I think you'll find that. [00:12:50] Speaker 05: But that's the response. [00:12:52] Speaker 06: OK. [00:12:54] Speaker 06: Let me make sure my colleagues don't have additional questions at this time. [00:12:57] Speaker 06: We'll give you a little bit of time for rebuttal. [00:12:58] Speaker 06: Thank you. [00:13:07] Speaker 06: Mr. Katie. [00:13:17] Speaker 04: Thank you, Your Honors. [00:13:18] Speaker 04: Steve Katie for defendant, Appellee Jean Sullivan. [00:13:23] Speaker 04: May it please the court. [00:13:24] Speaker 04: Judge Cooper wrote two fulsome and thoughtful opinions in this case, and they should be affirmed. [00:13:31] Speaker 04: He applied the facts as pled to the law and reached the right conclusion in his I think the questions this morning indicate [00:13:39] Speaker 04: This case must be dismissed not just because what the complaint does not plead, but exactly because of what it does plead. [00:13:47] Speaker 04: And with regard to Gene Sullivan, the case must be dismissed. [00:13:52] Speaker 04: And the opinion below affirmed for two independent reasons. [00:13:56] Speaker 04: First, the district court properly found the plaintiff did not plead a claim for fraud against Sullivan. [00:14:05] Speaker 04: because plaintiff pleaded that Sullivan did in fact provide him with legal services. [00:14:10] Speaker 04: And there's a crucial paragraph at page, paragraph 16 of the complaint that Sullivan, it says Sullivan later entered into a conspiracy with DOJ to capture the funds. [00:14:25] Speaker 04: And secondly, [00:14:27] Speaker 04: The district court was correct that plaintiff cannot satisfy the damages element for fraud because the money that he sought to repatriate did not belong to him, of course, in the complaint pleads that the plaintiff told African officials where the money was located and twice brought it to African police stations. [00:14:51] Speaker 04: Whatever Sullivan did to facilitate a meeting with DOJ in February of 2021 did not cause plaintiff damages. [00:14:59] Speaker 04: According to what plaintiff pleads in the complaint, these issues require dismissal and cannot be fixed because of what is pled. [00:15:07] Speaker 04: And I want to flesh those two rounds out in more detail. [00:15:12] Speaker 04: First, with regard to no fraud, [00:15:14] Speaker 04: plaintiff says that his flagship allegation of fraud is paragraph 14 of his complaint. [00:15:21] Speaker 04: And that's where he says that Sullivan said he would be plaintiff's lawyer. [00:15:28] Speaker 04: As Judge Cooper wrote in the opinion below, the complaint itself is replete, Judge Cooper says, with allegations showing that, in fact, Sullivan did provide legal services to plaintiff [00:15:42] Speaker 04: and I'd highlight paragraphs 17 and 18. [00:15:46] Speaker 04: and 35 and 37 and 39 of the complaint, all of which describe legal services that Gene Sullivan provided the plaintiff, including working with Treasury Department to alert them to funds, working with DOJ to coordinate a meeting to help plaintiff repatriate the funds, and also working with plaintiff's wife to help get plaintiff out of detention when he was in detention. [00:16:13] Speaker 04: Judge Cooper's analysis of these legal services [00:16:16] Speaker 04: is found at pages 41 and 42 of the record where he concludes, quote, Sullivan's agreement to represent plaintiff was literally true. [00:16:28] Speaker 04: Moreover, though, and this is crucial, the complaint alleges that the attorney-client relationship was formed in June or July of 2020. [00:16:39] Speaker 04: And that's at paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 of the complaint. [00:16:45] Speaker 04: June or July of 2020. [00:16:47] Speaker 04: And it says that Sullivan later in February of 2021, quote, entered into a conspiracy, close quote, with DOJ lawyers. [00:16:59] Speaker 04: And that's at paragraph 16 of the complaint. [00:17:03] Speaker 04: Thus, the complaint does not and cannot be amended to allege that the attorney client or relationship was entered into with the intent to defraud plaintiff [00:17:14] Speaker 04: because it alleges that the conspiracy with DOJ was entered into eight months later in February of 2021, entered into, it says. [00:17:23] Speaker 04: And it also alleges, of course, that Sullivan provided legal services both before and after that date. [00:17:29] Speaker 04: And as a result, Judge Cooper properly determined that no fraud was pled. [00:17:35] Speaker 04: Secondly, there can be no damages for two reasons. [00:17:38] Speaker 04: First, the complaint makes clear at paragraph 11 that this money is not plaintiffs to begin with. [00:17:44] Speaker 04: It says it was scattered across Africa after the fall of the Libyan dictator. [00:17:51] Speaker 04: And Judge Cooper properly determined that that meant that the money did not belong to plaintiff and instead belonged to Treasury, thus the repatriation effort. [00:18:02] Speaker 04: And that's at page 44 of the appendix. [00:18:05] Speaker 04: And secondly, there can be no damages because plaintiff himself pleads that he brought the money to two African police stations and he told officials in Africa where it was and thus, [00:18:17] Speaker 04: whatever happened at that DOJ meeting in February of 2021, where plaintiff told DOJ the location of the money can't be tied or can't be the cause of its alleged disappearance because the cause is pled in the complaint. [00:18:29] Speaker 04: We know it's because it was delivered to police stations in Africa, and thus there's no fraud. [00:18:35] Speaker 04: There are no damages. [00:18:36] Speaker 04: And Judge Cooper's thoughtful opinion we submit should be affirmed. [00:18:41] Speaker 04: Thank you, counsel. [00:18:42] Speaker 06: Thank you. [00:18:43] Speaker 06: We'll hear from the government now. [00:18:51] Speaker 01: Janda. [00:18:53] Speaker 01: Thank you, Your Honor, and may it please the court, Sean Janda for the United States. [00:18:57] Speaker 01: I think at this point, everyone agrees that the underlying conduct that the federal officials here are alleged to have engaged in meeting with the plaintiff, interviewing the plaintiff, is the sort of conduct that they are employed to do. [00:19:08] Speaker 01: And the only question is whether the sort of bare allegations that that conduct was engaged in for any improper purpose can take it outside of scope. [00:19:17] Speaker 01: We've explained in our briefs why the bare allegations in this case can't do that work. [00:19:22] Speaker 01: And I'm happy to address any questions that the court might have. [00:19:26] Speaker 01: But in the absence of questions, [00:19:27] Speaker 01: I also contend to rest on our briefs on this point. [00:19:30] Speaker 06: I have just one theoretical question. [00:19:31] Speaker 06: So there's often fact patterns once seen in the cases where the stream of conduct that the government, the defendant government officer is engaged in is the kind of thing that we would say at some level of generality the government officers is employed to do. [00:19:49] Speaker 06: But then there will be some kind of detour in the midst of that that parts ways with what the government officers generally [00:19:56] Speaker 06: employed to do and sometimes they're really extreme situations where somebody does something that's you know a violent crime or something of that nature that seems obviously outside the scope in some descriptive way government officers do and sometimes it's a little bit more of a minor blip but really we're just talking about kind of products and detours in some dimension and what's your how would you characterize [00:20:20] Speaker 06: the way in which a court is supposed to know whether the conduct that diverts from the path of what a normal government officer would do takes it outside the zone of something that would be scope for purposes of Westfall. [00:20:33] Speaker 06: How would you describe that? [00:20:35] Speaker 01: Yes, so I think both Carol on the substantive law and then this court's opinions on the Westfall Act make clear that you have to look at the underlying conduct that sort of the controversy that the alleged tort arose out of. [00:20:48] Speaker 01: And then I think there's just sort of a qualitative analysis about how tightly tied to the job duties the tort ultimately becomes, whether it's a minor blip or a huge detour. [00:20:59] Speaker 01: That being said, I think in this case, the court certainly doesn't have to address that. [00:21:02] Speaker 01: The allegations of any sort of blip here I think are [00:21:05] Speaker 01: so threadbare that the court doesn't need to credit them even the motion to dismiss stage and sort of disregarding the bear allegations of improper purpose. [00:21:13] Speaker 01: I think what you're left with is just conduct that is in the core of what these federal employees are. [00:21:19] Speaker 06: When you say, so that might be true on the facts of this case. [00:21:22] Speaker 06: I mean, I don't want to argue with you on that for now, but when you say qualitative assessment, what would you do? [00:21:28] Speaker 06: What are the guideposts? [00:21:29] Speaker 06: What's the [00:21:31] Speaker 06: What would you look at? [00:21:32] Speaker 06: And would you just look at the factors that Carol outlined? [00:21:35] Speaker 01: Yeah, I mean, I think Carol goes through the overall analysis in some detail and specifically focuses on the timing analysis for a couple of pages. [00:21:43] Speaker 01: I think that hasn't been the focus of our briefing here. [00:21:46] Speaker 01: But it does say that you're looking at the underlying conduct. [00:21:49] Speaker 01: You're not looking at kind of the tort itself or the moment the tort was committed. [00:21:53] Speaker 01: You probably have to be tightly scoped to the tort in some sense. [00:21:58] Speaker 01: I mean, you're not looking at [00:22:00] Speaker 01: If you have a multi-day spree that happens that's initially started as a job-related thing, but then goes far off, you're probably outside scope. [00:22:10] Speaker 01: If there's a momentary blip, you're probably within scope. [00:22:15] Speaker 01: Where one turns into the other, I think it's pretty hard to provide specific guideposts or analysis. [00:22:22] Speaker 01: Carol is very holistic and qualitative on this point. [00:22:27] Speaker 01: the rest of the analysis. [00:22:29] Speaker 01: But here again, I think that the allegations here are just so thin. [00:22:33] Speaker 01: I think under any plausible pleading standard, the court can disregard them for purposes of resolving the certification question in this case, and leave that for another day. [00:22:44] Speaker 06: Okay. [00:22:45] Speaker 06: Thank you, counsel. [00:22:46] Speaker 06: Thank you. [00:22:51] Speaker 06: Mr. Fine will give you two minutes for rebuttal. [00:22:53] Speaker 05: Thank you, your honor. [00:22:55] Speaker 05: appreciate the opportunity. [00:22:56] Speaker 05: A couple things. [00:22:58] Speaker 05: My colleague declared that there was an incompatible inconsistency between the allegation that at the time that the attorney-client privilege was established in June of 2020, we allege that there was at that time an intent not to comply with the obligations that were inherent in that relationship and the later conspiracy [00:23:25] Speaker 05: But just because it took time for the defendant, Mr. Sullivan, and he had army rangers who were his friends, they were the ones who were involved in this case, to later bring in other people, this doesn't mean that he couldn't have formed his own intent at the outset to plot towards undermining his obligations towards Mr. Plevening as an attorney. [00:23:51] Speaker 05: Now the second thing quickly about the ownership of the funds. [00:23:54] Speaker 05: Possession is nine-tenths of the law. [00:23:58] Speaker 05: We recited the ordinary standard that if someone possesses funds, unless a rival claims that it's theirs, the law presumes possession is ownership. [00:24:10] Speaker 05: There was no one in this case that's ever disputed that Istak Plevnik owned the funds that were to be repatriated. [00:24:16] Speaker 05: Indeed, remember in the complaint we allege that [00:24:21] Speaker 05: There were two letters prepared by the General Counsel of the Department of Treasury to Mr. Sullivan saying, this is how you repatriate this money to the U.S. [00:24:31] Speaker 05: Treasury from Ivory Coast. [00:24:33] Speaker 05: Two letters that referred to in the complaint. [00:24:36] Speaker 05: Why would those letters even be drafted if the money was already belonged to the United States? [00:24:41] Speaker 05: There wouldn't be any need for repatriation. [00:24:43] Speaker 05: And if Mr. Plevenik didn't have the ownership of the money, he couldn't repatriate it anyway. [00:24:48] Speaker 05: It'd just be a bystander. [00:24:51] Speaker 05: And third, with regard to the argument that, well, Mr. Plevenik had disclosed to certain people in Ivory Coast about the whereabouts, and that was the cause of the damage. [00:25:02] Speaker 05: But we have alleged that if Mr. Plevenik had honored his obligations, the funds would have been repatriated in a timely fashion. [00:25:12] Speaker 05: The last thing, and I appreciate your honor for indulging this, this relates to the point of the Westfall Act. [00:25:20] Speaker 05: It's clear one of the indispensable prongs for qualification is that at least part of the motivation for the challenge action, at least in part, was actuated by a goal to benefit the employer here in the United States. [00:25:34] Speaker 05: Here, what we allege was that the challenge acts were intended to injure the United States by depriving it of $6 billion. [00:25:41] Speaker 05: Let me give you this quick analogy. [00:25:44] Speaker 05: Suppose someone says, I'm going to be a toll operator at a booth and get money from the cars that come through the toll. [00:25:52] Speaker 05: But at the time, he becomes that operator who says, I'm going to steal the money. [00:25:56] Speaker 05: So he uses his position, taking the tolls, receives the money from the drivers, they go through, and he steals the money. [00:26:03] Speaker 05: It would be very hard, it seems to me, to say that there was an intent, at least in part in those circumstances, to benefit the employer. [00:26:11] Speaker 05: The intent was to benefit himself. [00:26:13] Speaker 05: If you have no questions, thank you. [00:26:15] Speaker 05: Thank you, counsel. [00:26:15] Speaker 05: Thank you to all counsel. [00:26:16] Speaker 05: We'll take this case under submission.