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Case number 22-3069, United States of America versus James Hutchings Jr., also known as James Hunter Hutchings II Appellant.

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Mr. Anzina for the appellant, Mr. Lenners for the appellate.

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Morning, Your Honors.

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May I please the court?

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I'm Paul Anzina, representing the appellant in this case, James Hutchings Jr.

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When law enforcement agents arrested Linwood Thorne in January 2019, they found him alone in an apartment with four cell phones.

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The agents sought a warrant to search the phones to see what was inside them, what their contents were.

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They told the magistrate judge there's probable cause to believe there would be evidence of crime in these phones because, first of all, Mr. Thorne was a drug dealer.

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He had already been indicted for drug charges.

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Second, drug dealers used phones in conducting their activities.

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Therefore, any phone that Mr. Thorne used was likely to contain evidence of his alleged illegal acts.

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And finally, the fact that he was alone in the apartment with these phones indicated that it was likely that he used these phones.

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Very straightforward, very simple.

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But the probable cause analysis does not end with the issuance of the warrant.

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The execution of the warrant must also meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

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When the phones were cracked here, when the password was deciphered and they were opened up and their contents revealed, the agents received a 36,000-page report containing everything that was in the phones, messages, photographs, everything.

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And on the very first page of that, the very first thing the agents looked at

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was the entry owner's name equals James iPhone.

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Now the agents knew that Thorn was not James.

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James was not his name.

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They knew also that someone named James had been in the apartment immediately before Thorn was arrested because they had stopped James Hutchings coming out of the apartment on their way in and they had asked him about who was in the apartment and he and the man he was with told the agents that Thorn was in

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And the agents had no reason to believe that Mr. Hutchings was involved in any criminal activity at that point.

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So now they knew that he had been in the apartment immediately before.

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So the warrants said, though, that it covered phones that were associated with Thorn.

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It didn't have to be owned by Thorn.

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No, it didn't have to be owned by him.

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But the association here, the only association was that it was found in the apartment with Thorn.

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But why isn't that enough of an association to bring this within the market?

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Well, here's the problem.

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If the agents had come a few minutes earlier and they had found Mr. Hutchings in the apartment with Mr. Thorne, they would have been required to disclose that in the application for the warrant.

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particularly.

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But that didn't happen.

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I guess.

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No, it didn't happen.

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What are you expecting law enforcement agents to do?

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They have a warrant that says you can search phones associated with Lynn with Thorne.

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They find this phone in the apartment with Thorne.

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Nobody else is there but Thorne.

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It's by a pile of clothes that Thorne admits are his clothes.

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I don't understand why this is not within the

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Well, that's exactly the point you made.

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You said nobody else is there in the apartment with Thorne.

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But the agents knew that someone named James, about whom they had no reason to believe was involved in any illegal activity, had been in the apartment just minutes before.

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I guess I can't get around the fact that this warrant says if it's associated with Thorne, you can search it.

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And this phone was found with Thorne.

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Why is it not associated with Thorne?

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It's associated with Thorne in the sense that it was found with him.

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But the underlying.

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Aren't you requiring law enforcement officers to overthink this?

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I have a warrant that says search the phone if it's associated with.

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Right.

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And they're searching.

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But they know that the only association is that it was found in the apartment with Thorne.

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Which is a little broader than the facts here, where it was found in the apartment with him.

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Nobody else was there.

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It was close to him.

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It was, in fact, on pile of his clothing.

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And he was, at that time, fleeing from law enforcement, which would raise a reasonable inference that he's not broadly socializing with people who aren't part of his team or to be trusted to keep his whereabouts.

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confidential.

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So it seems like there's quite a bit more here than somebody who's under a probable cause of drug dealing found in a residence where there are other phones somewhere they're in.

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Well, Your Honor, I think you're reading into this something that isn't there.

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And that is the possibility or the likelihood that Mr. Hutchings was involved in some kind of illegal activity.

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Imagine if instead of Mr. Hutchings coming out of the apartment, it had been a plumber.

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The plumber was wearing a shirt that said ace plumbing services.

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And when they opened the phone, the phone said ace plumbing services.

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That's exactly the situation you have here.

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Someone was in the apartment.

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Now the phone suggests that that person owned the phone and left it behind.

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And that person, there was no reason to believe that person was involved in any criminal activity.

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So it seems to me that you're suggesting that

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law enforcement officers who are executing a warrant need to be thinking about whether probable cause is still met as they're doing that.

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And that seems very disconnected from the way things work in the real world, because oftentimes the officers executing a warrant are different from the one who swore out the affidavit and got the warrant.

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And it seems to me that the whole purpose of the warrant is to remove that decision about probable cause away from the officers who are engaged in the competitive

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enterprise of ferreting out crime and putting in the hands of a magistrate judge or a judge, a neutral detached magistrate, that makes the probable cause finding.

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And that's what happened in this case.

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The judge or the magistrate judge signed the warrant.

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Now the officers just go execute it.

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That's what they did.

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And even if you were correct that there was a problem, they can rely on that in good faith.

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Well, the problem with two problems.

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One is agents do have to be thinking about whether there's probable cause, even if there's a warrant, because as your authority for that garrison.

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That's a factual situation that's somewhat different here.

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Here, a magistrate judge says you can search this particular phone in garrison.

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There was a warrant that said you can search the apartment on the third floor.

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There turned out to be two.

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And Garrison says that as long as they thought there was only one, that was OK.

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It was once they realized that there was two, there was an issue.

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So that's distinguishable.

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Well, what Garrison said was you can search the second floor of this building, right?

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And that's what they searched.

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But when they got there, they found out the second floor of the building was divided into two apartments.

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My recollection of Garrison was that once they

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As long as the police knew or thought that they were acting within the bounds of the warrant, they were fine.

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But once they realized that there were two, that's when they were put on notice.

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But in this case, there's an actual warrant that says you can search this particular phone.

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There was never a time at which the officers thought that the warrant didn't apply to this phone.

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So that's why it's different.

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what they had told the magistrate judge about the phone was incorrect.

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That's what I'm trying to say.

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In most cases, the agents who are executing the search don't know what was in the affidavit.

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They're just executing the search.

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Many search warrants search this whole house.

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One agent goes, gets the warrant.

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And then a team of people, 20 people are searching the house.

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And you're saying that every single one of them needs to be thinking about probable cause as they're searching.

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Well, in this case, the agents did know.

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because Agent Milliarra testified.

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But you're asking us to make a holding that's going to apply to all search warrants, and that just seems really impractical.

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Well, I think in any case where an agent knows that the probable cause showing they had made was incorrect, I don't think that's too big a burden, because agents, this agent said

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He knew when he looked at that first page, he knew immediately that it was reasonable that this phone did not belong to Thorne.

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But isn't that different than knowing that the phone did not have information that would incriminate Thorne?

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But the only reason why the magistrate judge allowed the search of the phone was because she or he felt that the phone was in his possession, so therefore it was likely he used it.

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But now we have different information.

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We have information saying that the phone was in his possession because

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The person who apparently owned it had just left his apartment and apparently left it behind.

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Is the inference of the warrant affidavit and the warrant that is likely that he himself used it, or rather that because it was associated with him, perhaps through his associates, that they might have used it in communicating with him or about the enterprise?

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Well, that's problematic, too, because let's play that out.

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That's what the district court held.

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But let's play that out.

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What that means is that any phone that Mr. Thorne had been in contact with, there would be probable cause to search that phone.

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Well, there's a lot that he had been in contact with.

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But I take your point.

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In this case, there is no claim that the magistrate judge erroneously issued this warrant, that it was overbought.

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And there isn't any indication that it's based on Thorn having owned the phone.

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No.

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Nor is it based on Thorn himself having held, used,

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dialed on the phone?

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Yes, it is based on him.

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You think it is?

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Yes.

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And what would you point to for that?

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I would point to the affidavit itself, which says that the reason there's probable cause here is because he's a drug dealer.

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Drug dealers use phones.

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Therefore, any phone he used is likely to have information about his activities.

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And on the pizza delivery example,

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It seems a lot less likely that if a, you know, or the plumber coming in and out, if that person's phone were left, it seems like clearly there would not be probable cause to seize that phone if the agents knew that that was, you know, if it had like a Domino's pizza phone case and it was like property of,

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than this one because, you know, an associate might not only lend their phone to this guy, that's Thorne, but it might be that Thorne is the boss and that they turn their phones into him for, you know, reasons of his determining that have to do with his security so that it doesn't really

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seem fair to say the officer should have treated this, or I guess I'm asking you, what makes it fair to say that the officer should have treated this the same way that they would have treated the left behind plumber or pizza delivery phone?

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I see my time is up.

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That's all right.

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We are somewhat lenient with time and useful arguments, and we're finding your argument useful.

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Thank you.

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The reason they needed to treat this exactly as they would have treated the pizza delivery man or the plumber is because

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Mr Hutchings is in exactly the same position as the treats of delivery man or the plumber.

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They have no reason at all to suspect that he's involved in any illegal activity.

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Zero.

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I guess the difference as you point out usefully in your brief that they they had let him go.

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They, you know, they didn't have probable cause to arrest him before the phone was cracked.

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But they also don't have an affirmative explanation like they would with the plumber or the pizza delivery that's innocent why he would be in an apartment and leave his phone where there's an indicted and fleeing felon.

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It's still, even on the objective facts, it still seems a little different.

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Well, it's only different if you postulate.

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that there is a reason to believe that Mr. Hutchings was involved in some illegal activity with him.

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And there's no reason for that, no basis for that.

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Thank you.

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Thank you, Your Honor.

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And we'll give you your rebuttal time.

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Thank you.

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And now we'll hear from Mr. Lennards for the United States.

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Thank you, Your Honor.

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Good morning, and may I please the court, Dan Lennards for the United States.

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The officers did not unreasonably execute the search warrant in this case when they continued to review the Selbright report of the iPhone's contents beyond the first page that had an indication that the owner's name was James's iPhone.

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That did not vitiate the probable cause that Linwood Thorn

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was using this phone while he was fleeing from the police, a drug dealer who had been caught with 44 kilograms of cocaine under circumstances where he had already switched phone numbers once during the course of the officer's investigation and where the warrant made clear that drug dealers use multiple phones and often use phones registered in other people's names.

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It's also true that it's very easy to rename an iPhone.

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And so under the totality of the circumstances, the mere indication that this phone had been named James's iPhone by someone did not eliminate the probable cause and officers did not unreasonably continue their review of the Selbright report, notwithstanding seeing that information.

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Can you walk us through the doctrinal framework that applies here?

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It's not Leon because we're not looking at the

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At the magistrate issuing judge, it does seem like it's in some ways analogous to the garrison, Maryland versus garrison framework in some ways different.

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It'd be helpful to hear your thoughts on garrison and the related cases on which counsel for Mr. Hutchings relies.

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My understanding of the law in this area, Your Honor, is that under garrison, once officers in the course of executing a warrant

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uncover information that eliminates the probable cause that was the basis or the search they were performing, they need to stop their search and limit it to the places for which they still have probable cause.

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So for example, in the Harmon case from the 10th Circuit, the warrant allowed the officers to search a house and a detached garage based on probable cause that both were being used as part of a drug dealing operation.

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The officers went into the detached garage and ultimately discovered that the residents of that garage had no involvement with the drug dealing operation from the main house.

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And the 10th Circuit said that upon discovering that, they were required to stop their search.

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In that case, they had already uncovered the incriminating evidence from the garage and thus there was no Section 1983 violation.

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So that's my understanding of the framework, is that there is some requirement that officers upon discovering the lack of probable cause while executing a warrant that applies to an area, stop the search.

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that that didn't occur when they merely read the name James's iPhone at the end of this report and the defense is not argued that it occurred at some later point.

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Before the officer saw the incriminating evidence on Hutchings.

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What if the.

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Warren affidavit had said that it was for, the premise was that they were phones that were owned by and used, I know this is not this case, but owned by and used by the defendant and identifiable as such.

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So that just like the strongest Warren affidavit to say, when you see James, then you have reason to think it's not the phone that we're asking for.

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I guess this relates to Judge Pan's inquiry of Mr. Enzina, which is if the warrant on its face doesn't say anything about the rationale, then how does Garrison even work?

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I think that's more than of a good faith exception question, as the First Circuit analyzed it in Pimentel.

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which is they had a warrant in that case that arguably on its face limited the officers ability to search the second floor.

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It turned out that the defendant lived, unbeknownst to the officers, on the third floor.

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And given the way the warrant had been written and ambiguities in it that suggested that the officers were allowed to search the defendant's residence, even though it was limited to the second floor, the First Circuit treated it as though, yes, this search was not directly authorized by the warrant,

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But the officers nonetheless acted under a good faith belief that it did.

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And thus, Leon applies.

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And so you could.

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That's because there was ambiguity.

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The residents would seem to give them authority to go to the third floor.

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The second floor seems like a limited specification that excludes the third floor.

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And because there's conflict there, they can go with residents.

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That is my understanding of the First Circuit's reasoning.

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It's basically if, I think the evaluation is, was the search in fact outside the scope of the warrant?

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Here it was not.

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On the face of the warrant, this search was authorized.

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And nothing the agents developed during the course of that search required them to stop and seek a new warrant.

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But if the search had not been authorized, or it's seemingly not authorized by the warrant, but there was nonetheless enough ambiguity on the face of the warrant, the officers can act in good faith to conduct the search that the warrant authorizes.

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So you would have us look at Garrison and say, because it's the principal claim that's being raised by the defendant, and ask whether the

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cracking officers here, or the officers looking at the reports, knew or should have known that there was a risk they were searching something that was erroneously included within the terms of the warrant.

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And you would say, well, they didn't see anything that seemed to exceed the terms of the warrant because the fact that the phone said James didn't render it not associated with Thorn, which was the premise of the

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of the warrant, and therefore the inquiry just isn't even triggered.

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Correct.

[00:20:06] Speaker 01:
The easy way is even if you assume that that means Thorne was using it, even if you think you read that warrant narrowly to only authorize a search of a phone to be used by Thorne, learning that the owner name was James' iPhone didn't undermine probable cause that

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the court has discussed.

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But even if that was true, as the court has noted, the warrant authorized the search of funds associated with Thorn.

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As the district court found, this was certainly associated with him found in this apartment while he was running from the police.

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He was likely only associating himself with people who were helping him commit his crimes at that time.

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And so even if

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So under those circumstances as well, it didn't fall outside the warrant.

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But the executing officers, based on Judge Pan's premise, don't know those facts, the narrowing facts, that the guy whose phones these were was on LAM, that he's likely only associating with people who are insiders to his criminal activities,

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I mean, that sort of hurts and helps from your perspective, that they're not versed in the underpinnings of the warrant.

[00:21:32] Speaker 04:
Is that accurate?

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Is it accurate that none of the executing officers are versed in what was put in the warrant affidavit and then be that that, in some ways, makes your case less robust?

[00:21:48] Speaker 01:
No, Your Honor.

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In this case, Agents Ray and Migliara are the two agents who read the Selbright report past the first page.

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They were also both on the scene on Linden Avenue the day of Thorne's arrest.

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And so they both knew that Hutchings had been stopped.

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They both knew that Thorne was in this very small apartment found with four phones, two of which, including this iPhone, were found on a pile of his clothes.

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They had been the ones searching for him ever since they found 44 kilograms of cocaine in his residence.

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They had tracked him to Baltimore with the marshals.

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And so these officers knew the entire constellation of facts that we put forth in our brief.

[00:22:30] Speaker 03:
Isn't this case really distinguished

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distinguishable from garrison in cases like it, and that in garrison there wasn't really a question about the finding of probable cause.

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The question was whether the police officers were going to the right place that was identified in the warrant for which probable cause was found.

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And it seems to me that law enforcement officers do

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have to execute the warrant in the right place.

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They're making a judgment there that we're going to the right place.

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You can't give them a warrant for the second floor and they can't go to the 10th floor.

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So they are responsible for executing the warrant in the correct place.

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And the difference with this case is that the warrant said search this particular cell phone.

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It's not a question of

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the probable cause being assigned to the right place.

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I think this is more squarely within what would be a good faith exception or anything, because there was a judge who said, you can search this particular phone.

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And there wasn't discretion about where they were going to execute it.

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They were just executing what they were told to execute.

[00:23:54] Speaker 01:
So I don't want to fight what I think is a helpful question, but there are cases that say the officers have been given have imagine has found probable cause that the officers can search place X. And in the course of executing the warrant, the officers learned that the probable cause they believe they had for place X no longer exists.

[00:24:14] Speaker 01:
And courts have said under garrison, you can't keep searching X even though the warrant says you may because you know the probable cause contained in the warrant has been vicious.

[00:24:23] Speaker 01:
That's, for example, the Harmon case, the warrant on its face that you can say that that district of Colorado case would you can you can search.

[00:24:31] Speaker 01:
You can keep tracking this car because you're probably cause to believe that.

[00:24:35] Speaker 03:
So is that a subjective inquiry?

[00:24:37] Speaker 03:
If these particular officers know or is it what any objective officer know?

[00:24:43] Speaker 03:
I think it should be objective, but I can see many situations where the executing officer might not actually know.

[00:24:50] Speaker 01:
I think it's objective, Your Honor.

[00:24:51] Speaker 01:
The Supreme Court in Garrison said, no, or have reason to know.

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And so have reason to know, I think, is an objective inquiry.

[00:24:59] Speaker 04:
So then how can it matter that officers Ray and Migliara were involved the whole way through?

[00:25:12] Speaker 04:
Because don't we look at them as they're executing the warrant as if any officer in that position or no?

[00:25:19] Speaker 04:
We look at any officer in the position with the knowledge that they had.

[00:25:24] Speaker 01:
I don't know the answer to that, Your Honor.

[00:25:25] Speaker 01:
If it's a collective knowledge, I don't think it matters here.

[00:25:28] Speaker 01:
Yeah.

[00:25:30] Speaker 01:
Because there was still probable cause to believe that Thorne was using.

[00:25:34] Speaker 04:
So I guess just stepping back, building on Judge Penn's

[00:25:40] Speaker 04:
I mean, cell phones are powerfully packed with information, as the Supreme Court has eloquently pointed out.

[00:25:57] Speaker 04:
You know, so there's, there's a high likelihood that they're full of fruitful information and a situation like, you know, thorn being found with cell phones, but there's also a high likelihood that if there are other people that live in the apartment and somebody's gone to school where

[00:26:13] Speaker 04:
You know, the phones are not allowed.

[00:26:15] Speaker 04:
They've left it at home.

[00:26:17] Speaker 04:
And there's really a high risk where searches of cell phones found in the presence of suspects are cracked of intruding deeply into other people's privacy.

[00:26:32] Speaker 04:
So to protect against that, would a warrant have to say,

[00:26:41] Speaker 04:
you know, a phone as to which there's no indicia that it was someone else's?

[00:26:50] Speaker 01:
No, and I think that is not presented here.

[00:26:57] Speaker 01:
I know.

[00:26:57] Speaker 04:
I'm just thinking about the rule that you ask for may seem sensible in this case.

[00:27:04] Speaker 04:
But, you know, authorizing

[00:27:08] Speaker 04:
based on generic law enforcement inferences, the cracking of phones found in the presence of criminal suspects is a rule with legs.

[00:27:20] Speaker 01:
So whatever the court holds in this case should have no implication on the propriety of issuing the warrant in the first place.

[00:27:29] Speaker 01:
granted that this warrant was properly issued and contained probable cause.

[00:27:34] Speaker 01:
And the question then is armed with the document with those words on it did the officers reasonably execute that warrant under the facts of this case.

[00:27:43] Speaker 01:
So that isn't carte blanche for officers to obtain a warrant for every phone found in a house where a drug dealer lives.

[00:27:52] Speaker 01:
In fact, it has no implication whatsoever to that question because that's there they must still have probable cause to believe

[00:27:59] Speaker 01:
that evidence of the drug dealers crimes would be found on that particular phone under the circumstances where found given the officer's knowledge and none of that's implicated here where we assume that the

[00:28:12] Speaker 01:
warrant was properly issued, the defense was not child set.

[00:28:15] Speaker 01:
And the question is, having been authorized by a magistrate to search this phone and armed with that warrant, were the officers properly proceeding beyond the first page?

[00:28:27] Speaker 01:
And I think a lot of the court's questions go to the Supreme Court's recognition in garrison that executing a warrant is often difficult.

[00:28:36] Speaker 01:
It's not a straightforward issue.

[00:28:38] Speaker 01:
And so the courts said, we allow latitude for honest mistakes made by officers in the difficult process of executing search warrants.

[00:28:46] Speaker 01:
And so the officers did everything right here.

[00:28:49] Speaker 01:
They obtained a warrant for this phone.

[00:28:51] Speaker 01:
They were authorized by a magistrate judge.

[00:28:54] Speaker 01:
And courts tend not, from the cases I've read, to nitpick that execution unless something they come across completely eliminates the probable cause on which the warrant was placed.

[00:29:06] Speaker 01:
there's no further questions.

[00:29:08] Speaker 01:
We'd ask that the judgment be affirmed.

[00:29:10] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:29:10] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:29:17] Speaker 06:
Here's a pick up where Mr Lenders left off.

[00:29:23] Speaker 06:
Uh, said that the agents did everything right here.

[00:29:28] Speaker 06:
Um, and he also said that the courts tend not to nitpick the execution of warrants

[00:29:35] Speaker 06:
except where the new information completely obliterates the probable cause showing.

[00:29:40] Speaker 06:
And I think, Your Honor, if you read the cases that we've cited in our brief, what the cases say is they don't require that the new information completely obliterate the finding of probable cause.

[00:29:55] Speaker 06:
They all speak in terms of the risk.

[00:29:57] Speaker 06:
Every single one of them.

[00:29:58] Speaker 06:
They say that there is a risk that we are searching a place that is erroneously included within the warrant.

[00:30:06] Speaker 06:
That's exactly what Garrison said.

[00:30:08] Speaker 06:
Then you have to stop searching.

[00:30:09] Speaker 06:
And I understand that the executing warrant may be difficult.

[00:30:15] Speaker 06:
But in this case, it really wasn't, because the agents had the phone.

[00:30:20] Speaker 06:
They weren't going to lose the opportunity to search it.

[00:30:22] Speaker 06:
All they needed to do is go back to the magistrate judge and say, look, it's a little bit different than we told you.

[00:30:28] Speaker 06:
We still think there's a cause to search here.

[00:30:32] Speaker 06:
But it's your decision, not ours, because you're the magistrate.

[00:30:36] Speaker 06:
It might have taken him a day to do that.

[00:30:38] Speaker 05:
I mean, I'm not sure what that request would have looked like.

[00:30:42] Speaker 05:
You go back to the magistrate judge and you say, we want to search for him because we had probable cause to believe there's incriminating information about Thorn on this phone, which is associated with him because it was found on a pile of his clothes in his own room.

[00:31:01] Speaker 05:
And if I were the magistrate judge, I would say, I already gave you a warrant to search phones associated with Thorn found in his room on a pile of his clothes.

[00:31:11] Speaker 05:
I don't need to give you another warrant.

[00:31:13] Speaker 06:
Well, if I was a magistrate judge, I would say, well, the fact that this person named James was in the room immediately before is something that I'm interested in knowing about.

[00:31:25] Speaker 06:
Obviously, my assumption was.

[00:31:27] Speaker 05:
Because you were the magistrate judge once you found out that it said, this is James's phone, you wouldn't give the warrant.

[00:31:33] Speaker 05:
I don't know if I would have or not.

[00:31:34] Speaker 05:
Well, then that contradicts with what you just said, I think, because what you said is, you know, look, they weren't in a rush.

[00:31:40] Speaker 05:
They could have just come back to the magistrate judge and got a warrant.

[00:31:43] Speaker 05:
And now you're saying they couldn't have gotten the warrant.

[00:31:44] Speaker 05:
I'm not saying that at all.

[00:31:46] Speaker 05:
Could they have gotten the warrant?

[00:31:47] Speaker 06:
They might have.

[00:31:48] Speaker 06:
The magistrate, it's the decision whether there's probable cause is the decision to be made by the magistrate judge.

[00:31:55] Speaker 05:
With them to make a decision on the ground as non lawyers that you're saying a magistrate judge trained lawyer himself or herself.

[00:32:04] Speaker 05:
My or my not know the right answer to.

[00:32:08] Speaker 06:
I'm not sure I understand the question.

[00:32:10] Speaker 05:
You're saying that the question of whether a magistrate judge should issue a second warrant in this situation is maybe yes, maybe no.

[00:32:19] Speaker 05:
I think that's right.

[00:32:21] Speaker 05:
OK, so that means it's a close call.

[00:32:23] Speaker 06:
Now, I would argue in that case, if I were opposing the warrant, I would argue that there isn't probable cause.

[00:32:29] Speaker 06:
Because look, this phone is left in the apartment, but we have every reason to believe.

[00:32:33] Speaker 05:
My only point is, it sounds like you think it's a close call.

[00:32:36] Speaker 05:
I do think it's a close call.

[00:32:37] Speaker 05:
For a Magister judge.

[00:32:38] Speaker 05:
Yes.

[00:32:39] Speaker 05:
And a police officer isn't even a trained lawyer.

[00:32:46] Speaker 05:
That may be true.

[00:32:48] Speaker 06:
But the point is that the officers here knew that what they told the magistrate judge about why they should be able to search this phone was not right or was not complete.

[00:32:59] Speaker 04:
In a way that appears material to the validity or the applicability here of the warrant.

[00:33:06] Speaker 04:
Yes.

[00:33:07] Speaker 04:
So you, I mean, isn't your position that if you were the magistrate judge and you knew it was James's iPhone, you would deny it?

[00:33:14] Speaker 04:
I would.

[00:33:15] Speaker 04:
I would.

[00:33:15] Speaker 04:
But your point is not

[00:33:17] Speaker 04:
that we would have to so hold, but that the importance is, given that there are magistrate judges out there who might view this case the way you do, that underscores the value of the neutral magistrate requirement.

[00:33:31] Speaker 06:
That's exactly correct.

[00:33:36] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:33:37] Speaker 04:
Mr. Anzina, you were appointed by the court to represent the appellant in this case, and the court thanks you for your very helpful.

[00:33:46] Speaker 06:
Thank you, Your Honor.