[00:00:00] Speaker 02:
14176 LG display company Thank you your honor and may it please the court.

[00:00:12] Speaker 05:
Defendants obtained a U.S.

[00:00:14] Speaker 05:
patent for an electoral property stolen from LG and went on to collect licensed thieves and after their theft was

[00:00:21] Speaker 05:
discovered they engaged in several rounds of appearing to reach a settlement and appearing to be willing to execute that settlement but backing out.

[00:00:29] Speaker 05:
And defendants finally were forced to turn over that IP and disclaim ownership, but they retained their gains from the wrongful conduct.

[00:00:37] Speaker 05:
And that's the question that remains in the case.

[00:00:39] Speaker 05:
And there are two issues, whether LG's claims against the company and Mr. Heroda are barred by the statute of limitations, and whether Mr. Tanaka, who stole the IP when he was an LG employee,

[00:00:50] Speaker 05:
and then masterminded the patent applications using essentially a straw man is subject to personal jurisdiction so he can answer for that wrongful conduct why could you have not proceeded while the Korean litigation was pending well we could have proceeded your honor I think the question the question is I think the district court assumed and I think the facts make it appropriate to assume that there was inequitable conduct here in terms of

[00:01:17] Speaker 05:
back and forth over whether the settlement would be executed.

[00:01:20] Speaker 05:
And so the question then is, when would a reasonable person institute a claim again?

[00:01:27] Speaker 00:
I don't understand.

[00:01:28] Speaker 00:
When you say when the settlement would be executed, you don't mean executed in terms of signed and memorialized.

[00:01:35] Speaker 00:
Consummated, I'm sorry.

[00:01:36] Speaker 00:
You mean executed in terms of why aren't you giving up the darn patents that you promised to give us, right?

[00:01:41] Speaker 00:
Exactly, Your Honor.

[00:01:43] Speaker 00:
One thing you knew from the very outset was Mr. Heroda said he wasn't giving you the $5 million from Hitachi.

[00:01:51] Speaker 00:
In fact, the fact he said, I'll accept your settlement terms, but I'm not giving you the $5 million.

[00:01:56] Speaker 00:
That's my interpretation.

[00:01:58] Speaker 00:
since Japanese.

[00:01:59] Speaker 00:
But no, he was very clear, unequivocally clear on that fact.

[00:02:05] Speaker 00:
And there was some back and forth that went on for almost a year between you all, where you didn't seem particularly excited about giving away that $5 million, understandably.

[00:02:13] Speaker 00:
But then when you came back and said to Mr. Rota, we received your signed settlement agreement on April 3rd, we accept your proposal for the existing contract between you and Hitachi before the settlement agreement.

[00:02:26] Speaker 00:
So his proposal was you're not getting the five million.

[00:02:29] Speaker 00:
You came along less than a year later and said in 2009, okay, we accept the fact that as part of the settlement, you're not giving us the five million.

[00:02:38] Speaker 00:
So why do anything

[00:02:40] Speaker 00:
that he did with regard to not transferring the patents in a timely fashion, lull you into believing he was, in fact, going to give you the $5 million so you didn't pursue it.

[00:02:49] Speaker 05:
Well, Your Honor, I think the way we interpret the settlement agreement, at least, and certainly my friends haven't said anything contrary, the settlement agreement just doesn't address, there wasn't a meeting of the minds on the $5 million one way or the other.

[00:03:02] Speaker 00:
You're fast.

[00:03:03] Speaker 00:
We received your signed settlement agreement on April 3rd.

[00:03:06] Speaker 00:
We accept your proposal for the existing contract between you and Hitachi

[00:03:10] Speaker 00:
before the settlement agreement.

[00:03:13] Speaker 00:
His proposal was unambiguous.

[00:03:14] Speaker 00:
I need to read that too.

[00:03:15] Speaker 00:
His proposal was, I'm not giving you the $5 million.

[00:03:18] Speaker 00:
The Hitachi contract is exempt from the settlement.

[00:03:22] Speaker 00:
What is ambiguous about that?

[00:03:23] Speaker 05:
Well, Your Honor, I think that the course of dealing back and forth about the $5 million that led to that ultimate acceptance in September of the April offer did say that

[00:03:36] Speaker 05:
focused on the offer and the transfer.

[00:03:38] Speaker 05:
And certainly, defendants have never said in this litigation that their view is that the agreement precludes the claims because they're still taking the position that there's no agreement.

[00:03:48] Speaker 00:
Is it your view that the settlement agreement itself entitles you to the $5 million?

[00:03:55] Speaker 05:
No.

[00:03:55] Speaker 05:
Our view is the settlement agreement doesn't address the question one way or the other.

[00:03:58] Speaker 05:
The meeting of the minds was for the transfer of the patents.

[00:04:02] Speaker 05:
And that was all that was agreed to.

[00:04:04] Speaker 05:
And everything else was not agreed to.

[00:04:06] Speaker 00:
and i'm not reading that then why would transfer of the patent have lulled you into believing that he was going to hand you over the five million dollars and why would that create an excuse for you waiting years and years and years to pursue the claim for the five million dollars.

[00:04:22] Speaker 05:
I don't think it lulled us into believing things one way or the other.

[00:04:24] Speaker 05:
I think LG's view was and the reason it was willing to accept the agreement ultimately that left the question of the five million unresolved was if indeed this

[00:04:34] Speaker 05:
Settlement was going to be quickly consummated.

[00:04:36] Speaker 05:
Worrying about the $5 million was beside the point.

[00:04:39] Speaker 05:
What LG wanted was to get its stolen property back and to get the patents.

[00:04:42] Speaker 05:
And so what happened was LG believed that it had consummated a deal that didn't resolve the $5 million.

[00:04:50] Speaker 05:
It was willing to put the $5 million aside at that point because it was going to immediately get the patents.

[00:04:54] Speaker 05:
It didn't.

[00:04:55] Speaker 00:
What does the fact that it didn't immediately get the patent have to do with creating an impression or an ability of them not to pursue the $5 million for so many years?

[00:05:03] Speaker 05:
Well, because part of LG's thinking about the 5 million claim was, it was willing to forego that claim.

[00:05:11] Speaker 04:
That all sounds like strategic thinking on your part, not lolling on their part.

[00:05:17] Speaker 04:
It sounds like intentional choices.

[00:05:19] Speaker 04:
I mean, in your own words, you're saying they decided to forego it.

[00:05:22] Speaker 04:
Well, if you decided to forego it, that's not lolling, that's your intentional choice.

[00:05:26] Speaker 04:
Why couldn't, at the very latest, it seems like you knew when you filed claims in Korea in 2006,

[00:05:33] Speaker 04:
that they weren't complying with the settlement agreement the way you thought they were, and that you at least filed some tort claims there, why couldn't you have filed suit in the district court in 2006?

[00:05:42] Speaker 05:
Well, we certainly could have, Your Honor, and I think the question as we view the case is, what's the reasonable period to, what would equity allow in terms of a period of time to not have the statute of limitations run?

[00:05:58] Speaker 04:
Submission is what don't you know?

[00:06:00] Speaker 04:
I mean isn't it typical that it?

[00:06:03] Speaker 04:
It accrues when you know there's some kind of dispute Well, I think that in 2006 That there was a dispute about the terms of the settlement agreement and you also went forward and filed some court claims in Korea So you must have had some idea in 2006 that you wanted to pursue those kinds of claims and

[00:06:20] Speaker 05:
We did, Your Honor.

[00:06:22] Speaker 05:
And our submission is that the question here is equity.

[00:06:26] Speaker 05:
It's obviously a flexible remedy in terms of how long the period can last and what the statute is suspended.

[00:06:33] Speaker 05:
And the running of the statute is suspended.

[00:06:34] Speaker 05:
And our submission is that really what happened here was that the inequitable conduct forced us to go to Korea and embark on that adventure to get a seven-year process of getting the contract

[00:06:49] Speaker 05:
upheld and that that is the appropriate period of time.

[00:06:53] Speaker 05:
There's obviously in the case law, there's nothing one way or another.

[00:06:56] Speaker 05:
Most of the cases deal with whether or not there was something done at all.

[00:07:03] Speaker 05:
Our submission is that as a result of the inequitable conduct, defendants should not be able to force us to basically litigate the same issue at the same time in two different places.

[00:07:13] Speaker 05:
That fairness and reasonableness would allow us to finish in Korea

[00:07:16] Speaker 05:
and then comes to the United States.

[00:07:18] Speaker 00:
Your point was that in Korea you were trying to get the transfer of the patents.

[00:07:22] Speaker 00:
It's not the same issue at the same time.

[00:07:24] Speaker 00:
What you're trying to see here and asking the loan doctor to extend a statute of limitation for is the five million.

[00:07:30] Speaker 00:
But as you said to Judge Hughes, you put that aside.

[00:07:35] Speaker 05:
Well, they're not exactly the same thing, but they're related things.

[00:07:39] Speaker 05:
Certainly, it would be highly relevant to the US misappropriation claim

[00:07:43] Speaker 05:
that the patents were transferred for no consideration.

[00:07:46] Speaker 05:
And having that happen would have given us quite a leg up in asserting our misappropriations plan.

[00:07:55] Speaker 05:
Maybe we should turn to the personal jurisdiction argument.

[00:07:59] Speaker 05:
The district court's finding of no personal jurisdiction was based on an affidavit by Mr. Tanaka that contained at least three material false statements regarding his role in these proceedings.

[00:08:11] Speaker 05:
Some of this is confidential, but it's discussed in detail on page 30 of our opening brief and pages 25 to 27 of our reply brief.

[00:08:20] Speaker 05:
Based on public information, I can say that he sold the technology and used Heroda as a front to apply for the patents.

[00:08:27] Speaker 05:
He denied having any role in giving the technology.

[00:08:31] Speaker 05:
He drafted the U.S.

[00:08:32] Speaker 05:
patent application and he benefited financially.

[00:08:36] Speaker 05:
affidavits to the contrary.

[00:08:39] Speaker 00:
There's no doubt that it appears that he made some misrepresentation to the district court in the course of their assessment of personal jurisdiction.

[00:08:48] Speaker 00:
But does that mean it warrants reversal in light of the fact that 293 only allows food against the patentee?

[00:08:56] Speaker 00:
And he's not the patentee.

[00:08:57] Speaker 00:
He never has been.

[00:08:59] Speaker 00:
In fact, it took great efforts to try to hide his involvement as you eloquently pointed out in many of your pleadings below.

[00:09:05] Speaker 00:
So he isn't the patentee.

[00:09:07] Speaker 00:
So if 293 doesn't allow it to reach him, what does it matter?

[00:09:10] Speaker 00:
I mean, of course it matters.

[00:09:11] Speaker 00:
If you lie to a tribunal, they'll do it to me.

[00:09:13] Speaker 00:
But what does it matter in terms of the outcome in this case?

[00:09:18] Speaker 05:
Well, I think obviously, just to back up, obviously the district court's decision was not based on 293 at all.

[00:09:25] Speaker 05:
It was based on the misapprehension that he had raised the statute of limitations defense, which he hadn't.

[00:09:33] Speaker 05:
But the district court's reason for not looking at our motion to reconsideration

[00:09:39] Speaker 05:
doesn't work based on the fact that he did not raise the statute of limitations.

[00:09:43] Speaker 05:
But so we're getting... The district court says if I got to it, I would be skeptical because he's not the patentee under 293.

[00:09:52] Speaker 05:
And I think our submission under 293 is, certainly if there were two corporations involved here, and they were alter egos, if the corporate veil could be pierced, I think there would be a very strong argument

[00:10:04] Speaker 05:
that 293 would reach the non-named patentee corporation that is in control and that was essentially under the law the same entity as the corporation that was the named patentee.

[00:10:17] Speaker 05:
I think there would be a strong argument of that and I think there would be a great reason to want to interpret 293 to do that as other statutes that confer

[00:10:26] Speaker 05:
long-arm jurisdiction are generally interpreted in terms of merging entities where there is an alter ego relationship because otherwise you obviously the really bad guys are not subject to jurisdiction so I think the question here in the argument we've made is that similar kind of argument that alter ego they're really one in the same should apply when an individual uses a frontman essentially as the named patentee but that person is literally the patentee in name only but the entire control of the process and everything else

[00:10:56] Speaker 05:
is being done by someone else.

[00:10:57] Speaker 05:
If the rule would be when there's a corporation that's an alter ego, we would merge them.

[00:11:02] Speaker 05:
We think the law allows for a similar rule when people use individuals, rather than a shell corporation, as their frontman.

[00:11:10] Speaker 00:
But while the district court may be annoyed by Mr. Tanaka's representations, the ones we won't talk about because some of them are confidential and I can't keep them in my head straight, what is and isn't, so I'll just avoid all of them.

[00:11:25] Speaker 00:
There's also the driving force of this case goes away entirely if Mr. Tanaka is allowed to

[00:11:31] Speaker 00:
amend his pleading and add the section of limitations to that.

[00:11:34] Speaker 00:
Because there's nothing that even vaguely is alleged to distinguish his set of circumstances from the others.

[00:11:41] Speaker 00:
And assuming you don't prevail on the section of limitations to that, why would the district court go through this exercise?

[00:11:48] Speaker 00:
Do you really think it's necessary to send it back to her or him?

[00:11:53] Speaker 00:
I don't know who it is.

[00:11:53] Speaker 00:
Didn't pay attention.

[00:11:54] Speaker 00:
But do you think it's really necessary to send it back to them and go through the exercise of deciding whether to allow Mr. Tanaka to amend?

[00:12:00] Speaker 05:
I think so, Your Honor, because I think, first of all, he has asked for leave to amend.

[00:12:04] Speaker 05:
And I think a highly relevant question on whether the district judge would grant leave to amend is the misrepresentation in the very affidavit that led to the personal jurisdiction decision.

[00:12:14] Speaker 05:
And certainly there are, the district court has wide discretion with respect to sanctions.

[00:12:18] Speaker 05:
uh... for misconduct and here we have with respect to pleading before the district court we think an extremely strong case for uh... material faulted and we think probably intentionally false statement that were the basis of the ruling that doesn't mean that he's going to say that he can't amend it for purposes of statute of limitations where he's already really decided the statute of limitations questions with respect to the other case if the district court has the your honor

[00:12:48] Speaker 05:
respectfully, I think the district court has wide discretion in terms of picking a sanction.

[00:12:52] Speaker 05:
I mean, at the outset, the same law firm prepared two answers.

[00:12:56] Speaker 05:
It included a statute of limitations defense for two defendants.

[00:12:59] Speaker 05:
It didn't for one.

[00:13:00] Speaker 05:
We don't know why.

[00:13:01] Speaker 05:
Maybe it was a mistake.

[00:13:02] Speaker 05:
But certainly, as the case now stands, the district judge

[00:13:07] Speaker 05:
Having seen some quite significant misconduct, my Mr. Tanakis could say, and I think would be well within his authority under the rules to say, as a sanction for your misconduct and basically lying to me in your personal jurisdiction motion, I'm not going to allow you to defend.

[00:13:24] Speaker 05:
It's in my discretion, and I'm not going to do it.

[00:13:26] Speaker 04:
I think it would be within proper discretion to preclude a mandate to allow an appropriate legal defense because he made misrepresentations on an entirely different legal defense.

[00:13:36] Speaker 05:
I think there were all kinds of clues, certainly for discovery sanctions.

[00:13:41] Speaker 05:
District judges all the time enter orders.

[00:13:43] Speaker 04:
excluding parties from raising... Those are usually related to the issues or claims that they're based on, but this is an entirely different defense than the personal jurisdiction defense.

[00:13:57] Speaker 05:
In my experience, Your Honor, they're not always related to the underlying claims.

[00:14:01] Speaker 05:
Sometimes they're quite broad, and sometimes they have the effect of precluding the entire defense or the entire claim, depending on which side

[00:14:10] Speaker 05:
you're on, I think the district court has wide discretion here.

[00:14:12] Speaker 05:
And Mr. Tanaka, frankly, it's hard to think of what the other sanction would be.

[00:14:17] Speaker 05:
Mr. Tanaka is not here.

[00:14:18] Speaker 05:
If he's no longer before the case, because the case is going to be dismissed, it's not clear that the district court would have something.

[00:14:26] Speaker 05:
It certainly seems to me it would be well within his discretion.

[00:14:31] Speaker 05:
And this is a case where he should be entitled to exercise that discretion, given the fact that there was this

[00:14:37] Speaker 05:
uh... knowing misrepresentation on the very personal jurisdiction issue okay we're getting close to using up all your time.

[00:14:44] Speaker 01:
We still have two minutes of re-battling.

[00:14:47] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:14:56] Speaker 03:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:14:57] Speaker 03:
May it please the Court, my name is Andrew George.

[00:14:59] Speaker 03:
I represent the appellees of Ayashi Sekun, Naoto Hirota, and Sake Tanaka.

[00:15:04] Speaker 03:
There's just a couple of items from the record that I'd like to correct

[00:15:07] Speaker 03:
at the outset.

[00:15:09] Speaker 03:
First of all, it was alleged by LG Display just now that we didn't say anything, excuse me, we didn't say that the agreement between the parties with regard to Hitachi precludes them raising the Hitachi claim now.

[00:15:22] Speaker 03:
We've said that several times.

[00:15:23] Speaker 03:
We said it to the district court in our motion for summary judgment and our reply brief, and we said it to this court in our forum nonconvenience section of our brief.

[00:15:31] Speaker 03:
So that is in the record.

[00:15:33] Speaker 03:
Also, LG Display just claimed that the very affidavit that led to

[00:15:38] Speaker 03:
the district court's personal jurisdiction decision was Mr. Tanaka's affidavit.

[00:15:43] Speaker 03:
The district court didn't cite Mr. Tanaka's affidavit at all in ruling on personal jurisdiction.

[00:15:47] Speaker 03:
It certainly didn't rely on anything Mr. Tanaka had said.

[00:15:50] Speaker 03:
And I would respectfully disagree with it seems to be taken as a given that Mr. Tanaka made all of these misrepresentations.

[00:15:58] Speaker 03:
There's only one party in this case that's actually been found to ever make a misrepresentation to the district court and it was LG Display

[00:16:05] Speaker 03:
in footnote six of the district court's opinion, where it made an allegation regarding claims against Apple that was unsupported by the record.

[00:16:12] Speaker 03:
That is actually in the record.

[00:16:15] Speaker 03:
Beyond that, LG Display is still continuing to make a misrepresentation about the state status of the party's settlement agreement, claiming that it was lulled into dropping its tort claims by a settlement agreement that it told the district court at the time didn't yet exist.

[00:16:33] Speaker 03:
So that's just not possible, your honor.

[00:16:35] Speaker 03:
The one other thing I would mention is that there were no tort claims in LG Display's first US lawsuit.

[00:16:42] Speaker 03:
So the idea that LG Display was lulled into dropping claims

[00:16:45] Speaker 03:
when it dropped its U.S.

[00:16:46] Speaker 03:
lawsuit is not possible.

[00:16:48] Speaker 03:
There were no claims to begin with.

[00:16:49] Speaker 00:
Is Mr. Pinkus right that the district court footnote articulation of, well, the same statute of limitations defense would apply to Tanaka, is incorrect when Tanaka did not, in his answer, include a statute of limitations defense?

[00:17:07] Speaker 03:
It's true that Mr. Tanaka did not include a statute of limitations defense.

[00:17:12] Speaker 03:
I don't know whether or not the district court was taking into account that fact when it made that determination.

[00:17:17] Speaker 03:
This was a motion for reconsideration, your honor, and motions for reconsideration give a district court a pretty wide berth in terms of how it's going to handle them.

[00:17:26] Speaker 03:
We've set forth what we believe is a ground for upholding what the district court found under prudential mootness, which is to say that what LG Display was asking for

[00:17:36] Speaker 03:
was pointless because ultimately at the end of the day at the court record at the court uh... noted in question before mr canada could have simply amended his here that's right he had permission from the court

[00:17:55] Speaker 00:
is evidence in this record regarding the district court's knowledge that it wasn't in the pleading, or predilection with regard to whether he would exercise his discretion to allow such an amendment.

[00:18:06] Speaker 00:
And so that's my problem.

[00:18:09] Speaker 00:
Sure.

[00:18:09] Speaker 00:
Aren't I jumping ahead of the district court if I were to affirm that?

[00:18:15] Speaker 03:
I understand the point.

[00:18:16] Speaker 03:
And if that's not something that convinces this court, then it should turn to the harmless error question.

[00:18:21] Speaker 03:
in terms of the question of whether or not it would have made any difference if the district court hadn't assumed, as that position would assume, that Mr. Tanaka had actually alleged a defense of statute of limitations.

[00:18:35] Speaker 03:
And on the harmless error question, this would have been pretty easy.

[00:18:39] Speaker 03:
LG display filed for briefs with the district court.

[00:18:42] Speaker 00:
I'm sorry.

[00:18:42] Speaker 00:
I don't think I understand your harmless error to be on point.

[00:18:45] Speaker 00:
OK.

[00:18:46] Speaker 00:
I don't even understand what you're saying, because I'm saying, suppose the district court

[00:18:50] Speaker 00:
didn't reach the issue of whether or not it would exercise its discretion to allow a motion to amend.

[00:19:00] Speaker 00:
And suppose that when it does reach it, it says, no.

[00:19:03] Speaker 00:
You people have dragged me through the mud on this.

[00:19:05] Speaker 00:
You've lied, and I'm not going to allow it.

[00:19:07] Speaker 00:
I'm not saying that's what happened.

[00:19:09] Speaker 00:
I'm saying suppose the district court reaches that conclusion.

[00:19:11] Speaker 00:
I'm not going to let you amend at this point.

[00:19:14] Speaker 00:
Well, then Mr. Tanaka is entirely without the statute of limitations defense.

[00:19:18] Speaker 00:
So I don't see how it can be harmless error, because that's the only basis on which this case regarding the $5 million was resolved.

[00:19:24] Speaker 03:
The reason it can be harmless error, Your Honor, is because before the district court even gets to that place, it first has to bring Mr. Tanaka back into the case.

[00:19:32] Speaker 03:
He had been dismissed from the case long before summary judgment even came up.

[00:19:37] Speaker 03:
He was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and LG Display raised what is honestly a frivolous argument for bringing him back into the case, claiming that he is a patentee of the Pattinson suit.

[00:19:47] Speaker 03:
conspiracy and agency allegations here in this court, but they never raised them below.

[00:19:52] Speaker 03:
They actually affirmatively forfeited agency below.

[00:19:55] Speaker 03:
But on the patentee issue, LG Display argued without acknowledging that there's a statutory definition of the term patentee.

[00:20:05] Speaker 03:
And it means that you're the legal title holder of the patents.

[00:20:08] Speaker 03:
Now they're also in their reply brief in this court, the first time they acknowledged that definition exists, they are now raising an all-substantial rights argument.

[00:20:17] Speaker 03:
and arguing that Mr. Tanaka had legal had all substantial rights to the patents in suit.

[00:20:21] Speaker 03:
I'm sure this court is very familiar with the term all substantial rights.

[00:20:24] Speaker 00:
office that's right also has a legal definition and it's actually in every case but i don't agree with you on that what conspiracy it was raised below on the people on discussion about that why why can't he be brought in and under the document respondent theory or the conspiracy idea it was that part was raised below and there are regional circuit cases that allow for the extension of personal jurisdiction

[00:20:53] Speaker 00:
to the mastermind behind that.

[00:20:56] Speaker 03:
So it's a little bit complicated, but let me be clear.

[00:20:58] Speaker 03:
It actually wasn't raised below.

[00:21:00] Speaker 03:
What happened was when we moved to dismiss Tanaka at the very beginning of this case, at that point, LG Display opposed the motion and raised the conspiracy allegation.

[00:21:09] Speaker 03:
And the district court rejected that.

[00:21:12] Speaker 03:
Then LG Display attempted to bring Mr. Tanaka back into the case

[00:21:15] Speaker 03:
And it didn't raise conspiracy at that point.

[00:21:18] Speaker 03:
And that's the motion that is the subject of this appeal, not the original dismissal of Mr. Tanaka.

[00:21:24] Speaker 03:
What it's arguing is that it has new facts that give rise to jurisdiction.

[00:21:28] Speaker 03:
It argued to the district court that those new facts give rise to patentee jurisdiction.

[00:21:33] Speaker 03:
It didn't argue conspiracy.

[00:21:35] Speaker 03:
And it affirmatively didn't argue agency.

[00:21:38] Speaker 03:
But even so, there would still be the question of, well, where did it plead conspiracy?

[00:21:45] Speaker 03:
didn't lead it in any of it in either its original complaint or in its proposed amended complaint it made no effort to raise this issue uh... with regard to these new alleged facts about mister snarka until it came to this court and that's just not appropriate your honor it's not right to ask the district court to overturn its root excuse me to ask this court to overturn the district court on an argument that was never made to the district court

[00:22:11] Speaker 03:
So if there aren't any other questions about Mr. Tanaka, the last point I'll make is that everything in this case, including the choice of law clause, is Asian.

[00:22:24] Speaker 03:
There's a choice of law clause that's binding in this case, that's in the settlement agreement that this whole case revolves around.

[00:22:29] Speaker 03:
And LG Display enforced that settlement agreement in Korea

[00:22:33] Speaker 03:
came here and enforced it here too.

[00:22:35] Speaker 03:
And as the court noted, the settlement agreement called for the Hitachi license to remain with appellees.

[00:22:41] Speaker 03:
Now LG Display is trying to get that too, having enforced the settlement agreement.

[00:22:45] Speaker 03:
If it's going to go back on what it enforced, then it should have to do it in the court where it enforced it, not here.

[00:22:51] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:22:58] Speaker 05:
Just a few quick points.

[00:23:00] Speaker 05:
I think my friend's argument that the district court didn't cite the affidavit is quite remarkable.

[00:23:04] Speaker 05:
The affidavit was obviously introduced as part of the motion.

[00:23:08] Speaker 05:
If the affidavit had been truthful and revealed Mr. Tanaka's involvement, we would have immediately had an opportunity to seek the discovery

[00:23:15] Speaker 05:
on these issues and to raise the issues that we're raising now.

[00:23:18] Speaker 05:
So obviously, Mr. Kanaka's false statements were critical here.

[00:23:22] Speaker 05:
Second of all, that no one has found these statements to be misrepresentations.

[00:23:26] Speaker 05:
The two decisions of the Tokyo courts that we've submitted in the record have found all of these relevant facts that basically that Mr. Hiroto was a straw person and this was technology stolen from LG.

[00:23:40] Speaker 05:
With respect to the question of whether we raise these arguments below, I would refer to the court to 8, 10, 20 to 21, which is the motion for reconsideration, which talks about these very arguments about alter ego, veil-piercing, and applies them in this context, and refers to conspiracy and agency as all getting at the same thing, which is when you have individuals who are in the same position as companies that are alter egos, they should be treated as one and the same.

[00:24:11] Speaker 05:
Finally, I just want to give the court to have any questions.

[00:24:14] Speaker 05:
We raised this question of the sealing of the notice of interest to parties, which the motions panel referred to this court, and I don't know if the court has any questions about that question.

[00:24:26] Speaker 02:
Thank you.