[00:00:01] Speaker 03: We have four argued cases this morning and we'll take a recess after the first three because we have to reconstitute the panel and that should take five to ten minutes. [00:00:15] Speaker 03: So our first case is number 161176, Rickson Solutions versus Jupiter Networks, Mr. Summerfield. [00:00:24] Speaker 04: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:00:24] Speaker 04: May it please the Court? [00:00:28] Speaker 04: The focus of my argument today is going to be whether, in this particular instance, the hypothetical person of ordinary skill is the right paradigm for really evaluating the question of obviousness. [00:00:40] Speaker 04: And what we typically do when we look at obviousness is we retain an expert and we say, pretend that you're a person of ordinary skill, which you're not. [00:00:48] Speaker 04: Pretend that you know all the prior art, which you don't. [00:00:51] Speaker 04: Pretend that you've traveled back in time to the time of invention, which you haven't. [00:00:55] Speaker 04: Pretend that you haven't read the claims, which you have. [00:00:58] Speaker 04: Oh, and most importantly, pretend that you're not being paid hundreds of dollars to render an opinion in this case and all you're trying to do is really solve a problem. [00:01:07] Speaker 04: That's what we typically use. [00:01:09] Speaker 04: It's the best system we have unless you have a case like this one where you have not one but four prior art references where all the components of the claimed invention were there in different parts of the references and the authors of those references didn't think to combine them. [00:01:26] Speaker 04: What you have in that circumstance... You can't have obviousness without anticipation? [00:01:31] Speaker 04: You can, Your Honor, yes. [00:01:32] Speaker 04: But the point is, if all the pieces of the puzzle are in the box, and the people had those pieces in front of them and still didn't build the puzzle, then that's pretty clear direct evidence that the invention was not obvious. [00:01:46] Speaker 04: If piece A is here and piece B is there... That's true in every obviousness case, isn't it? [00:01:51] Speaker 04: Not when they're in the same reference, Your Honor. [00:01:54] Speaker 04: When you pick and choose from different references, of course, we take one from column A, one from column B, and one from column C, we come up with a claimed invention. [00:02:01] Speaker 04: But where the components of the claimed inventions are themselves in a single reference, four times over, and the authors of those references didn't think to combine them, that's a direct evidence that the invention was a copy. [00:02:16] Speaker 01: Even if we concede that the passage of time is relevant, the passage of time without action, [00:02:22] Speaker 01: is relevant to the question of motivation to combine. [00:02:25] Speaker 01: That's only one factor. [00:02:26] Speaker 01: I mean, we have said that passage of time is a factor when you also have, for instance, something like Longfellow Need. [00:02:34] Speaker 01: You didn't present any evidence of Longfellow Need. [00:02:37] Speaker 04: No, Judge, and I don't think we have to in this case. [00:02:40] Speaker 04: The point is, it's not a question of passage of time. [00:02:43] Speaker 04: It's the point that, for example, let's take the specifics of the references that we're talking about here. [00:02:48] Speaker 04: We have the Hofmeister reference. [00:02:50] Speaker 04: And in paragraph 405, which appears at page A1070, the author discussed call admission control or CAC algorithm, and that prioritizes traffic in a communication network to address overbooking. [00:03:04] Speaker 04: Hofmeister then applied the CAC to categorizing setup and holding priorities in normal operations. [00:03:11] Speaker 04: And even Juniper admits that Hofmeister didn't apply that algorithm to network failure. [00:03:18] Speaker 04: which would be required by the claims. [00:03:20] Speaker 02: There are some areas in obviousness law that kind of address what you're going to, I think. [00:03:26] Speaker 02: I just think you don't need them here. [00:03:28] Speaker 02: For example, teaching away. [00:03:30] Speaker 02: Do any of these references teach away? [00:03:32] Speaker 02: Have you argued that any of them teach away? [00:03:34] Speaker 02: That would be a possibility. [00:03:35] Speaker 02: Or as Judge O'Malley referenced, secondary considerations of non-obviousness. [00:03:42] Speaker 02: It might be a long period of time between when the priority issue, [00:03:47] Speaker 02: And when the invention came, combining the different pieces of the very same prior art reference. [00:03:54] Speaker 02: But you don't have a long passage of time here, I don't think. [00:03:57] Speaker 04: No, we don't. [00:03:58] Speaker 04: But the point is, those are the kinds of things that would go into what I would characterize as circumstantial evidence of obviousness or non-obviousness. [00:04:07] Speaker 04: Is there a long-felt need? [00:04:08] Speaker 04: Were there failures by others? [00:04:11] Speaker 04: Was there a long passage of time? [00:04:13] Speaker 04: essentially going again to the hypothetical person paradigm. [00:04:18] Speaker 04: What were people thinking back then? [00:04:19] Speaker 04: Let's try to imagine that. [00:04:21] Speaker 04: Here, though, we know what people were thinking. [00:04:22] Speaker 04: We know what these authors did. [00:04:25] Speaker 01: So the mere fact that you're saying that your empirical data should control in all cases, so the mere fact that there are references out there that haven't taken the combination or haven't taken the next step, is the end of the inquiry? [00:04:40] Speaker 04: No, Judge, that's not what we're saying at all. [00:04:42] Speaker 04: We're saying that unlike normal situations where you have element A from reference 1 and element B from reference 2, and neither author thought to combine them, here we have an author that says, here's A, here's B, but I don't combine them. [00:04:57] Speaker 04: And this happens four separate times here. [00:05:00] Speaker 04: As I mentioned, Hofmeister talks about assigning priorities to pseudowires, but he doesn't think to do that in the context of network failure. [00:05:10] Speaker 03: There is a mention to network failure in Hofmeister, isn't there? [00:05:14] Speaker 04: There is. [00:05:15] Speaker 04: 270 paragraphs earlier with regard to an MPLS scheme, having nothing to do with pseudo wires or prioritization. [00:05:22] Speaker 04: An MPLS, as Juniper's own expert witness has said, when you have a failure in an MPLS scheme, you just switch traffic from a working path to a standby path. [00:05:32] Speaker 04: There's no prioritization there. [00:05:34] Speaker 04: It's automatic. [00:05:35] Speaker 04: There's no determination made as far as priorities are concerned. [00:05:39] Speaker 04: Hoffmeister says on the one hand, prioritize pseudo-wires. [00:05:43] Speaker 04: On the other hand, he says, network failure, use MPLS. [00:05:46] Speaker 04: So he does have the prioritization element here. [00:05:49] Speaker 04: He has the network failure element there in the same reference and doesn't combine them. [00:05:54] Speaker 04: That is empirical evidence of non-obviousness. [00:05:57] Speaker 04: And it is unlike a situation where you have to take element A, the network failure element from one reference, and combine it with a prioritization element from another reference. [00:06:06] Speaker 01: But, well, I mean, isn't there a difference between saying, [00:06:09] Speaker 01: Okay, your inventor was the first one clever enough to put these two things together and saying that no one else would have thought it was obvious to put them together. [00:06:21] Speaker 04: Again, Judge, if we're looking at actual evidence of what people did, not just what we thought they might do, we know what people did. [00:06:30] Speaker 04: We know what Hofmeister did. [00:06:32] Speaker 04: We know he had both elements in front of him. [00:06:34] Speaker 04: So Hofmeister's failure to combine them shows that it was not [00:06:38] Speaker 04: certainly to Hofmeister, and what we have from the panel is the determination that the level of ordinary skill is evident from the references cited themselves. [00:06:47] Speaker 04: So they said, all you have to do to find out what the level of ordinary skill is, is go read these references. [00:06:52] Speaker 04: Okay, Hofmeister is a person of ordinary skill. [00:06:55] Speaker 04: Didn't think to combine them, but it doesn't stop there. [00:06:57] Speaker 03: What case suggests that the failure of someone [00:07:01] Speaker 03: to make that combination that you say Hofmeister didn't make is relevant to the question of obvious. [00:07:07] Speaker 04: None, Judge. [00:07:08] Speaker 04: And I think that is the point of the argument today. [00:07:12] Speaker 04: We're asking the court to take a fresh look in circumstances like this, which are unusual, admittedly, where you have all the elements of a claim taught disjointedly in a single reference, not just once, but four separate times. [00:07:25] Speaker 02: Do you think your argument is consistent with KSR? [00:07:28] Speaker 04: Yes, we do because in KSR there wasn't this particular fact situation. [00:07:34] Speaker 04: In KSR it was a refinement or a further explanation of the hypothetical person paradigm because there was no other way to look at obviousness. [00:07:43] Speaker 04: If we don't have a situation like this, we are left with a hypothetical person paradigm. [00:07:47] Speaker 04: There is no other way to look at obviousness. [00:07:50] Speaker 04: We have to go back in time and imagine what that person would have done. [00:07:53] Speaker 04: Here we don't have to do that. [00:07:55] Speaker 04: We know what people did. [00:07:58] Speaker 04: Again, it wasn't having to pick and choose from disparate references to come up with the invention. [00:08:02] Speaker 04: They were all in each of these references. [00:08:06] Speaker 04: So here, it isn't a KSR situation because you don't have to worry about circumstantial things like what the person of ordinary skill looked like, what they would have known, what problems they were facing. [00:08:18] Speaker 04: All of those are in the four corners of each of these references. [00:08:22] Speaker 04: And in no reference do the authors actually say, [00:08:26] Speaker 01: I'm going to actually combine A and B. So we're supposed to sort of create a subjective obviousness test? [00:08:33] Speaker 01: Let's look at subjectively what these individual prior references did rather than what objectively someone skilled in the art might see? [00:08:42] Speaker 04: It's not subjective at all, Your Honor. [00:08:44] Speaker 04: We know what they did in the circumstance. [00:08:47] Speaker 04: We don't have to interpret. [00:08:49] Speaker 04: We know what they did. [00:08:50] Speaker 04: In Hofmeister, you have a teaching of prioritizing pseudo wires [00:08:55] Speaker 04: and then 270 paragraphs earlier, you have a completely unrelated teaching of network failure. [00:09:01] Speaker 04: That's not subjective at all. [00:09:02] Speaker 04: That's a fact and it's undisputed. [00:09:04] Speaker 01: My problem is that even if we accept the proposition that it's a relevant fact, I don't understand your argument that it is a controlling fact. [00:09:13] Speaker 04: Because we don't even have to look at the circumstantial evidence that's set forth in KSR. [00:09:18] Speaker 04: We don't have to imagine what some hypothetical person would have done. [00:09:21] Speaker 04: We have actual skilled people. [00:09:24] Speaker 04: as the board acknowledged, people of ordinary skill that had these things in front of them and didn't think to combine them. [00:09:31] Speaker 04: That's the best evidence of non-obviousness that we are going to be able to find. [00:09:36] Speaker 04: Otherwise, again, we are in this pretend universe where we have people opining about what a person that doesn't even exist, knowing far more than they actually do, not having read the claims in suit, coming up with an opinion as to whether something's obvious or not. [00:09:54] Speaker 04: And again, in most circumstances, that's the only test we have, which is why we use it. [00:09:59] Speaker 04: But this in essence is direct objective evidence that people of skill in the art at the time didn't think to combine these things. [00:10:11] Speaker 04: And that's true with Hofmeister. [00:10:13] Speaker 04: It's true with Owens. [00:10:14] Speaker 04: It's true with the RFC 3386 reference, and it's true with Halabi. [00:10:21] Speaker 04: In each of these references, [00:10:23] Speaker 04: Each reference had the prioritization element in one place, pseudo wires or paths for path protection in another place, and network failure taught. [00:10:35] Speaker 04: All four of them. [00:10:36] Speaker 04: And that just isn't disputed here. [00:10:39] Speaker 04: As a matter of fact, the board and Juniper rely on that. [00:10:42] Speaker 04: They consider it an admission by us. [00:10:44] Speaker 04: Well then of course it must be obvious. [00:10:46] Speaker 04: So they don't dispute it at all. [00:10:49] Speaker 04: So again, if these four references [00:10:53] Speaker 04: empirically demonstrate that when presented with the pieces of the puzzle, all of them, that the authors didn't think to make the puzzle, then the puzzle cannot be obvious. [00:11:05] Speaker 01: Again, you don't have a situation where those authors didn't think to make the piece, put the pieces of puzzle together despite the passage of time or a long felt need. [00:11:14] Speaker 04: No, it's, well, the point is if they didn't appreciate the problem, [00:11:20] Speaker 04: in the first place because that may be one reason. [00:11:23] Speaker 04: As a matter of fact, in our brief, we cite to a question that the board asked me, are we supposed to guess as to why this is not obvious? [00:11:31] Speaker 04: And the answer is no, but it really doesn't matter if in fact they didn't think to do it for whatever reason, whether they didn't see the problem in the first place, they didn't think it was a solution to the problem [00:11:44] Speaker 04: in the second place or that it was just a bad idea for whatever reason in the third place. [00:11:49] Speaker 04: Any one of those reasons belies the notion that the invention is obvious. [00:11:52] Speaker 02: So you are advocating for us to look at this particular case differently than all other obviousness cases. [00:11:59] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:11:59] Speaker 02: And what other types of cases would you say that we need to change the law on obviousness and apply a different test? [00:12:08] Speaker 02: Is it just a situation where there's four prior references [00:12:12] Speaker 02: that teach every element of the claim, each and every one of them, and yet doesn't do the combination? [00:12:19] Speaker 02: I'm just curious about the situations where you would apply this new test. [00:12:25] Speaker 03: Your Honor, where there is direct evidence like this of non-obviousness, where you actually have a reference... What about a situation where inventor A is aware of reference B at the time that he files the application [00:12:42] Speaker 03: or personal reference? [00:12:44] Speaker 04: That might very well be another instance. [00:12:45] Speaker 04: In fact, from personal experience, I had that very issue before the board where there was, in fact, an author where it was demonstrated that she had knowledge of another reference and didn't think to combine them. [00:12:58] Speaker 04: And that was our argument there, too. [00:12:59] Speaker 04: However, you don't have to reach that in this case because here, you don't even have to go that far. [00:13:06] Speaker 04: Here, you have the authors themselves not being aware of other references [00:13:11] Speaker 04: but having their own teachings in front of them. [00:13:15] Speaker 04: Again, with respect, there is no better evidence of non-obviousness out there than when you have everything in front of the author of a prior art reference and they don't think to put it together to get the claimed invention. [00:13:27] Speaker 02: You referred earlier to secondary considerations evidence as being circumstantial. [00:13:31] Speaker 02: I don't think that's right. [00:13:34] Speaker 02: Why is it circumstantial? [00:13:37] Speaker 04: again goes to the mindset that we try to get into of the people that were doing this work at the time. [00:13:43] Speaker 04: There isn't any one individual that we are imputing a long felt need to. [00:13:48] Speaker 04: We're just saying generally in the industry there was this recognized need. [00:13:52] Speaker 04: There is no one individual that we can say, yes, this person actually recognized the need but failed to come up with the invention. [00:14:00] Speaker 04: It is still in the hypothetical realm. [00:14:02] Speaker 04: It's circumstantial evidence that [00:14:04] Speaker 04: Someone skilled in the art at that time wouldn't have come up with the invention. [00:14:09] Speaker 04: Here we have the skilled people that didn't come up with the invention despite having the elements in front of them. [00:14:14] Speaker 04: That's what makes this direct versus circumstantial evidence. [00:14:18] Speaker 03: OK, you're into your rebuttal time. [00:14:20] Speaker 03: Do you want to save the rest of it here? [00:14:21] Speaker 03: I do, thank you, Your Honor. [00:14:23] Speaker 03: OK, thank you. [00:14:23] Speaker 03: Miss Carson? [00:14:30] Speaker 00: May it please the court. [00:14:32] Speaker 00: There's no basis for disturbing the board's decision that the challenged claims of the 652 patent are obvious. [00:14:38] Speaker 00: I want to start by correcting a mischaracterization of the record that appellant has just informed the board of. [00:14:46] Speaker 00: So Juniper and the board did not find that all four references disclose every element of the challenged claims. [00:14:54] Speaker 00: Rather, they found that the references collectively disclosed all of those elements. [00:15:00] Speaker 00: So in terms of the factual premise on which appellant rests for this novel new argument of obviousness, it's just not supported by the record. [00:15:08] Speaker 03: Well, is that true of Hofmeister, though? [00:15:12] Speaker 00: So with respect to Hofmeister, the board found that it disclosed each element of the claims, but it disclosed those in the context of setting up a network in terms of admitting paths into the network, as opposed to in the context of network failure. [00:15:26] Speaker 00: And that makes a lot of sense because the Hofmeister reference was directed towards a situation of setting up a new way of implementing pseudowires. [00:15:35] Speaker 00: So the focus of the reference was on setting that up and admitting pseudowires into the network. [00:15:42] Speaker 00: The reference to network failure was merely to note that the particular system would be well suited to take advantage of conventional techniques for protecting networks. [00:15:54] Speaker 00: Protection wasn't a focus of that reference and we admitted that in front of the board and on appeal here. [00:16:01] Speaker 00: So that reference disclosed everything except for the context of network failure. [00:16:05] Speaker 00: Now if we move to RFC 3386, that particular reference was a higher level reference that explained various protection techniques and mechanisms that could be used across a wide variety of types of networks. [00:16:19] Speaker 00: However, it didn't get into the details about how to set up PAS and sort of the signaling requirements, which are the first several elements of the challenged claims at issue today. [00:16:29] Speaker 00: Those were conventional techniques, but they weren't expressly disclosed within the four corners of RFC 3386 because those particular, it was focused more on high-level protection schemes. [00:16:41] Speaker 00: Moving to Owens. [00:16:43] Speaker 00: So Owens is an actual implementation of a protection scheme, but it's in the context of an MPLS network, not a pseudowire network. [00:16:51] Speaker 00: And since the challenge claims require that these things be done in the context of a pseudowire, again, within the four corners of Owens, it's not disclosed. [00:17:00] Speaker 00: However, it's a very analogous system. [00:17:02] Speaker 00: And the 652 patent itself acknowledges that MPLS protection schemes are applicable to pseudowires, but again, not within the four corners. [00:17:11] Speaker 00: Then we move to Halaby. [00:17:12] Speaker 00: The context of Halaby is that it's a textbook that gives a high-level view of sort of what's going on in the state of the art. [00:17:22] Speaker 00: And again, it focuses on high-level protection aspects that apply to all sorts of networks. [00:17:28] Speaker 00: It does provide some applications of those towards the end of the book. [00:17:32] Speaker 00: And those, again, are in the context of MPLS networks as opposed to pseudo-wire networks. [00:17:37] Speaker 00: So in terms of the factual premise of appellant's argument, it's not supported by the record. [00:17:43] Speaker 00: We do agree that as a whole, all of the references disclose each of the elements of the challenge claims. [00:17:49] Speaker 00: But in terms of the particular references, the elements are not disclosed by any one reference. [00:17:59] Speaker 00: So in light of this, [00:18:01] Speaker 01: Well, you're not saying the elements aren't disclosed by any one reference. [00:18:04] Speaker 01: You're saying the elements aren't necessarily disclosed in exactly the same context. [00:18:09] Speaker 01: But there is more than one reference that discloses all the elements. [00:18:14] Speaker 00: That's correct, yes. [00:18:16] Speaker 00: So the references collectively disclose all of the elements, and most of the references in the record disclose almost all of the elements, but they're each missing a little piece. [00:18:26] Speaker 00: And that's the precise situation where we come to obviousness. [00:18:30] Speaker 00: that it would be obvious for one of skill and the art to combine the references. [00:18:34] Speaker 00: And this is the same framework that we apply under the statute and in this court's precedent. [00:18:39] Speaker 00: And what Appellant is asking the court to do here is completely eviscerate that doctrine and come up with an entirely new standard. [00:18:47] Speaker 03: I would guess that in most obviousness situations, probably the inventor of one of those references is aware of other references. [00:18:59] Speaker 03: I don't know how to quantify it, but it would seem to be a fairly common situation, right? [00:19:06] Speaker 00: I think that would be correct in some circumstances. [00:19:09] Speaker 00: There wasn't evidence of that in this particular case, but that may occur often. [00:19:17] Speaker 00: But I don't think that that changes the inquiry. [00:19:19] Speaker 00: The inquiry for obviousness is whether one of skill and the art would be motivated to combine. [00:19:24] Speaker 01: What kind of weight should we give to this kind of evidence where we actually have [00:19:29] Speaker 01: admittedly, people skilled in the art who don't combine? [00:19:35] Speaker 00: Well, I think that's the case in any case of obviousness. [00:19:38] Speaker 00: The whole point of obviousness is that the elements were out there in the prior art, but nobody had previously combined them. [00:19:45] Speaker 00: And that's where the rationales under the KSR precedent come into play. [00:19:50] Speaker 01: But factually, they're not as close. [00:19:53] Speaker 01: In other words, they're out there, and they're in many, many disparate references. [00:19:57] Speaker 01: But isn't that different from a situation where you've got some of them in the same reference, or if not in the same reference, from closely related references? [00:20:09] Speaker 00: So I'm not sure I'm understanding your question. [00:20:12] Speaker 00: In this particular case, we do have the elements in different references. [00:20:18] Speaker 00: So the references themselves don't each disclose. [00:20:20] Speaker 01: Well, you can see that Owens has all the elements. [00:20:22] Speaker 01: You're just saying it's in a slightly different but wholly analogous context. [00:20:28] Speaker 00: So it's in the context of an MPLS network, which is a different type of network than a pseudowire network. [00:20:34] Speaker 00: And the 652 patent does state that MPLS protection techniques are applicable to pseudowires, but they are different. [00:20:43] Speaker 00: So in terms of anticipation, you have to check off each of the boxes, right? [00:20:47] Speaker 00: It has to be in that exact context. [00:20:49] Speaker 01: Right, I get that. [00:20:49] Speaker 01: So it's not anticipation. [00:20:50] Speaker 01: Sure. [00:20:51] Speaker 01: But is it not relevant that that very inventor who [00:20:56] Speaker 01: likely because of these references all being fairly close in time, which was also if their one skill in the art was likely familiar with the other references as well, that that very inventor didn't put these things together. [00:21:08] Speaker 00: So I think there could be cases where that would be relevant. [00:21:10] Speaker 00: But in this particular circumstance, given that the Owens reference, which you referred to, is talking about MPLS and the whole reference is about MPLS, it wouldn't really make sense for them to [00:21:22] Speaker 00: also add in pseudowires because the reference was about MPLS. [00:21:26] Speaker 00: So in this particular circumstance, I think it makes sense that they didn't expressly apply it to pseudowires. [00:21:33] Speaker 00: There could be a scenario where your hypothetical would make sense, but this is not the case where I think that that would apply. [00:21:45] Speaker 00: The board relied on several of the obvious instructionals from the KSR case to support its decision that in this particular case, one of skill in the art would be motivated to combine the references. [00:21:57] Speaker 00: And there's substantial evidence in the record to support that. [00:22:00] Speaker 00: Juniper presented detailed arguments in its reply brief on that that were supported by one of skill in the art, Dr. Atal Lavian's declaration. [00:22:09] Speaker 00: And appellant has not rebutted that in any way. [00:22:13] Speaker 00: Appellant has not [00:22:14] Speaker 00: explained why the references teach away or has presented any evidence that there would be a problem in terms of combining it. [00:22:25] Speaker 00: They presented no evidence whatsoever to rebut that. [00:22:33] Speaker 00: I think unless there are any other questions from the panel, I've addressed all of the issues. [00:22:38] Speaker 03: Okay. [00:22:39] Speaker 03: Thank you, Ms. [00:22:40] Speaker 03: Carson. [00:22:41] Speaker 03: Mr. Somerville? [00:22:46] Speaker 04: Let's talk about what the board actually said. [00:22:49] Speaker 04: First with Halabi. [00:22:51] Speaker 04: On page A15, the board said that the Halabi reference teaches automatically switching from an active primary pseudo-wire to an inactive secondary pseudo-wire. [00:23:00] Speaker 04: On A16, the board cited Halabi's teachings of priority preemption attributes that are among the basic attributes of network traffic trunks that are significant for traffic engineering. [00:23:10] Speaker 04: Those are the elements of the claim. [00:23:12] Speaker 04: So for Ms. [00:23:13] Speaker 04: Carson to suggest that the board didn't find those for these references is just incorrect. [00:23:17] Speaker 04: Now we go to RFC 3386. [00:23:20] Speaker 04: There on page A11, the board talked about pseudo wires and the preemption of lower priority traffic in the event of network failure on page A11. [00:23:30] Speaker 04: They also said that there should be priorities assigned to protection connections taught in RFC 3386 on page A13. [00:23:38] Speaker 04: So again, the board expressly found that those elements were in [00:23:41] Speaker 04: these references, all of them, not just a piece here and a piece there. [00:23:46] Speaker 04: Then we get to Owens. [00:23:47] Speaker 04: Now, as I understand Ms. [00:23:48] Speaker 04: Carson's statement, she says, well, it's MPLS. [00:23:50] Speaker 04: But the only way this is relevant to an obviousness situation is if it's analogous prior art. [00:23:56] Speaker 04: So the fact that it's MPLS, which the 652 patent says is relevant to pseudo wires, does matter. [00:24:02] Speaker 03: And it's clear that the board's... Mr. Sanfield, we're out of time, I think. [00:24:06] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:24:07] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:24:09] Speaker 03: And now we move to