[00:00:20] Speaker 03: Next case is Keith Ranieri versus Microsoft and AT&T, 2017-1414-01. [00:00:30] Speaker 03: Mr. Crocker. [00:00:32] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:00:33] Speaker 02: May it please the Court? [00:00:34] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:00:35] Speaker 02: Is it Ranieri or Ranier? [00:00:36] Speaker 02: Ranieri. [00:00:37] Speaker 02: OK. [00:00:38] Speaker 02: Thank you for letting me appear before you again. [00:00:42] Speaker 02: And my client and I stand before you as chastened individuals. [00:00:47] Speaker 02: Mistakes were made. [00:00:48] Speaker 02: They were not exceptional mistakes. [00:00:51] Speaker 02: My remarks are prefaced by the fact that I fully understand the discretionary aspects of this case. [00:00:57] Speaker 02: I don't pretend to ignore them. [00:00:58] Speaker 02: I don't pretend to run from them. [00:01:01] Speaker 02: But this case is not exceptional and did not justify the level of attorney fee sanctions that were issued against my client. [00:01:10] Speaker 02: The case is not exceptional because not exceptional. [00:01:14] Speaker 04: Don't you think it exceptional that taking the district court at its word [00:01:20] Speaker 04: that at every stage of the litigation, Mr. Ranieri filed declarations misrepresenting his ownership interest in GTI? [00:01:30] Speaker 02: That's incorrect. [00:01:31] Speaker 02: He filed one declaration, and he did not misrepresent his ownership interest in GTI. [00:01:38] Speaker 02: The district court was incorrect. [00:01:41] Speaker 02: The district court was incorrect in holding him in contempt. [00:01:44] Speaker 02: The district court [00:01:48] Speaker 04: said he continued to file requests for extensions for periods of discovery after it had ended and without sufficient cause, that there was no reason to think additional facts would be discovered. [00:02:05] Speaker 04: He delayed proffering evidence of standing, et cetera. [00:02:14] Speaker 02: The district court was erroneous, Your Honor. [00:02:19] Speaker 02: The only request for extensions he ever made was when he couldn't appear for his deposition for a family emergency, but he was willing to appear. [00:02:27] Speaker 02: And Microsoft and AT&T weren't interested. [00:02:30] Speaker 02: The district court had the facts wrong on contempt and delay. [00:02:35] Speaker 02: We outlined that in our opening brief. [00:02:37] Speaker 02: We cite to the record on every score. [00:02:39] Speaker 02: He only filed one declaration. [00:02:42] Speaker 00: My problem with your exceptionality argument is that you're not pointing to any legal error. [00:02:48] Speaker 00: You're just debating the factual conclusion. [00:02:51] Speaker 00: So the standard you have to meet is extraordinarily high. [00:02:54] Speaker 00: You have to show that the district court clearly erred and clearly erred given our deferential standard of review. [00:03:03] Speaker 00: So I think that's a very difficult position for you to take. [00:03:07] Speaker 02: you are correct. [00:03:09] Speaker 02: And that was the first thing I said today, was that I understood the burden was high and that the discretion was a burden I had to overcome. [00:03:17] Speaker 02: But citing from the Supreme Court's decision on octane fitness, I'd like to read just a little language you probably don't know. [00:03:27] Speaker 04: Oh, don't bother. [00:03:29] Speaker 04: Let's go to reading quotes. [00:03:30] Speaker 04: We know what it says. [00:03:31] Speaker 04: Yeah. [00:03:32] Speaker 04: And we also know octane fitness. [00:03:35] Speaker 04: But in the blue brief, [00:03:37] Speaker 04: You say you weren't given access to documents filed under SEAL. [00:03:41] Speaker 04: But a couple of pages later, page 41, you appear to cite documents filed under SEAL in your arguments, citing to J4083-4232. [00:03:57] Speaker 04: Were you able to review the documents that Microsoft filed under SEAL? [00:04:02] Speaker 02: Where, Your Honor, do I say that we could not review documents under seal? [00:04:07] Speaker 02: 39. [00:04:10] Speaker 02: Of the opening brief, 39? [00:04:11] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:04:20] Speaker 02: Oh, I'm sorry. [00:04:21] Speaker 02: These were the redacted bills. [00:04:23] Speaker 02: Correct. [00:04:24] Speaker 02: Right. [00:04:25] Speaker 02: We could not see the redactions. [00:04:26] Speaker 02: That's correct. [00:04:27] Speaker 02: But you could see the bills. [00:04:29] Speaker 02: So we could see the bills, but we could not see the redactions. [00:04:32] Speaker 02: That's correct. [00:04:33] Speaker 04: But the redacted bills were filed under seal, were they not? [00:04:38] Speaker 02: Not that I'm aware of, no, Your Honor, no. [00:04:41] Speaker 00: So my question is, because this is unclear from the record, you couldn't see the redactions. [00:04:46] Speaker 00: Did the trial court review the redactions in camera? [00:04:50] Speaker 02: Not that I'm aware, Your Honor, no. [00:04:52] Speaker 00: Did you request that the trial court review them in camera? [00:04:54] Speaker 02: I didn't request that, no, Your Honor. [00:04:56] Speaker 02: They were redacted and we didn't see them. [00:05:00] Speaker 02: I mean, we didn't see the redactions. [00:05:02] Speaker 02: We saw the bills. [00:05:05] Speaker 00: But you don't know what the trial court saw. [00:05:07] Speaker 02: I don't believe they did. [00:05:09] Speaker 02: I have no reason to believe they saw unredacted bills. [00:05:11] Speaker 02: We would have really complained about that. [00:05:16] Speaker 00: If the trial court did? [00:05:17] Speaker 02: No, I would have complained about the fact that the trial court would have seen something I didn't get to see. [00:05:21] Speaker 00: But it happens all the time if there's a privilege issue. [00:05:25] Speaker 02: But I would have complained about it and demanded to see it, and that didn't happen. [00:05:29] Speaker 02: So I'm not aware that the trial court saw unredacted bills. [00:05:34] Speaker 00: Can you turn to your prevailing party argument? [00:05:39] Speaker 00: Yes. [00:05:40] Speaker 00: Because exceptionality aside, there has to be a prevailing party. [00:05:45] Speaker 02: Yes, the prevailing party issue is this is an odd thing, odd case, given in particularly the Supreme Court's CRST decision. [00:05:56] Speaker 00: That's what I'm asking about. [00:05:59] Speaker 02: OK. [00:05:59] Speaker 02: The odd thing about the Supreme Court CRST decision is it didn't overrule Buchanan. [00:06:07] Speaker 02: Buchanan required, in order to be a prevailing party, you had to have a decision on the merits. [00:06:14] Speaker 02: CRST said, obviously, in a Title VII employment case, that you didn't have to have a decision on the merits. [00:06:24] Speaker 02: But that case really only applied to employment issues. [00:06:30] Speaker 00: So you read CRST to be limited to Title VII? [00:06:34] Speaker 02: I would, however, I point out that the First Circuit in I think it's small justice LLC versus eccentric 873 F3D 313 in 2017 cited, it was a copyright case, cited it for the proposition opposite to what I'm arguing now and that is that [00:06:57] Speaker 02: Title VII, that because the Supreme Court did not overrule Buchanan, and Buchanan is still cited as good law, that when it comes to a jurisdictional dismissal, for lack of standing, CRST shouldn't apply. [00:07:15] Speaker 00: You say... I'm sorry. [00:07:17] Speaker 00: When you say Buchanan is still cited as good law, it hasn't been cited as good law by the Supreme Court, has it? [00:07:23] Speaker 02: Well, it was cited by good law as a Supreme Court in CRST. [00:07:26] Speaker 02: Yes, Your Honor. [00:07:28] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:07:28] Speaker 04: In that section of your blueberry, you say that Rule 41B is where we should look to determine that involuntary dismissals for jurisdiction do not act as decisions on the merits. [00:07:47] Speaker 02: That's correct. [00:07:48] Speaker 04: OK. [00:07:49] Speaker 04: Does 41B address dismissals with prejudice? [00:07:53] Speaker 02: 41B says... I have it right here in front of me. [00:07:57] Speaker 02: Yeah. [00:07:59] Speaker 02: Our argument depends upon an implied understanding of 41B. [00:08:06] Speaker 02: And I think the answer to your question is no. [00:08:10] Speaker 02: But it says that unless the dismissal states otherwise, and it's the exception, except for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or fail to join a party. [00:08:20] Speaker 04: Which is probably why Pittsburgh doesn't fit. [00:08:25] Speaker 02: Well, I think Pittsburgh does fit, your honor. [00:08:27] Speaker 02: I think Pittsburgh is the controlling decision from this court's jurisdiction. [00:08:31] Speaker 02: Your case doesn't have anything to do with failure to join a party. [00:08:34] Speaker 02: But it was a lack of jurisdictional dismissal. [00:08:37] Speaker 02: That's hardly any different than a lack of standing jurisdiction. [00:08:41] Speaker 02: In other words, [00:08:43] Speaker 02: You cannot appear before the court if you don't have standing or if you fail to join a required party for that reason. [00:08:52] Speaker 04: Given the posture of this case, it sounds like there can be a huge difference when somebody fibs repeatedly about why they have standing. [00:09:02] Speaker 02: Your Honor, forgive me for taking exception in the little time I have left. [00:09:08] Speaker 02: And this is my one and only time to try and defend my client. [00:09:13] Speaker 02: But my client never fibbed. [00:09:16] Speaker 02: The district court was wrong. [00:09:19] Speaker 02: As what happened in the underlying case, and I apologize for revisiting. [00:09:24] Speaker 04: Let me see if I got it correct. [00:09:26] Speaker 04: Your client said he had an ownership interest. [00:09:30] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:09:30] Speaker 04: Is that not correct? [00:09:31] Speaker 02: That is correct. [00:09:32] Speaker 04: And then when he was pressed on it as to documentation, he said, well, it's out there. [00:09:40] Speaker 04: I'll have to get it. [00:09:43] Speaker 04: when he was pressed on getting it, he said, well, it was sort of implied that it would be given to me. [00:09:50] Speaker 04: And then when he was pressed on that, he came up with another story. [00:09:53] Speaker 04: Am I incorrect on that? [00:09:55] Speaker 02: Yes, you are incorrect, Your Honor, and I apologize. [00:09:58] Speaker 04: No, don't apologize. [00:09:59] Speaker 02: If I'm incorrect, it's my fault. [00:10:01] Speaker 02: You tell me why. [00:10:02] Speaker 02: The facts are that he made a mistake when he invented the product and obtained the patent. [00:10:08] Speaker 02: It was in his name. [00:10:09] Speaker 02: He made a mistake of transferring it to a corporation [00:10:13] Speaker 02: for exploitation purposes. [00:10:15] Speaker 02: And then because he didn't want to have the publicity associated with owning the corporation, he left the shares in trust with his girlfriend. [00:10:22] Speaker 02: They parted ways. [00:10:24] Speaker 02: He couldn't obtain the, recall the documentation with sufficient precision by the time he had to file his case. [00:10:32] Speaker 02: So when he filed his case, he couldn't really remember where the documentation was or how it stands. [00:10:39] Speaker 02: stood, but one of the shareholders who held a 12.5% interest, his lawyer stepped forward and said, you've got 100% sign this document affirming that, and he did. [00:10:51] Speaker 02: When the case came for filing, that's what he understood. [00:10:58] Speaker 02: I stepped into case very late, very late. [00:11:01] Speaker 02: I stepped into case when the case was almost ready to be dismissed, and the court was very unhappy with everybody on my side. [00:11:07] Speaker 03: Well, she sure was. [00:11:09] Speaker 03: She used deplorable conduct, vexatiously multiplying proceedings. [00:11:16] Speaker 02: Yes. [00:11:16] Speaker 03: The crime was not credible. [00:11:18] Speaker 03: Contumacious conduct. [00:11:20] Speaker 02: That's what Her Honor said. [00:11:21] Speaker 02: And in my opening brief, I document where that's just wrong. [00:11:26] Speaker 02: He never violated a single order, and he didn't seek any delay. [00:11:30] Speaker 02: But going back to Judge White. [00:11:32] Speaker 04: You document where you disagree. [00:11:34] Speaker 04: Pardon me? [00:11:35] Speaker 04: You document where you disagree. [00:11:37] Speaker 02: No, I document, for instance, where she says, in my opening brief, where she says she's, where her honor said he's confamations, I document every single order issued in the court. [00:11:49] Speaker 02: And I show that he did not violate a single one of those orders. [00:11:52] Speaker 02: And I also further argue in my opening brief that her honor never specified which order he violated. [00:12:00] Speaker 04: We disagree with you about your interpretation [00:12:05] Speaker 04: his compliance, then would you concede that there was contumely? [00:12:12] Speaker 02: I just can't do that, Your Honor, because I have looked at this record closely. [00:12:18] Speaker 02: I came in late. [00:12:20] Speaker 02: I came in at the last minute. [00:12:22] Speaker 02: I documented every single order in the case. [00:12:24] Speaker 02: There was not a single violation of a single order. [00:12:28] Speaker 02: The one that Her Honor felt that there was a violation of involved [00:12:32] Speaker 02: a failure to deliver documents of standing. [00:12:36] Speaker 02: But he didn't have those. [00:12:37] Speaker 00: Well, the whole point was that he felt that he kept dragging out the proceedings because he knew he was never going to be able to establish standing. [00:12:44] Speaker 02: There was no dragging out of proceedings. [00:12:46] Speaker 02: He didn't ask for any delays. [00:12:48] Speaker 02: All the court imposed the delays. [00:12:50] Speaker 02: He couldn't meet the deadlines. [00:12:53] Speaker 02: He couldn't meet the deadlines. [00:12:55] Speaker 02: There was no delay. [00:12:56] Speaker 02: This case was only one year. [00:12:58] Speaker 00: She didn't really talk about delay. [00:13:00] Speaker 00: What she talked about is dragging out the process. [00:13:04] Speaker 00: That in other words, he had to have understood very early on that he was never going to be able to put that documentation together to establish his standings. [00:13:14] Speaker 02: What happened before I got there, Your Honor, is that my predecessor did not ask for rights of discovery to go get the documents he knew was there. [00:13:21] Speaker 02: I come into the case shortly before its dismissal and I say, [00:13:24] Speaker 02: give me discovery rights. [00:13:26] Speaker 02: I know where the documents are. [00:13:27] Speaker 02: And I get very limited discovery rights. [00:13:29] Speaker 02: And I get some documents. [00:13:31] Speaker 02: And he sees the documents. [00:13:32] Speaker 02: And he says, gee, I was wrong. [00:13:33] Speaker 02: I don't own 100%. [00:13:35] Speaker 02: I only own 70%. [00:13:36] Speaker 02: And that's where the judge for her honor was very upset. [00:13:41] Speaker 02: You said 100. [00:13:42] Speaker 02: Now you're saying 70. [00:13:43] Speaker 02: Who am I going to believe? [00:13:45] Speaker 02: Not you. [00:13:46] Speaker 02: That's what happened. [00:13:47] Speaker 02: And I submit my last two minutes. [00:13:49] Speaker 04: There is a doctrine in the law, falsus in unis, falsa in ominous. [00:13:54] Speaker 02: You, Your Honor, cited that to me in the first hearing pertaining to me. [00:13:59] Speaker 02: Because I told Your Honor that what happened in the hearing wasn't as you saw it happen. [00:14:04] Speaker 03: But this isn't about you. [00:14:06] Speaker 02: Well, it was about me. [00:14:07] Speaker 02: It was about me. [00:14:08] Speaker 02: I apologize for it being about me. [00:14:10] Speaker 00: But Your Honor, I But the fee award is against Mr. Ranieri, right? [00:14:16] Speaker 02: Right. [00:14:17] Speaker 02: This is not, I assure you, is not an exceptional case. [00:14:23] Speaker 02: There was no contempt. [00:14:26] Speaker 02: I'm here to contest the judge's discretion. [00:14:29] Speaker 02: I fully understand the need for her discretion. [00:14:34] Speaker 02: I'm here to contest it. [00:14:35] Speaker 02: I'm here to say that in my opening brief, I set forth chapter and verse where there was no contempt. [00:14:40] Speaker 02: There was no delay. [00:14:42] Speaker 02: He didn't delay anything. [00:14:43] Speaker 02: The only delay that occurred in this case was when Microsoft and AT&T repeatedly asked for delay. [00:14:49] Speaker 02: My client wanted discovery to show and prove his case. [00:14:54] Speaker 02: The judge, her honor, would not let him open discovery to get it. [00:14:59] Speaker 02: He wanted subpoena power to get the facts and the evidence, and he knew where to get it. [00:15:04] Speaker 02: He couldn't get it. [00:15:05] Speaker 02: She wouldn't let him. [00:15:06] Speaker 02: When she offered him very limited discovery against the incorporating attorney, he got it. [00:15:14] Speaker 02: He saw where this was leading, and it refreshed his recollection. [00:15:18] Speaker 02: It was that refreshed recollection which bothered her honor. [00:15:21] Speaker 02: And she said, how could he be changing his story on the basis of these documents? [00:15:26] Speaker 02: I submit, Your Honor, that in eight seconds here, that my client is very apologetic for not getting his paperwork in order in the first place. [00:15:36] Speaker 02: But he was not contemptuous. [00:15:38] Speaker 02: And this is not a conceptual case. [00:15:40] Speaker 02: And furthermore, [00:15:41] Speaker 02: Her honor had no right to impose an inherent power here because the Section 285 covers. [00:15:49] Speaker 03: Mr. Crockett, your time has expired. [00:15:51] Speaker 03: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:15:52] Speaker 03: Two minutes for rebuttal. [00:15:54] Speaker 01: Thank you. [00:15:55] Speaker 03: Mr. Kinnaird. [00:15:59] Speaker 01: May it please the Court, Stephen Kinnaird, on behalf of AT&T and Microsoft. [00:16:03] Speaker 04: Nobody raised Section 1927. [00:16:06] Speaker 01: No, Your Honor, we proceeded under 285. [00:16:09] Speaker 01: And you can throw that in, too. [00:16:11] Speaker 01: Suppose we could have, Your Honor. [00:16:13] Speaker 00: Can I ask that? [00:16:14] Speaker 00: Because I like the legal stuff. [00:16:15] Speaker 00: So the 285, there is a good argument that the court's use of inherent powers where there is a statutory provision that is directly on point would be inappropriate. [00:16:29] Speaker 01: What the Supreme Court said in chambers is that the first resort should be to the statute of rule that provides for a sanction. [00:16:38] Speaker 01: But if it's not up to the task, [00:16:40] Speaker 01: then the court may resort to inherent power and that would be here. [00:16:44] Speaker 00: So let's figure out if it's up to the test. [00:16:46] Speaker 00: Can we talk about CRST? [00:16:50] Speaker 00: What do you make of the fact that CRST did not express the overruled Buchanan and in fact cite it to Buchanan? [00:16:57] Speaker 01: Well, Buchanan is still good law for abolishing the catalyst theory. [00:17:03] Speaker 01: I think what the Supreme Court corrected was an overreading of certain language in Buchanan that you needed to have a consent decree or [00:17:10] Speaker 01: or merits judgment. [00:17:11] Speaker 01: And the court said that doesn't make sense. [00:17:13] Speaker 01: It says prevailing party. [00:17:15] Speaker 01: That's a term to be interpreted consistently across statutes. [00:17:19] Speaker 01: And as long as the challenge rebuffed, it does not have to be relieved from the merits. [00:17:23] Speaker 00: So you read the CRSP to have clarified that Buchanan really is saying you just need some judicial action or imprimatur. [00:17:31] Speaker 01: Which we have here. [00:17:33] Speaker 01: But we also have, so I think it's enough the dismissal for standing, but the fact that this dismissal [00:17:38] Speaker 01: is one with prejudice, means that it is, in fact, relief on the merits. [00:17:43] Speaker 01: Because it alters the legal relationship of the parties, Ranieri can no longer sue defendants for infringement of the assertive powers. [00:17:50] Speaker 00: But we wouldn't need to go there if we conclude that CRST is an intervening system in law. [00:17:54] Speaker 01: That's correct. [00:17:54] Speaker 01: That's correct, Your Honor. [00:17:56] Speaker 01: And the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding this was an exceptional case. [00:18:02] Speaker 01: The district court found that Ranieri engaged in a pattern of obfuscation and bad faith [00:18:09] Speaker 01: is that he uh... i'm sure you know that's springboard that exceptional doesn't mean who trade this one it's that's right the supreme court said it's exceptional uh... if the case is litigated in an unreasonable manner even if it does not uh... rise to the level of sanctionable conduct here it certainly did because of the pattern of obfuscation [00:18:38] Speaker 01: because he submitted to the court documents, these purported assignment documents, that the district court found contained a knowing misrepresentation and that she found observing him in front of her that all of his testimony was untruthful and that the wild goose chase on which he led the court and the defendants in pursuit of transfer documents that she found not to exist vexatiously delayed the proceedings. [00:19:08] Speaker 00: Mr. Crockett's concern, though, is that you've got the award against a client when he, having come into the case late, realized that it wasn't the client that was falling down. [00:19:23] Speaker 00: It was the fact that the appropriate quest for discovery hadn't been made by prior counsel. [00:19:28] Speaker 00: What's your response to that? [00:19:30] Speaker 01: That's absolutely not true. [00:19:32] Speaker 01: And I think response would be twofold. [00:19:34] Speaker 01: First of all, [00:19:36] Speaker 04: None of these contentions about... I didn't ask the question of whether prior counsel had been sued for malpractice, but it's out there. [00:19:47] Speaker 01: Well, I think it's more than that, Your Honor. [00:19:49] Speaker 01: Mr. Veneery is the one who executed these documents. [00:19:53] Speaker 01: He represented in them that he was the sole shareholder at all times from the inception of GTI. [00:20:00] Speaker 01: He knew that was false, and there's no [00:20:02] Speaker 01: uh... there's no getting around in fact is a two thousand three declaration in which he said that you know i gave shares in global to my uh... uh... to my colleagues and the whole purpose of establishing gti listed disassociate himself from the corporation that was a knowing falsehood the record supports that it's important to realize all of these issues were resolved [00:20:27] Speaker 01: in the final merits judgment and are not subject to revision here. [00:20:32] Speaker 00: I understand that this is a little bit beyond the record, but even if it were true that he owned a substantial portion of the shares of GTI, wouldn't he have a problem with the fact that the other inventors were not involved in the case? [00:20:55] Speaker 01: Well, the problem would happen [00:20:57] Speaker 01: GTI was assigned the patent by all the inventors. [00:21:02] Speaker 01: The problem is that under Washington law, if the corporation is dissolved, the actions have to be taken by all the shareholders. [00:21:10] Speaker 01: And his testimony was he didn't even receive the so-called oral transfers from Delaney and Donsick until after 1997. [00:21:19] Speaker 04: So none of this... This pops into my head, but isn't there a statute of frauds problem as well? [00:21:25] Speaker 01: I don't know that there's a statute of frauds in terms of the transfer of stock. [00:21:29] Speaker 01: There were bylaws that required it to be written. [00:21:31] Speaker 01: But it's important to note that because the district court had found in the original dismissal order on the merits that there were no transfers, there were no transfer documents, that the reported assignment documents had false representations, that he delayed the proceedings. [00:21:51] Speaker 01: These questions, including whether it should have been [00:21:54] Speaker 01: with Presidents and whether there was contumacious conduct are all barred from revision here in this Court. [00:22:03] Speaker 01: And I think my colleague is incorrect in saying that contumacious conduct requires disobedience of a court order. [00:22:10] Speaker 01: That's contempt. [00:22:11] Speaker 01: That could be contumacy. [00:22:13] Speaker 01: But contumacy is the flouting of the authority of the Court, and the Fifth Circuit has said that perjury is contumacious conduct. [00:22:21] Speaker 01: So, and this court has effectively upheld that by necessary implication in affirming the merits judgment. [00:22:28] Speaker 04: Just follow my reasoning for a second. [00:22:30] Speaker 04: I'm not talking about stock transfers per se. [00:22:32] Speaker 04: I'm talking about alleged contractual obligations which fall under the statute. [00:22:39] Speaker 01: That could be, Your Honor, in terms of the... Well, there was a writing here. [00:22:43] Speaker 01: It was just a false writing. [00:22:46] Speaker 01: So, I would like to address finally the [00:22:49] Speaker 01: The reasonableness of the award, the district court has broad latitude there, and the district court did not rubber stamp the fees. [00:22:57] Speaker 00: What about the redacted documents? [00:22:59] Speaker 00: That makes me a little uncomfortable. [00:23:01] Speaker 00: I'm certain that as a trial court judge, I would have insisted on seeing the redactions, even if I didn't allow the other side to see them. [00:23:10] Speaker 01: Yes. [00:23:11] Speaker 01: I would make three points on that. [00:23:12] Speaker 01: First of all, the district court, as a finer fact, found that she could still conduct [00:23:17] Speaker 01: meaningful review even with the redactions and it's important to know that of the hundred seventy four redacted entries hundred sixty three of them were simply for fractions of an hour uh... and so and almost invariably for correspondence or conferences with clients of the court co-counsel and so the district court wouldn't actually find those unreasonable is twenty percent and she reduced twenty percent for duplication so the fact that [00:23:45] Speaker 01: She reduced it for 20%. [00:23:46] Speaker 01: She only gave a five-month fee period. [00:23:49] Speaker 01: Didn't give a whole of the case. [00:23:50] Speaker 01: We only got about a third of our fees for AT&T. [00:23:55] Speaker 01: And the fact that she struck certain entries, she made a very careful deliberation in terms of what was reasonable. [00:24:01] Speaker 01: And so we think the case should be upheld in full. [00:24:06] Speaker 01: If there are no further questions, Your Honor, I'll sit down. [00:24:10] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:24:10] Speaker 03: Thank you, Counsel. [00:24:12] Speaker 03: Mr. Crawford, we'll give you two minutes for a bottle. [00:24:14] Speaker 02: Thank you. [00:24:16] Speaker 02: I appreciate it. [00:24:16] Speaker 02: In response to Judge O'Malley's question, and that was, don't all inventors have to be before the court? [00:24:20] Speaker 02: That's correct. [00:24:21] Speaker 02: But this involved a corporation. [00:24:23] Speaker 02: And it is not true that all the shareholders of the corporation, the corporate owner, has to be before the court. [00:24:29] Speaker 02: The shares are transferred. [00:24:31] Speaker 02: All the shares are transferred into the corporation. [00:24:32] Speaker 02: The question was. [00:24:34] Speaker 02: Is all? [00:24:35] Speaker 02: It was a dissolved corporation. [00:24:36] Speaker 02: But under Washington law, dissolved corporation continues to have viability, and it continues to press claims. [00:24:43] Speaker 00: But isn't it true that can only happen if, in fact, it acts through all the shareholders? [00:24:48] Speaker 02: No, that is untrue. [00:24:49] Speaker 02: Under Washington law, a dissolved corporation operates by the majority of shareholders, not all shareholders. [00:24:57] Speaker 02: That is incorrect. [00:24:58] Speaker 02: And that was an incorrect statement, and we argued that before. [00:25:02] Speaker 02: And so when Mr. Ranieri appeared [00:25:04] Speaker 02: with his supposed false documentation that said he holds 100%. [00:25:08] Speaker 02: But when the Rubin's documents were subpoenaed, eventually, when I got into the case from the corporate formation, it was 70%. [00:25:15] Speaker 02: He had enough to control the corporation. [00:25:19] Speaker 02: He had enough to assert the corporate shares. [00:25:21] Speaker 02: It was not like a patent case where all the inventors had to be there. [00:25:23] Speaker 02: He had 70% control. [00:25:26] Speaker 02: But the court found a defensive that he would say 70% on the one hand and 100% on another. [00:25:33] Speaker 02: She discredited his entire testimony. [00:25:34] Speaker 04: Well, there was a lot more than that. [00:25:36] Speaker 02: Well, not much, Your Honor. [00:25:40] Speaker 02: I would say that the record does not say there was much more. [00:25:42] Speaker 02: Winston Churchill famously said three times is a lot. [00:25:45] Speaker 02: And I would say that was it. [00:25:47] Speaker 02: I would say the only thing that really bothered the court specifically was that 70%, 100% distinction. [00:25:54] Speaker 02: There was nothing really else. [00:25:56] Speaker 02: I've documented that in my brief. [00:25:58] Speaker 02: And I've heard counsel just basically admit that there was no order violated. [00:26:03] Speaker 02: The only thing that he claims now was condemnatious was the perjury when Mr. Ranieri tried to explain why he said 100 and why he said 70. [00:26:15] Speaker 02: His perjury didn't matter. [00:26:17] Speaker 02: He held control of the corporation. [00:26:18] Speaker 02: Thank you, Your Honor. [00:26:20] Speaker 03: Thank you, Mr. Crawford. [00:26:21] Speaker 03: We'll take the case around to the court.