[00:00:10] Speaker ?: Okay. [00:00:19] Speaker ?: Okay. [00:00:28] Speaker ?: Okay. [00:00:41] Speaker 00: Okay, the next case is number 162669, Railbird LLC against Mattel, Mr. Delady. [00:00:51] Speaker 04: Good morning. [00:00:52] Speaker 04: May I please report? [00:00:54] Speaker 04: There are two main issues in this appeal. [00:00:55] Speaker 04: First, did the district court commit an error in weighing the evidence offered to prove the existence of the 1988 reversion agreement? [00:01:04] Speaker 04: And all of the evidence either supports the existence of this reversion agreement or is not germane to this issue. [00:01:11] Speaker 04: So the district court must have committed an error and improperly weighed the evidence. [00:01:16] Speaker 04: Second, did the district court err in ruling that a written patent assignment was needed in order for the ownership of the 161 application to have passed to Tony Bono and Joaquin Martillo in January of 1993 according to federal law? [00:01:31] Speaker 04: There is no evidence of any promise to assign any patent application in this case. [00:01:36] Speaker 04: The evidence on this issue all suggests [00:01:39] Speaker 04: a self-executing automatic reversion based on one of two conditions precedent occurring so federal law does not apply, and state law governs the determination of ownership in this case. [00:01:50] Speaker 04: The first issue regarding evidence is determinative of the outcome on the second. [00:01:54] Speaker 04: So I'll address that in detail first. [00:01:57] Speaker 04: The district court confines all of its points on the evidentiary issue to page 24 of its opinion. [00:02:04] Speaker 04: But first, I want to point out that all the evidence of this case is consistent with one thing. [00:02:09] Speaker 04: Vincent Bono, the former president of Clearpoint, who was a party to the reversion agreement, as the former president of Clearpoint, chose to act consistently in Clearpoint's interests in this case. [00:02:23] Speaker 04: But the fact that Mr. Bono, Vincent Bono, chose to act in Clearpoint's interests after the fact is not determinative and does not [00:02:34] Speaker 04: does not disprove the existence of the 1988 agreement that he made with his brother Tony and Joachim Martino. [00:02:46] Speaker 04: Vincent Bono refused to sign an assignment or other document documenting the transfer of ownership of the 161 application to Tony or Joachim for 14 years. [00:02:56] Speaker 04: But he did this out of his concern that Clearpoint would be exposed to some type of liability. [00:03:02] Speaker 04: This is supported by all the evidence in this case. [00:03:06] Speaker 04: For example, the Penroll Agreement of July 1993 appears in some ways to act as an assignment from Clearpoint to Penroll of the 161 application. [00:03:17] Speaker 04: But at the time Vincent signed this Penroll Agreement, Vincent knew that the intellectual property was no longer owned by Clearpoint, and the sworn declarations provide other reason. [00:03:27] Speaker 04: Vincent Bono signed the Penroll agreement in July 1993 to appease Penroll, which was threatening to sue it at that time, based on the agreement that Clearpoint and Penroll had for delivery of the Constellation devices that are the subject of that patent application. [00:03:44] Speaker 04: Thus, Vincent Bono clearly had a motivation to keep the true ownership of the 161 application hidden. [00:03:52] Speaker 04: This is well-documented throughout the force-worn declarations that were briefed extensively in this case. [00:03:58] Speaker 04: At trial, the appellee repeatedly refers to the Penroll Agreement as an assignment of the 161 application. [00:04:05] Speaker 04: This, despite the conflicting language it has regarding the ownership claim held by Tony and Joe O'Keefe. [00:04:11] Speaker 04: The district court apparently confused Vincent's behavior in acting in Clearpoint's interest in July of 1993 with some other motive that is not explained by the district court in its opinion and is not supported by any of the evidence. [00:04:26] Speaker 04: But the facts here all point to Vincent Bono choosing, in later 1993 and after that, to act in clear points interest. [00:04:34] Speaker 04: This does not disprove the existence of the 1988 verbal agreement, which is supported by all the other evidence. [00:04:42] Speaker 04: Instead, these separate actions by Vincent Bono in refusing to sign an assignment to Tony or Joaquin or in signing the Penderel agreement, they're evidence of the existence of this 1988 reversion agreement. [00:04:56] Speaker 04: that was set up through oral contracts and also the written assignment. [00:05:02] Speaker 04: Now, on the evidence issue, Judge Ellis's opinion states at page 24 that plaintiff has not established by preponderance of the evidence the existence of any agreement that would grant a reversionary interest in the 161 application to Tony or Joaquin. [00:05:18] Speaker 04: The district court is clearly in error here, as all the evidence plainly supports the existence [00:05:23] Speaker 04: of this reversion either by direct proof or indirectly. [00:05:27] Speaker 04: There is no evidence in the record that actually contradicts the existence of a reversion agreement for the reversion that occurred in January 1993 when Clearpoint canceled the Constellation Project and terminated Tony and Joe King from their employment. [00:05:41] Speaker 04: What has been offered by the district court and the appellee as supposedly disproving the existence of the reversion doesn't actually disprove what is established and supported by all the evidence. [00:05:52] Speaker 04: When I state all the evidence, what I mean, what I'm referring to primarily are the foreign sworn declarations, two by Vincent Bono, one by Anthony Bono, one by Joaquin Martino, the 1988 written agreement, and the 1993 Penroll agreement from July of 1993, and the October royalty letters that Penroll signed with Tony and Joaquin to pay them royalties on the Constellation technology. [00:06:20] Speaker 01: The fall 1993 royalty letters, the letters that were sent to the parties help you. [00:06:29] Speaker 01: Those seem to me to be problematical for you. [00:06:33] Speaker 04: Well, they actually help because these are royalty, they're basically setting out, they're recognizing that Tony Bono and Joachim have a ownership claim of the constellation technology. [00:06:47] Speaker 04: They're recognizing that they have an ownership claim, and they're agreeing to pay them royalties over and above their salary based on this ownership claim. [00:06:57] Speaker 04: Actually, I cleared this with opposing counsel, but I brought these documents from the joint appendix. [00:07:05] Speaker 04: I'd be happy to distribute them. [00:07:06] Speaker 04: Well, we have the joint appendix. [00:07:12] Speaker 04: The 1988 written agreement is the primary evidence [00:07:15] Speaker 04: on this issue as it is contemporaneous with the formation of both the written agreement and the verbal agreement in 1988. [00:07:23] Speaker 04: The written agreement does not directly prove the existence of the reversion agreement, but it suggests it. [00:07:30] Speaker 04: It's a very short document, and it clearly supports the existence of the reversion by the 1988 verbal agreement. [00:07:37] Speaker 04: If you take a look at the first paragraph on page one of the 1988 written agreement, it states, [00:07:43] Speaker 04: This is a summary by which Clearpoint acquires rights to the technology and intellectual property from Tony and Joe and Kim. [00:07:52] Speaker 04: So it is setting out that Clearpoint will be acquiring all the rights and technology, including the intellectual property. [00:07:59] Speaker 04: But on page two, it outlines conditions for establishing a reversion. [00:08:05] Speaker 04: It goes into detail in both of those two paragraphs about what would happen if [00:08:11] Speaker 04: Tony and Joakim left Clearpoint or if Clearpoint decided to terminate the project. [00:08:18] Speaker 04: And it also states at the end of the second paragraph that Tony and Joakim will later own the software in order to sell it to Clearpoint. [00:08:26] Speaker 04: So when you take a look at that second paragraph on page two, the second paragraph on page two and compare and juxtapose it with the first paragraph, the first paragraph on page one [00:08:36] Speaker 04: is talking about the transfer of all the technology and all the intellectual property into Clearpoint, whereas in the second paragraph on page two, it's contemplating that Tony and Joaquin again own the software. [00:08:50] Speaker 01: So there has to be some sort of reversion taking place. [00:08:53] Speaker 01: But then subsequently, in 1992, there is the assignment, which seems to me to be pretty explicit [00:09:01] Speaker 01: to be an assignment of all intellectual property rights, these would be this patent application. [00:09:06] Speaker 04: It is, Your Honor. [00:09:07] Speaker 04: It is. [00:09:08] Speaker 04: But the 1992 assignment is not inconsistent with the 1988 verbal agreement. [00:09:15] Speaker 04: As a matter of fact, it is consistent with it because Tony and Joachim had agreed, on coming to a clear point, that they're going to be giving all their rights to technology subject to the reversion agreement. [00:09:28] Speaker 01: But the assignment doesn't have any language about subject to an oral agreement or anything like that. [00:09:32] Speaker 01: The 1992 assignment does not. [00:09:34] Speaker 01: It's very sweeping in its terminology. [00:09:37] Speaker 04: But the thing is, take it into context, the 1992 assignment only relates to the patent application, whereas the 1988 verbal agreement relates to all the intellectual property, all the technology. [00:09:51] Speaker 01: The patent application is pretty important to this case. [00:09:54] Speaker 04: It is very important to this case. [00:09:55] Speaker 01: I mean, that's what we're here for to discuss. [00:09:58] Speaker 01: So if it applies only to the patent application, it's still, you're out of court if that assignment governs. [00:10:04] Speaker 04: I agree. [00:10:05] Speaker 04: I agree. [00:10:05] Speaker 04: But it does not agree. [00:10:06] Speaker 04: It has to be taken into context with the overarching 1988 verbal agreement and the Whitney agreement. [00:10:13] Speaker 01: Isn't that why we have a requirement [00:10:16] Speaker 01: in federal law as vis-a-vis patent assignments that they'd be in writing to avoid exactly the kind of problem that we have in this case? [00:10:23] Speaker 04: That would have simplified things quite a bit, Your Honor, but that did not happen in this case. [00:10:26] Speaker 01: But that is the rule. [00:10:28] Speaker 01: And therefore, it simplifies it to the extent if we follow the rule and apply it in this case, then this document, the 1992 document, is the end of the case. [00:10:40] Speaker 04: But case law does establish that ownership of a patent application can transfer by other than patent assignment. [00:10:46] Speaker 01: By operation of a law. [00:10:48] Speaker 01: But then that gets you into the argument that you make, which you refer to as a reversionary interest, which looks to me like just a promise to assign upon future events. [00:11:07] Speaker 01: is, in fact, operation of law as opposed to just an oral agreement. [00:11:12] Speaker 01: And that seems to me a stretch. [00:11:14] Speaker 01: What's the basis for your argument that that is a transfer by operation of law as opposed to by contractual agreement? [00:11:22] Speaker 04: Well, my argument is that it was a transfer by law, by enforcement of a contractual agreement. [00:11:29] Speaker 01: By virtue of the enforcement of a contract, right. [00:11:31] Speaker 01: But then that would make all oral contracts [00:11:35] Speaker 01: transfers by operation of law, would it not? [00:11:41] Speaker 04: Depending on the circumstances, yes, it can be construed that way. [00:11:45] Speaker 01: Which would totally defeat the writing requirement for assignments, would it not? [00:11:53] Speaker 04: No, it would not, Your Honor. [00:11:54] Speaker 04: Transfers of property have to be able to take place outside of written patent assignment. [00:12:00] Speaker 01: There are transfers of property that have to be taken, that have to be accounted for outside of... The transfer in intestacy, for example, which is the example that shows up as operational law, but that doesn't include contractual arrangements to transfer property, which looked to me like exactly the core of what the writing requirement is intended to prohibit. [00:12:24] Speaker 04: Well, that is correct. [00:12:25] Speaker 04: And my clients did what they could in this record to rectify that and satisfy the writing requirement. [00:12:34] Speaker 04: They did file a declaratory patent assignment in 2010 that referred to all these circumstances that we're talking about here. [00:12:44] Speaker 04: And that was not the confirmatory assignment. [00:12:47] Speaker 04: This was a declaratory assignment that basically included the documentation, including Vincent Bono's declaration. [00:12:53] Speaker 04: and the 1988 written agreement. [00:12:56] Speaker 04: That was filed in 2010. [00:12:58] Speaker 04: Nothing was ever done by Penroll with that Penroll agreement from July of 1993. [00:13:02] Speaker 04: So. [00:13:02] Speaker 04: OK. [00:13:09] Speaker 00: Let's hear from the office. [00:13:10] Speaker 00: Let me save you a rebuttal time. [00:13:13] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:13:20] Speaker 00: Mr. Foreman. [00:13:22] Speaker 03: Thank you. [00:13:24] Speaker 03: May it please the court. [00:13:26] Speaker 03: This case hinges on the existence of this 1988 oral agreement. [00:13:32] Speaker 03: As opposing counsel. [00:13:34] Speaker 00: Mr. Foreman, why does the office care about the chain, the sequence of transfers of ownership when there is an owner and a signee who brings an action, so 145 action or any other kind [00:13:51] Speaker 00: Does the office always say, do you really own it? [00:13:54] Speaker 00: It seems quite unusual to me. [00:13:58] Speaker 03: This is the only case, 145 case I'm aware of where the issue of ownership has arisen. [00:14:03] Speaker 03: We raised this issue. [00:14:06] Speaker 00: But why does it, why did it arise? [00:14:08] Speaker 00: That's my question. [00:14:09] Speaker 03: Well, this application is kind of a complicated history where in 1993, the assignee of record was clear point and that's when the application went abandoned. [00:14:17] Speaker 00: Yes, it has a curious history, I agree. [00:14:21] Speaker 00: You're saying if the office thinks this is a curious history, then we are entitled, required to check who owned what at what stage? [00:14:33] Speaker 03: Well, as I was saying, in 2007 when the application was attempted to be revived, the purported owners were Mr. Bono and Mr. Martillo. [00:14:46] Speaker 03: The office looked at that and saw kind of the disconnect between the two and just asked for some documentation, evidence in that these two individuals actually have some claim of ownership. [00:15:00] Speaker 03: And that's the kind of the back and forth that happened with the two orders to show cause. [00:15:05] Speaker 00: Is that standard procedure? [00:15:07] Speaker 03: I think it's standard procedure that for an assignee to, [00:15:12] Speaker 03: be able to prosecute an application, they have to have something on record showing the change. [00:15:17] Speaker 00: But that's what's happening here, the assignee seeking to prosecute the application. [00:15:22] Speaker 00: Yes. [00:15:22] Speaker 00: And the office says, well, maybe you never really got the assignment. [00:15:26] Speaker 00: We're going to penetrate that. [00:15:28] Speaker 03: Correct. [00:15:29] Speaker 03: And it wasn't explored fully during the office proceedings, because it's purely an ex parte proceeding. [00:15:37] Speaker 03: But once we over brought this case into district court and allowed us [00:15:42] Speaker 03: to discover and explore it more, we were entitled, I believe, to explore the ownership issue. [00:15:49] Speaker 00: That's what I'm trying to understand, why the office cares. [00:15:51] Speaker 00: There is no adverse party. [00:15:53] Speaker 00: There is no adverse claimant. [00:15:55] Speaker 00: It is just a long stretch of time that piques one's interest. [00:16:02] Speaker 03: Well, if they had come back in 2007 and said, here's the document, here's the assignment that shows that Clearpoint assigned [00:16:11] Speaker 03: this application to these two individuals. [00:16:13] Speaker 00: Why were they required to do that? [00:16:16] Speaker 03: Well, under our regulations, we require assignees to show some chain of title. [00:16:23] Speaker 03: That's 37 CFR 3.73, I believe. [00:16:25] Speaker 00: The assignee has to show the chain of title. [00:16:29] Speaker 00: All that's needed is for the signature that I've assigned it to so-and-so. [00:16:34] Speaker 03: Well, they didn't have that. [00:16:36] Speaker 03: I mean, there was no written assignment from Clearpoint to these two individuals. [00:16:41] Speaker 03: In fact, the only written assignment that exists is from Clearpoint to Penroll in 1993. [00:16:45] Speaker 03: And that 1993 agreement, I mean, I don't know how you could say it any more clearly, that Clearpoint was assigning its patent rights to Penroll. [00:16:54] Speaker 00: So they say, now, after all of this back and forth and refusals and so on, yes, we've assigned it. [00:17:01] Speaker 00: And it's for the office to say, no, you didn't. [00:17:04] Speaker 03: Well, the office doesn't make an ownership determination. [00:17:07] Speaker 03: The office really just wants to have something on record that will allow the office to let these individuals proceed. [00:17:16] Speaker 03: The office doesn't typically challenge ownership claims. [00:17:22] Speaker 00: So what's a record now in the office? [00:17:25] Speaker 03: Well, what's a record in the office is what's a record in this case. [00:17:32] Speaker 03: So they submitted. [00:17:34] Speaker 03: The office asked them, what's your evidence that you own this? [00:17:39] Speaker 03: And they came back with their declarations. [00:17:43] Speaker 03: And the PTO said, well, give us something more. [00:17:48] Speaker 03: Give us either an order from a court showing that you own this, or give us a memorandum from an attorney explaining why you own this. [00:17:56] Speaker 03: And so they submitted this memorandum. [00:17:58] Speaker 03: that laid out their case for why they owned it. [00:18:00] Speaker 03: And the office accepted that and allowed prosecution to continue. [00:18:03] Speaker 03: Well, that wasn't an ownership determination per se. [00:18:07] Speaker 03: That was just something that was in the record that, according to them, showed that they had the right to prosecute. [00:18:15] Speaker 03: And so once this case went to district court, we examined the records again. [00:18:22] Speaker 03: We had a valid argument, but they didn't own it on the application. [00:18:26] Speaker 03: So we pursued that argument. [00:18:30] Speaker 03: And I think that the evidence here, I think I'm going to say the opposite of what my opposing counsel says, that all the evidence points to the fact that there was no oral agreement. [00:18:42] Speaker 03: I mean, you have the 1988 written agreement, which is nothing about a reversionary interest. [00:18:47] Speaker 03: You have the 1992 assignment, which is nothing about a reversionary interest. [00:18:51] Speaker 03: The 1993 Penroll agreement, where Clearpoint clearly assigns the application to Penroll, you have the October 1993 letters from Penroll to the two individuals, which they both signed, stating that they have no ownership interest in this application. [00:19:07] Speaker 03: And then you have this 14-year span where Vincent Bono refuses to put in writing a statement that these two individuals own the application. [00:19:17] Speaker 03: And they've never given us really a satisfactory explanation about why [00:19:21] Speaker 03: He refused to do that. [00:19:22] Speaker 03: So you put all this. [00:19:23] Speaker 00: I agree it's mysterious. [00:19:25] Speaker 00: What I'm trying to understand is why this is the business of the office to say that this went on for so long. [00:19:31] Speaker 00: So we're very curious as to what happened here and there. [00:19:34] Speaker 00: So please provide the chain of ownership from the beginning to now. [00:19:41] Speaker 03: Well, so the office was interested. [00:19:43] Speaker 03: During the prosecution proceedings, the office was interested because there was a disconnect between who owned the application in 1993. [00:19:51] Speaker 03: claimed to own the application in 1993 and who claimed to own the application. [00:19:54] Speaker 00: Well, I agree this is disconnect. [00:19:55] Speaker 00: I'm trying to understand why this is the business of the office. [00:19:59] Speaker 03: Like I said, there's a regulation, 37 CFR 3.73, which says that when an assignee is going to prosecute the application, there needs to be something in the record showing [00:20:14] Speaker 03: the assignee's right to do that. [00:20:16] Speaker 00: But they did that. [00:20:16] Speaker 00: They eventually got the document. [00:20:19] Speaker 03: Correct. [00:20:19] Speaker 03: And I mean, they eventually provided documents that the office accepted and allowed prosecution to continue. [00:20:25] Speaker 03: Now we're in district court where the rules are different. [00:20:29] Speaker 03: They have to show that they have the right to be in district court. [00:20:32] Speaker 03: They have to show standing that the district court has jurisdiction over this claim. [00:20:38] Speaker 00: Well, there's no question that being raised, I gather, [00:20:42] Speaker 00: But they are the current owners. [00:20:45] Speaker 00: And is it in order to establish an effective date going back to the beginning? [00:20:50] Speaker 00: Or why should it be different just because this happens to be a 145 action? [00:20:57] Speaker 03: Because, I mean, there is a question. [00:20:58] Speaker 03: We don't think that Realvert has any ownership interest in this application whatsoever. [00:21:02] Speaker 03: And so it would be no different than you or me going into district court and saying, [00:21:07] Speaker 03: we'd like you to review this patent application, the rejection of this patent application. [00:21:12] Speaker 00: For which I have an assignment. [00:21:14] Speaker 03: Well, no, they have no, I was referring to you or me because we have absolutely no interest, ownership interest in this application, just like real work does. [00:21:23] Speaker 03: So we don't allow anyone to just challenge a PTO determination [00:21:31] Speaker 03: regardless of their connection to this application. [00:21:33] Speaker 03: They have to show an ownership interest in this application for them to have standing for their being injured. [00:21:39] Speaker 03: Because if they don't have any ownership interest in this application, then they suffered no injury. [00:21:45] Speaker 00: I'm trying to understand why the current assignment is ineffective. [00:21:50] Speaker 03: There is no current assignment. [00:21:52] Speaker 00: They finally got an assignment, these two ex-employees. [00:21:59] Speaker 03: I'm not sure which assignment you're referring to, but the only written assignment that they ever received was a 2013, allegedly, a confirmatory assignment. [00:22:07] Speaker 00: Yes, that's the one. [00:22:10] Speaker 00: That's the one I'm referring to. [00:22:11] Speaker 00: I gather that was all that they were able to get after all these years. [00:22:15] Speaker 03: But Clearpoint cannot assign what it doesn't have. [00:22:18] Speaker 03: At that point, Clearpoint had already assigned to Penroll, right? [00:22:21] Speaker 03: Correct. [00:22:21] Speaker 03: In 1993, Clearpoint assigned to Penroll. [00:22:25] Speaker 00: Did they intervene and say, no, this is our patent? [00:22:28] Speaker 03: Penroll has not. [00:22:29] Speaker 03: been involved in the case whatsoever. [00:22:32] Speaker 03: And as far as I know, Penroll doesn't even exist anymore. [00:22:37] Speaker 03: The confirmatory assignment cannot be valid because Clearpoint, once they assigned, once Clearpoint assigned their rights to Penroll in 1993, they had no right to sign the application to anyone else. [00:22:49] Speaker 03: So there is absolutely no valid written assignment to real birth in this case. [00:22:56] Speaker 03: There are no further questions. [00:22:59] Speaker 00: You're not raising then the question of the propriety of the revival? [00:23:05] Speaker 03: No. [00:23:06] Speaker 03: The application was revived, and that's not an issue in this case. [00:23:12] Speaker 00: OK. [00:23:12] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:23:13] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:23:16] Speaker 00: All right. [00:23:16] Speaker 00: Mr. Delaney. [00:23:19] Speaker 04: As I've covered in the brief, from the history of this case, Tony and Joaquin came to the Patent Office in 1993. [00:23:26] Speaker 04: and they wanted to resume prosecution of the patent application at that time. [00:23:32] Speaker 04: They were told by the Patent Office properly and by counsel outside that they could not communicate with the Patent Office about the patent application because they did not have power of attorney. [00:23:45] Speaker 04: It was based on the 1992 assignment that was of record. [00:23:51] Speaker 04: The Patent Office was relying on that and saying, we cannot talk to you about this case. [00:23:55] Speaker 00: So where do you stand if, to state a possibility, we conclude that that oral conversation was insufficient, that you have to, if you assign an invention and an application has to be in writing? [00:24:12] Speaker 04: If you come to that conclusion, then I have nothing else to say. [00:24:15] Speaker 00: Is that it? [00:24:16] Speaker 00: Does that end it? [00:24:17] Speaker 00: That unless you can go back to 1993, your [00:24:21] Speaker 00: A chain of ownership or whatever it is that's being established. [00:24:25] Speaker 04: Yes, I believe the record is very clear and the evidence is very clear that there was a reversion agreement that was executed in 1993. [00:24:36] Speaker 04: But if there wasn't, then you lose. [00:24:39] Speaker 04: Then there would be nothing. [00:24:41] Speaker 04: There would be nothing. [00:24:44] Speaker 02: And that Judge Bryson was asking you about the subsidiary question about an assignment by force of law we need to decide whether this agreement qualifies under that rubric, right? [00:24:55] Speaker 02: Correct. [00:24:56] Speaker 02: You're relying on the Massachusetts state law. [00:24:59] Speaker 04: Yes. [00:25:00] Speaker 04: Yes. [00:25:00] Speaker 04: Yes, Your Honor. [00:25:02] Speaker 04: And I just want to point out that the declarations in this case, they're highly, highly detailed. [00:25:08] Speaker 04: They're sworn to under [00:25:10] Speaker 04: Section 1001 of Title 18 with the re-gramifications are attended upon that. [00:25:18] Speaker 04: The district court offers only a single criticism of one of the four declarations, and it states that the opinion only names the Vincent Bono Declaration of June 30th, 2008, and the district court gives one reason for finding that one declaration not credible. [00:25:35] Speaker 04: Vincent Bono refused for 14 years to sign a document assigning the 161 application to Tony and Joe Aquino. [00:25:42] Speaker 04: That is the single criticism that the court takes with any of the declaration evidence that was submitted in this case. [00:25:49] Speaker 04: And there are four declarations. [00:25:52] Speaker 04: The district court construes the single fact that's making all of Vincent Bono's declaration is not credible. [00:25:57] Speaker 04: But this is on page 14 of the opinion, Your Honor. [00:26:01] Speaker 04: But Vincent's reasons for refuting in the footnote, footnote 24. [00:26:06] Speaker 04: But Vincent's reasons for refusing to sign this document, such a document, for this period of time are highly documented throughout all four declarations. [00:26:16] Speaker 04: Furthermore, Vincent Bono's declaration explains the circumstances of the July 1993 Penroll Agreement. [00:26:24] Speaker 04: He goes into great detail. [00:26:26] Speaker 04: He also points out in his sworn declaration why [00:26:31] Speaker 04: July 1993 Penroll Agreement is not effective, and it's got conflicting provisions. [00:26:37] Speaker 04: In the second whereas clause, on the first page of the Penroll Agreement, it talks about, in point two of that second whereas clause, it talks about how Penroll's predecessor, Datability, did not get proper title to certain technologies that are associated with the Constellation switch. [00:26:58] Speaker 04: And because it didn't get proper title, it had to pay royalties. [00:27:02] Speaker 04: And then it goes on in section 4.3c. [00:27:06] Speaker 04: It talks about the claim that Tony and Joachim, the claim of ownership that Tony and Joachim had to that technology. [00:27:16] Speaker 04: So the penal agreement, although it talks about being an assignment, and it references the 161 application, it also talks about the ownership claim held by Tony and Joachim. [00:27:27] Speaker 04: It's not specific about exactly what that ownership claim is, but they still paid [00:27:31] Speaker 04: According to, and this is all in the evidence, they paid Tony and Joachim royalties based on their ownership claim that is referenced within that Penroll agreement. [00:27:41] Speaker 04: Furthermore, Penroll did nothing with that assignment document. [00:27:43] Speaker 04: Penroll basically went off and it no longer exists as a company to my knowledge or to anybody's knowledge. [00:27:57] Speaker 04: So that is my presentation if you have any other questions. [00:28:03] Speaker 00: Okay. [00:28:04] Speaker 00: Thank you. [00:28:05] Speaker 00: Thank you both. [00:28:05] Speaker 00: The case is taken under submission. [00:28:07] Speaker 04: Thank you. [00:28:08] Speaker 00: That concludes our argued cases for this morning.