[00:00:52] Speaker 02:
The next case is really two cases consolidated for argument, Charles Burris versus Department of Veterans Affairs, Ben Thompson versus Department of Veterans Affairs, 17-2001, 17-2003.

[00:01:08] Speaker 02:
Mr. Rosinski.

[00:01:12] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:01:16] Speaker 01:
May it please the Court.

[00:01:18] Speaker 01:
This case raises a single issue to the Court.

[00:01:20] Speaker 01:
as whether the Veterans Court erred by not even considering equitable relief in both of the cases below.

[00:01:31] Speaker 01:
This court has jurisdiction because this is a straightforward statutory interpretation issue.

[00:01:38] Speaker 03:
And what statute are we interpreting?

[00:01:40] Speaker 01:
We're interpreting both 7252 and 7261, 38 USC, which define the Veterans Court's jurisdiction

[00:01:49] Speaker 01:
as well as its scope.

[00:01:51] Speaker 02:
What about 38 USC 503?

[00:01:56] Speaker 01:
We don't believe that 503 has any impact on this argument because it relates strictly to the Secretary's authority and we believe that's independent of the Veterans Court authority which we believe derives from Article 3, Section 2 because the Veterans Court is an Article 1 court which has the judicial power of the United States.

[00:02:17] Speaker 00:
That judicial power includes... Just to be clear, so you're not asking us to decide whether the secretary's decision under the secretary's statute is 502 or 503?

[00:02:29] Speaker 00:
503, 30-UC-503.

[00:02:29] Speaker 00:
No, Your Honor.

[00:02:33] Speaker 00:
Whether that's viewable and what standards?

[00:02:35] Speaker 00:
There was some argument in rebuttal.

[00:02:37] Speaker 02:
Judge, ask the question, please.

[00:02:39] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:02:41] Speaker 01:
We are not raising any issue with 503 or any issue with the Secretary's action or inaction under 503 below.

[00:02:48] Speaker 00:
Just in some kind of inherent power of the Veterans Court under its grants of authority to do what you would like it to do.

[00:02:57] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:02:58] Speaker 01:
We believe.

[00:02:58] Speaker 00:
In one case, it's actually a monetary claim, specifically $50,000 of out-of-pocket reliance interest.

[00:03:07] Speaker 00:
In the other, it's what?

[00:03:09] Speaker 01:
In Mr. Thompson's case, it is approximately a $50,000 reliance harm, damage to him.

[00:03:18] Speaker 00:
And in Mr. Burris' case, what is the relief that you are asking?

[00:03:21] Speaker 00:
I thought it was, please remand this so that I can go and ask the secretary.

[00:03:26] Speaker 00:
And the Veterans Court said, we don't need to do that.

[00:03:29] Speaker 00:
Just go and ask the secretary, something like that.

[00:03:31] Speaker 01:
Mr. Burris did ask,

[00:03:33] Speaker 01:
for remand for that purpose, but he also asked, as stated in the opinion, the Veterans Court opinion, for the Veterans Court itself to consider equitable relief.

[00:03:46] Speaker 01:
Essentially, equitably tolling the time limit for the benefit that he was seeking below.

[00:03:58] Speaker 00:
And that kind of equitable tolling would not be tolling of a

[00:04:02] Speaker 00:
court filing requirement in the ordinary equitable tolling sense.

[00:04:07] Speaker 01:
That is correct.

[00:04:08] Speaker 00:
And all the cases, tell me if I'm wrong, that you have pointed to, including the Seventh Circuit case in the tax court context, are about tolling time limits for filing before a tribunal.

[00:04:20] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:04:20] Speaker 01:
What we're seeking is to apply that same tolling theory to a time limit for a benefit of which, at the time that the occurrence has occurred,

[00:04:32] Speaker 01:
he was eligible for, then some activities that he had no control over occurred.

[00:04:39] Speaker 01:
His mother died.

[00:04:41] Speaker 01:
And that told the time limit for that benefit.

[00:04:47] Speaker 01:
And we distinguished that from the cases where you're asking for a benefit that you were not eligible for or has been explicitly

[00:04:57] Speaker 01:
taken away by Congress.

[00:04:58] Speaker 01:
For example, you cannot get more than one year retroactive benefit.

[00:05:03] Speaker 03:
Is it your position though that the statutory provision that creates the court and defines the jurisdiction of the court necessarily includes conveying authority for broad equitable powers beyond the kind that Judge Toronto was talking about that would be an aid of the specific powers?

[00:05:25] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:05:26] Speaker 01:
We believe that Congress did not explicitly take away any of the Article III judicial powers of the United States.

[00:05:36] Speaker 03:
They could have, because it is an Article I. So it's not an Article III court.

[00:05:39] Speaker 03:
That's part of my problem.

[00:05:40] Speaker 03:
You agree that Article I courts are creatures of statutes.

[00:05:43] Speaker 03:
I mean, we're all creatures of statutes.

[00:05:44] Speaker 03:
The scope of our jurisdiction is, anyway, even though our court is created by the Constitution.

[00:05:50] Speaker 03:
But Article I courts are, by definition, creatures of statute, right?

[00:05:54] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:05:55] Speaker 03:
So the scope of their jurisdiction has to be defined in a statute.

[00:05:58] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:05:59] Speaker 01:
I would draw the Court's attention.

[00:06:01] Speaker 03:
But you agree that there's no express provision for broad-ranging equitable powers.

[00:06:07] Speaker 01:
There is no express provision in the statute that created the Veterans Court.

[00:06:13] Speaker 01:
However, I would draw your attention to a case that I don't believe I was cited in our brief.

[00:06:18] Speaker 01:
Freytag v. Commissioner 501 US 888 and 889

[00:06:24] Speaker 01:
that they discuss the powers of an Article I court, and that is where they state they cannot state, they reverse it, but essentially it says an Article I court has the Article III, Section II powers because they have the judicial powers of the United States, which necessarily includes all the Article III powers unless there is explicit congressional withholding of that or... What's the citation on that one?

[00:06:53] Speaker 01:
501 U.S.

[00:06:55] Speaker 01:
at 888 and 899.

[00:07:02] Speaker 00:
That's a Supreme Court case about the Article III and Article I constitutionality of the tax court.

[00:07:09] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:07:11] Speaker 01:
But the theory applies here.

[00:07:12] Speaker 01:
It's an Article I court which was created and Congress specified the jurisdiction but did not withhold any particular jurisdiction here.

[00:07:23] Speaker 00:
So let me ask you, I guess, the question from the viewpoint of OPM and what is it, McCrae, our kind of, McKay, sorry, McKay, the kind of follow on to OPM in this veterans arena.

[00:07:39] Speaker 00:
How is it that one could get out of some sort of background component of a judicial authority, equitable authority, the power to

[00:07:53] Speaker 00:
order monetary payments from the government that are not authorized by statute, consistent with the core rationale of OPM against Mitchell.

[00:08:04] Speaker 01:
Well, OPM and McKay discuss relief that we are not seeking here.

[00:08:10] Speaker 01:
We are seeking, we are not seeking benefits that Congress has not authorized.

[00:08:16] Speaker 01:
We are seeking relief.

[00:08:18] Speaker 01:
for errors.

[00:08:19] Speaker 00:
You're seeking benefits in violation of the terms that Congress set for the payment of said benefits.

[00:08:25] Speaker 01:
No, Your Honor.

[00:08:26] Speaker 01:
Mr. Thompson is asking for the difference for the harm, the damages caused to him by the government's error.

[00:08:32] Speaker 01:
He is not asking for 48 months or extra months.

[00:08:36] Speaker 00:
When does damages for harm come within the equitable authority of any tribunal as opposed to requiring a sovereign immunity, a waiver of the sort that

[00:08:49] Speaker 00:
Congress did provide in the Tucker Act.

[00:08:52] Speaker 00:
Not necessarily applicable to this situation, the Federal Tort Claims Act, but those?

[00:08:58] Speaker 01:
Well, I believe we cited in our brief the case hold that supports this detrimental reliance in good faith on government employees.

[00:09:07] Speaker 00:
I'm not questioning for a second the equities here, but where does some sort of equitable authority of a tribunal

[00:09:18] Speaker 00:
include, say in Mr. Thompson's case, the authority to award damages for reliance?

[00:09:29] Speaker 01:
Well, the equitable relief here is to weigh the equities here is unfair, to resolve the unfairness to Mr. Thompson and Mr. Burris and his situation because of a government error or because of a situation

[00:09:49] Speaker 01:
outside the control of the veteran.

[00:09:51] Speaker 01:
And Congress, in all of its jurisdiction for the veteran, the solicitude towards the veteran, and we believe that the inherent authority of the veteran's court under the theory we've laid out, Article 3, not being restricted in any means by Congress, and that Congress, having solicitude for the veteran, could have taken it away if they didn't want the same

[00:10:16] Speaker 03:
But money damages and equitable relief are almost always considered totally different, right?

[00:10:24] Speaker 03:
And what you're asking for, as you said, yes, I mean, even as the Veterans Court said, he is sympathetic to the position that the veteran was in.

[00:10:37] Speaker 03:
But the question is who has the authority to remedy that sympathy, that inequity?

[00:10:42] Speaker 03:
The secretary does.

[00:10:44] Speaker 01:
The secretary has independent authority to do so if he, in his discretion, unreviewable discretion.

[00:10:52] Speaker 02:
What's discretionary?

[00:10:54] Speaker 01:
It is discretionary.

[00:10:57] Speaker 01:
We are not questioning the secretary's denial of this.

[00:11:00] Speaker 01:
Both were denied.

[00:11:02] Speaker 01:
We are saying that the Veterans Court has, we believe, it's not expansion of the scope.

[00:11:08] Speaker 01:
We believe it's inherent in the scope, similar in Monk where the

[00:11:11] Speaker 01:
class action, aggregate action capability was there, just not recognized by the Veterans Court, to do what Congress wants for veterans, which is not to be harmed or damaged.

[00:11:22] Speaker 01:
Perhaps I'm using the wrong term here, but to be made whole when the government accidentally or for whatever reason.

[00:11:30] Speaker 03:
But the right to use a class action vehicle isn't an equitable principle.

[00:11:35] Speaker 03:
I mean, it's a different vehicle to obtain the very same benefits that are

[00:11:40] Speaker 03:
that are authorized by law.

[00:11:42] Speaker 01:
But the Veterans Court used the same justification that they were not authorized to do that.

[00:11:48] Speaker 01:
This court found that it did have authorization.

[00:11:51] Speaker 01:
Go back and resolve each of the individual cases.

[00:11:55] Speaker 03:
But again, the authorization that we found was because it was tied expressly to or clearly to the jurisdiction that was granted to the Veterans Court by Congress, right?

[00:12:10] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor, and we believe we're making where we're trying to make the same argument here is that Congress created an Article I court without restrictions in this area, no explicit restrictions.

[00:12:21] Speaker 01:
Therefore, it has the authority, similar to having the authority to do class actions, it has the authority to consider equitable relief.

[00:12:28] Speaker 01:
The other restrictions on equity, equitable relief against the government still apply, but the court needs to apply it to the facts in the individual case, similar to mine.

[00:12:40] Speaker 01:
Not just a blanket, we have no authority to have class actions.

[00:12:43] Speaker 01:
But we've considered a class action here.

[00:12:46] Speaker 01:
It's not appropriate.

[00:12:47] Speaker 01:
They could do the same here.

[00:12:49] Speaker 01:
As one of the judges in the dissent below said, equitable remedy may be found unwarranted, but it should not properly be unavailable.

[00:12:59] Speaker 01:
So if the damages for Mr. Thompson are, as I said, used the wrong term, the court can say damages are not allowed.

[00:13:09] Speaker 01:
under equity or we don't find equity compels us to pay this difference for reliance.

[00:13:15] Speaker 02:
Was the Veterans Court reviewing the denials by the secretary?

[00:13:19] Speaker 01:
No.

[00:13:21] Speaker 01:
He was reviewing the case below, and there was an argument in both cases that at bottom, the court should do the right thing.

[00:13:29] Speaker 01:
And the court interpreted both of those as requests for equitable relief, I believe, properly.

[00:13:35] Speaker 02:
Which it said it had no authority to do.

[00:13:37] Speaker 01:
It had no authority.

[00:13:38] Speaker 01:
It did not address individual claims, whether it can toll

[00:13:41] Speaker 00:
this particular, or in general, toll a time limit or toll it in this particular instance, or whether... But the time limit that you're talking about is not a time limit for filing the paper that initiates the tribunals, the case in front of the tribunal.

[00:13:58] Speaker 01:
Absolutely, Your Honor.

[00:13:59] Speaker 01:
We're using it as an example of tolling and that in equity, in fairness, the court could say, yes, it needed to be, he needed another three months because he lost three months in the middle of this for

[00:14:12] Speaker 01:
a good and fair reason.

[00:14:14] Speaker 01:
So we believe it may even be less significant than tolling a court appeal, because you can bring all the issues.

[00:14:23] Speaker 01:
We're asking for a specific issue.

[00:14:25] Speaker 01:
And we believe that the authority listed is not to veto the secretary or to question the secretary.

[00:14:33] Speaker 01:
It's an independent.

[00:14:33] Speaker 01:
After the secretary has acted, after the claims are up, the Veterans Court sits above that and says,

[00:14:40] Speaker 01:
We think this should be done in fairness.

[00:14:44] Speaker 01:
The issue that we have here is we believe Congress did not intend that the only relief for veterans who are harmed or damaged by honest mistakes of the government, delay, or misinformation, which is clear from this record, is not just sympathy, which is what the court always says.

[00:15:02] Speaker 01:
We sympathize with the veteran.

[00:15:04] Speaker 01:
Our hands are tied.

[00:15:05] Speaker 01:
We don't believe their hands are actually tied.

[00:15:08] Speaker 01:
They have dated.

[00:15:10] Speaker 01:
and questionable precedent within their own court to come to this conclusion hasn't been reviewed in 20 years.

[00:15:19] Speaker 01:
And we believe that what we have put forward as far as the lack of restriction by Congress and the question as in the cases in this court in Bailey, is there any reason Congress would not want the veterans to have the same right to equity in these types of decisions and at least

[00:15:40] Speaker 01:
the power in the Veterans Court, even if they use it very extraordinarily, that is a power that's very, very compelling that Congress did not say we did not grant.

[00:15:52] Speaker 02:
Counsel, you've just about used up your rebuttal time, but we'll give you two minutes for rebuttal.

[00:15:57] Speaker 01:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:16:03] Speaker 02:
Ms.

[00:16:03] Speaker 02:
Onyema, is it?

[00:16:04] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:16:07] Speaker 03:
Let me just ask a few basic questions.

[00:16:09] Speaker 03:
Factual questions.

[00:16:11] Speaker 03:
So the secretary denied relief in one of the two cases, under 503.

[00:16:16] Speaker 03:
But the secretary's basis was there was no mistake by any employee.

[00:16:21] Speaker 03:
But there's clearly a mistake by an employee, right?

[00:16:24] Speaker 04:
There were two certificates that were sent, one that did include the incorrect date and one that had the incorrect number of remaining eligibility months and one that did not.

[00:16:34] Speaker 03:
Right.

[00:16:35] Speaker 03:
But the incorrect one came second.

[00:16:38] Speaker 03:
Correct.

[00:16:38] Speaker 03:
Right.

[00:16:39] Speaker 03:
So, and that's, and the, at least on the facts here, there is a claim that the correct one was never received.

[00:16:46] Speaker 03:
That is what Mr. Thompson argued below.

[00:16:49] Speaker 03:
Correct.

[00:16:50] Speaker 03:
Now I get the fact that we're not allowed to review the secretary's discretion and that they're not even asking us to do that.

[00:16:57] Speaker 03:
But do you, are you aware of whether the secretary's ever exercised the authority under 503 to grant the type of relief that is expressly authorized in that provision?

[00:17:09] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor, the secretary, for example, in fiscal year 2016 granted equitable relief in 20 cases.

[00:17:16] Speaker 04:
And so the secretary publishes a report as is required by statute to Congress and that's published each year.

[00:17:22] Speaker 04:
And the equitable relief included the payment of monies?

[00:17:25] Speaker 04:
Yes.

[00:17:26] Speaker 04:
And so by the statute under 503, the secretary can award any equitable relief he deems appropriate and that includes the payment of money.

[00:17:33] Speaker 03:
Okay.

[00:17:33] Speaker 03:
So you don't argue as Darrow seems to imply that even if the secretary

[00:17:38] Speaker 03:
it's him or herself had the power under 503 that the appropriations clause would prevent the exercise of that power.

[00:17:48] Speaker 04:
That's correct.

[00:17:48] Speaker 04:
If the secretary is exercising that authority, I believe there is a statute that allows for necessary expenses that the VA uses to pay for claims for equitable relief.

[00:18:00] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:18:01] Speaker 03:
Then moving forward, you argue that the court does not have

[00:18:07] Speaker 03:
general equitable powers.

[00:18:10] Speaker 03:
Do we need to go that far to conclude that even if they had equitable powers, it wouldn't include the authority to order the payment of money?

[00:18:21] Speaker 04:
I don't think we need to go that far.

[00:18:22] Speaker 04:
And I'm happy to talk more about the equitable powers in general.

[00:18:25] Speaker 04:
But in terms of the ability to order money, any request for relief that involves payment of money from federal public funds

[00:18:35] Speaker 04:
needs to be authorized by statute.

[00:18:37] Speaker 04:
And here there is no corresponding statute, especially given that the statutes that govern the adjudication of benefits under section 511, Mr. Burrs and Thompson don't qualify for the benefits under those statutes.

[00:18:49] Speaker 04:
So there's two separate concerns or two separate problems with their argument.

[00:18:53] Speaker 04:
One is the general principles of sovereign immunity, but the second is the lack of an appropriation.

[00:18:59] Speaker 03:
But your argument that the court has no general equitable powers

[00:19:04] Speaker 03:
Wouldn't that fly in the face of some of the times when we authorized the exercise of things like tolling of the filing limits?

[00:19:12] Speaker 04:
Well, Your Honor, there's a distinction between the equitable powers that are encompassed, for example, within the All Writs Act, this court discussed in Monk, which relate to procedural issues.

[00:19:22] Speaker 04:
And so this court noted that the ability to certify a class is a procedural tool that is exercised under the All Writs Act, which does not serve to expand the jurisdiction of the Veterans Court

[00:19:34] Speaker 04:
It simply enables it to carry out its existing jurisdiction.

[00:19:38] Speaker 04:
So the ultimate question is still, within 7252, is there a basis for the Veterans Court to consider the underlying issue?

[00:19:46] Speaker 04:
And so in Monk, the underlying arguments were benefits under 511.

[00:19:51] Speaker 04:
The only question was whether or not there was a procedural tool available to the court while adjudicating those claims and reviewing those claims.

[00:20:01] Speaker 04:
but it was still within the structure, the general and detailed structure of Section 511, which questions the statutory entitlement to benefits, which is separate and distinct from this narrow carve-out that Congress has prescribed to the Secretary under 503 to award equitable relief for individuals who don't meet the statutory entitlement.

[00:20:21] Speaker 03:
And you rely on the appropriations clause and sovereign immunity, and I get why those are background things to consider in determining what the

[00:20:30] Speaker 03:
what the scope of jurisdiction is that's granted by statute, but doesn't this at bottom fall down to a real statutory interpretation?

[00:20:40] Speaker 04:
It does go into a statutory interpretation question.

[00:20:42] Speaker 04:
So if 7252 states what the jurisdiction is of the veterans court.

[00:20:50] Speaker 04:
And so the question becomes under that statute, is there sort of this inherent power to consider areas that are not included

[00:20:58] Speaker 04:
Um, apart that are not just related to benefits, but also relief.

[00:21:02] Speaker 04:
However, in interpreting that statute, um, 72 52 notes that, um, the veteran's courts jurisdiction, um, reviews what the board does under, and under the under 71, I believe oh four, the board only has jurisdiction to review determinations on benefits.

[00:21:20] Speaker 04:
And so those are the determinations that are made daily by the regional offices as delegated delegated authority.

[00:21:26] Speaker 03:
So how would

[00:21:27] Speaker 03:
I mean, I think that's my point.

[00:21:29] Speaker 03:
If the statute says your authority is to review the decisions of the board and the decisions of the board are limited to award of benefits by statute, doesn't that end the inquiry?

[00:21:39] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:21:40] Speaker 04:
We would argue that it doesn't end the inquiry there.

[00:21:43] Speaker 00:
And just as a kind of threshold matter, we haven't got to everything you just said about why we have a statutory question in front of us makes it clear, does it not, that we have jurisdiction to decide that question?

[00:21:58] Speaker 00:
traded the first argument in your brief here and probably every single veteran brief you filed.

[00:22:04] Speaker 04:
Well, respectfully, Your Honor, when we were reviewing the decisions of the Veterans Court, we noted that the Veterans Court did not expressly discuss the relevant statutes.

[00:22:13] Speaker 00:
It said we have no authority.

[00:22:15] Speaker 04:
It said that under controlling statutes in our case law, we do not have authority.

[00:22:21] Speaker 04:
So we viewed that under, I believe it's the Forchet case as them not elaborating on what those statutes were.

[00:22:27] Speaker 04:
But certainly, if the court finds that they're interpreting statute, we would agree that there's jurisdiction.

[00:22:31] Speaker 04:
And the bulk of our brief is spent discussing why on the merits they don't prevail.

[00:22:36] Speaker 03:
Is there still an opportunity for Mr. Burris to petition the secretary?

[00:22:47] Speaker 04:
He actually did petition the secretary in 2017.

[00:22:49] Speaker 04:
So after the Veterans Court decision, he filed his petition.

[00:22:54] Speaker 04:
And it's currently pending.

[00:22:56] Speaker 04:
Because of this case, certainly if the court were to determine that the Veterans Court can't award equitable relief, then there's the possibility of a double recovery if the secretary also considered whether equitable relief was appropriate.

[00:23:08] Speaker 04:
So he has since filed a petition.

[00:23:10] Speaker 04:
If the court has no further questions, we respectfully request the court.

[00:23:17] Speaker 03:
Can I just ask, what weight do you put on the tax court case, the Frye tax

[00:23:23] Speaker 03:
versus commissioner.

[00:23:24] Speaker 03:
I mean, it seems there that they were addressing a different principle, but there is some broad language that your friend on the other side points to.

[00:23:35] Speaker 04:
Yes, Your Honor, and I'm not familiar with the case, but ultimately I would find that that doesn't change the analysis here because still there must be an express waiver of sovereign immunity that would open up the federal government to suits and equity.

[00:23:49] Speaker 04:
before the veterans court, especially when those suits would run counter to congressional statute.

[00:23:57] Speaker 04:
So if the court has no further questions, we respectfully request the court affirm.

[00:24:01] Speaker 02:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:24:02] Speaker 02:
Mr. Rosinski has two minutes for rebuttal.

[00:24:06] Speaker 01:
Yes, your honor.

[00:24:08] Speaker 01:
As my learned professor of law colleague pointed out, the proper term for damage is restitution, is what Mr. Thompson is seeking.

[00:24:20] Speaker 01:
And as far as the remedies under equity, they are, you know, an equity system is remedies when the remedies at law are inadequate.

[00:24:28] Speaker 01:
And I think in every case that we've identified and hundreds others where the court says their hands are tied, it's because they say, we can't help you under the law and we sympathize with you because the law is inadequate in it to answer or make you whole in this question.

[00:24:46] Speaker 01:
One other point I wanted to mention is that the Veterans Court Rule 8,

[00:24:51] Speaker 01:
which was created under the authority of the Congress for the Court to make its own rules is entitled suspension of secretarial action.

[00:25:00] Speaker 01:
So it's another example of where the Veterans Court actually uses its inherent equitable authority to temporarily halt secretarial action.

[00:25:14] Speaker 01:
And it's been applied in cases that I have where the Secretary is threatening

[00:25:18] Speaker 01:
to send an action for collection before the investigation and the challenge or the appeal of that action was done.

[00:25:27] Speaker 01:
And they told the secretary, you've got to stop.

[00:25:30] Speaker 01:
And the secretary does stop.

[00:25:32] Speaker 01:
So there is an example of exactly what the Monk Court has described the authority of Congress to let the Veterans Court implement those unspoken or implicit

[00:25:48] Speaker 01:
powers under its judicial power of the United States.

[00:25:53] Speaker 02:
No questions, I thank the court.