[00:00:41] Speaker 02:
Counselor Kenkel, you've reserved five minutes of time for rebuttal, correct?

[00:00:46] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:00:47] Speaker 02:
And the appellee is dividing their time up 12 minutes for attorney acres and three minutes for attorney annals.

[00:00:57] Speaker 02:
Correct, Your Honor.

[00:00:58] Speaker 02:
OK.

[00:00:58] Speaker 02:
You may proceed, sir.

[00:01:00] Speaker 03:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:01:04] Speaker 03:
May it please the court.

[00:01:05] Speaker 03:
Rongxin Dong, Rongxin, known as Rongxin,

[00:01:08] Speaker 03:
was subject to an administrative review concerning an anti-dumping case before the US Department of Commerce, DOC.

[00:01:15] Speaker 03:
Rongsheng has two broad arguments here.

[00:01:18] Speaker 03:
One is that the initiation of that review was void ab initio.

[00:01:22] Speaker 03:
It was void because Dixon Ticonderoga, the alleged petitioner, requested a review and did not meet the standards in the dumping statute.

[00:01:33] Speaker 03:
Because of that, Rongxin complained in its case brief that the review was void.

[00:01:42] Speaker 03:
Specifically, in its letter requesting review, Dixon said that it was a US importer and a producer of subject merchandise.

[00:01:51] Speaker 03:
Subject merchandise is a term of art.

[00:01:54] Speaker 03:
It applies to foreign exports under a dumping order.

[00:01:57] Speaker 02:
I think it was later stated that that was an error.

[00:02:02] Speaker 03:
They did state that.

[00:02:03] Speaker 03:
But still, it was an error.

[00:02:04] Speaker 03:
That was stated much later after the review.

[00:02:07] Speaker 02:
In the review itself... Is it disputed that they actually manufacture pencils in the United States?

[00:02:15] Speaker 03:
It's very much disputed, Your Honor, yes.

[00:02:18] Speaker 03:
And that came to the fore in the first remand at the lower court.

[00:02:22] Speaker 04:
But Commerce made a finding about that, right, based on pictures of a facility in Georgia or something?

[00:02:30] Speaker 03:
It made a decision based upon both the letter that was filed by the letter requesting the review, filed by Dixon, and its rebuttal brief, both of which failed to meet the standard of the statute.

[00:02:46] Speaker 03:
Because the statute has spoken,

[00:02:48] Speaker 03:
Under the ship they submitted invoices another document that was it that was it that was not until the first remand That's not in the review itself.

[00:02:56] Speaker 03:
That's in the first remand and In those I did submit a lot of information in during that first remand But I direct the court to wrong shins to rebuttals in that first remand where two things wrong shin provided one it found dozens of

[00:03:14] Speaker 03:
what it called errors in the so-called screenshots supplied by Dixon of its production in Macon, Georgia.

[00:03:22] Speaker 03:
And in all those screenshots, in those dozens of incongruities that Rongxin found, it also found that the, it also supplied in its second response in that first remand,

[00:03:40] Speaker 03:
two documents on the internet.

[00:03:43] Speaker 03:
One was by the U.S.

[00:03:44] Speaker 03:
Department of Labor, OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

[00:03:48] Speaker 03:
It investigated just the year earlier Dixon's facility in Macon, Georgia.

[00:03:55] Speaker 03:
It called it a distribution warehouse and it said that all Dixon

[00:03:59] Speaker 03:
did there was basically painting logos on finished, already finished pencils.

[00:04:08] Speaker 03:
The record shows that Dixon has plants in China and Mexico and Canada, but OSHA found no pencil production in Macon, Georgia.

[00:04:18] Speaker 03:
It only found painting of logos.

[00:04:20] Speaker 03:
Then the same month, and this is simply one year prior to our period of review,

[00:04:25] Speaker 03:
The CEO of Dixon was interviewed by a radio station, and this is on the record.

[00:04:31] Speaker 05:
Can I ask you, where is this in your blue brief?

[00:04:36] Speaker 05:
Because I have to say, I read your brief as not actually disputing whether they actually produced pencils.

[00:04:43] Speaker 05:
I could be wrong, so please identify.

[00:04:56] Speaker 03:
Well, I cannot direct you to the exact page of, well, actually, maybe I can.

[00:05:01] Speaker 05:
And I understand it was disputed below.

[00:05:03] Speaker 05:
I just didn't know that it was disputed before us.

[00:05:28] Speaker 03:
Well, my brief is very long, Your Honor.

[00:05:31] Speaker 03:
I don't see it offhand.

[00:05:33] Speaker 05:
Maybe you could look for it while your adversaries, when you sit down, maybe while your adversary's talking, you could look for it.

[00:05:42] Speaker 03:
Sure.

[00:05:42] Speaker 04:
Thank you.

[00:05:43] Speaker 04:
Just this one paragraph on page 36 of your brief.

[00:05:48] Speaker 04:
Dixon failed to show.

[00:05:53] Speaker 04:
The rest seems to be a variety of legal arguments, that it was improper to

[00:05:57] Speaker 04:
Right, Your Honor.

[00:05:59] Speaker 03:
Yes, I cite the OSHA press release and Dixon CEO's statement on page 36, the first full paragraph.

[00:06:06] Speaker 03:
Thank you.

[00:06:07] Speaker 05:
Is that the sum and substance of the argument?

[00:06:12] Speaker 03:
Basically, they didn't meet the statute.

[00:06:14] Speaker 03:
There's two.

[00:06:15] Speaker 03:
That's one of them.

[00:06:16] Speaker 03:
That's the second one.

[00:06:17] Speaker 05:
I surely appreciated the other arguments.

[00:06:19] Speaker 05:
This is the only one where I didn't appreciate that this was a separate argument.

[00:06:24] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor, it is a separate argument.

[00:06:26] Speaker 03:
The first is that commerce had no discretion.

[00:06:28] Speaker 03:
Under the Chevron test, the first prong is met.

[00:06:31] Speaker 03:
Congress has spoken clearly to the issue of who an interested party is.

[00:06:36] Speaker 03:
Dixon did not even allege that it met that test, that it complied with the statute.

[00:06:41] Speaker 03:
And therefore, because it's crystal clear, we don't get to the second prong of the Chevron case in that commerce has the ability to interpret, that the court should listen to its interpretation because either

[00:06:54] Speaker 03:
It's not addressed in the statute, or it's not clear, or it's ambiguous.

[00:06:58] Speaker 03:
Commerce simply goes to the second prong, saying it can't interpret.

[00:07:04] Speaker 03:
And it doesn't even address the first prong of the Chevron test in its opening brief.

[00:07:11] Speaker 02:
So the CIT and Rasheen II, they affirm Commerce's finding that Dixon was a domestic producer, withstanding to request an administrative review

[00:07:24] Speaker 02:
Now, I understand that Dixon also was certified for CDOSA refunds.

[00:07:33] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:07:33] Speaker 02:
And to get those refunds, you have to be a domestic producer.

[00:07:40] Speaker 03:
You're correct, Your Honor.

[00:07:41] Speaker 03:
The CDSOA statute is a different statute.

[00:07:45] Speaker 03:
What was it?

[00:07:46] Speaker 02:
Byrd disbursements?

[00:07:48] Speaker 03:
Yes, Byrd amendments.

[00:07:48] Speaker 03:
It's known as the Byrd Amendment.

[00:07:51] Speaker 03:
And after Senator Byrd, who submitted it to the Senate.

[00:07:55] Speaker 03:
That's a different statute.

[00:07:57] Speaker 03:
It's enforced by the US Customs and Border Protection under different regulations.

[00:08:02] Speaker 03:
It is not subject to the dumping law itself.

[00:08:05] Speaker 03:
But the CIT also considered this particular fact.

[00:08:08] Speaker 03:
It did.

[00:08:09] Speaker 03:
It did consider it.

[00:08:10] Speaker 03:
And the CIT found,

[00:08:11] Speaker 03:
that the evidence supplied by Dixon outweighed the counter evidence submitted by Rong Shen.

[00:08:17] Speaker 03:
And that's why we have that second opinion by the lower court.

[00:08:23] Speaker 03:
But that, in Dixon's mind, just a year before, all they're doing is putting logos on pencils.

[00:08:32] Speaker 03:
In their mind, that might be sufficient for them to request millions of dollars under the Byrd Amendment.

[00:08:40] Speaker 03:
But the point is that they were certified.

[00:08:42] Speaker 02:
They didn't just request it.

[00:08:44] Speaker 02:
They were certified to receive funding.

[00:08:46] Speaker 03:
Yes, and they did.

[00:08:47] Speaker 03:
They did.

[00:08:47] Speaker 03:
But in their mind, and this is why I mentioned the Brother case in detail in my brief, was to show that painting a logo on an already finished pencil under the dumping statute does not constitute substantial production in the US.

[00:09:07] Speaker 03:
That's required by the US International Trade Commission, for example.

[00:09:10] Speaker 03:
Or to be a petitioner, but not to be an interested party.

[00:09:14] Speaker 03:
You still have to, every proceeding stands on its own under the dumping law.

[00:09:19] Speaker 03:
So for each administrative review, you start from the beginning.

[00:09:23] Speaker 03:
And therefore, you have to, because you're starting over, you have to act as if nothing happened beforehand.

[00:09:30] Speaker 03:
So sure, they were a petitioner, I don't know, 15 years early maybe, like 1993 or 94.

[00:09:37] Speaker 03:
But again, they're a competitor of Rong Xin.

[00:09:41] Speaker 03:
Just recently before that, their Chinese affiliate had gotten out of the dumping order.

[00:09:45] Speaker 03:
It had participated in these administrative reviews, and it had been excluded from the dumping order.

[00:09:50] Speaker 03:
So clearly, their focus had changed in the intervening years since they were a petitioner in the early 90s to focus on their Chinese production.

[00:10:01] Speaker 03:
But they also have production in Mexico and Canada.

[00:10:05] Speaker 03:
Here is the United States government, Department of Labor, finding no pencil production.

[00:10:10] Speaker 03:
The CEO of Dixon is saying, we don't produce pencils, we have 5,000 square feet.

[00:10:14] Speaker 03:
I mean, that's 50 feet by 100.

[00:10:18] Speaker 03:
Okay, 5,000 square feet, that's nothing for, you know, we all know the name Dixon Ticonderoga, we grew up with it.

[00:10:25] Speaker 03:
Clearly, it changed its focus to overseas production, and the CEO didn't even admit it.

[00:10:30] Speaker 03:
They have a screening process.

[00:10:31] Speaker 02:
I think you'd better get to the other issue.

[00:10:33] Speaker 03:
OK.

[00:10:33] Speaker 03:
The second issue is, if the initiation was legitimate, then did commerce correctly find, based upon substantial evidence on the record, that Rongxin was under control by the government of China?

[00:10:50] Speaker 03:
I refer.

[00:10:50] Speaker 03:
This is actually a very simple issue.

[00:10:55] Speaker 03:
I refer the court to the Articles of Association that were provided by Rong Shin and its Section A responses.

[00:11:10] Speaker 03:
The Commerce Department found.

[00:11:12] Speaker 04:
You have a joint appendix page?

[00:11:16] Speaker 03:
Yes, Your Honor.

[00:11:26] Speaker 03:
I believe it was the second supplemental.

[00:11:29] Speaker 03:
It was either the first Section A response, Appendix 0156, or it was the second one, 0606.

[00:11:39] Speaker 03:
But in those articles of association, commerce relies solely on Article 7.2.

[00:11:50] Speaker 03:
Rongxin today is making public

[00:11:53] Speaker 03:
the contents of Article 7 itself.

[00:11:57] Speaker 03:
Each of those articles are basically the same as any statute in America.

[00:12:02] Speaker 03:
Each article, like every statutory provision, discusses a separate and unique concept.

[00:12:08] Speaker 02:
OK?

[00:12:09] Speaker 02:
Who's the major shareholder?

[00:12:12] Speaker 03:
It's called Shandong International Trade Group.

[00:12:16] Speaker 02:
And the percentage of ownership is over 50%?

[00:12:20] Speaker 03:
Yes.

[00:12:21] Speaker 03:
And that, in turn, is owned by SESAC, which is an entity of the Chinese government.

[00:12:28] Speaker 03:
And because of that, commerce felt that Rongxin was owned or controlled by the Chinese government.

[00:12:37] Speaker 03:
Commerce looked at the Articles of Association.

[00:12:39] Speaker 03:
It didn't look at the provision regarding voting by shareholders.

[00:12:42] Speaker 03:
The whole issue here is you have possibly 11 shareholders.

[00:12:48] Speaker 03:
SITG is one of them, so one-eleventh of all shareholders.

[00:12:51] Speaker 03:
It does have a majority.

[00:12:53] Speaker 03:
The board of directors is comprised of six people.

[00:12:55] Speaker 03:
In the POR, there are only five.

[00:12:58] Speaker 03:
The articles of association state that SITG can only nominate one of those six people.

[00:13:07] Speaker 03:
It did.

[00:13:08] Speaker 03:
The other four, and there are only five total, the other four were the next four largest shareholders of Rongsheng, who are also employees.

[00:13:16] Speaker 02:
You're well into your rebuttal time.

[00:13:19] Speaker 02:
Can you sum up and tell us why?

[00:13:22] Speaker 03:
To sum up, Commerce used Article 7.2, which regards capital contribution.

[00:13:29] Speaker 03:
It says, perform the company's responsibility according to their shares.

[00:13:35] Speaker 03:
Commerce viewed that as saying,

[00:13:37] Speaker 03:
that you can vote based upon how much you own.

[00:13:39] Speaker 03:
If you own 60%, you get 60% of the vote.

[00:13:42] Speaker 03:
So the section on capital contribution, they tried to put that into the section concerning voting.

[00:13:49] Speaker 03:
In all the articles, while it doesn't talk about the voting other than saying SITG can only nominate one and have one person on the board,

[00:14:03] Speaker 03:
Congress just blurs the issue.

[00:14:06] Speaker 03:
It tries to pigeonhole something that has nothing to do with voting into the voting article.

[00:14:11] Speaker 03:
Plus, any time in the Articles of Association it talks about how votes are cast, it always says two-thirds of the shareholders.

[00:14:20] Speaker 03:
Nowhere in the articles does it ever talk about any kind of vote based upon how many shares you own.

[00:14:27] Speaker 03:
When it does mention it, it always says two-thirds of the shareholders.

[00:14:31] Speaker 03:
Therefore, it was not reasonable

[00:14:33] Speaker 03:
For commerce to take something regarding capital contribution, stick it in the voting article and assume that the vote is based upon amount of shares.

[00:14:43] Speaker 03:
OK.

[00:14:43] Speaker 03:
We have your article.

[00:14:53] Speaker 02:
Thank you.

[00:14:54] Speaker 02:
20 acres.

[00:14:54] Speaker 02:
You have two minutes, correct?

[00:14:57] Speaker 01:
12, yes, Your Honor.

[00:14:59] Speaker 02:
12, yes.

[00:15:00] Speaker 01:
Nate, please, the court, your honors.

[00:15:01] Speaker 01:
I'll address the first issue related to the interested party status and then move to the separate rate issue.

[00:15:06] Speaker 01:
Ronkshin puts forth a number of arguments as to why Commerce's determination that Dixon was an interested party is wrong.

[00:15:14] Speaker 01:
First, up here today, Ronkshin argues that because Dixon used the phrase subject merchandise in its letter submitted to Commerce, that somehow precludes a finding

[00:15:24] Speaker 01:
that Dixon was, in fact, a United States producer of pencils.

[00:15:28] Speaker 01:
Ronksen never raised this argument below to commerce.

[00:15:32] Speaker 01:
Rather, Ronksen raised the argument that there was not sufficient evidence in support of that letter.

[00:15:37] Speaker 01:
There was no determination from commerce as to whether the language subject merchandise versus domestic-like party somehow precluded a determination of interested party status.

[00:15:48] Speaker 01:
And therefore, it's waived before this court.

[00:15:51] Speaker 01:
The second thing that Ranxin argues here today is that there was alternative evidence that demonstrated that Dixon was not a United States producer of pencils.

[00:16:01] Speaker 01:
But that a party can point to evidence that detracts from commerce's determination doesn't mean that commerce's determination is not based on substantial evidence.

[00:16:11] Speaker 01:
Indeed, commerce cited a list of evidence that's in the administrative records, such as work orders, production screenshots,

[00:16:18] Speaker 01:
the production facility, the disbursements, a certification by its CEO, that it was in fact a United States producer of pencils.

[00:16:26] Speaker 02:
The evidence dealing with OSHA I found kind of interesting, because it seems to me that OSHA makes on-site visits in order to ensure that safety procedures are being followed, et cetera, standards.

[00:16:40] Speaker 02:
Can you address that?

[00:16:41] Speaker 01:
Sure, Your Honor.

[00:16:41] Speaker 01:
And this was addressed by the Department of Commerce as well.

[00:16:45] Speaker 01:
First and foremost, the OSHA was in a different period.

[00:16:48] Speaker 01:
So this was prior to the period that Dixon was making its certifications, that it was the United States producer of pencils.

[00:16:54] Speaker 01:
So a different time period.

[00:16:56] Speaker 01:
And then second, this was a health visit.

[00:17:00] Speaker 01:
And so they were looking and had a different purpose for the visit.

[00:17:03] Speaker 01:
They weren't trying to assess whether a production or manufacturing facility was in fact in operation.

[00:17:09] Speaker 01:
And Commerce also noted in a footnote in their final results that OSHA, the OSHA article in fact did say the word production or manufacturing in a different part of the article.

[00:17:22] Speaker 01:
And so because it's a different time period, a different purpose,

[00:17:24] Speaker 01:
And in fact, the OSHA article did in fact say either the word production or manufacturing.

[00:17:29] Speaker 01:
I can't quite remember.

[00:17:31] Speaker 01:
Commerce found that that did not detract from its finding.

[00:17:34] Speaker 01:
And in fact, there was stronger evidence that Commerce found, such as the work orders and production screenshots that did in fact show in the relevant period of time, Dixon was in fact a United States producer of these pencils.

[00:17:48] Speaker 04:
be enough for Dixon to be a United States producer if the only thing it did in the Macon plant was to put paint and lettering on already fully made pencils?

[00:18:06] Speaker 01:
That's an interesting question, Your Honor, that wasn't in fact addressed by commerce because it wasn't put forth to commerce as far as the exact procedure by which it takes to become a manufacturer,

[00:18:18] Speaker 01:
versus an assembler or producer.

[00:18:21] Speaker 01:
Here, Ronchon below to commerce simply said that there wasn't enough evidence in support of the certification that it gave to commerce.

[00:18:29] Speaker 01:
And commerce can, in fact, presume that a certification is sufficient and presume standing.

[00:18:35] Speaker 01:
But that's really irrelevant because once it was remanded back to commerce, commerce reopened the record, collected an abundance of additional evidence in support of its determination that

[00:18:45] Speaker 01:
Dixon was, in fact, a United States producer of pencils.

[00:18:48] Speaker 02:
And what about the Byrd's certification?

[00:18:50] Speaker 01:
Yeah.

[00:18:51] Speaker 01:
So that certification, we believe, demonstrates that, again, it's in support of commerce's determination that it was, in fact, a United States producer of pencils.

[00:19:02] Speaker 01:
That's, again, an alternate certification, because it's not looking at the exact issue that we have here.

[00:19:07] Speaker 01:
But it certainly is evidence in support of commerce's determination.

[00:19:10] Speaker 04:
Is this standard?

[00:19:12] Speaker 04:
for the certification under the Byrd Amendment of what is it, affected domestic producer?

[00:19:20] Speaker 01:
Correct.

[00:19:20] Speaker 01:
And it's slightly different, Your Honor.

[00:19:22] Speaker 01:
But it's certainly one piece of the evidence that Commerce relied upon.

[00:19:25] Speaker 01:
But even if we were to take that out, we still have the work orders, the production screenshots, the explanation of the production process, the certification from the CEO, and an identification of the production facility.

[00:19:39] Speaker 01:
Any one of those pieces of evidence would constitute substantial evidence upon which commerce relied in addition to the certification that the CEO gave.

[00:19:48] Speaker 01:
And so our argument is all of that evidence as a whole demonstrates that commerce's determination was, in fact, supported by substantial evidence.

[00:19:57] Speaker 02:
Are you also addressing the separate duty rate issue?

[00:20:00] Speaker 01:
Yep.

[00:20:00] Speaker 01:
Let's move to that now.

[00:20:01] Speaker 01:
Can we move to that?

[00:20:02] Speaker 01:
Sure, Your Honor.

[00:20:03] Speaker 01:
So that issue as to whether Rongshan is, in fact, entitled to a separate rate, we agree that it's a simple issue.

[00:20:11] Speaker 01:
And it really comes down to this.

[00:20:13] Speaker 01:
When a government entity, and both parties agree that Shandong International Trade Group is wholly owned by the Chinese government, SESAC, when a government entity wholly owns or has a majority ownership in a respondent exporter, there is a presumption against giving that respondent exporter a separate rate.

[00:20:32] Speaker 01:
And that's based on commerce's practice that when a government entity has this majority ownership, either directly or indirectly,

[00:20:41] Speaker 01:
That majority ownership in and of itself means that the Chinese government exercises control or has the ability to exercise control over the company's operations, which include management.

[00:20:54] Speaker 01:
And that's one of the four elements necessary to overcome the presumption of government control.

[00:21:00] Speaker 01:
And so here, commerce made a determination based first upon the third de facto criteria, which is autonomy over management.

[00:21:09] Speaker 01:
And commerce explained

[00:21:11] Speaker 01:
that the shareholders elect the board of directors.

[00:21:15] Speaker 01:
The board of directors, there are five of them that are at issue here.

[00:21:19] Speaker 01:
Both parties agree that SITG already has one of those.

[00:21:24] Speaker 01:
And Rongxin here argues that the articles state that SITG can have only one of those board of director seats.

[00:21:33] Speaker 01:
And that's not the case.

[00:21:34] Speaker 01:
The articles state that SITG automatically

[00:21:37] Speaker 01:
gets to appoint one of those, but it doesn't speak specifically to SITG as to the other five slots.

[00:21:44] Speaker 01:
And so Commerce explains that because the shareholders elect the other five slots, the shareholders vote in accordance with the proportion of their shares.

[00:21:54] Speaker 01:
A majority vote is needed to elect a shareholder, and therefore, by virtue of SITG being the majority shareholder, it effectively has the power to place the remaining five slots.

[00:22:07] Speaker 01:
SITG, which again is a wholly owned Chinese government entity, has the power to place all five of those slots in addition to the sixth one under the articles.

[00:22:17] Speaker 01:
SITG effectively controls the management.

[00:22:20] Speaker 01:
And under the articles of association, the management is responsible for things such as determining the export prices, negotiating contracts, determining how profits are dispersed.

[00:22:31] Speaker 01:
And so those are the other three criteria for overcoming the de facto elements.

[00:22:37] Speaker 01:
And so therefore, based on commerce's explanation and interpretation of the articles, Rongxin cannot overcome these four elements and thus cannot show that it's independent of the Chinese government.

[00:22:50] Speaker 02:
OK.

[00:22:51] Speaker 02:
I think we have your argument.

[00:22:52] Speaker 02:
Let's hear from your colleague.

[00:22:53] Speaker 01:
Thank you.

[00:23:03] Speaker 00:
May it please the court, Felicia Labour-Knolls with Ackerman, and I represent Dixon Ticonderoga.

[00:23:09] Speaker 00:
Your Honours, I'd like to address the issue of standing, which must be liberally construed.

[00:23:15] Speaker 00:
Rongshin would have this court completely ignore the overwhelming record evidence in support of the fact that Dixon Ticonderoga is a manufacturer of pencils here in the United States.

[00:23:31] Speaker 00:
That record evidence includes the fact that Dixon has been a manufacturer since 1827 and during the period of review.

[00:23:41] Speaker 00:
That evidence also includes full production orders, work orders, screenshots, not just painting, your honor, but full production of pencils in Macon, Georgia.

[00:23:53] Speaker 04:
What did the screenshots show?

[00:23:56] Speaker 00:
The screenshots were production orders.

[00:23:58] Speaker 00:
So in Macon, Georgia, for example, to take

[00:24:01] Speaker 00:
piece of wood to a pencil, a full pencil, there are several production steps.

[00:24:09] Speaker 00:
So in order to get from the big to the small, there are several steps.

[00:24:16] Speaker 00:
And so the screenshots showed each of those steps, basically the manufacture of pencils, thousands of them.

[00:24:25] Speaker 05:
Is that in our appendix?

[00:24:26] Speaker 00:
It is in the, yes, Your Honor, it is in the appendix, it is in the remand results, it's in the Court of International Trades record, and it is in your appendix, Your Honor, yes.

[00:24:39] Speaker 05:
Do you happen to have a site for us for those pages?

[00:24:43] Speaker 00:
Yes, we do.

[00:24:45] Speaker 00:
992 through 1,192.

[00:24:48] Speaker 02:
And this was addressed in Rongxin 2?

[00:24:52] Speaker 00:
This was addressed in Rongxin 1.

[00:24:55] Speaker 00:
The CIT had remanded to the Department of Commerce in Rongxin 1 when Dixon submitted work orders.

[00:25:06] Speaker 00:
But actually, again, Dixon had certified that it was an interested party on day one of the administrative review.

[00:25:15] Speaker 00:
The burden then shifts to Rongxin to put factual record evidence to rebut that presumption.

[00:25:26] Speaker 00:
Rongxin never did.

[00:25:27] Speaker 00:
Rongxin waited well a year after the administrative review was started, did all of its questionnaires, participated with commerce.

[00:25:40] Speaker 00:
It wasn't until Rongxin, until the record closed

[00:25:44] Speaker 00:
And Rongxin received a negative result that it then claimed Dixon didn't have standing.

[00:25:53] Speaker 00:
But also, to take it back just a little bit further, Rongxin is trying to confuse this court to believe that the level of production which Dixon did put on the record substantially

[00:26:07] Speaker 00:
and the CDSOA reimbursements as well, proof thereof.

[00:26:12] Speaker 00:
Rongxin is trying to confuse the court that the level of production is important.

[00:26:17] Speaker 00:
On the contrary, the administrative reviews are to determine whether exporters, such as Rongxin, are abusing the US market and harming US producers, not to determine the level of production of a US producer.

[00:26:35] Speaker 02:
Thank you for your argument.

[00:26:37] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honors.

[00:26:44] Speaker 02:
Counselor, you got two minutes.

[00:26:46] Speaker 03:
Your Honor, first, the government's first legal argument is that Rongshan never brought up the issue of standing in the review itself.

[00:26:54] Speaker 03:
I direct the Court's attention to Rongshan's case brief, which was filed approximately 30 days after the preliminary results.

[00:27:01] Speaker 03:
Quote, the second argument is that Dixon Ticonderoto Company, Dixon, has presented no evidence on the record, much less substantial evidence that it was a US manufacturer of pencils in the United States in the period of review, POR.

[00:27:18] Speaker 03:
Unquote.

[00:27:19] Speaker 03:
So Brungsche did bring it up.

[00:27:21] Speaker 03:
It did bring it up in a timely manner.

[00:27:23] Speaker 03:
Yes, it was a year after the case began, but the first legal arguments aren't required

[00:27:28] Speaker 03:
until the case brief.

[00:27:29] Speaker 03:
That's number one.

[00:27:30] Speaker 03:
Regarding who can vote for the board of directors, also in the case brief.

[00:27:38] Speaker 03:
In footnote one on page 11,

[00:27:42] Speaker 03:
Rongxin stated that Article 12, Article 12 regards voting, Article 12, company sets up the board of directors, there are six directors, among which one director should represent SITG and recommended by SETG.

[00:27:58] Speaker 03:
Black and white, one director out of six.

[00:28:01] Speaker 03:
In this POR, there are five.

[00:28:02] Speaker 03:
That's one out of five.

[00:28:03] Speaker 03:
It states it clearly.

[00:28:05] Speaker 03:
It goes on to say, in more general terms, during his term, if SITG regards he cannot protect its interests, it can change this director based on the related regulations.

[00:28:20] Speaker 03:
It also says all the directors should be elected by all the shareholders.

[00:28:23] Speaker 03:
But specific language is more important than general language.

[00:28:28] Speaker 03:
He can recommend and have only one director on the board.

[00:28:32] Speaker 03:
OK.

[00:28:32] Speaker 03:
That's not controlled.

[00:28:33] Speaker 03:
All right.

[00:28:33] Speaker 03:
We thank you, sir.

[00:28:34] Speaker 02:
Thank you very much.

[00:28:36] Speaker 02:
We thank the parties for their arguments.

[00:28:42] Speaker 02:
Our next case is Safe and Sec Corporation versus SNS holding LLC.