[00:00:00] Speaker 04:
24, 2353, Berkeley v. W. W. Granger, Inc. Ms. Addy.

[00:00:08] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors. May it please the Court. This case turns on a basic structural error. Berkeley pled specific implementations of method claims by Granger and DHL, but those defendants were severed from the case on the premise that Teradata could stand in their shoes.

[00:00:31] Speaker 04:
Yet, the court later... Do you read the action on the motion to sever and stay as barring discovery against the customer defendants?

[00:00:41] Speaker 00:
I do, Your Honor. I do, Your Honor, and let me tell you why.

[00:00:49] Speaker 00:
So, in the decision on the motion to sever and stay, the court says that the district court envisions that even if TVA infringed, the sole issue left would be damages. And that is at Appendix Page 9.

[00:01:07] Speaker 00:
And the court relied on the customer suit exception, which has a couple of purposes. One is to streamline litigation in different districts, which this case doesn't have. But another one is to remove the customers from the suit entirely when there's no difference between the product asserted of infringement by the manufacturer and the product asserted of infringement by the customers. Here, there was no product.

[00:01:33] Speaker 03:
Why did it take you so long to make these arguments before the court? That's the problem here, isn't it?

[00:01:41] Speaker 00:
I understand, Your Honor, and...

[00:01:47] Speaker 03:
And while we're at it, are we looking at an abuse of discretion standard?

[00:01:51] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor. For the customer suit exception, we're looking at an abuse of discretion standard.

[00:01:59] Speaker 00:
I want to focus on infringement, too, so I want to make sure I get to that. But specifically, Your Honor, for the customer suit exception, this case doesn't really – deal with the discovery issues. During the case, of course, Berkeley was trying to comply with the judge's severance order, and Berkeley was working with Teradata to get the information it needed. But the issue here on the customer suit exception is not the discovery or the later ask for discovery.

[00:02:29] Speaker 00:
The issue is instead that the customer defendant shouldn't have been severed in state to begin with because Berkeley pled to in the complaint and in its motion, opposition to Teradata's motion, that those defendants specifically implemented the method that Teradata sold. So Teradata sold a method, but they did it their own way. So it was improper to remove them to begin with.

[00:02:56] Speaker 04:
I'm a little confused here because we're talking about two different possible effects of the Order 7.

[00:03:03] Speaker 04:
One is to bar discovery with respect to the customer suits, and certainly the Order did that. But there's also the question of whether it barred discovery against the customers in connection with the suit against Teradata. And that, it seems to me, is less clear.

[00:03:27] Speaker 04:
Could you help me?

[00:03:30] Speaker 04:
Because the original motion wanted a severance stay that counts against the customers. It didn't say anything specific about staying discovery against the customers in connection with the suit against Teradata, right?

[00:03:49] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, I think that was the intent of the motion, was to remove the customers so the case could proceed against Teradata. It seems to have been interpreted that way. Yes, Your Honor. And, Your Honor, in addition to the section of the decision that I quoted, there's a later decision where the court is foreclosing...

[00:04:08] Speaker 00:
where the court is denying Berkeley's request for discovery, and the court says that it recognized that the stay structure foreclosed discovery, and that's at Appendix 6460. So I think that that also shows that had Berkeley come earlier, it would have been futile. But again, for the customer suit, the issue is not what happened later. The issue is that Berkeley specifically pled these implementations that were different from the method claim that Teradata made to the method that the customer defendants performed.

[00:04:46] Speaker 00:
And the district court recognized this. This goes to the abuse of discretion standard, Your Honor. The district court recognized Berkeley's arguments that the customers had, quote, substantial knowledge and expertise in the use and implementation of the patented method. That's at 92 to 93. It also recognized that the customer's methods were custom-built and designed for specific customer databases at 93 and 94. And finally, that Grainger uses the services of the patented level object-level accounting and not Teradata.

[00:05:20] Speaker 00:
And that's at Note 2 at 89. The problem is, and the abuse of discretion is, After the court recognized those specific features that only the customer defendants could supply, it found the customers to be peripheral and stayed them. And that is where our error lies, Your Honor. In addition, one more point.

[00:05:40] Speaker 03:
So all these arguments you're making deal with the customization issue.

[00:05:45] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor, they do.

[00:05:47] Speaker 03:
And that argument is the one that you make often.

[00:05:52] Speaker 03:
It took a long time to come up with it. Why is it? It's so central to your case here today in our field. Why did it take you four years from the time that fact discovery was initiated for you to come up with this theory?

[00:06:07] Speaker 00:
Two points, Your Honor. First of all, it didn't. That theory was raised at the beginning in the complaint. In the second amended complaint, for example, at 373 to 374 and 375 to 383, the Berkeley pled that Grainger used Teradata's pricing engine to blend information and to write their own code. So we're pleading this specific implementation. Grainger expanded the Teradata rules from 280 to over 500.

[00:06:37] Speaker 00:
So, again, these rules that are claimed are changing in the Grainger device. The same goes for DHL, and those are at, 374 to 375, and 383 to 390. So we did plead them.

[00:06:53] Speaker 00:
The court recognized them at the pleading stage but still disregarded them.

[00:06:59] Speaker 02:
But why did it take you so long to move to vacate the severance stay order? I'm not understanding it. I mean, we're talking about over a year, well, 20 months after the fact the severance deadline ended, you moved to stay and sever. Why did it take so long?

[00:07:15] Speaker 00:
So, Your Honor, Berkeley was trying very hard to comply with the order, and it's not appealable. So Berkeley had to work within the constraints of the order, and it was trying to work with Teradata because Teradata had said it could stand in the shoes of the customer defendant.

[00:07:30] Speaker 02:
So you're saying that this was so important that you decided that you would wait so long to raise it? I'm not sure I understand that.

[00:07:40] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, I disagree that we waited so long. Berkeley, throughout the case, was trying to work with Teradata to resolve these issues.

[00:07:47] Speaker 02:
We did not move to vacate the severance state order until February of 2023. Is that accurate?

[00:07:54] Speaker 00:
I believe that's accurate, Your Honor.

[00:07:57] Speaker 00:
So I want to say one more thing about the customer stay, and that is that Teradata has admitted that these implementations are important. And that confirms the original error that occurred in implementation of the severance. Teradata now says that it's highly customizable depending on the customer's desires, needs, and preferences. And, Your Honor, to your point of why it took so long, Teradata was saying the opposite in the beginning.

[00:08:27] Speaker 00:
In addition, Teradata now says, and it says this in defense of the customer suit, it says that it accepts – Indeed, in defense of the customer suit, Teradata accepts the very premise that Berkeley advances the pleadings.

[00:08:41] Speaker 02:
But at this point, you had already gone through the fact discovery period.

[00:08:45] Speaker 00:
Because we thought we were going to get what we needed from Teradata because they said they could provide it.

[00:08:51] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, the error did not occur in the discovery. The error occurred in the abuse of discretion at the customer suit level, and we were not allowed to appeal it.

[00:09:00] Speaker 04:
Well, you can appeal it now.

[00:09:02] Speaker 00:
And here we are.

[00:09:06] Speaker 00:
Your Honors, I'd like to turn to infringement for a minute. Infringement, the court made two errors on direct infringement. First, it entered judgment on the 316 patent without analyzing the 316 patent because it incorrectly assumed that the 521 patent was representative.

[00:09:26] Speaker 04:
The motion for summary judgment included the 316, right? Yes.

[00:09:30] Speaker 00:
It did not. It did not mention the 316.

[00:09:32] Speaker 04:
Well, but it said all the asserted claims, right?

[00:09:36] Speaker 00:
It did, but it did not make any assertions with regard to the 316. It focused on limited limitations in the 521 patent.

[00:09:45] Speaker 00:
And second, which I will address, it's the 521 issue on 1E.

[00:09:49] Speaker 04:
Your opposition didn't say anything about the 316, right? No.

[00:09:53] Speaker 00:
No, Your Honor, but it's not our job to identify Teradata's failures. They had the duty to raise the issues, and they didn't raise a single limitation that was missing from the 316.

[00:10:03] Speaker 00:
And, Your Honors, the 316 doesn't have limitation 1E in the 521 pattern.

[00:10:08] Speaker 04:
But they argued it has 1D, and they argued 1D, right?

[00:10:12] Speaker 00:
They argued 1D with respect to the 521, and the Court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the 521 and 1D. They did not argue...

[00:10:22] Speaker 00:
the 316 at all, and there is no 1E. So the one issue that the court found lacked a genuine issue is not present in that patent. And for that reason, the 316 decision should be reversed.

[00:10:35] Speaker 00:
Second, on the 521 patent, Teradata presented limitation 1E through statement of fact 67.

[00:10:47] Speaker 00:
And Berkeley objected to that statement of fact specifically. You can see that at 8684, starts at the bottom, goes to 8685.

[00:10:56] Speaker 00:
Indeed, Berkeley denied that statement of fact reflected Ms. Maracle's opinion, but Berkeley also said that that statement of fact was not an accurate representation of the claim language, and it said it was accounting, it was talking about general accounting principles. So it definitely, excuse me, owner, so it did rebut that, and it directed Ms.

[00:11:20] Speaker 00:
in 67 to the Miracle Report, which contains five to six pages of specific analysis on 1E. There was factual dispute. The court did not address it, and for this reason, infringement on 521E should be reversed as well.

[00:11:36] Speaker 03:
On inducement... Can you move to the 101 issue and explain how those claims contain an inventive concept of parallel processing?

[00:11:45] Speaker 04:
That would be the cross-appeal, right?

[00:11:47] Speaker 03:
Yeah.

[00:11:47] Speaker 04:
So you should do that...

[00:11:51] Speaker 04:
Okay.

[00:11:53] Speaker 00:
Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:11:55] Speaker 00:
Only real quickly on inducement. Again, Berkeley presented genuine issues of material fact with respect to inducement. Those things are normally inferred, and Teradata had a license for a field of use, so it could be inferred that it knew when it wasn't operating in that license. And Berkeley introduced evidence of Teradata's assistance in the customer implementations You can see that at 529 through 533, where Berkeley walks through specifically things that look like the claimed process.

[00:12:30] Speaker 00:
Thank you. I'll reserve the rest of my time.

[00:12:34] Speaker 04:
Mr. Shaw.

[00:12:41] Speaker 01:
Good morning, Your Honor.

[00:12:50] Speaker 01:
May it please this honorable court, my name is Cal Shaw, and I have the pleasure today of representing the good people at Teradata, Grainger, and the DHL entities. With me this morning is Ms. Jessica Roberts of Teradata, as well as one of my colleagues, Louie Constantino. Your Honors, I'd like to cover several issues this morning, but let me start with this issue raised by opposing counsel on the structural error.

[00:13:14] Speaker 01:
We vehemently disagree that there's any structural error.

[00:13:16] Speaker 04:
I think... Okay, but could we be clear here as to what the order on the motion to sever and stay did? As I understand it, it barred discovery against the customers, both with respect to the customer accounts and also with respect to the accounts against Teradata. Correct?

[00:13:36] Speaker 01:
Your Honor, I would say correct in part. So I do not, I cannot concede that it expressly precluded discovery against the customer.

[00:13:46] Speaker 04:
Well, it was interpreted that way by the district court. It may have been interpreted that way, Your Honor, but that does not create a... Let's assume that it covered both, that it barred discovery against the customers for purposes of the customer's suit and also with respect to the suit against the interrogator.

[00:14:04] Speaker 04:
Why can't they now appeal from that? I mean, it surely is too late for them to complain about the denial of the motion to reopen Discovery. That seems to be correct. But why can't they appeal the original order foreclosing Discovery against the customers?

[00:14:23] Speaker 01:
Your Honor, a couple of reasons. I would say at least two. First, it wasn't done at the time. But second, and perhaps more.

[00:14:30] Speaker 04:
What wasn't done at the time?

[00:14:31] Speaker 01:
Well, there was no request or reconsideration, motion or appeal.

[00:14:35] Speaker 04:
Well, in lots of cases, you don't have to request reconsideration to raise an issue complaining about an order.

[00:14:41] Speaker 01:
Fair enough, which is why the second issue is probably maybe perhaps more important, which is they, Berkeley in this case, certainly wasn't shy in bringing motions. And as the district court noted, and this is at appendix, I believe it was at appendix page 16.

[00:14:57] Speaker 01:
and this is a quote, the step that Berkeley did not take back in July of 2022 was it seems to be one taken literally at the 11th hour of the final line of fact discovery could be reopened under local rule patent 1.3. This is after claim construction, Judge. And even before that... So what?

[00:15:14] Speaker 04:
They're complaining about the original order. Why can't they complain about the original order barring them from taking discovery?

[00:15:20] Speaker 01:
Well, they should have, Your Honor. And they should have done it...

[00:15:24] Speaker 01:
Correct, Your Honor, but they're doing it too late. Why is it too late?

[00:15:28] Speaker 04:
They couldn't have done it earlier. They had no right to appeal the order severing and staying until they came up with a final judgment.

[00:15:36] Speaker 01:
Absolutely, Judge. But this is because there was no preclusion per se. And so, for example, if we go back to what the district court judge said on May of 2021, and this is at Appendix 3539, the court said, once there's certain other issues that were pending, and the court said, third, once the designation of documents issues is resolved, There may or may not be some valid reason for reopening of discovery in this four-year-old case for limited purposes. But plaintiff did not do that. As Judge Bassoon, I hope I'm saying it right, had noticed, they did not do that until February of 2023.

[00:16:08] Speaker 01:
They certainly could have come into court.

[00:16:10] Speaker 04:
To the extent that they're complaining about the action on that motion to reopen, you're absolutely right. It was too late. But they're also complaining about the original order. And I'm not understanding why it's too late to complain about the original order.

[00:16:25] Speaker 01:
Because they took no action when they had the time to do it. The only time they took action was in February of 2023 to reopen fact discovery when it was too late. And quite frankly, Your Honor, I believe that's part of a pivot because, quite candidly, they did not get the evidence they needed from TVA. We stand by the position that while we don't infringe the discovery that they needed against these other defendants, they could have gotten from us. We produced 40,000 pages of documents, statements of work with respect to Granger, contracts, and until February of 2023 or later, they didn't say anything about this.

[00:16:57] Speaker 01:
In fact, we were before the court in March of 2021, and the judge said, you've asked for 30 days extension. I'll give you 60.

[00:17:05] Speaker 01:
And the plaintiff didn't say anything. Your Honor, we're having trouble with the sever and stay issue. We're having trouble with the customer defendants. Remember, they asserted induced infringement, which requires direct infringement. And we went all the way through to February 2023, and they hadn't raised it. Even at summary judgment, Your Honor. They did not say, well, we're going to do a Rule 56D as to Granger, because Granger is one of these third-party defendants or customer defendants. They said in their summary judgment brief, and I can pull this slide up if you'd like, we can prove infringement against Granger, despite this document issue.

[00:17:40] Speaker 01:
So it's only now, after they've lost and they took that... several attempts post-discovery, when they should have brought it before, having at all times known since the amended complaint that direct infringement was an issue, that they'd try to say, well, this severance day issue was an abuse of discretion. And it was not. It was under the spread spectrum case. The judge properly said... this may reduce major issues. And at no time during the discovery phase, the fact discovery phase, did the plaintiff suggest to the court, this is a problem, can we get this discovery?

[00:18:17] Speaker 01:
And as Judge Cole noted in that quotation I read you, the real issue here is they just waited too long.

[00:18:24] Speaker 04:
Maybe you should turn to the 101 issue.

[00:18:26] Speaker 01:
Yes, I appreciate that, Your Honor. So on 101, because I think in many ways that may resolve these other issues, As this court is very familiar, it's a two-part analyst test. And that two-part test focuses on the scope of the claims. And we've agreed, and for purposes of this case, that claim one of the 521 patent is representative. If you look at that claim, there are only really two components. The first three elements of that claim relate to an RDBMS.

[00:18:55] Speaker 03:
You said claim one is representative.

[00:18:58] Speaker 01:
Of all three patents, yes. Sorry, Judge. Okay.

[00:19:01] Speaker 01:
If you look at that first claim, claim one, it has essentially what we've broken down through elements A through F. The first three of those elements relate to something called a relational database. Now, the specification is clear that there's nothing special happening, no new use of this relational database. If you look at, and this is columns 3, lines 65 to 66, it says you use standard accounting practices and standard language SQL for purposes of the RDBMS.

[00:19:32] Speaker 01:
At column 11, the specification further specifies that you use standard protocol based on RDBMS textbooks. So nothing special about that. The next three components of the patent claim relate to calculating profit. In fact, the plaintiff itself calculates characterizes the patent as one of calculating profit at object level. And so all we're doing is taking revenue, subtracting costs, we get profit. Age-old mathematical construct.

[00:20:03] Speaker 03:
Did you win or lose a summary judgment on the 1-1 issue?

[00:20:06] Speaker 01:
Well, I'd say it's a split decision in that we got Ellis step one but not step two.

[00:20:11] Speaker 03:
You can't appeal if you won a summary judgment.

[00:20:14] Speaker 01:
Correct. So, Your Honor, on step one, Alice, step one, the court found that the claims did cover just an abstract idea. And step two, we lost on summary judgment.

[00:20:24] Speaker 04:
Because of parallel processing.

[00:20:25] Speaker 01:
Because of parallel processing, which, Your Honor, is not part of the claims. And as this court's precedent in the SAP case states, you cannot use – and, in fact, that case – I'll get you the site in a moment, Your Honor. But in that particular case, which we've cited in our brief – SAP, the same argument was made by the patentee, which is these are data processing claims relating to a database, but there's certain parallel processing they've done that's unique, and the court found, well, that's not part of the claims.

[00:20:58] Speaker 01:
In contrast, like Enfish, where in Enfish they did say, well, the claims teach a new way, the self-referential table, a new way of performing and using this particular computer. Here, the specification is very clear. You use the RDBMS in the way that it's meant to be used, according to the textbooks in column 11, and all you do is you calculate profit. And so for that reason, Your Honor, we do believe that the district court erred in denying a summary judgment because the district court focused on a narrow embodiment covered, which could have parallel processing, but was very clear that parallel processing is not required as part of the claims, and that's inconsistent with this court's jurisprudence under Alice.

[00:21:41] Speaker 02:
And am I to understand you correctly that if we find that the district court erred at the second stage of Alice and therefore... find that this is unpatternable under 101, that the whole issue with the severance day order falls by the wayside. Would that be your position?

[00:22:01] Speaker 01:
Yes, Your Honor. And just for the record, the case I was referenced to is SAP 898 F3rd 1161.

[00:22:10] Speaker 01:
Any further questions on the 101 issues, Your Honor? I'm happy to address them. But I do think that if you look at this court's jurisprudence, particularly in SAP and BSG, this patent fits squarely within that construct. All it does is says we're calculating profit, and we're doing so using an RDBMS.

[00:22:30] Speaker 01:
If there are no questions on 101, briefly with the remaining time, I would like to turn to the issue of infringement. In particular here, I believe the district court's determinations on infringement are threefold, should be affirmed. Let me start with each defendant separately.

[00:22:45] Speaker 04:
As to Teradata, there are... In your summary judgment motion, there's no reference to the 316 cap other than a generic statement that you're moving on all the asserted claims, right?

[00:22:57] Speaker 01:
That's correct, Judge.

[00:22:58] Speaker 04:
and there's no discussion of the 316 patent in the motion.

[00:23:01] Speaker 01:
Well, other than we say all asserted claims and all the claims do teach the same function, I believe for the first time on appeal we're hearing that somehow the 316 is distinct. But quite frankly, Judge, I was looking at that over the weekend. I think the claim is probably indefinite if we get to that level because it's missing an entire limitation, meaning if you look at it, the plaintiff suggests, I believe, that element 1E is missing indefinitely.

[00:23:25] Speaker 01:
If you remember, because I was telling you that this is on the 101 side, there are only three mathematical components to the claim. One is you calculate profit. The next is you calculate cost. And the last element, F, is you subtract one from the other to get your object-level profitability. somehow in claim 316 they don't have this, or at least they claim they don't have this component of calculating the cost. And if you don't have that, you can't get the profit because you're now missing this element. And, in fact, if you read element 1F of the 316 patent, it says combine, but it doesn't say what to combine with.

[00:24:01] Speaker 01:
Now, we never got the opportunity to raise that argument beneath because for the first time on appeal, as Your Honor noted, The plaintiff suggests, or I guess appellant now, suggests that there was not this, we were not asserting the infringement against or non-infringement against all claims, and that's just not true. As Your Honor pointed out over and over again in our brief, we said as to all claims, these elements 1D and 1E are missing.

[00:24:30] Speaker 01:
So that relates to 1D and 1E, and that would apply, Your Honor, both to TerraData because it is, directly related to the claim, it also applies to Granger because Granger was expressly sought in the summary judgment. This goes back to the initial issue of plaintiff had the opportunity to say, I'm going to abstain from Granger, but affirmatively said in the summary judgment briefing, we have the evidence and we're proceeding on Granger. And then to close out, because I would like to save my remaining time, Your Honor, as to the DHL defendants, Your Honor, the court granted our motion to dismiss under the 271G, and that should stand as well, because here we're just talking about profit.

[00:25:11] Speaker 01:
That is data and the RDBMS, and so we would ask that all three of those decisions be affirmed. Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

[00:25:26] Speaker 00:
Your Honors, on 101, I note counsel spent a long time arguing the facts, but then he simplified the invention. But I think it's more important to look at what the judge did. The judge didn't just rely on the parallel processing, which is an advantage that results from the invention, but the judge also said, that the claims recite a novel and unconventional software architecture where the individual profitability calculations are performed within the RDBMS.

[00:25:54] Speaker 04:
And the judge relied on... You agree that it's the parallel processing. It's not a claim requirement?

[00:26:00] Speaker 00:
It's not a claim requirement. It's an advantage that results from the use of the... So you can't rely on that at one step? I don't think you can't rely on it, but it's an advantage. I don't need to rely on it. Let's leave it at that. It's an advantage that results from the claims.

[00:26:11] Speaker 02:
However... How is your case distinguishable from SAP?

[00:26:15] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, in SAP, SAP dealt with just financial analysis claims in the abstract, but here this court found a specific implementation of the unconventional architecture, and that unconventional combination is where the RDBMS performs profitability using established rules. Those are claimed, and those rules are applied to selected and prepared information. The district court said, that Teradata cited no evidence showing that this combination was conventional.

[00:26:47] Speaker 00:
And remember, on summary judgment, we're on invalidity, and so they had to provide clear and convincing evidence, which they did not do. On the flip side, Berkeley provided the testimony of its expert, Scarborough.

[00:27:05] Speaker 00:
So, importantly, Teradata does not dispute the underlying technological facts on appeal. It just argues that they don't qualify.

[00:27:16] Speaker 00:
Turning quickly to my counsel said that To get discovery, we ask for 30 to 60 days towards the end of discovery.

[00:27:24] Speaker 04:
Hold on. Before you leave one-on-one, what language in the district court opinion are you relying on as suggesting that there's an alternative plan as to step two of the parallel processing?

[00:27:37] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor. Several statements. First of all, at Appendix 52...

[00:27:42] Speaker 00:
I think it's 52, Your Honor. That's where I read that quote that the claims recite a novel and unconventional software architecture. And then at Appendix 49... Excuse me?

[00:27:55] Speaker 04:
I'm trying to find the part you're referring to.

[00:28:01] Speaker 02:
And you're suggesting that that's separate and apart from the parallel and simultaneous processing?

[00:28:07] Speaker 00:
Yes, Your Honor, because...

[00:28:10] Speaker 00:
The claims do more than just permit parallel or simultaneous processing, and it's the combination of these changes in architecture that make the claims inventive concept. You can't just extract one out of the other.

[00:28:23] Speaker 02:
What more do they do?

[00:28:27] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, the claims – the specification – The undisputed record shows that the architecture in which... I'm asking you what more do they do.

[00:28:40] Speaker 02:
I'm not asking you to cite to the record. What more do they do?

[00:28:44] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, because they take the profitability calculations inside, they are able to provide a more correct analysis. They're able to do it at a level that was not able to be done before. Because this relational database is able to use thousands of different data points, they are able to calculate this analysis in a way that was never done before.

[00:29:07] Speaker 02:
You're not really telling me what more it does.

[00:29:09] Speaker 00:
That's what more it does.

[00:29:11] Speaker 02:
It's doing it in a way that it's not been done before. It doesn't tell me what more it does.

[00:29:17] Speaker 00:
I return to the district court relied on the Scarborough Declaration, which walked through the differences between the claims and the prior art. And based on those differences between the claims and the prior art, the district court relied on that and Teradata did not rebut it.

[00:29:38] Speaker 04:
Where in your yellow brief do you develop this argument? That it's something other than parallel processing.

[00:29:49] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, I believe our brief addresses that argument in detail.

[00:30:01] Speaker 00:
be in our response brief. Sorry, wrong brief.

[00:30:07] Speaker 00:
Your Honor, our brief addresses that argument at page 56, where it says that the independent calculation of marginal value of each object provides this unconventional arrangement because that was not possible outside the database.

[00:30:29] Speaker 04:
Where on 56 is this?

[00:30:30] Speaker 00:
This is the heading on 56, and then we discuss it in detail.

[00:30:37] Speaker 00:
Again, Your Honors, this is a clear and convincing issue at this point at summary judgment.

[00:30:46] Speaker 00:
The honors, I see my time is up. I wanted to address a couple of his points, but I defer to the court.

[00:30:51] Speaker 04:
We'll give you another minute. Go ahead.

[00:30:53] Speaker 00:
Thank you. I wanted to point out, you know, Teradata complained that Berkeley didn't tell the court when it asked for an extension that it was having trouble getting the discovery it needed. And that's because, once again, it was stuck with this customer severance, and it knew the court would not be responsive. However, I want to make sure that you know that in – Getting the customer severance, it was Teradata that told the court that it could address everything, and Berkeley tried to work very hard with them to get what they needed.

[00:31:23] Speaker 00:
Finally, the customer suit is directed to products, not method claims implemented specifically. Thank you for your time today. This case should be reversed.

[00:31:32] Speaker 04:
Okay, thank you. Thank you. Mr. Shaw.

[00:31:50] Speaker 01:
Your Honor, just briefly, I think, I want to just focus on the 101. This is obviously my rebuttal. A couple things. First, as this court has pointed out in BSG Tech, merely providing a generic environment for a claim method is insufficient.

[00:32:06] Speaker 04:
To get back to Judge Bassoon's question, what do you understand them to be arguing at Step 2 other than parallel processing?

[00:32:15] Speaker 01:
I don't, Your Honor. As I understand it, they're using the parallel processing to suggest that this will expedite the calculation process. In fact, I believe that's consistent with what their expert has said, which is you could do this, it would just be slower using the RDBMS, makes it faster. The problem with that is if you look at column 11.

[00:32:36] Speaker 04:
Did their expert, F. David, say that there was another inventive concept at step two?

[00:32:44] Speaker 01:
Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor. I believe the focus was on the speed of processing because of parallel processing, which of course is not.

[00:32:52] Speaker 03:
So for parallel processing, is there any allegation of a specific framework as to how this is achieved or anything?

[00:33:01] Speaker 01:
No, Your Honor. Just to make sure I understand your question. Certainly the claims nor the specification provide any other understanding other than, as I was about to say, that you perform at the administration based on required calculations using the standard process. And it says, and this is at column 11, lines 25 to 30, see relational database management requirements.

[00:33:24] Speaker 01:
relational database management system textbooks. So nothing unique or new. You're just using a relational database, which these databases have been around since 1980. That's not in dispute. And the point of having them was to have data in a separate location on a server that you could access and process more quickly. Certainly, the claims, as we know, do not require that specifically, and that's the problem here, as what we're talking about in these claims are merely using a computer to a relational database, and the way it's meant to be used with certain data to calculate a profit.

[00:33:59] Speaker 01:
And to that point, if you look at, I think the opposing counsel here mentioned the rules, this is also at column 11 of the patent. If you look at column 11, starting at line 49, going through to the claims, it talks about the rules. But these rules, as it points out, are according to GAAP, i.e., according to general accounting practices. So the patent's not even teaching specific rules or new rules. It's just saying you can use standard accounting rules, and you can use them with this standard computer, the RDBMS, which is why, Your Honors, we believe the patents are invalid under 101.

[00:34:36] Speaker 01:
If there's no further questions, Your Honor, I see my time is up. Thank you.

[00:34:42] Speaker 04:
Thank you, both counsel and cases submitted.