[00:00:01] Speaker 01:
Our last case this morning is similarly Woodway USA versus Life Corps Fitness 2025-1431. Ms. Jelenczyk.

[00:00:22] Speaker 03:
Good morning. May it please the court. Katie Jelenczyk of Foley & Lardner on behalf of Woodway, the patent holder and the appellant here today.

[00:00:31] Speaker 03:
The issues in this appeal are very different than the issues you just heard about from my colleague, Ms. Rieger. Here, the district court's judgment should be vacated for at least three reasons.

[00:00:43] Speaker 02:
We actually have a claim construction here to argue over, I think, right?

[00:00:46] Speaker 03:
That's correct.

[00:00:48] Speaker 03:
And principally, that's the first issue with why judgment... should be vacated. The district court rewrote the claim limitation substantially prevents to mean completely prevents.

[00:01:02] Speaker 03:
And that construction reads substantially out of the claim.

[00:01:05] Speaker 03:
And it's unsupported by any clear and unmistakable disclaimer.

[00:01:11] Speaker 03:
The second issue is that the prosecution history does not do the work that the district court assigned to it.

[00:01:18] Speaker 03:
Woodway distinguished Bostek and Savatieri because the one-way mechanisms that were included in those two prior art disclosures were not safety devices that restricted treadmill belt rotation at all.

[00:01:36] Speaker 03:
Woodway never told the examiner that the claims require absolute impossibility of movement in the opposite direction under every force condition.

[00:01:47] Speaker 03:
The last issue is that even if you're unsure with Woodway's proposed interpretation of the plain and ordinary meaning of substantially prevents, under the district court's approach, summary judgment cannot stand because assault's non-infringement showing depends exclusively on users circumventing the normal operation of the treadmill.

[00:02:16] Speaker 02:
Users are deliberately... Do you have a definition for substantially prevents beyond clear and ordinary?

[00:02:23] Speaker 02:
I don't think you made one to the district court, but I'm just... If we agree with you that the district court has improperly used prosecution history to limit this, then what's going to happen below? Are you just going to go back to playing an ordinary meeting?

[00:02:41] Speaker 02:
Or are you going to actually give the district court what you think the proper construction of substantially prevents is?

[00:02:47] Speaker 03:
We think most prudent would be to provide what constitutes plain and ordinary meaning. Insofar, the parties disagreed as to what that was. What is your view on what it is? Sure. Woodway believes that substantially prevents means largely prevents, but it doesn't require absolute impossibility or complete restriction of movement.

[00:03:09] Speaker 04:
What about life course for post construction, which is it prevents movement after allowing no or minimal movement?

[00:03:17] Speaker 03:
Assault construction is incomplete. because it doesn't address the period of time after the one-way bearing or the safety device more generally is engaged, because there can be circumstances, and in particular, the particular circumstances that assault is relying on to avoid infringement is by forcing an override of that safety device. But claim destruction?

[00:03:45] Speaker 04:
I'm looking at the specification, right? I mean, that's what I'm thinking about with claim construction. And the specification doesn't talk about that. what you're talking about there. Instead, it has an embodiment like in the bottom of column 7, holding over onto column 28, that has some sort of interaction of a key and a keyway that says that, if I have the language correctly, it says it's configured to...

[00:04:17] Speaker 04:
rotation, wait, I'm sorry, hang on. It says that there's some, oh yeah, here it is, the rear shaft 68 begins to move counterclockwise and then the interaction of the key and keyway begins to drive the inner ring so that it's not going to move anymore. I mean, in other words, I see the specification of how there's some movement for sure in this embodiment in the the counterclockwise direction, the direction that the claim that the district court judge thought there should be no direction movement at all, but then it doesn't say anything like, and if there's an excessive amount of force, then there's going to be, you know, there will be possible rotation, but it will require an excessive amount of force.

[00:05:06] Speaker 03:
The specification, and importantly the claim language, does not delineate any particular force thresholds or requirements, and indeed, within the specification of the three asserted patents, the discussion never refers to the treadmill belt being substantially prevented. It talks about the concept of prevention, and in particular, tethering the preventing the forward movement or the opposite direction of movement of the treadmill belt in the context of safety.

[00:05:40] Speaker 03:
And so in that discussion and throughout the remainder of the discussion of the specification, it does not delineate one way or the other that there needs to be this absolute prohibition about movement in the opposite direction. To the contrary, there are instances, including the portion of the specification that states Judge Stoll, you just referred to that contemplates movement. And so again, going back to what Woodway's proposed... But it's movement until the safety device is engaged.

[00:06:11] Speaker 03:
That's correct. But from Woodway's perspective...

[00:06:17] Speaker 03:
There also could be movement once the frictional threshold is reached from this mechanical safety device system.

[00:06:24] Speaker 03:
The safety device, and in particular the one-way bearing that assault used and incorporated into the accused treadmills, the specification sheet specifically identifies that that one-way bearing only moves in a single direction and and does not require particularly you're conflating uh infringement with claim construction right no i'm not conflating infringement with claim construction my point is in the in the practical application of using a one-way safety device there is going to be modest movement to engage the safety device in the first instance.

[00:07:02] Speaker 03:
For example, when somebody steps on the curved manual treadmill, for that one-way bearing to lock in place, to preclude, to substantially prevent rotation in the forward direction, it's going to lock.

[00:07:14] Speaker 03:
And at some frictional threshold, the safety device is going to be overcome.

[00:07:21] Speaker 03:
The amount of force that it's going to take to overcome that safety device It depends on the particular selection of the one-way bearing you're going to use. In this circumstance, the claim language specifically and the specification more generally does not require or call for specific tolerances for that frictional threshold.

[00:07:44] Speaker 04:
It says substantially prevents rotation.

[00:07:47] Speaker 03:
Correct.

[00:07:50] Speaker 02:
And that can just be enough friction to make it not really operate unless you force it in some way, which you can do. Or it could be some kind of mechanical device that's going to just absolutely stop the treadmill.

[00:08:07] Speaker 02:
Although maybe that still can be overcome with enough force too, I guess.

[00:08:12] Speaker 02:
I mean, I'm not sure that that makes much difference, but it seems like the whole point of this is to substantially prevent forward movement in the normal operation of the device, not whether you can grab a hold of the bars and press forward and it's going to override whatever the safety features are, either by overcoming the friction point or just maybe breaking something and having it rotate free.

[00:08:37] Speaker 03:
I think that's exactly right, Your Honor.

[00:08:39] Speaker 02:
How do we know, though, that that's what substantially prevents means rather than what they think, which is at some point there's some device that just locks it and no amount of movement, no matter how much force could make it go forward.

[00:08:55] Speaker 03:
Right. Well, I think the issue really is in the former category, how much is going to be enough. And here, going back to the specific claim language, we say substantially prevents. We don't say resists.

[00:09:07] Speaker 03:
Resist could describe any opposing force, however modest or negligible. So it could be a modest amount of friction or it could be a massive amount of friction such that it's never going to move in the opposite direction.

[00:09:18] Speaker 04:
Are you suggesting that substantially prevents is broader than resists?

[00:09:27] Speaker 03:
No, I believe resist is broader than substantially prevents.

[00:09:32] Speaker 03:
But substantially prevents doesn't mean that it completely prevents. It means it's a phrase of approximation. It means largely, wholly, but it may not be entirely. And that is where the error is in the district court's construction, reading out substantially.

[00:09:49] Speaker 04:
So how much it takes to make it substantially prevent.

[00:09:56] Speaker 03:
I think that's ultimately the jury would decide whether that claim limitation is met based on the normal operation of the assault's accused treadmill.

[00:10:09] Speaker 02:
So in your view, some of these examples where you hold on the bars and push your foot really hard or you use your hands, that certainly is moving forward in the wrong way, but that would still not be something that violates the claim construction of substantially prevents. That would be in the barrier between substantially prevents and completely prevents.

[00:10:40] Speaker 02:
That was very inelegant, but I think what I meant was the examples they provided of of moving forward, which the district court relied on, were instances of abnormal operation of the machine, not normal operation of the machine.

[00:10:54] Speaker 03:
Yes, I agree with that. I agree with that.

[00:10:57] Speaker 02:
And that's what substantially prevents has to do is, and where do you get that substantially prevents has to be read in context of the normal operation of the machine?

[00:11:09] Speaker 03:
Well, it's certainly not a claim construction issue. It matters that infringement, because that's simply what assault is saying in terms of its non-infringement theory. And that non-infringement theory depends on that deliberate, unusual override use. And deliberate override use is still going to be infringement, sometimes, not always.

[00:11:30] Speaker 04:
If we were to agree with you on claim construction, that is... that whatever substantially prevents means, it doesn't mean what the district court said, that just is too strict. What, and you're asking for us to, are you asking for us to construe the claim based on the record That was before the district court. Are you asking for a remand so the district court could construe the claim in light of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence in the first instance?

[00:12:03] Speaker 04:
What are you asking for? Because I think I understand that everybody asked for plain and ordinary meeting and then there was a disagreement at summary judgment on what that was.

[00:12:12] Speaker 03:
Right. So for the purposes of remand, remand with direction on what constitutes plain and ordinary meaning would make best sense because the court... So based on what the record is currently. Correct.

[00:12:27] Speaker 03:
And the district court judge improperly under the guise of prosecution history disclaimer, limited the plain and ordinary meaning of substantially prevents based on the misapplication or misapprehension on the scope of what Bostic and Savatieri mean.

[00:12:46] Speaker 04:
What is your best evidence that substantially prevents that a person of ordinary skill in the art looking at the intrinsic evidence in this record would know that that includes, that it doesn't contemplate that it would prevent forever, that it would, in other words, there's some amount of force that, even if it's overridden by some amount of force, it's still substantially preventive.

[00:13:17] Speaker 03:
So I think it's two things. I think it's first the plain and unambiguous claim language.

[00:13:23] Speaker 03:
Also, it relates to the definition of what constitutes a safety device in the specification of the patent.

[00:13:30] Speaker 04:
And what is the language in the specification that you're relying on?

[00:13:34] Speaker 03:
Sure. So in column 29 in the 580 patent, Appendix 96, particularly line 23, it identifies other safety devices to help prevent undesirable forward rotation of the running belt, may include cam locking systems, et cetera, et cetera. And this concept of help prevent embodies safety.

[00:14:01] Speaker 03:
the possibility that it's not going to be complete prevention, an absolute cessation of movement in the opposite direction under all force conditions.

[00:14:12] Speaker 01:
I'd like to reserve my rebuttal time. Rebuttal time. We'll give you two minutes for rebuttal. Thank you. Mr. Hallin.

[00:14:34] Speaker 00:
Go ahead.

[00:14:35] Speaker 01:
Please proceed.

[00:14:37] Speaker 00:
Good morning, Your Honors.

[00:14:40] Speaker 00:
There's only really two ways a device can impede movement of the belt. It can either stop it entirely or it can somehow resist it and allow some movement. Those are the only two ways. And they clearly and unmistakably disclaimed mere resistance. They did it with regard to Bostick and when they disclaimed it. They didn't try to distinguish whether it was a safety device or not. They said the one-way clutch, the one-way clutch of Bostick does not provide for rotation in only one direction.

[00:15:14] Speaker 00:
And that the treadmill belt of Bostick is free to move in both directions.

[00:15:19] Speaker 00:
They explained in the blue briefs, that page is 35 and 36, exactly how Bostick works. And that is the one-way clutch, when it is gauged, it rotates a flywheel, and when the flywheel rotates, this is a quote from there.

[00:15:35] Speaker 00:
Quote, when flywheel... What page are you looking at in the record? Right now I'm looking at the blue brief at page 36, and it's citing the Bostic patent at appendix 719 through 720. Quote, Woodway said, quote, When the flywheel rotates, it does so against the resistance band wrapped around the flywheel. This causes friction, which the user experiences as resistance. So it was just disclaiming the mere resistance that was taught by Bostick.

[00:16:08] Speaker 04:
Is this the language in the prosecution history?

[00:16:13] Speaker 00:
It's taken...

[00:16:15] Speaker 00:
It's taken from their brief and they're explaining what Bostick teaches.

[00:16:18] Speaker 04:
I understand. Normally when someone is relying on some sort of disclaimer, it would be based on the prosecution history or maybe something in the specifications. So that's what I was trying to figure out.

[00:16:28] Speaker 00:
That's fine. And the prosecution history, Appendix 751 through 752.

[00:16:34] Speaker 00:
There they take the position that the Bostick, quote, one-way clutch does not affect movement of the treadmill surface, close quote, quote, because the one-way clutch of Bostick is designed to control movement of the flywheel, not the running belt, close quote. And as explained in that prosecution history, that causes friction and it causes resistance to the treadmill surface.

[00:16:59] Speaker 00:
Moving on to Sabathia.

[00:17:00] Speaker 02:
I don't understand that. I mean, to me, that's just distinguishing the device in Bostik as completely different from the purpose of their device, rather than just saying you can't use resistance as substantially prevents. I mean, the Bostik device is all about using it as resistance for the workout or whatever it is, right? Sure enough. So that doesn't tell me that you can't use resistance to substantially prevent. Bostick teaches using some resistance for the workout.

[00:17:30] Speaker 02:
It doesn't speak to resistance to substantially prevent movement at all.

[00:17:35] Speaker 00:
You're right. Bostick teaches resistance for the workout, which means that there's resistance moving the belt one way, but in the other direction, the one-way clutch freewheels, and there is no resistance. And what the examiner was doing was saying we could just apply that sort of device and combine that and that would be, that would solve the issue. And again, that's when they took this disclaimer. They made their disclaimer. And the same thing with Sabatier. Sabatier, you're right. Sabatier was a roller that was frictionally engaged the belt, which technically, if you tried to move the belt one way, it would frictionally engage it.

[00:18:11] Speaker 00:
If you moved the other way, it would freely rotate it. But you're right, in Sabatier, that was a device that was used to move the belt.

[00:18:18] Speaker 02:
Do you agree without this prosecution history that the district court's definition of substantially prevents is overly restricted?

[00:18:29] Speaker 02:
No, no. So what in the claim terms and the specifications setting aside the prosecution history suggests that substantially prevents doesn't allow...

[00:18:44] Speaker 00:
abnormal forward movement well to me substantially prevents can be construed in one of two ways it can mean that it can mean resistance maybe it could have meant that or it can mean like as it was explained by opposing counsel the locking you know there's some movement before it locks in there's always the safety device has to lock the one-way clutch there's always going to be some movement so that is substantially prevention too that is i think what is allowed and that's what the judge Below said would be allowed.

[00:19:11] Speaker 02:
Yeah, but the judge below relied on the prosecution history. And if I don't find that convincing, I'm still trying to figure out what substantially prevents mean. And why does substantially prevents in the claim language read out forward movement that's deterred by friction?

[00:19:32] Speaker 02:
Because it was disclaimed. Okay, but you're not answering my question. Okay, I'm sorry. Set aside the prosecution history and disclaimer and just look on the term substantially prevents and the patent.

[00:19:44] Speaker 02:
And why would that rule out, not looking at the prosecution history, friction from being a method of substantially preventing forward movement?

[00:20:00] Speaker 00:
You know, I'm not sure how to answer that, except that, again, to me it has two different meanings, and to me it would mean that substantially prevents it. It stops it after moving a short while. Part of that is because of the specification, although...

[00:20:14] Speaker 00:
Woodway argued in their gray brief that the specification never suggests complete prevention of the belt movement. That's in the gray brief of 13. That's not true. The spec stresses the importance of preventing belt movement, and in every safety device embodiment, it prevents movement. And, of course, in every single embodiment, there is going to be a locking, some locking movement before the movement is prevented.

[00:20:36] Speaker 02:
I mean, if the friction is high enough, it also completely prevents movement unless you operate it with an abnormal force, right?

[00:20:46] Speaker 00:
You're talking about what's disclosed in the patent?

[00:20:49] Speaker 02:
Yes.

[00:20:51] Speaker 00:
Well, you'd have to break the mechanism to do that within the patent.

[00:20:56] Speaker 00:
To move it forward. Move it forward, yeah. What's in the 580 and the asserted patents? You'd have to break the system.

[00:21:07] Speaker 00:
For example, the patent teaches... The patent teaches that there's pulley teeth that engage endless belts, the endless belts that support the running belt slats.

[00:21:22] Speaker 04:
Can you tell us where it is?

[00:21:24] Speaker 00:
Yes, and this is...

[00:21:26] Speaker 00:
For example, the 580 patent, A88 through 89, column 14, line 54 through column 15, line 3.

[00:21:40] Speaker 00:
So again, the spec stresses over and over again. You've got to stop this thing.

[00:21:45] Speaker 04:
Is there a particular sentence in that discussion? You said 88 to 89. Is there a particular sentence?

[00:21:53] Speaker 00:
Yeah, I said column 14, line 54 through column 15, line 3.

[00:22:01] Speaker 04:
It's a lot. I just want to know which sentence are you... Oh, it's the entire sentence. I want to know which one you're really focusing on there.

[00:22:08] Speaker 00:
The entire thing, again, it teaches that the pulley has teeth that engage this endless belt on which the running surface is mounted. So if you stop the pulley that has the teeth, then the belt can't move, unless you break the system. I suppose, again, with some superhuman force, you could break it and force it to move. That's the specification.

[00:22:31] Speaker 04:
There's other embodiments, right?

[00:22:35] Speaker 00:
There's not a single embodiment with a safety device that allows movement. Every single safety device embodiment says it has to be stopped.

[00:22:43] Speaker 04:
It says it.

[00:22:44] Speaker 00:
Yes, it does.

[00:22:45] Speaker 04:
It says prevents, right?

[00:22:46] Speaker 00:
It says prevents. To me, prevents means prevent.

[00:22:51] Speaker 04:
Your view is because the specification doesn't say something like, of course, a person who's darned, you know, really wants to make sure they go in the opposite direction if they exerted a force of X or Y could overcome this mechanical safety device. That means that it has to, there has to be a, the claims require a safety device that prevents movement 100% of the time.

[00:23:21] Speaker 00:
Well, I guess I'm not following that.

[00:23:23] Speaker 04:
You're not following me?

[00:23:24] Speaker 00:
No. Now, what are you asking?

[00:23:25] Speaker 04:
It sounds like you're saying that the claim requires a perfect safety device that prevents movement all the time, even if somebody misuses the system.

[00:23:39] Speaker 00:
Well, again, if someone breaks the system, that would still not fall within the claims scope because you're breaking the system. So that is our position. It has to stop it. There can be some movement before it locks into place, but it has to stop it.

[00:23:52] Speaker 02:
So even abnormal operation that moves it forward is outside of substantially prevents?

[00:24:02] Speaker 00:
Well, I don't know what you mean by abnormal, but if someone can move it, that's not abnormal.

[00:24:07] Speaker 02:
Sure it is. I mean, there's a lot of different I mean, there's devices out there where there's enough friction that you stand on them and they won't go the wrong way unless you use abnormal force and then you can get it to move the other way. So you think that substantially prevents forecloses both of those, not just one of them.

[00:24:28] Speaker 00:
Well, I guess I'm not sure if this is delving into the infringement issue, but again, that's what the judge was talking about, the superhuman versus a... It's very easy to move the belt forward on ours. You can see it was moved with one video, but it can be moved with hands, it can be moved with one hand.

[00:24:41] Speaker 02:
You're right, that's an infringement issue, but the district courts seem to have encompassed both abnormal and or required that substantially prevents both normal and abnormal movement.

[00:24:59] Speaker 02:
instead of just normal movement. And why would that be correct?

[00:25:06] Speaker 00:
The court was not...

[00:25:09] Speaker 00:
Abnormal movement, the court was saying, would still fall within the realm of being substantially prevented. Again, if it was abnormal, like if it took superhuman strength, if someone broke the mechanism, if it took Superman to move it, then it would still be preventing it for the use of an ordinary user.

[00:25:25] Speaker 02:
I don't read the district court's opinion that way. I read the district court's opinion as not permitting any movement at all after some minimal movement. That's your claim. And that's not the same as...

[00:25:36] Speaker 02:
as allowing abnormal movement but not allowing normal movement.

[00:25:43] Speaker 02:
That might get to an infringement question over whether it requires abnormal force in your device, but it seems like the district court didn't allow both possibilities and that that's too restrictive.

[00:25:59] Speaker 00:
Yeah.

[00:26:00] Speaker 00:
Again, we're going back and forth on the same issue. The court said if it can be done easily by normal use, that falls outside the claim scope. If it takes a superhuman effort, then it's not.

[00:26:15] Speaker 02:
Then she got summary judgment wrong. I'm sorry? Then she got summary judgment wrong, if you think that's the correct construction.

[00:26:23] Speaker 02:
No, she was just saying that. It seems like there's a debate over whether...

[00:26:28] Speaker 02:
The opposite movement in your device requires normal or abnormal movement.

[00:26:32] Speaker 00:
No, not at all.

[00:26:34] Speaker 00:
She was only saying if you go super normal, again, like a superman. But that was outside the realm of the reality of the case.

[00:26:43] Speaker 00:
I just want to talk about the saboteur real quickly because I know First Woodway argued that the device... is different mechanically. But then again, they went on to say, they gave the disclaimer that where it starts, and this is on, this is the office action, I'm sorry.

[00:27:03] Speaker 00:
Yeah, this is response to office action at Appendix 1142. Moreover, the one-way clutch device of Sabaterra does not teach enabling or allowing only one rotational direction of movement. And then it goes on with that disclaimer, which we think was very clear. It was stepped from the mechanical distinction And according to computer docking versus Dell, 519F31366 at 1377, that's circa 2008, a disavowal of clear and ambiguous can lie in a single distinction among many.

[00:27:36] Speaker 00:
So there were two distinctions, but the one was the clear disavowal. Real quick, I want to touch on some other things first.

[00:27:42] Speaker 00:
For claim differentiation, Woodway argues claim differentiation applies only to different words in the same claim. That's exactly the case here. The originally asserted 005 patent had substantially prevent or resist. So substantially prevent has to mean something different than resist. And then there's the Woodway briefing admission where they admitted that with the issues of the 005 patent limitation of substantially prevent or resist, quote, Woodway broadened the scope of its invention to include resistance of the running belt.

[00:28:15] Speaker 00:
So, again, Woodway didn't address that in their briefing, but that's in their admission, and according to the case of Arlington that we have cited in our brief, you can rely on that as a factor. Of course, then we have the Woodwell Council admission during the claim construction hearing, which I think is pretty clear that they agreed to the claim construction of the district court, and they can't refute that.

[00:28:37] Speaker 04:
Did the district court adopt your construction, your proposed construction? I don't think it did. Am I wrong?

[00:28:43] Speaker 00:
It did not adopt.

[00:28:45] Speaker 04:
It didn't adopt your construction and it didn't adopt his construction.

[00:28:49] Speaker 00:
Our construction was meant to capture the fact that there can be some movement before the locking device locks in. That's what ours was meant to capture as being realistic, I guess. Okay.

[00:29:08] Speaker 01:
Are there any other questions?

[00:29:09] Speaker 00:
What's that?

[00:29:10] Speaker 01:
Anything further?

[00:29:11] Speaker 00:
Are there any other questions?

[00:29:14] Speaker 00:
Okay, thank you.

[00:29:18] Speaker 00:
Oh, I have one thing. Real quick, I'm sorry.

[00:29:21] Speaker 00:
And the reason, again, I talked about the 005 patent and the fact that it has substantially prevent or resist.

[00:29:28] Speaker 00:
It's a case of like Vingen, LLC versus ESET, 5154.

[00:29:34] Speaker 00:
1377 and 1381 Fed Circuit 2022 says that the disclosures of related patents may inform the construction of claim terms common across the patents. In this case, the 005 patent is part of the same family. It's based on the same parent applications. It basically has the same exact figures. It has the same specification.

[00:29:54] Speaker 00:
That's all I have. Thank you.

[00:29:56] Speaker 01:
Thank you, counsel.

[00:30:00] Speaker 01:
Ms. Challenger?

[00:30:08] Speaker 03:
I'll start with where Mr. Halen concluded as it related to this claim differentiation argument.

[00:30:17] Speaker 03:
Woodway does not argue that substantially prevents covers mere resistance. And we've agreed in my opening remarks that resist is broader than substantially prevents.

[00:30:30] Speaker 02:
Woodway is simply arguing for... He's arguing it covers resistance strong enough to substantially prevent forward movement. It's not just some other mechanism that kicks into place and locks.

[00:30:42] Speaker 03:
That's correct.

[00:30:42] Speaker 02:
Okay.

[00:30:43] Speaker 03:
That's correct.

[00:30:47] Speaker 03:
Woodway's plain and ordinary construction of substantially prevents is simply that it does not require absolute prevention, and the claim language includes the word substantially. Mr. Halen refers to the specification talking about complete stoppage, complete prohibition of movement. I'll direct your honors to column 29, beginning at lines 7, through the discussion of the various embodiments associated in the 580 specification.

[00:31:16] Speaker 03:
through column 29, line 22, which refers to prevent.

[00:31:27] Speaker 03:
And if the claim language said prevent, standing alone, Perhaps that does mean complete cessation of movement in the opposite direction. But the claims say substantially prevents, and the court's precedent treats substantially as a meaningful modifier, denoting approximation, not perfection.

[00:31:48] Speaker 03:
The final point I'll make as it relates to any purported concession below about embracing the district court's complete prevention construction is, is laid bare that this there was clear disagreement during during argument as to the idea that complete prevention was required specifically i directed the district court to the circumstance of abnormal overcoming the one-way bearing movement and the court told me that was not something that we were going to address and we were talking about other things and so if you review the entire colloquy During the Markman hearing, it makes clear that there was firm disagreement about this absolute prohibition of movement in the opposite direction.

[00:32:36] Speaker 01:
Thank you to both counsel. The case is submitted.